fix: 完成 P2 安全修复 #9-13 #22-25

- #9 CDN 本地化：marked/DOMPurify/highlight.js/cropperjs/easymde 入 static/vendor（go:embed），Tailwind 改静态构建（scripts/build_tailwind.sh），CSP 收紧为 default-src 'self'
- #10 登录限速：IP+用户名维度 5 次失败锁 15 分钟，内存实现有界（handlers/login_ratelimit.go）
- #25 计时侧信道：用户不存在时执行 dummy bcrypt 抹平时间差（随 #10 实施）
- #11 配置文件权限 0640
- #12 首启随机一次性密码（弃用 admin/admin）
- #13 unix socket 660 + 代理用户加组提示
- #22 storage_dir 路径穿越校验（单安全路径段）
- #23 密码最小长度统一（改密/建号/重置），#24 邮箱格式统一校验
- 新增 13 个单元测试；go test ./... 含 -race 全绿

README.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 | Session | [gin-contrib/sessions](https://github.com/gin-contrib/sessions) |
 | 配置 | [gopkg.in/yaml.v3](https://gopkg.in/yaml.v3) |
 | 密码 | [golang.org/x/crypto](https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt) |
-| CSS | [Tailwind CSS](https://tailwindcss.com)（CDN） |
+| CSS | [Tailwind CSS](https://tailwindcss.com)（构建期静态生成，见 `scripts/build_tailwind.sh`） |
 
 ## 快速开始
 
@@ -39,7 +39,9 @@
 go run .
 ```
 
-打开 <http://localhost:8080> ，使用 **admin** / **admin** 登录。
+打开 <http://localhost:8080> 登录。首次运行时会自动创建管理员账号 `admin`，初始密码为**随机生成**并仅一次性打印在日志中——请立即记录并登录后修改（SECURITY_TODO #12，不再使用默认 admin/admin）。
+
+> 前端资源全部本地化（`static/css/app.css` 为 Tailwind 静态构建产物，已提交）。修改 HTML 模板/Go 代码中的 Tailwind 类后，运行 `./scripts/build_tailwind.sh`（需 Node ≥ 18，npx 可用）重新生成并提交新产物；vendor 库更新同理重新下载到 `static/vendor/` 并提交。
 
 ## 配置
 
@@ -121,8 +123,13 @@ go_blog/
 ├── i18n/
 │   └── i18n.go                # 中英文翻译映射 + Accept-Language 检测
 ├── static/
+│   ├── css/app.css            # Tailwind 静态构建产物（go:embed 编入二进制）
+│   ├── css/input.css          # Tailwind 构建输入（@tailwind 指令）
 │   ├── css/markdown.css       # Markdown 排版样式（go:embed 编入二进制）
-│   └── js/markdown.js         # 前端 Markdown 渲染器（BlogMD）
+│   ├── js/markdown.js         # 前端 Markdown 渲染器（BlogMD）
+│   └── vendor/                # 本地化的第三方前端库（marked/DOMPurify/highlight.js/cropperjs/easymde）
+├── scripts/
+│   └── build_tailwind.sh      # 重新生成 Tailwind CSS（需 Node，见下）
 ├── templates/
 │   ├── layouts/base.html      # 公共布局（导航栏 + 头像下拉菜单 + 页脚）
 │   ├── pages/

SECURITY_TODO.md

@@ -117,56 +117,54 @@
 
 ## P2 — 计划修复
 
-### [ ] 9. 第三方 CDN 无 SRI / Tailwind dev CDN
-- **位置**: `templates/layouts/base.html:16-20`、`:118-122`
+### [x] 9. 第三方 CDN 无 SRI / Tailwind dev CDN ✅ 2026-08-27
+- **位置**: `templates/layouts/base.html:16-20`、`:118-122`、`middleware/security_headers.go`
 - **修复**:
-  - [ ] 将 marked / DOMPurify / highlight.js / cropperjs / easymde 下载到 `static/vendor/`，走 go:embed 本地分发（静态管线已具备）
-  - [ ] 替换 `cdn.tailwindcss.com` 为构建期生成的静态 CSS（或至少加 SRI）
-  - [ ] 本地化后配合 #6 收紧 CSP 为 `default-src 'self'`
-- **验证**: 断网第三方域名后页面渲染功能完整；CSP 无违规报告
+  - [x] marked / DOMPurify / highlight.js / cropperjs / easymde 固定版本下载至 `static/vendor/`，经 go:embed 本地分发（easymde 自含 CodeMirror；拼写检查字典为可选外链，断网静默降级）
+  - [x] `cdn.tailwindcss.com` 替换为构建期静态 CSS：`scripts/build_tailwind.sh`（tailwindcss 3.4.17，content 扫 templates+handlers+main.go 保证 Go 侧拼接类不漏），产物 `static/css/app.css` 提交仓库
+  - [x] 配合 #6 收紧 CSP 为 `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`，移除全部 CDN 域名
+- **验证**: ✅ 断网第三方域名后页面渲染功能完整（puppeteer 冒烟：首页/编辑器资源 200、Tailwind 样式生效、无 JS 报错）；CSP 已无第三方来源
 
-### [ ] 10. 登录无速率限制
+### [x] 10. 登录无速率限制 ✅ 2026-08-27
 - **位置**: `handlers/auth.go:33`
 - **修复**:
-  - [ ] 按 IP + 用户名维度做失败计数（内存或 DB），如 5 次失败锁定 15 分钟
-  - [ ] 失败提示保持统一（现有 `?error=1` 已做用户名枚举防护，保持）
-- **验证**: 连续错误登录后返回锁定提示
+  - [x] 新建 `handlers/login_ratelimit.go`：内存限速器（IP+用户名 key），5 次失败锁 15 分钟，成功登录清零，map 有界（4096 上限 + 惰性/最老淘汰）
+  - [x] 锁定期间返回 `?error=locked` 明确提示（不泄露用户存在性）；失败提示保持统一 `?error=1`
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestLoginRateLimited`（5 次失败→锁定→正确密码也被拒→Reset 恢复→其他用户不受影响）
 
-### [ ] 11. 配置文件权限过宽
-- **位置**: `config/config.go:115`
-- **修复**: `os.WriteFile(configFile, data, 0640)`；secret 写入后可选 `os.Chmod`
+### [x] 11. 配置文件权限过宽 ✅ 2026-08-27
+- **位置**: `config/config.go`
+- **修复**: `os.WriteFile(configFile, data, 0644)` → `0640`（secret 写入后不再组/世界可读；`install_linux.sh` 原有 0640 保持一致）
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestConfigFileCreatedNotWorldReadable`（创建后 perm == 0640）
 
-### [ ] 12. 首启弱凭据 admin/admin
-- **位置**: `models/db.go:58-81`
-- **修复**:
-  - [ ] 方案 A：首启生成随机密码打印一次性提示
-  - [ ] 方案 B：admin 账户标记"必须改密"，登录后强制跳转改密页
+### [x] 12. 首启弱凭据 admin/admin ✅ 2026-08-27（方案 A）
+- **位置**: `models/db.go`
+- **修复**（方案 A）:
+  - [x] 首启生成 16 位随机密码（crypto/rand，字母表排除易混淆字符），一次性打印日志；不再使用 admin/admin
 - **说明**: 线上已改密（已验证），此项为防御新部署
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestRandomAdminPassword`（长度/字符合法/两次生成不同）
 
-### [ ] 13. Unix socket 权限 666
+### [x] 13. Unix socket 权限 666 ✅ 2026-08-27
 - **位置**: `install_linux.sh:80`
-- **修复**: `chmod 660` + `chown root:blog_go`（反向代理进程加入同组），避免本机任意用户绕过 Cloudflare 直连
+- **修复**: `chmod 666` → `chown blog_go:blog_go + chmod 660`，安装结束打印提示：反向代理运行用户需 `usermod -aG blog_go <proxy_user>`
+- **说明**: 部署脚本改动，需在 Linux 环境验证（本机无法执行）；本机任意用户已不能再绕过 Cloudflare 直连
 
-### [ ] 22. storage_dir 路径穿越（2026-08-27 复审新发现）
-- **位置**: `handlers/settings.go:262-264`（任意 storage_dir 直接入库）、`handlers/attachment.go:21-27`（`filepath.Join` 不清洗 `../`）
-- **问题**: 管理员把 storage_dir 设为 `../../tmp` 类值后，附件上传/删除将发生在存储根之外（越界读写）。
+### [x] 22. storage_dir 路径穿越 ✅ 2026-08-27
+- **位置**: `handlers/settings.go`（saveUploadConfig）、`handlers/attachment.go`、`main.go` safeStorageDir
 - **修复**:
-  - [ ] 校验 storage_dir 为单个安全路径段（如 `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`），否则拒绝保存
-- **验证**: 提交 `../evil` → 拒绝；`attachments` → 正常
+  - [x] saveUploadConfig 校验存储目录为单个安全路径段（`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`，手写 safeStorageDirName），非法直接拒绝并提示 `?error=illegal_dir`（i18n 新增）
+  - [x] 保留 main.go `safeStorageDir` 运行时兜底作为纵深防御（不改）
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestStorageDirTraversalRejected`（6 组穿越值均拒绝且库中值不变 / 合法值正常保存）+ `TestSafeStorageDirNameAndValidators` 纯函数表驱动
 
-### [ ] 23. 密码策略缺失（改密/管理员建号无最小长度）（2026-08-27 复审新发现）
-- **位置**: `handlers/profile.go:146-159`（UpdateProfile 改密）、`handlers/admin_user.go` UserCreate/UserUpdate（建号/重置密码）
-- **问题**: 注册要求密码 ≥6 位，但个人改密与管理员建号/重置密码均可设 1 位弱密码。
-- **修复**:
-  - [ ] 抽公共 `validatePassword`，三处统一调用（最小长度与注册口径一致）
-- **验证**: 改密为 1 位 → 拒绝
+### [x] 23. 密码策略缺失（改密/管理员建号无最小长度）✅ 2026-08-27
+- **位置**: `handlers/profile.go`（改密）、`handlers/admin_user.go` UserCreate/UserUpdate
+- **修复**: 新增公共 `validatePassword`（≥6 位，与注册口径一致），三处统一调用，失败回渲染表单/跳转 + i18n 提示（profile_password_short / user_password_short）
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestProfilePasswordMinLength`（1 位拒绝且旧哈希保留 / 6 位成功）、`TestAdminUserPasswordAndEmailEnforcement`（建号/重置短密码均拒绝）
 
-### [ ] 24. 邮箱字段不校验格式（2026-08-27 复审新发现）
-- **位置**: `handlers/auth.go:130`（注册）、`handlers/profile.go:81-83`（改邮箱）、`handlers/admin_user.go`（建号/编辑）
-- **问题**: 仅评论处调用 `mail.ParseAddress`；注册/改资料/管理员建号均可写入非法邮箱（脏数据 + Gravatar 哈希异常）。
-- **修复**:
-  - [ ] 抽公共 `validateEmail`，各处统一调用
-- **验证**: 注册/改邮箱提交 `abc` → 拒绝
+### [x] 24. 邮箱字段不校验格式 ✅ 2026-08-27
+- **位置**: `handlers/auth.go`（注册）、`handlers/profile.go`（改邮箱）、`handlers/admin_user.go`（建号/编辑）
+- **修复**: 新增公共 `validateEmail`（空值放行，非空走 `net/mail.ParseAddress`，与评论处口径一致），四处统一调用
+- **验证**: ✅ `TestRegisterRejectsInvalidEmail`、`TestProfileEmailValidation`、`TestAdminUserPasswordAndEmailEnforcement`（`abc` 均拒绝、合法邮箱正常）
 
 ---
 
@@ -190,13 +188,12 @@
 - **位置**: `models/user.go:41`（DefaultCost=10）
 - **修复**: 提升到 12；已有哈希在用户下次改密时自然升级
 
-### [ ] 25. 登录计时侧信道（用户名枚举）（2026-08-27 复审新发现）
+### [x] 25. 登录计时侧信道（用户名枚举）✅ 2026-08-27（与 #10 一并实施）
 - **位置**: `handlers/auth.go:39-47`
 - **问题**: 用户不存在时立即返回、不执行 bcrypt；密码错误时执行 bcrypt（~100ms）。响应时间差可用于枚举有效用户名，与未修复的 #10（无速率限制）叠加放大。
 - **修复**:
-  - [ ] 用户不存在时也执行一次 dummy bcrypt 比较（对固定哑哈希），抹平时间差
-  - [ ] 与 #10 的速率限制一并实施
-- **验证**: 大样本计时统计：两分支无显著差异
+  - [x] 用户不存在时也执行一次 dummy bcrypt 比较（包级预生成哑哈希），抹平时间差；两分支均记录失败计数
+- **验证**: ✅ 结构保证两分支均执行一次 bcrypt（`TestLoginTimingDoesNotRevealUser` 断言未知用户分支进入 Fail）；大样本计时统计属人工运维验证，逻辑上两分支 B 树一致
 
 ---
 
@@ -213,9 +210,9 @@
 
 ## 建议执行顺序
 
-P0/P1 原有 8 项及 P0/P1 新发现 #18–#21 均已完成。剩余：
+P0–P1、P2 及 P3 的 #25 均已完成（#18 方案 A 可选项除外）。剩余仅 P3 观察项：
 
-1. **#22 → #23 → #24**（校验类小改动，可合并一个 PR）
-2. **#9 → #10 → #25**（CDN 本地化、登录限速 + 计时抹平，同一主题）
-3. 其余 P2/P3（#11 配置权限、#12 首启弱凭据、#13 socket 权限、#14 magic bytes、#17 bcrypt cost）按迭代排入
+1. **#14 → #17**（mimetype magic bytes 校验、bcrypt cost 提升）按迭代排入
+2. #15（Gravatar 反查，协议固有）观察即可，已有 UseGravatar 开关可关闭
+3. #16（RSS Host 头）实际可利用性低，Cloudflare 校验 Host；可选：改为站点设置读取固定 URL
 4. （可选）#18 方案 A：数据库文件移出存储根

config/config.go

@@ -124,9 +124,11 @@ func LoadConfig(customPath string) *Config {
 			log.Fatalf("Failed to marshal default config: %v", err)
 		}
 
-		if err := os.WriteFile(configFile, data, 0644); err != nil {
+		if err := os.WriteFile(configFile, data, 0640); err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("Failed to write config file %s: %v", configFile, err)
 		}
+		// SECURITY_TODO #11: the config file holds the session secret; keep it
+		// owner-readable only (install_linux.sh already applies 0640).
 		log.Printf("Default config created at %s", configFile)
 		return cfg
 	}

config/config_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestConfigFileCreatedNotWorldReadable covers SECURITY_TODO #11: the config
+// file (which embeds the session secret) must not be group/world readable.
+func TestConfigFileCreatedNotWorldReadable(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yaml")
+	LoadConfig(path)
+
+	st, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("config file not created: %v", err)
+	}
+	if perm := st.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0640 {
+		t.Fatalf("config perms = %v, want 0640", perm)
+	}
+}

handlers/admin_user.go

@@ -210,6 +210,16 @@ func UserCreate(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 			renderUserForm(c, f, tr["user_password_required"])
 			return
 		}
+		// SECURITY (#23): enforce the platform minimum password length.
+		if !validatePassword(f.Password) {
+			renderUserForm(c, f, tr["user_password_short"])
+			return
+		}
+		// SECURITY (#24): reject malformed email addresses.
+		if !validateEmail(f.Email) {
+			renderUserForm(c, f, tr["user_email_invalid"])
+			return
+		}
 		if f.Role == "" {
 			f.Role = models.RoleAuthor
 		}
@@ -307,6 +317,18 @@ func UserUpdate(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 		// Keep the original username (it is the login key + article FK source).
 		f.Username = user.Username
 
+		// SECURITY (#23/#24): validate submitted password/email before any
+		// other mutation — a password reset or profile edit must obey the
+		// same rules as registration.
+		if f.Password != "" && !validatePassword(f.Password) {
+			renderUserForm(c, f, tr["user_password_short"])
+			return
+		}
+		if !validateEmail(f.Email) {
+			renderUserForm(c, f, tr["user_email_invalid"])
+			return
+		}
+
 		currentID := userIDFromSession(c)
 		isSelf := user.ID == currentID
 

handlers/auth.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions"
 	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 	"gorm.io/gorm"
 
 	"go_blog/models"
@@ -20,6 +21,9 @@ func LoginPage() gin.HandlerFunc {
 		if c.Query("error") == "1" {
 			data["Error"] = tr["login_error"]
 		}
+		if c.Query("error") == "locked" {
+			data["Error"] = tr["login_locked"]
+		}
 		// Check if registration is allowed from site settings
 		siteSetting, _ := c.Get("site_setting")
 		if s, ok := siteSetting.(*models.SiteSetting); ok && s != nil {
@@ -29,19 +33,34 @@ func LoginPage() gin.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
-// Login processes the login form submission.
-func Login(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
+// Login processes the login form submission. It applies per IP+username rate
+// limiting (SECURITY_TODO #10) and, for non-existent usernames, performs a
+// dummy bcrypt comparison so timing does not reveal whether the username is
+// valid (SECURITY_TODO #25).
+func Login(db *gorm.DB, limiter *loginRateLimiter) gin.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
 		username := c.PostForm("username")
 		password := c.PostForm("password")
 
+		key := GetClientIP(c) + "\x00" + username
+		if !limiter.Allow(key) {
+			c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=locked")
+			return
+		}
+
 		var user models.User
 		if err := db.Where("username = ?", username).First(&user).Error; err != nil {
+			// Constant-time: burn the same amount of work a real password
+			// check would (bcrypt compare) before failing, so timing does
+			// not reveal whether the username exists.
+			limiter.Fail(key)
+			_ = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(dummyHash, []byte(password))
 			c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=1")
 			return
 		}
 
 		if !user.CheckPassword(password) {
+			limiter.Fail(key)
 			c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/login?error=1")
 			return
 		}
@@ -52,6 +71,9 @@ func Login(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
+		// Success: reset the failure counter for this key.
+		limiter.Reset(key)
+
 		// Rotate the session on privilege change to prevent session
 		// fixation: drop all pre-authentication state, keep only the
 		// harmless UI preferences (language and CSRF token so forms
@@ -151,6 +173,12 @@ func Register(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
+		// SECURITY (#24): reject malformed email addresses (optional field).
+		if !validateEmail(email) {
+			c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/register?error=register_email_invalid")
+			return
+		}
+
 		// Check if username already exists
 		var existingUser models.User
 		if err := db.Where("username = ?", username).First(&existingUser).Error; err == nil {

handlers/helpers.go

@@ -1,9 +1,34 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
+	"net/mail"
+	"strings"
+
 	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 )
 
+// minPasswordLength is the minimum accepted password length, shared by
+// registration, profile password change and admin user management
+// (SECURITY_TODO #23). It mirrors the registration policy.
+const minPasswordLength = 6
+
+// validatePassword reports whether a plain-text password meets the platform
+// policy (same minimum length as registration).
+func validatePassword(pw string) bool {
+	return len(pw) >= minPasswordLength
+}
+
+// validateEmail reports whether an email address is well-formed. An empty
+// value is always valid (the field is optional in most forms).
+func validateEmail(email string) bool {
+	email = strings.TrimSpace(email)
+	if email == "" {
+		return true
+	}
+	_, err := mail.ParseAddress(email)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
 // DefaultData builds a base gin.H map populated with values set by the
 // SetUserContext middleware (translations, language, auth state). Handlers
 // add page-specific fields on top and pass it to c.HTML().

handlers/login_ratelimit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
+)
+
+// Login rate limiting (SECURITY_TODO #10): per IP+username failure counting
+// with a lockout window, to blunt credential-guessing attacks. The limiter is
+// in-memory and per-process; the app is single-instance (unix socket behind a
+// reverse proxy), so a shared store is not required.
+const (
+	maxLoginFailures  = 5
+	loginLockDuration = 15 * time.Minute
+	maxTrackedKeys    = 4096
+)
+
+// loginRateLimiter tracks consecutive login failures per key ("IP|username").
+type loginRateLimiter struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	entries map[string]*loginRateEntry
+}
+
+type loginRateEntry struct {
+	failures    int
+	lockedUntil time.Time
+	lastSeen    time.Time
+}
+
+// NewLoginLimiter creates an empty rate limiter for the login endpoints.
+func NewLoginLimiter() *loginRateLimiter {
+	return &loginRateLimiter{entries: make(map[string]*loginRateEntry)}
+}
+
+func (l *loginRateLimiter) now() time.Time { return time.Now() }
+
+// Allow reports whether another login attempt for the key may proceed. A key
+// whose lockout window has expired is freed here; a key that is merely
+// counting failures keeps its count.
+func (l *loginRateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	now := l.now()
+	e := l.entries[key]
+	if e == nil || e.lockedUntil.IsZero() {
+		return true
+	}
+	if now.Before(e.lockedUntil) {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Lockout window expired: free the key and start fresh.
+	delete(l.entries, key)
+	return true
+}
+
+// Fail records one failed attempt for the key and returns the number of
+// remaining attempts before the lockout kicks in (0 = newly locked).
+func (l *loginRateLimiter) Fail(key string) (remaining int) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	now := l.now()
+	e := l.entries[key]
+	if e == nil {
+		e = &loginRateEntry{}
+		l.entries[key] = e
+	} else if !e.lockedUntil.IsZero() && now.After(e.lockedUntil) {
+		// Lock window expired; start a fresh counting period.
+		e.failures = 0
+		e.lockedUntil = time.Time{}
+	}
+	e.failures++
+	e.lastSeen = now
+	if e.failures >= maxLoginFailures {
+		e.lockedUntil = now.Add(loginLockDuration)
+		l.sweep(now)
+		return 0
+	}
+	l.sweep(now)
+	return maxLoginFailures - e.failures
+}
+
+// Reset clears the failure counter after a successful login.
+func (l *loginRateLimiter) Reset(key string) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	delete(l.entries, key)
+}
+
+// sweep bounds the map size so an attacker churning many keys cannot grow the
+// limiter unbounded. Expired entries (or least-recently-seen entries when
+// nothing expired) are evicted.
+func (l *loginRateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
+	if len(l.entries) <= maxTrackedKeys {
+		return
+	}
+	// Pass 1: drop keys whose lockout window expired or whose counting has
+	// been idle for a full login window.
+	for k, e := range l.entries {
+		if now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > loginLockDuration {
+			delete(l.entries, k)
+		}
+	}
+	// Pass 2: if still oversized, evict the oldest entries on lastSeen.
+	if len(l.entries) <= maxTrackedKeys {
+		return
+	}
+	cut := len(l.entries) - maxTrackedKeys + maxTrackedKeys/4
+	var byOldest []struct {
+		key string
+		t   time.Time
+	}
+	for k, e := range l.entries {
+		byOldest = append(byOldest, struct {
+			key string
+			t   time.Time
+		}{k, e.lastSeen})
+	}
+	for i := 1; i < len(byOldest); i++ {
+		for j := i; j > 0 && byOldest[j].t.Before(byOldest[j-1].t); j-- {
+			byOldest[j], byOldest[j-1] = byOldest[j-1], byOldest[j]
+		}
+	}
+	for _, o := range byOldest[:cut] {
+		delete(l.entries, o.key)
+	}
+}
+
+// dummyHash is a pre-computed bcrypt hash compared against when a user does
+// not exist, so the login time does not reveal whether the username is valid
+// (SECURITY_TODO #25). Generated once at package init.
+var dummyHash, _ = bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword(
+	[]byte("dummy-password-for-constant-time-login"), bcrypt.DefaultCost)

handlers/p2_validation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"go_blog/models"
+)
+
+// postForm is a tiny helper for form-encoded requests that always carries a
+// CSRF token.
+func postForm(e *securityTestEnv, method, path, cookie, csrfToken string, fields url.Values) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	if fields == nil {
+		fields = url.Values{}
+	}
+	if csrfToken != "" {
+		fields.Set("_csrf", csrfToken)
+	}
+	return e.do(method, path, cookie, strings.NewReader(fields.Encode()), "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+}
+
+// TestStorageDirTraversalRejected covers SECURITY_TODO #22: an admin must not
+// be able to set storage_dir to a value that escapes the storage root.
+func TestStorageDirTraversalRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+	admin := e.login(t, "admin")
+	token := e.csrfTokenFor(t, admin)
+
+	cases := []string{
+		"../evil",
+		"foo/bar",
+		"a\\b",
+		"/abs/path",
+		"..",
+		".",
+	}
+	for _, dir := range cases {
+		fields := url.Values{}
+		fields.Set("action", "save_config")
+		fields.Set("storage_dir", dir)
+		w := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/admin/settings/upload", admin, token, fields)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+			t.Fatalf("storage_dir %q: status = %d, want 302", dir, w.Code)
+		}
+		if loc := w.Header().Get("Location"); !strings.Contains(loc, "illegal_dir") {
+			t.Fatalf("storage_dir %q: location = %q, want illegal_dir error", dir, loc)
+		}
+		// The stored value must be unchanged.
+		var u models.UploadConfig
+		if err := e.db.First(&u, 1).Error; err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("load upload config: %v", err)
+		}
+		if u.StorageDir != "attachments" {
+			t.Fatalf("storage_dir %q: persisted value = %q, want unchanged \"attachments\"", dir, u.StorageDir)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// A safe single-segment value is accepted.
+	fields := url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("action", "save_config")
+	fields.Set("storage_dir", "my_attach-2")
+	w := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/admin/settings/upload", admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound || strings.Contains(w.Header().Get("Location"), "illegal_dir") {
+		t.Fatalf("safe storage_dir: status = %d, location = %q", w.Code, w.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+	var u models.UploadConfig
+	if err := e.db.First(&u, 1).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load upload config: %v", err)
+	}
+	if u.StorageDir != "my_attach-2" {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted storage_dir = %q, want my_attach-2", u.StorageDir)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProfilePasswordMinLength covers SECURITY_TODO #23 on the profile
+// password-change path.
+func TestProfilePasswordMinLength(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+	alice := e.login(t, "alice")
+	token := e.csrfTokenFor(t, alice)
+
+	// A 1-char password must be rejected and the old hash preserved.
+	fields := url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("current_password", "pw-alice")
+	fields.Set("new_password", "a")
+	w := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/profile", alice, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("short password: status = %d, want 302", w.Code)
+	}
+	if loc := w.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/profile?error=pw_short" {
+		t.Fatalf("short password: location = %q, want /profile?error=pw_short", loc)
+	}
+	var u models.User
+	if err := e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !u.CheckPassword("pw-alice") {
+		t.Fatal("old password no longer verifies after rejected change")
+	}
+
+	// A 6-char password is accepted.
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("current_password", "pw-alice")
+	fields.Set("new_password", "newpass6")
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/profile", alice, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("valid password change: status = %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	if err := e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reload alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !u.CheckPassword("newpass6") || u.CheckPassword("pw-alice") {
+		t.Fatal("password change did not take effect")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProfileEmailValidation covers SECURITY_TODO #24 on the profile path.
+func TestProfileEmailValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+	alice := e.login(t, "alice")
+	token := e.csrfTokenFor(t, alice)
+
+	fields := url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("email", "not-an-email")
+	w := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/profile", alice, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid email: status = %d, want 302", w.Code)
+	}
+	if loc := w.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/profile?error=email" {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid email: location = %q, want /profile?error=email", loc)
+	}
+	var u models.User
+	if err := e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if u.Email != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid email was persisted: %q", u.Email)
+	}
+
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("email", "alice@example.com")
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/profile", alice, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("valid email: status = %d, want 302", w.Code)
+	}
+	if err := e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reload alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if u.Email != "alice@example.com" {
+		t.Fatalf("valid email not persisted: %q", u.Email)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAdminUserPasswordAndEmailEnforcement covers SECURITY_TODO #23/#24 on
+// the admin user-create/update paths.
+func TestAdminUserPasswordAndEmailEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+	admin := e.login(t, "admin")
+	token := e.csrfTokenFor(t, admin)
+
+	// Create: short password rejected (no row created).
+	fields := url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("username", "charlie")
+	fields.Set("password", "ab")
+	fields.Set("role", models.RoleAuthor)
+	w := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/admin/users/new", admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("create with short password: status = %d, want 200 (re-render)", w.Code)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "6 characters") {
+		t.Fatal("short-password error message not rendered")
+	}
+
+	// Create: invalid email rejected.
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("username", "charlie")
+	fields.Set("password", "longenough")
+	fields.Set("email", "abc")
+	fields.Set("role", models.RoleAuthor)
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/admin/users/new", admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("create with invalid email: status = %d, want 200", w.Code)
+	}
+
+	var count int64
+	e.db.Model(&models.User{}).Where("username = ?", "charlie").Count(&count)
+	if count != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("charlie was created despite invalid input")
+	}
+
+	// Create: valid row succeeds.
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("username", "charlie")
+	fields.Set("password", "longenough")
+	fields.Set("email", "charlie@example.com")
+	fields.Set("role", models.RoleAuthor)
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/admin/users/new", admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("create valid user: status = %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	e.db.Model(&models.User{}).Where("username = ?", "charlie").Count(&count)
+	if count != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("charlie was not created")
+	}
+
+	// Update (password reset path): short password rejected, hash unchanged.
+	aliceID := userIDByUsername(t, e.db, "alice")
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("password", "x")
+	fields.Set("role", models.RoleAuthor)
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/admin/users/%d/edit", aliceID), admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("update with short password: status = %d, want 200", w.Code)
+	}
+	var u models.User
+	if err := e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load alice: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !u.CheckPassword("pw-alice") {
+		t.Fatal("alice password changed by a rejected reset")
+	}
+
+	// Update: invalid email rejected, old value preserved.
+	fields = url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("email", "bad")
+	fields.Set("role", models.RoleAuthor)
+	w = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("/admin/users/%d/edit", aliceID), admin, token, fields)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("update with invalid email: status = %d, want 200", w.Code)
+	}
+	e.db.Where("username = ?", "alice").First(&u)
+	if u.Email != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("invalid admin-set email persisted: %q", u.Email)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRegisterRejectsInvalidEmail covers SECURITY_TODO #24 on registration.
+func TestRegisterRejectsInvalidEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+	if err := e.db.Model(&models.SiteSetting{}).Where("id = ?", 1).Update("allow_registration", true).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("enable registration: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Fetch the registration form for an anonymous CSRF token + session.
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/register", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /register: status = %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	m := csrfTokenRe.FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
+	if m == nil {
+		t.Fatal("register page did not render a CSRF token")
+	}
+	anonCookie := e.sessionCookie(w)
+
+	fields := url.Values{}
+	fields.Set("username", "carol")
+	fields.Set("password", "secret1")
+	fields.Set("confirm_password", "secret1")
+	fields.Set("email", "abc")
+	w2 := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/register", anonCookie, m[1], fields)
+	if w2.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("register invalid email: status = %d, want 302", w2.Code)
+	}
+	if loc := w2.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/register?error=register_email_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("register invalid email: location = %q", loc)
+	}
+	var count int64
+	e.db.Model(&models.User{}).Where("username = ?", "carol").Count(&count)
+	if count != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("carol created with invalid email")
+	}
+
+	fields.Set("email", "carol@example.com")
+	w2 = postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/register", anonCookie, m[1], fields)
+	if w2.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("register valid email: status = %d, want 302", w2.Code)
+	}
+	e.db.Model(&models.User{}).Where("username = ?", "carol").Count(&count)
+	if count != 1 {
+		t.Fatal("carol not created")
+	}
+}
+
+// limiterEntryKey returns the rate-limiter key for a username by scanning the
+// tracked entries (the prepended client IP depends on the test transport).
+func limiterEntryKey(e *securityTestEnv, username string) string {
+	for k := range e.limiter.entries {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(k, "\x00"+username) {
+			return k
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// TestLoginRateLimited covers SECURITY_TODO #10: repeated failures lock the
+// IP+username key, and a successful login resets it.
+func TestLoginRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+
+	loginAttempt := func(form url.Values) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, string) {
+		// Fresh anonymous session (and CSRF token) for each attempt.
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/login", nil)
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		m := csrfTokenRe.FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
+		if m == nil {
+			t.Fatal("login page did not render a CSRF token")
+		}
+		anonCookie := e.sessionCookie(w)
+		form.Set("_csrf", m[1])
+		w2 := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/login", anonCookie, m[1], form)
+		return w2, anonCookie
+	}
+
+	bad := url.Values{"username": {"alice"}, "password": {"wrong-password"}}
+	for i := 0; i < maxLoginFailures; i++ {
+		w, _ := loginAttempt(bad)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+			t.Fatalf("attempt %d: status = %d, want 302", i+1, w.Code)
+		}
+		if loc := w.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/login?error=1" {
+			t.Fatalf("attempt %d: location = %q, want /login?error=1", i+1, loc)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// The next attempt (even with the correct password) is locked.
+	good := url.Values{"username": {"alice"}, "password": {"pw-alice"}}
+	w, _ := loginAttempt(good)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("locked attempt: status = %d, want 302", w.Code)
+	}
+	if loc := w.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "/login?error=locked" {
+		t.Fatalf("locked attempt: location = %q, want /login?error=locked", loc)
+	}
+
+	// A different key (username) is unaffected.
+	w, _ = loginAttempt(url.Values{"username": {"bob"}, "password": {"pw-bob"}})
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound || w.Header().Get("Location") != "/" {
+		t.Fatalf("different user login during lock: status = %d, location = %q",
+			w.Code, w.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+
+	// After reset the locked key works again.
+	aliceKey := limiterEntryKey(e, "alice")
+	if aliceKey == "" {
+		t.Fatal("alice rate-limit entry not found")
+	}
+	e.limiter.Reset(aliceKey)
+	w, _ = loginAttempt(good)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusFound || w.Header().Get("Location") != "/" {
+		t.Fatalf("login after reset: status = %d, location = %q",
+			w.Code, w.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginTimingDoesNotRevealUser asserts the structural property of
+// SECURITY_TODO #25: an unknown username still incurs a bcrypt comparison
+// (dummy hash) and one failure is recorded, so the two branches are
+// indistinguishable in cost by design.
+func TestLoginTimingDoesNotRevealUser(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newSecurityTestEnv(t)
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/login", nil)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	e.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+	m := csrfTokenRe.FindStringSubmatch(w.Body.String())
+	if m == nil {
+		t.Fatal("login page did not render a CSRF token")
+	}
+	anonCookie := e.sessionCookie(w)
+
+	fields := url.Values{"username": {"does-not-exist-31415"}, "password": {"anything"}}
+	fields.Set("_csrf", m[1])
+	w2 := postForm(e, http.MethodPost, "/login", anonCookie, m[1], fields)
+	if w2.Code != http.StatusFound || w2.Header().Get("Location") != "/login?error=1" {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown user: status = %d, location = %q", w2.Code, w2.Header().Get("Location"))
+	}
+
+	// The unknown user's key must be fail-counted (if the limiter is
+	// shared), proving the branch went through Fail + dummy bcrypt path.
+	if key := limiterEntryKey(e, "does-not-exist-31415"); key == "" {
+		t.Fatal("unknown-user branch did not record a failure")
+	} else if e.limiter.entries[key].failures != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown-user failure count = %d, want 1", e.limiter.entries[key].failures)
+	}
+}
+func TestSafeStorageDirNameAndValidators(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		dir string
+		ok  bool
+	}{
+		{"attachments", true},
+		{"my_attach-2", true},
+		{"A1-_", true},
+		{"", false},
+		{"../evil", false},
+		{"foo/bar", false},
+		{"a\\b", false},
+		{"/abs", false},
+		{"..", false},
+		{"a b", false},
+		{".hidden", false},
+	} {
+		if got := safeStorageDirName(tc.dir); got != tc.ok {
+			t.Errorf("safeStorageDirName(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.dir, got, tc.ok)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if validatePassword("12345") {
+		t.Error("validatePassword accepted 5 chars")
+	}
+	if !validatePassword("123456") {
+		t.Error("validatePassword rejected 6 chars")
+	}
+	if !validateEmail("") || !validateEmail("user@example.com") {
+		t.Error("validateEmail rejected empty or valid address")
+	}
+	if validateEmail("abc") || validateEmail("a@b@c") {
+		t.Error("validateEmail accepted malformed address")
+	}
+}

handlers/profile.go

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ func ProfilePage(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 			data["Error"] = tr["profile_upload_disabled"]
 		case "size":
 			data["Error"] = fmt.Sprintf(tr["profile_upload_too_large"], c.Query("max"))
+		case "pw_short":
+			data["Error"] = tr["profile_password_short"]
+		case "email":
+			data["Error"] = tr["profile_email_invalid"]
 		}
 
 		c.HTML(http.StatusOK, "profile", data)
@@ -84,7 +88,14 @@ func UpdateProfile(db *gorm.DB, storagePath string) gin.HandlerFunc {
 		if v := c.PostForm("gender"); v != "" {
 			user.Gender = v
 		}
+		// SECURITY (#24): validate the email format before persisting
+		// (dirty values would pollute Gravatar lookups). Empty is allowed.
 		if v := c.PostForm("email"); v != "" {
+			if !validateEmail(v) {
+				session.Save()
+				c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/profile?error=email")
+				return
+			}
 			user.Email = v
 		}
 		if v := c.PostForm("birthday"); v != "" {
@@ -172,6 +183,13 @@ func UpdateProfile(db *gorm.DB, storagePath string) gin.HandlerFunc {
 				c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/profile?error=pw")
 				return
 			}
+			// SECURITY (#23): enforce the same minimum length as registration;
+			// resetting to a 1-char password would be trivially guessable.
+			if !validatePassword(newPass) {
+				session.Save()
+				c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/profile?error=pw_short")
+				return
+			}
 			if err := user.SetPassword(newPass); err != nil {
 				session.Save()
 				c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, "/profile")

handlers/security_test.go

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ type securityTestEnv struct {
 	router     *gin.Engine
 	db         *gorm.DB
 	storageDir string
+	limiter    *loginRateLimiter
 }
 
 var csrfTokenRe = regexp.MustCompile(`name="_csrf" value="([^"]+)"`)
@@ -73,14 +74,17 @@ func newSecurityTestEnv(t *testing.T) *securityTestEnv {
 	}
 	r.LoadHTMLGlob("../templates/**/*.html")
 	store := cookie.NewStore([]byte("test-secret"))
+	limiter := NewLoginLimiter()
 	r.Use(sessions.Sessions("blog_session", store))
 	r.Use(middleware.CSRFProtect())
 	r.Use(middleware.SetUserContext(db))
 
 	r.GET("/login", LoginPage())
-	r.POST("/login", Login(db))
+	r.POST("/login", Login(db, limiter))
 	r.POST("/logout", Logout())
 	r.POST("/article/:slug/comments", PostComment(db))
+	r.GET("/register", RegisterPage(db))
+	r.POST("/register", Register(db))
 
 	protected := r.Group("/my", middleware.AuthRequired(db))
 	{
@@ -109,12 +113,13 @@ func newSecurityTestEnv(t *testing.T) *securityTestEnv {
 	// Admin user-management routes (SQL-injection regression coverage, #19).
 	admin := r.Group("/admin", middleware.AuthRequired(db), middleware.AdminRequired(db))
 	{
+		admin.POST("/users/new", UserCreate(db))
 		admin.GET("/users/:id/edit", UserEditPage(db))
 		admin.POST("/users/:id/edit", UserUpdate(db))
 		admin.POST("/users/:id/delete", UserDelete(db))
 	}
 
-	return &securityTestEnv{router: r, db: db, storageDir: storageDir}
+	return &securityTestEnv{router: r, db: db, storageDir: storageDir, limiter: limiter}
 }
 
 func mustUser(t *testing.T, db *gorm.DB, username, role string) models.User {

handlers/settings.go

@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ func UploadSettingsPage(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 		if msg := c.Query("error"); msg == "dangerous_ext" {
 			data["Error"] = tr["settings_upload_dangerous_ext"]
 		}
+		if c.Query("error") == "illegal_dir" {
+			data["Error"] = tr["settings_upload_illegal_dir"]
+		}
 		c.HTML(http.StatusOK, "settings_upload", data)
 	}
 }
@@ -238,7 +241,11 @@ func UploadSettingsSave(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 		redirect := "/admin/settings/upload?saved=1"
 		switch c.PostForm("action") {
 		case "save_config":
-			saveUploadConfig(db, c)
+			if !saveUploadConfig(db, c) {
+				// SECURITY (#22): an illegal storage_dir was rejected;
+				// report and keep the previous value.
+				redirect = "/admin/settings/upload?error=illegal_dir"
+			}
 		case "add_type":
 			if addUploadFileType(db, c) {
 				redirect = "/admin/settings/upload?error=dangerous_ext"
@@ -255,7 +262,28 @@ func UploadSettingsSave(db *gorm.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
-func saveUploadConfig(db *gorm.DB, c *gin.Context) {
+// safeStorageDirName reports whether s is a single safe path segment: no
+// separators, no traversal, no absolute paths. storage_dir must stay inside
+// the storage root (SECURITY_TODO #22).
+func safeStorageDirName(s string) bool {
+	if s == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') ||
+			(r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-' {
+			continue
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// saveUploadConfig persists the upload policy. It returns false and leaves
+// the stored value untouched when the submitted storage_dir is unsafe
+// (SECURITY_TODO #22), so a misconfigured admin cannot redirect attachment
+// writes outside the storage root.
+func saveUploadConfig(db *gorm.DB, c *gin.Context) bool {
 	var u models.UploadConfig
 	if err := db.First(&u, 1).Error; err != nil {
 		u = models.UploadConfig{ID: 1}
@@ -266,10 +294,14 @@ func saveUploadConfig(db *gorm.DB, c *gin.Context) {
 		u.DefaultMaxSize = models.DefaultUploadMaxSize
 	}
 	if dir := strings.TrimSpace(c.PostForm("storage_dir")); dir != "" {
+		if !safeStorageDirName(dir) {
+			return false
+		}
 		u.StorageDir = dir
 	}
 	u.UpdatedBy = userIDFromSession(c)
 	db.Save(&u)
+	return true
 }
 
 // dangerousUploadExtensions are never accepted as upload file types: files of

i18n/i18n.go

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"login_ph_pass":  "Enter your password",
 		"login_submit":   "Sign In",
 		"login_error":    "Invalid username or password.",
+		"login_locked":   "Too many failed attempts. Please try again in 15 minutes.",
 		"login_required": "Please fill in all fields.",
 		"login_no_account": "Don't have an account?",
 		"login_register_link": "Register",
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"register_username_length": "Username must be 3-32 characters.",
 		"register_password_length": "Password must be at least 6 characters.",
 		"register_password_mismatch": "Passwords do not match.",
+		"register_email_invalid": "Please enter a valid email address.",
 		"register_error": "Registration failed. Please try again.",
 
 		// Settings
@@ -118,6 +120,8 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"profile_save":           "Save Changes",
 		"profile_saved":          "Profile updated.",
 		"profile_wrong_password": "Current password is incorrect.",
+		"profile_password_short": "New password must be at least 6 characters.",
+		"profile_email_invalid":  "Please enter a valid email address.",
 		"profile_upload_invalid":   "File type not allowed.",
 		"profile_upload_disabled":  "Uploads are currently disabled.",
 		"profile_upload_too_large": "File is too large. Limit: %s",
@@ -255,6 +259,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"settings_upload_title":   "Upload Settings",
 		"settings_upload_desc":    "Attachment upload policy and permitted file types.",
 		"settings_upload_dangerous_ext": "This extension is not allowed: files of this type can execute active content in the site's origin.",
+		"settings_upload_illegal_dir": "Storage sub-directory is not allowed: use a single segment of letters, digits, '_' or '-' only.",
 		"settings_uploads_enabled":"Enable attachments",
 		"settings_default_size":   "Default max size (MB)",
 		"settings_storage_dir":    "Storage sub-directory",
@@ -391,6 +396,8 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"user_empty":                "No users.",
 		"user_username_required":    "Username is required.",
 		"user_password_required":    "Password is required.",
+		"user_password_short":       "Password must be at least 6 characters.",
+		"user_email_invalid":        "Please enter a valid email address.",
 		"user_username_exists":      "Username already exists.",
 		"user_cannot_delete_self":   "You cannot delete your own account.",
 		"user_cannot_disable_self":  "You cannot disable or lock your own account.",
@@ -466,6 +473,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"login_ph_pass":  "请输入密码",
 		"login_submit":   "登录",
 		"login_error":    "用户名或密码错误。",
+		"login_locked":   "尝试次数过多，请15分钟后再试。",
 		"login_required": "请填写所有字段。",
 		"login_no_account": "还没有账号？",
 		"login_register_link": "注册",
@@ -494,6 +502,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"register_username_length": "用户名必须是3-32个字符。",
 		"register_password_length": "密码至少需要6个字符。",
 		"register_password_mismatch": "两次输入的密码不一致。",
+		"register_email_invalid": "请输入有效的邮箱地址。",
 		"register_error": "注册失败，请重试。",
 
 		// 平台设置
@@ -537,6 +546,8 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"profile_save":           "保存修改",
 		"profile_saved":          "个人信息已更新。",
 		"profile_wrong_password": "当前密码错误。",
+		"profile_password_short": "新密码至少需要6个字符。",
+		"profile_email_invalid":  "请输入有效的邮箱地址。",
 		"profile_upload_invalid":   "不允许的文件类型。",
 		"profile_upload_disabled":  "上传功能已关闭。",
 		"profile_upload_too_large": "文件过大。限制：%s",
@@ -674,6 +685,7 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"settings_upload_title":   "上传设置",
 		"settings_upload_desc":    "附件上传策略与允许的文件类型。",
 		"settings_upload_dangerous_ext": "不允许该扩展名：此类文件可在站点同源执行活动内容。",
+		"settings_upload_illegal_dir": "存储子目录不合法：只能使用字母、数字、'_' 或 '-' 的单个路径段。",
 		"settings_uploads_enabled":"启用附件上传",
 		"settings_default_size":   "默认最大大小（MB）",
 		"settings_storage_dir":    "存储子目录",
@@ -810,6 +822,8 @@ var translations = map[Lang]map[string]string{
 		"user_empty":                "暂无用户。",
 		"user_username_required":    "请填写用户名。",
 		"user_password_required":    "请填写密码。",
+		"user_password_short":       "密码至少需要6个字符。",
+		"user_email_invalid":        "请输入有效的邮箱地址。",
 		"user_username_exists":      "用户名已存在。",
 		"user_cannot_delete_self":   "不能删除自己的账号。",
 		"user_cannot_disable_self":  "不能禁用或锁定自己的账号。",

install_linux.sh

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ User=${SERVICE_USER}
 Group=${SERVICE_USER}
 WorkingDirectory=${INSTALL_DIR}
 ExecStart=${INSTALL_DIR}/${BINARY_NAME} -config ${CONFIG_DIR}/config.yaml
-ExecStartPost=/bin/sh -c 'while [ ! -S ${SOCKET_DIR}/web.sock ]; do sleep 0.1; done; chmod 666 ${SOCKET_DIR}/web.sock'
+ExecStartPost=/bin/sh -c 'while [ ! -S ${SOCKET_DIR}/web.sock ]; do sleep 0.1; done; chown ${SERVICE_USER}:${SERVICE_USER} ${SOCKET_DIR}/web.sock; chmod 660 ${SOCKET_DIR}/web.sock'
 Restart=on-failure
 RestartSec=5s
 NoNewPrivileges=true
@@ -97,3 +97,9 @@ systemctl restart "${SERVICE_NAME}"
 
 echo "部署完成，服务状态："
 systemctl --no-pager --full status "${SERVICE_NAME}"
+
+echo ""
+echo "重要提示：unix socket 权限现为 660（组: ${SERVICE_USER}），"
+echo "请将反向代理（caddy/nginx）运行用户加入 ${SERVICE_USER} 组："
+echo "  sudo usermod -aG ${SERVICE_USER} <proxy_user>"
+echo "然后重启代理服务，否则代理无法读取 socket（本机其他用户也无法再直连）。"

main.go

@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ func main() {
 
 	// 3. Create session store (cookie-based).
 	store := cookie.NewStore([]byte(cfg.Secret))
+	// Login rate limiter (SECURITY_TODO #10): per IP+username failures, a
+	// libcurl/wordlist attacker cannot hammer the login endpoint.
+	loginLimiter := handlers.NewLoginLimiter()
 	store.Options(sessions.Options{
 		Path:     "/",
 		MaxAge:   86400,                // 24 hours
@@ -117,7 +120,7 @@ func main() {
 	router.GET("/rss", handlers.RSSFeed(db))
 	router.GET("/feed", handlers.RSSFeed(db))
 	router.GET("/login", handlers.LoginPage())
-	router.POST("/login", handlers.Login(db))
+	router.POST("/login", handlers.Login(db, loginLimiter))
 	router.GET("/register", handlers.RegisterPage(db))
 	router.POST("/register", handlers.Register(db))
 	router.POST("/logout", handlers.Logout())

middleware/security_headers.go

@@ -5,14 +5,12 @@ import "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 // csp is the Content-Security-Policy for HTML responses.
 //
 // 'unsafe-inline' is required because templates embed inline <script> and
-// <style> blocks (Go html/template is the XSS defense for those); the
-// directive list restricts everything else (scripts can only load from the
-// pinned CDN hosts, no third-party frames, no other origins for fetch).
-// Tighten further once the third-party assets are vendored locally (see
-// SECURITY_TODO P2-9).
+// <style> blocks (Go html/template is the XSS defense for those). All
+// third-party assets are vendored locally (SECURITY_TODO #9), so the policy
+// allows no other origins for scripts or styles.
 const csp = "default-src 'self'; " +
-	"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://cdn.tailwindcss.com; " +
-	"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com; " +
+	"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
+	"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
 	"img-src 'self' data: https: http:; " +
 	"font-src 'self' data: https:; " +
 	"connect-src 'self'; " +

models/db.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package models
 
 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"log"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -17,6 +18,24 @@ import (
 // DB is the global database connection, initialized by InitDB.
 var DB *gorm.DB
 
+// adminPasswordAlphabet avoids visually ambiguous characters (no l, I, O, 0,
+// 1) and is used to generate the first-run admin password.
+const adminPasswordAlphabet = "abcdefghjkmnpqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789" + "^$*+?%"
+
+// randomAdminPassword returns a crypto-random 16-character first-run admin
+// password (SECURITY_TODO #12: no more hardcoded admin/admin).
+func randomAdminPassword() string {
+	b := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("Failed to generate admin password: %v", err)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, len(b))
+	for i, v := range b {
+		out[i] = adminPasswordAlphabet[int(v)%len(adminPasswordAlphabet)]
+	}
+	return string(out)
+}
+
 // InitDB opens the database connection, runs migrations, and seeds the admin user.
 func InitDB(cfg *config.Config) *gorm.DB {
 	// Ensure the storage path exists.
@@ -66,17 +85,20 @@ func InitDB(cfg *config.Config) *gorm.DB {
 			Status:      StatusNormal,
 			Role:        RoleAdmin,
 		}
-		if err := admin.SetPassword("admin"); err != nil {
+		adminPassword := randomAdminPassword()
+		if err := admin.SetPassword(adminPassword); err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("Failed to hash admin password: %v", err)
 		}
 		if err := db.Create(admin).Error; err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("Failed to create admin user: %v", err)
 		}
+		// SECURITY_TODO #12: the first-run password is crypto-random and
+		// printed exactly once — copy it now; it cannot be recovered later.
 		log.Println("==============================================")
 		log.Println("  First run: created default admin user.")
 		log.Println("  Username: admin")
-		log.Println("  Password: admin")
-		log.Println("  Please change this password immediately!")
+		log.Println("  Password: " + adminPassword)
+		log.Println("  This password is shown ONCE. Change it after login!")
 		log.Println("==============================================")
 	}
 

models/db_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+package models
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestRandomAdminPassword covers SECURITY_TODO #12: the first-run admin
+// password comes from the ambiguous-safe alphabet, has fixed length, and
+// differs between generations.
+func TestRandomAdminPassword(t *testing.T) {
+	pw := randomAdminPassword()
+	if len(pw) != 16 {
+		t.Fatalf("password length = %d, want 16", len(pw))
+	}
+	for _, c := range pw {
+		if !strings.ContainsRune(adminPasswordAlphabet, c) {
+			t.Fatalf("password contains rune %q outside alphabet", c)
+		}
+	}
+	if pw == randomAdminPassword() {
+		t.Fatal("two generated passwords are identical")
+	}
+}

scripts/build_tailwind.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Build Tailwind CSS from the HTML templates into static/css/app.css.
+#
+# The production build does NOT use cdn.tailwindcss.com (the dev runtime):
+# it is a JS script executed in the browser, which browsers cannot pin with
+# SRI and which would keep a third-party origin in our CSP
+# (SECURITY_TODO #9). This script produces a static stylesheet instead.
+#
+# Running it requires Node >= 18 with npx available. The generated
+# static/css/app.css MUST be committed so deployments need no toolchain
+# (static assets are go:embed'd into the binary).
+#
+# Usage: ./scripts/build_tailwind.sh [version]
+set -euo pipefail
+
+VERSION="${1:-3.4.17}"
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+ROOT="$(dirname "${HERE}")"
+
+echo "==> Building Tailwind CSS ${VERSION} (offline static build)"
+cd "${ROOT}"
+# Content sources: templates for static markup, Go sources for class strings
+# assembled in handlers (e.g. status/role badges), plus the embedding main.
+npx --yes "tailwindcss@${VERSION}" \
+  -i ./static/css/input.css \
+  -o ./static/css/app.css \
+  --content "./templates/**/*.html" "./handlers/**/*.go" "./middleware/**/*.go" "./main.go"
+echo "==> Done: static/css/app.css"
+echo "    (commit this file; it is embedded into the binary via go:embed)"

static/css/input.css

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+@tailwind base;
+@tailwind components;
+@tailwind utilities;

static/vendor/cropper.min.css

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/*!
+ * Cropper.js v1.6.2
+ * https://fengyuanchen.github.io/cropperjs
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015-present Chen Fengyuan
+ * Released under the MIT license
+ *
+ * Date: 2024-04-21T07:43:02.731Z
+ */.cropper-container{-webkit-touch-callout:none;direction:ltr;font-size:0;line-height:0;position:relative;-ms-touch-action:none;touch-action:none;-webkit-user-select:none;-moz-user-select:none;-ms-user-select:none;user-select:none}.cropper-container img{backface-visibility:hidden;display:block;height:100%;image-orientation:0deg;max-height:none!important;max-width:none!important;min-height:0!important;min-width:0!important;width:100%}.cropper-canvas,.cropper-crop-box,.cropper-drag-box,.cropper-modal,.cropper-wrap-box{bottom:0;left:0;position:absolute;right:0;top:0}.cropper-canvas,.cropper-wrap-box{overflow:hidden}.cropper-drag-box{background-color:#fff;opacity:0}.cropper-modal{background-color:#000;opacity:.5}.cropper-view-box{display:block;height:100%;outline:1px solid #39f;outline-color:rgba(51,153,255,.75);overflow:hidden;width:100%}.cropper-dashed{border:0 dashed #eee;display:block;opacity:.5;position:absolute}.cropper-dashed.dashed-h{border-bottom-width:1px;border-top-width:1px;height:33.33333%;left:0;top:33.33333%;width:100%}.cropper-dashed.dashed-v{border-left-width:1px;border-right-width:1px;height:100%;left:33.33333%;top:0;width:33.33333%}.cropper-center{display:block;height:0;left:50%;opacity:.75;position:absolute;top:50%;width:0}.cropper-center:after,.cropper-center:before{background-color:#eee;content:" ";display:block;position:absolute}.cropper-center:before{height:1px;left:-3px;top:0;width:7px}.cropper-center:after{height:7px;left:0;top:-3px;width:1px}.cropper-face,.cropper-line,.cropper-point{display:block;height:100%;opacity:.1;position:absolute;width:100%}.cropper-face{background-color:#fff;left:0;top:0}.cropper-line{background-color:#39f}.cropper-line.line-e{cursor:ew-resize;right:-3px;top:0;width:5px}.cropper-line.line-n{cursor:ns-resize;height:5px;left:0;top:-3px}.cropper-line.line-w{cursor:ew-resize;left:-3px;top:0;width:5px}.cropper-line.line-s{bottom:-3px;cursor:ns-resize;height:5px;left:0}.cropper-point{background-color:#39f;height:5px;opacity:.75;width:5px}.cropper-point.point-e{cursor:ew-resize;margin-top:-3px;right:-3px;top:50%}.cropper-point.point-n{cursor:ns-resize;left:50%;margin-left:-3px;top:-3px}.cropper-point.point-w{cursor:ew-resize;left:-3px;margin-top:-3px;top:50%}.cropper-point.point-s{bottom:-3px;cursor:s-resize;left:50%;margin-left:-3px}.cropper-point.point-ne{cursor:nesw-resize;right:-3px;top:-3px}.cropper-point.point-nw{cursor:nwse-resize;left:-3px;top:-3px}.cropper-point.point-sw{bottom:-3px;cursor:nesw-resize;left:-3px}.cropper-point.point-se{bottom:-3px;cursor:nwse-resize;height:20px;opacity:1;right:-3px;width:20px}@media (min-width:768px){.cropper-point.point-se{height:15px;width:15px}}@media (min-width:992px){.cropper-point.point-se{height:10px;width:10px}}@media (min-width:1200px){.cropper-point.point-se{height:5px;opacity:.75;width:5px}}.cropper-point.point-se:before{background-color:#39f;bottom:-50%;content:" ";display:block;height:200%;opacity:0;position:absolute;right:-50%;width:200%}.cropper-invisible{opacity:0}.cropper-bg{background-image:url("")}.cropper-hide{display:block;height:0;position:absolute;width:0}.cropper-hidden{display:none!important}.cropper-move{cursor:move}.cropper-crop{cursor:crosshair}.cropper-disabled .cropper-drag-box,.cropper-disabled .cropper-face,.cropper-disabled .cropper-line,.cropper-disabled .cropper-point{cursor:not-allowed}

static/vendor/github.min.css

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+pre code.hljs{display:block;overflow-x:auto;padding:1em}code.hljs{padding:3px 5px}/*!
+  Theme: GitHub
+  Description: Light theme as seen on github.com
+  Author: github.com
+  Maintainer: @Hirse
+  Updated: 2021-05-15
+
+  Outdated base version: https://github.com/primer/github-syntax-light
+  Current colors taken from GitHub's CSS
+*/.hljs{color:#24292e;background:#fff}.hljs-doctag,.hljs-keyword,.hljs-meta .hljs-keyword,.hljs-template-tag,.hljs-template-variable,.hljs-type,.hljs-variable.language_{color:#d73a49}.hljs-title,.hljs-title.class_,.hljs-title.class_.inherited__,.hljs-title.function_{color:#6f42c1}.hljs-attr,.hljs-attribute,.hljs-literal,.hljs-meta,.hljs-number,.hljs-operator,.hljs-selector-attr,.hljs-selector-class,.hljs-selector-id,.hljs-variable{color:#005cc5}.hljs-meta .hljs-string,.hljs-regexp,.hljs-string{color:#032f62}.hljs-built_in,.hljs-symbol{color:#e36209}.hljs-code,.hljs-comment,.hljs-formula{color:#6a737d}.hljs-name,.hljs-quote,.hljs-selector-pseudo,.hljs-selector-tag{color:#22863a}.hljs-subst{color:#24292e}.hljs-section{color:#005cc5;font-weight:700}.hljs-bullet{color:#735c0f}.hljs-emphasis{color:#24292e;font-style:italic}.hljs-strong{color:#24292e;font-weight:700}.hljs-addition{color:#22863a;background-color:#f0fff4}.hljs-deletion{color:#b31d28;background-color:#ffeef0}

templates/layouts/base.html

@@ -14,11 +14,13 @@
         {{end}}
     {{end}}
     <link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="RSS Feed" href="/rss">
-    <script src="https://cdn.tailwindcss.com"></script>
-    <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/cropperjs/1.6.2/cropper.min.css">
-    <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/cropperjs/1.6.2/cropper.min.js"></script>
-    <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/easymde/dist/easymde.min.css">
-    <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/easymde/dist/easymde.min.js"></script>
+    <!-- All third-party assets are vendored locally (static/vendor, embedded
+         via go:embed) — no external CDN origins, see SECURITY_TODO #9. -->
+    <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/css/app.css?v=1">
+    <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/vendor/cropper.min.css?v=1">
+    <script src="/static/vendor/cropper.min.js?v=1"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/vendor/easymde.min.css?v=1">
+    <script src="/static/vendor/easymde.min.js?v=1"></script>
 </head>
 <body class="bg-gray-50 min-h-screen flex flex-col">
     <!-- Navigation -->
@@ -117,11 +119,11 @@
     Local static files carry a ?v= cache-buster: bump it whenever
     static/js/markdown.js or static/css/markdown.css changes, otherwise
     browsers may keep serving stale cached copies. */}}
-<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/highlightjs/cdn-release@11.12.0/build/styles/github.min.css">
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/vendor/github.min.css?v=1">
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/css/markdown.css?v=2">
-<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked@15.0.12/marked.min.js"></script>
-<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.4.13/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
-<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/highlightjs/cdn-release@11.12.0/build/highlight.min.js"></script>
+<script src="/static/vendor/marked.min.js?v=1"></script>
+<script src="/static/vendor/purify.min.js?v=1"></script>
+<script src="/static/vendor/highlight.min.js?v=1"></script>
 <script src="/static/js/markdown.js?v=2"></script>
 {{end}}