Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into session-query
# Conflicts: # docs/capability-seams.md # docs/config-catalog.md # packages/README.md # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # pnpm-lock.yaml
This commit is contained in:
Hypatia May
@@ -82,6 +82,20 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: Install (immutable)
|
||||
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
|
||||
|
||||
# The snapshot lane REPLAYS the sandbox example's recorded scenarios,
|
||||
# re-executing their bash calls under a real runner. ubuntu-latest has
|
||||
# no bubblewrap preinstalled and no built Landlock launcher, so without
|
||||
# this the confined executions fail closed (SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE). Same
|
||||
# install as sandbox.yml's bwrap leg (incl. the Ubuntu 24.04 AppArmor
|
||||
# userns knob).
|
||||
- name: Install bubblewrap (unrestrict userns)
|
||||
if: matrix.lane == 'snapshot'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
sudo apt-get update -q
|
||||
sudo apt-get install -yq bubblewrap
|
||||
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0 \
|
||||
|| echo "apparmor userns knob absent — the functional probe decides"
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/cache@v4
|
||||
if: matrix.lane == 'lint'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,6 +82,20 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: Install (immutable)
|
||||
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
|
||||
|
||||
# The with-key escalation e2e (examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/
|
||||
# escalation.e2e.ts) self-skips without a usable runner — without this
|
||||
# step it would never actually execute anywhere (CI had no bwrap, dev
|
||||
# macs run Seatbelt instead), which is exactly how a broken harness
|
||||
# composition once survived unseen. Same recipe as ci.yml's bwrap
|
||||
# steps; the userns knob is best-effort (absent on pre-24.04 kernels,
|
||||
# the probe decides).
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||||
- name: Install bubblewrap (unrestrict userns)
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||||
run: |
|
||||
sudo apt-get update -q
|
||||
sudo apt-get install -yq bubblewrap
|
||||
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0 \
|
||||
|| echo "apparmor userns knob absent — the functional probe decides"
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||||
|
||||
# Guard against a false green: the e2e suites self-skip when the key is
|
||||
# absent, so a missing/misconfigured secret would otherwise pass as
|
||||
# "all skipped". This job only runs on trusted events (the `if:` above
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
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||||
# Sandbox CI: the keyless real-kernel confinement proofs. A separate workflow
|
||||
# from ci.yml because the axis is different — these jobs fan out over
|
||||
# OS×runner (kernel capabilities), not node versions. The Landlock launcher
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||||
# arrives from the registry with `pnpm install` (the npm package family
|
||||
# `node-addon-landlock-run`, built and released from its own repository), so
|
||||
# these legs exercise the true consumer path — nothing is compiled here.
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||||
name: Sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [main, master]
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
cancel-in-progress: true
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
# Keyless real-kernel sandbox proofs (sandbox RFC § Testing): each ladder
|
||||
# rung is only provable on a host where it enforces, so this job fans out
|
||||
# an OS×runner matrix — bwrap and Landlock on Linux (separate legs: the
|
||||
# Landlock files force the bwrap rung off, so each leg proves exactly one
|
||||
# rung; Landlock twice, once per architecture, each confining through the
|
||||
# registry-installed launcher), Seatbelt on macOS (sandbox-exec ships with
|
||||
# the OS). One node
|
||||
# version only: kernel confinement does not vary by node, and ci.yml's
|
||||
# node matrix already covers the node axis.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The e2e files self-skip where their runner is absent, so a leg that lost
|
||||
# its runner (no bwrap, kernel without Landlock, macOS without
|
||||
# sandbox-exec) would otherwise pass as a false green — the same trap
|
||||
# e2e.yml's key preflight guards against. Each leg therefore asserts BOTH
|
||||
# its platform files actually ran: `Test Files 2 passed (2)`, no skips.
|
||||
sandbox-e2e:
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
include:
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
runner: bwrap
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-24.04
|
||||
runner: landlock
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
|
||||
runner: landlock
|
||||
- os: macos-latest
|
||||
runner: seatbelt
|
||||
name: sandbox e2e (${{ matrix.runner }}, ${{ matrix.os }})
|
||||
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 20
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-node@v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version: 24
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Enable corepack (pnpm)
|
||||
run: corepack enable
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install (immutable)
|
||||
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
|
||||
|
||||
# The bwrap rung needs bubblewrap on PATH and unprivileged user
|
||||
# namespaces. Ubuntu 24.04 gates the latter behind an AppArmor knob;
|
||||
# lift it best-effort — on images where the knob is absent the
|
||||
# functional probe (and the run-guard below) is the arbiter anyway.
|
||||
- name: Install bubblewrap (unrestrict userns)
|
||||
if: matrix.runner == 'bwrap'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
sudo apt-get update -q
|
||||
sudo apt-get install -yq bubblewrap
|
||||
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0 \
|
||||
|| echo "apparmor userns knob absent — the functional probe decides"
|
||||
|
||||
# The unit suite runs on ubuntu in `checks`; this is the one darwin leg
|
||||
# in the workflow, so run it here too — the platform-dependent unit
|
||||
# expectations (Seatbelt path canonicalization: /tmp IS /private/tmp)
|
||||
# take their darwin branch only on this runner.
|
||||
- name: Unit tests (darwin parity)
|
||||
if: matrix.runner == 'seatbelt'
|
||||
run: pnpm run test
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Sandbox e2e (real kernel confinement, world-verified)
|
||||
# NO_COLOR: vitest force-enables ANSI color under GITHUB_ACTIONS even
|
||||
# without a TTY, which would thread escape codes through the summary
|
||||
# line the run-guard greps.
|
||||
env:
|
||||
NO_COLOR: 1
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -u +e -o pipefail
|
||||
out=$(pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.e2e.config.ts \
|
||||
packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/${{ matrix.runner }}.e2e.ts \
|
||||
packages/bash/bash-sandbox/tests/${{ matrix.runner }}.e2e.ts 2>&1); status=$?
|
||||
echo "$out"
|
||||
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
|
||||
# Both platform files must have RUN — a self-skip (runner missing on
|
||||
# the very platform that exists to prove it) is a failure, not a pass.
|
||||
echo "$out" | grep -qE 'Test Files[[:space:]]+2 passed \(2\)'
|
||||
|
||||
# Publish-path rehearsal, Landlock legs only (the pack gates need built
|
||||
# lib/). The e2e packs the workspace closure, installs the tarballs
|
||||
# into a throwaway consumer — npm pulling `node-addon-landlock-run`
|
||||
# and its platform package from the registry, the true consumer path —
|
||||
# and confines through the INSTALLED launcher, asserting it executable
|
||||
# apart (a mode-stripped binary must not masquerade as a non-enforcing
|
||||
# kernel). Same no-silent-skip guard as above.
|
||||
- name: Build packages (lib/ for the pack rehearsal)
|
||||
if: matrix.runner == 'landlock'
|
||||
run: pnpm run build
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Packed-distribution e2e (pack → install → confine)
|
||||
if: matrix.runner == 'landlock'
|
||||
env:
|
||||
NO_COLOR: 1
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -u +e -o pipefail
|
||||
out=$(pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.e2e.config.ts \
|
||||
packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/packed-install.e2e.ts 2>&1); status=$?
|
||||
echo "$out"
|
||||
[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
|
||||
echo "$out" | grep -qE 'Test Files[[:space:]]+1 passed \(1\)'
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ packages/ Harness packages at packages/<group>/<pkg>/, all named @deepseek-ai
|
||||
llm/ LLM seam + the DeepSeek adapters (hand-rolled + pi-ai design twin)
|
||||
bash/ bash executor seam + local impl + model-facing bash tools
|
||||
fs/ filesystem seam + local impl + policy gate + read/write/edit tools
|
||||
skill/ skill provider registry + local impl + catalog/loader tool
|
||||
web/ web seam + search/fetch providers + model-facing web tools
|
||||
compact/ compaction seam + basic backend
|
||||
subagent/ subagent seam + spawn/fork/ACP backends + delegation tool
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ packages/ Harness packages at packages/<group>/<pkg>/, all named @deepseek-ai
|
||||
cordis/ self-referential toolset: the agent inspects/mounts plugins in its own runtime
|
||||
hooks/ Claude Code / Codex hook bridges + shared wire-protocol library
|
||||
session-persistence/ persistence seam + JSONL/SQLite backends
|
||||
ui/ ACP bridge, app-boot glue, stdio/ACP app bins, user-interaction seam, ask-user tool
|
||||
ui/ ACP bridge, app-boot glue, stdio/ACP app bins, user-approval and user-interaction seams, ask-user tool
|
||||
support/ dev/test infrastructure packages
|
||||
util/ zero-dependency utilities
|
||||
examples/ Runnable demos: thin cordis.yml leaves over the app packages (see examples/AGENTS.md)
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ pnpm run hygiene
|
||||
out=$(printf 'echo ci smoke\n' | pnpm run demo:echo 2>&1)
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q '\[tool call\] echo({"text":"ci smoke"})'
|
||||
printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q '\[tool result\] ECHO: CI SMOKE'
|
||||
ls .sessions/_no-cwd/main-session-*.jsonl >/dev/null
|
||||
test -n "$(find .sessions -path '.sessions/cwd-*/main-session-*.jsonl' -type f -print -quit)"
|
||||
rm -rf .sessions
|
||||
pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.e2e.config.ts packages/ui/stdio-agent/tests/built-bin.e2e.ts packages/ui/acp-agent/tests/built-bin.e2e.ts packages/workflow/workflow-workerthread/tests/built-worker.e2e.ts packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/tests/built-lib.e2e.ts
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# DeepSeek Harness Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
The project is an SDK for building agent harnesses. The idea is to have **everything as a plugin**. For example, the agent loop is just one plugin shipped by default.
|
||||
The **DeepSeek Harness SDK** builds agent harnesses on Cordis. The principle is simple: **everything is a plugin**. The shipped loop is one plugin, not a privileged kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ Composition is preferred over inheritance. `packages/core/` is a repository grou
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `ctx.llm` | [`llm/`](../packages/llm/README.md) | adapter registry and streaming model calls |
|
||||
| `ctx.bash` | [`bash/`](../packages/bash/README.md) | foreground/background command execution |
|
||||
| `ctx.sandbox` | [`sandbox/`](../packages/sandbox/README.md) | same-world process confinement (argv wrapping, per-call policy) |
|
||||
| `ctx.codeRuntime` | [`code-runtime/`](../packages/code-runtime/README.md) | model-written program execution |
|
||||
| `ctx.fs` | [`fs/`](../packages/fs/README.md) | filesystem provider primitives and policy events |
|
||||
| `ctx.skills` | [`skill/`](../packages/skill/README.md) | skill provider registry and progressive disclosure |
|
||||
| `ctx.web` | [`web/`](../packages/web/README.md) | search/fetch provider registries |
|
||||
| `ctx.compact` | [`compact/`](../packages/compact/README.md) | session-log compaction |
|
||||
| `ctx.subagents` | [`subagent/`](../packages/subagent/README.md) | named delegation providers |
|
||||
@@ -128,11 +130,11 @@ Streaming is a raw chunk protocol (`block-start` through `finish`) with `BlockAs
|
||||
|
||||
A swappable capability usually splits into **interface / implementation / consumer**: the interface owns the `ctx` key and event names; an implementation registers a backend; a consumer exposes model-facing behavior through `ctx.tools` or prompt assembly. The bash trio is the reference shape, and the [capability graph](capability-seams.md) shows the current package families.
|
||||
|
||||
Some cases bend the template deliberately. LLM keeps interface and consumer event names together because adapters are the implementations. Filesystem adds policy checks around provider primitives. Web is one service with search and fetch provider registries, so provider swaps do not rename model tools. Subagents use a named provider registry because multiple delegation backends can coexist; `spawn` starts fresh, `fork` seeds from the parent's completed-turn prefix, and ACP can drive an out-of-process child ([subagent.md](core-data-structures/subagent.md)).
|
||||
Some seams bend the template deliberately. LLM keeps interface and consumer vocabulary together because adapters are the implementations. Filesystem adds policy gates around provider primitives. Web is one service with search and fetch provider registries, so provider swaps do not rename model tools. Skills and subagents use named provider registries; local skills scan project/user roots, and other providers can add embedded or remote catalogs without registry/tool changes. Subagents spawn fresh, fork from the parent's completed-turn prefix, or use ACP children ([subagent.md](core-data-structures/subagent.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Bundles And Apps
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-agent-core` is the default bundle: one plugin loading the agent loop ([README](../packages/core/agent-core/README.md)). App packages compose it with a front end and own the entrypoint `bin`: `dsh-stdio-agent` for the terminal REPL, and `dsh-acp-agent` for ACP over JSON-RPC stdio with no stdout logger ([ui/](../packages/ui/README.md)). A deployment is a thin `cordis.yml` leaf: swappable backends, one app entry, and optional product tools ([examples/](../examples/AGENTS.md), [runnable wirings](cookbook/extension-cookbook.md#runnable-wirings), [graph atlas](graph-atlas.md)).
|
||||
`dsh-agent-core` is the default composition bundle: one plugin loading the shared spine ([README](../packages/core/agent-core/README.md)). App packages compose it with a front door and boot `bin`: `dsh-stdio-agent` for terminal REPL, and `dsh-acp-agent` for ACP over JSON-RPC stdio with no stdout logger ([ui/](../packages/ui/README.md)). A deployment is a thin `cordis.yml` leaf: swappable backends, one app entry, and optional product tools ([examples/](../examples/AGENTS.md), [runnable wirings](cookbook/extension-cookbook.md#runnable-wirings), [graph atlas](graph-atlas.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Where New Behavior Goes
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ New behavior should attach to a documented extension point; changing the shipped
|
||||
| Add a model-facing capability | register a tool on `ctx.tools`; schemas flow into prompt assembly |
|
||||
| Add command execution | implement and register a `ctx.bash` backend |
|
||||
| Add filesystem access or policy | implement a `ctx.fs` provider or listen on `fs/*` policy events |
|
||||
| Confine spawned processes | a `ctx.sandbox` backend; consumers wrap their argv before spawning |
|
||||
| Intercept prompts, requests, tool use, or continuation | listen on the relevant `agent/*` or `tools/*` waterfall |
|
||||
| Add a session-stable request prefix outside history | compose it on `agent/session-prefix`, once per loop instance; logged on the request header |
|
||||
| Add UI or editor integration | drive `ctx.agents` and render from `session/event` |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,19 +35,29 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
pkg_tool_ask_user["tool-ask-user"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash["tool-bash"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_cordis["tool-cordis"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill["tool-skill"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_subagent["tool-subagent"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_todo["tool-todo"]
|
||||
pkg_user_interaction["user-interaction"]
|
||||
svc_userInteraction["ctx.userInteraction<br/>Human question/answer seam"]
|
||||
pkg_stdio_agent["stdio-agent"]
|
||||
pkg_skill["skill"]
|
||||
svc_skills["ctx.skills<br/>Skill provider registry"]
|
||||
pkg_skill_local["skill-local"]
|
||||
svc_agents["ctx.agents<br/>Agent registry"]
|
||||
svc_agentLoop["ctx.agentLoop<br/>Concrete loop driver"]
|
||||
pkg_agent_core["agent-core"]
|
||||
pkg_bash["bash"]
|
||||
svc_bash["ctx.bash<br/>Bash executor seam"]
|
||||
pkg_bash_local["bash-local"]
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox["bash-sandbox"]
|
||||
pkg_hooks_claude["hooks-claude"]
|
||||
pkg_hooks_codex["hooks-codex"]
|
||||
pkg_sandbox["sandbox"]
|
||||
svc_sandbox["ctx.sandbox<br/>Process-sandbox seam"]
|
||||
pkg_sandbox_local["sandbox-local"]
|
||||
pkg_approval["approval"]
|
||||
svc_approval["ctx.approval<br/>Approval seam"]
|
||||
pkg_code_runtime["code-runtime"]
|
||||
svc_codeRuntime["ctx.codeRuntime<br/>Code-execution seam"]
|
||||
pkg_code_runtime_worker["code-runtime-worker"]
|
||||
@@ -73,11 +83,14 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
svc_workflows["ctx.workflows<br/>Workflow script engine"]
|
||||
pkg_workflow_workerthread["workflow-workerthread"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_workflow["tool-workflow"]
|
||||
pkg_acp --> svc_approval
|
||||
pkg_acp --> svc_userInteraction
|
||||
pkg_agent --> svc_agents
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> svc_agentLoop
|
||||
pkg_approval --> svc_approval
|
||||
pkg_bash --> svc_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_local --> svc_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> svc_bash
|
||||
pkg_code_runtime --> svc_codeRuntime
|
||||
pkg_code_runtime_worker --> svc_codeRuntime
|
||||
pkg_compact --> svc_compact
|
||||
@@ -88,11 +101,15 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
pkg_llm_deepseek --> svc_llm
|
||||
pkg_llm_pi_ai --> svc_llm
|
||||
pkg_llm_replay --> svc_llm
|
||||
pkg_sandbox --> svc_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_sandbox_local --> svc_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_session --> svc_sessions
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence --> svc_sessionPersistence
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_jsonl --> svc_sessionPersistence
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_sqlite --> svc_sessionPersistence
|
||||
pkg_session_query --> svc_sessionQuery
|
||||
pkg_skill --> svc_skills
|
||||
pkg_skill_local --> svc_skills
|
||||
pkg_stdio_agent --> svc_userInteraction
|
||||
pkg_subagent --> svc_subagents
|
||||
pkg_subagent_acp --> svc_subagents
|
||||
@@ -115,6 +132,8 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
svc_agents --> pkg_invariants
|
||||
svc_agents --> pkg_stdio_agent
|
||||
svc_agents --> pkg_subagent_inprocess
|
||||
svc_approval --> pkg_tool_bash
|
||||
svc_approval --> pkg_tools
|
||||
svc_bash --> pkg_hooks_claude
|
||||
svc_bash --> pkg_hooks_codex
|
||||
svc_bash --> pkg_tool_bash
|
||||
@@ -123,6 +142,7 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
svc_fs --> pkg_tool_fs
|
||||
svc_llm --> pkg_agent_loop
|
||||
svc_llm --> pkg_compact_basic
|
||||
svc_sandbox --> pkg_bash_sandbox
|
||||
svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_acp
|
||||
svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_agent_loop
|
||||
svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_session_query
|
||||
@@ -132,6 +152,7 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
svc_sessions --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
svc_sessions --> pkg_session_query
|
||||
svc_sessions --> pkg_subagent_inprocess
|
||||
svc_skills --> pkg_tool_skill
|
||||
svc_subagents --> pkg_tool_subagent
|
||||
svc_systemPrompt --> pkg_agent_loop
|
||||
svc_systemPrompt --> pkg_tool_fs
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +164,7 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_bash
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_cordis
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_fs
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_skill
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_subagent
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_todo
|
||||
svc_tools --> pkg_tool_web
|
||||
@@ -161,11 +183,14 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
| `ctx.sessionPersistence` | `seam` | [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) | [`session-persistence-jsonl`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl), [`session-persistence-sqlite`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | - | Backends persist the same SessionEvent vocabulary; apps choose a backend at composition time. |
|
||||
| `ctx.sessionQuery` | `seam` | [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | - | - | - | Resolves live and optional persisted logs into one logical corpus for exact reads. |
|
||||
| `ctx.systemPrompt` | `core` | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs), [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web) | - | Collects prompt sections and model-facing tool schemas for each step. |
|
||||
| `ctx.tools` | `core` | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis), [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs), [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent), [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo), [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | Registers tool definitions, exposes schemas to the prompt, and routes calls through tools/pre-execute and tools/post-execute. |
|
||||
| `ctx.tools` | `core` | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis), [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs), [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill), [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent), [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo), [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | Registers tool definitions, exposes schemas to the prompt, and routes calls through tools/pre-execute and tools/post-execute. |
|
||||
| `ctx.userInteraction` | `seam` | [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) | [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user), [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | UI front doors provide the active human-answer provider; tool-ask-user pauses a tool call on the provider-neutral ask() promise. |
|
||||
| `ctx.skills` | `seam` | [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill) | [`skill-local`](../packages/skill/skill-local) | [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill) | - | Merges provider skill catalogs; tool-skill renders the session-prefix catalog and loads complete skill bodies. |
|
||||
| `ctx.agents` | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`subagent-inprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess), [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) | - | Owns live Agent handles and the create/resume factory seam. |
|
||||
| `ctx.agentLoop` | `bundle` | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) | - | [`agent-core`](../packages/core/agent-core) | - | The one concrete loop plugin; extension packages depend on dsh-agent events and services, not on this package. |
|
||||
| `ctx.bash` | `seam` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local) | [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | - | The model-facing bash tools and hook bridges consume this seam; sandboxed or remote executors can replace bash-local. |
|
||||
| `ctx.bash` | `seam` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | - | The model-facing bash tools and hook bridges consume this seam; sandboxed or remote executors replace bash-local without touching them. |
|
||||
| `ctx.sandbox` | `seam` | [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) | [`sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) | [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | - | Consumers hand over the exact argv they are about to spawn; same-world backends wrap it under a per-call policy and report enforcement. |
|
||||
| `ctx.approval` | `seam` | `approval` | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | - | One-shot permission decisions dispatched over the `approval/request` waterfall; answerers are listeners (the ACP bridge for its own agents), absence fails closed to `unavailable`. |
|
||||
| `ctx.codeRuntime` | `seam` | [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime) | [`code-runtime-worker`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | Runs one model-written program against host-provided async bindings; backends differ by substrate and language (the tool registry consumes it for Code Mode). |
|
||||
| `ctx.fs` | `seam` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) | [`fs-local`](../packages/fs/fs-local) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) | tool-fs executes read/write/edit through ctx.fs; fs-policy contributes observed-state checks through the fs/* event gate. |
|
||||
| `ctx.compact` | `seam` | [`compact`](../packages/compact/compact) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | - | The basic backend currently consumes the pre-step event directly; a model-facing compact tool remains deferred. |
|
||||
|
||||
+184
-14
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export interface AcpConfig {
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on: `Stream` (`@agentclientprotocol/sdk`)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:236`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:248`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,10 +56,12 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
tools?: ToolsConfig
|
||||
/** Directory the JSONL session backend writes under. Defaults to `./.sessions`. */
|
||||
persistenceRoot?: string
|
||||
/** Skill registry, local-provider, and model-facing consumer config forwarded to agent-core. */
|
||||
skills?: agentCore.SkillConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on: [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools)
|
||||
Depends on: [`agentCore`](../packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts) · [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts:52`](../packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -71,12 +73,12 @@ Source: [`packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts:52`](../packages/ui/acp-agent/src/i
|
||||
* `agents` to the agent loop (an app that pre-creates no agents, like the ACP
|
||||
* bridge, simply omits it), `persona` and `toolOrder` to the system-prompt
|
||||
* plugin (the deployment's persona section and the explicit model-facing tool
|
||||
* order), the `tools` object to the tool registry (its presentation `mode`).
|
||||
* Every field is optional INPUT here because each owner's schema
|
||||
* supplies the default (`[]` / `''` / absent — lexicographic / `native`); the
|
||||
* schema is the INTERSECTION of the owners' own schemas (the registry's
|
||||
* nested under its `tools` key), so validation and defaulting can never
|
||||
* drift from them.
|
||||
* order), the `tools` object to the tool registry (its presentation `mode`),
|
||||
* and `skills` to the skill registry/local provider/tool consumer. Every field
|
||||
* is optional INPUT here because each owner's schema supplies the default;
|
||||
* the schema is the INTERSECTION of the owners' own schemas (with registry
|
||||
* schemas nested under their bundle keys), so validation and defaulting can
|
||||
* never drift from them.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** The agent-loop `agents` list (see dsh-agent-loop's `Config`). */
|
||||
@@ -87,12 +89,24 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
toolOrder?: SystemPromptConfig['toolOrder']
|
||||
/** The tool registry's config — its presentation `mode` (see dsh-tools' `Config`). */
|
||||
tools?: ToolsConfig
|
||||
/** Skill registry, local provider, and model-facing consumer config. */
|
||||
skills?: SkillConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Skill bundle config forwarded to the registry, local provider, and model-facing consumer. */
|
||||
export interface SkillConfig {
|
||||
/** Registry-level discovery cache settings. */
|
||||
registry?: SkillRegistryConfig
|
||||
/** Local filesystem skill provider settings. */
|
||||
local?: SkillLocal.Config
|
||||
/** Model-facing skill catalog and tool settings. */
|
||||
tool?: toolSkill.Config
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on: [`AgentLoopConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-agent-loop) · [`SystemPromptConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-system-prompt) · [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools)
|
||||
Depends on: [`AgentLoopConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-agent-loop) · [`SkillLocal`](../packages/skill/skill-local/src/index.ts) · [`SkillRegistryConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-skill) · [`SystemPromptConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-system-prompt) · [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools) · [`toolSkill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts:71`](../packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts:87`](../packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-loop`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +122,8 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
agents: (AgentOptions & {
|
||||
/** Agent id to register under; also seeds the fresh per-run session id (`${id}-session-<uuid>`). */
|
||||
id: AgentId
|
||||
/** Optional workspace cwd for the config-created fresh session. */
|
||||
cwd?: string
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* If set, the config agent RESUMES this persisted session id instead of
|
||||
* starting a fresh `${id}-session-<uuid>`. Sourced from an env var in
|
||||
@@ -150,6 +166,33 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/bash/bash-local/src/index.ts:29`](../packages/bash/bash-local/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `sandbox`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Plugin config: the local executor's knobs plus the sandbox policy. All
|
||||
* optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults (`mode: 'read-only'` is the
|
||||
* fail-safe default; an example that wants a workspace-writable agent opts in
|
||||
* explicitly). The runner choice is NOT configured here: which platform
|
||||
* backend confines the command is the `ctx.sandbox` provider's config.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface Config extends LocalConfig {
|
||||
/** File-sandbox mode commands run under (default: `read-only`). */
|
||||
mode?: SandboxMode
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Root directory `workspace-write` mode may write under (default: the
|
||||
* executor's default working directory — `cwd`, else `process.cwd()`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
workspaceRoot?: string
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on: [`LocalConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-bash-local) · [`SandboxMode`](core-data-structures/sandbox.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts:60`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +473,53 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/src/index.ts:55`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Plugin config. All optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Override the sandbox runner argv (the bwrap-shaped profile arguments are
|
||||
* appended). A NON-EMPTY argv is the operator's assertion that this runner
|
||||
* exists and FULLY enforces the profile (confinement reports
|
||||
* `enforcement: 'full'`, and — the runner's kernel mechanism being unknown
|
||||
* — carries both Linux file-denial dialects as its denial signatures) —
|
||||
* the runner chain and its probes are skipped,
|
||||
* and a broken runner fails loudly at execution time. The operator also
|
||||
* supplies {@link runnerFailureSignatures}, which distinguish the runner
|
||||
* refusing its profile from the wrapped command failing normally.
|
||||
* Absent (or empty — the schema normalizes an omitted array to `[]`): the
|
||||
* built-in platform chains — Linux `bwrap` then the Landlock launcher
|
||||
* (probed in that order), darwin `sandbox-exec` (the sole candidate,
|
||||
* selected without a probe). Used for custom/alternative runners and
|
||||
* for deterministic fake runners in keyless test tiers.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
runnerCommand?: string[]
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Case-insensitive stderr substrings emitted when a configured
|
||||
* {@link runnerCommand} refuses its profile before executing the wrapped
|
||||
* command. Required and non-empty with `runnerCommand`; rejected without
|
||||
* it. Missing/unexecutable runner errors are added automatically from
|
||||
* `runnerCommand[0]`, while these signatures cover an executable runner's
|
||||
* own failure dialect.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
runnerFailureSignatures?: string[]
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Per-probe timeout in milliseconds for the chain's functional probes
|
||||
* (default: 5000; must be a positive finite number — Node treats a 0
|
||||
* `spawnSync` timeout as UNBOUNDED, so 0 is rejected at construction). A
|
||||
* probe that exceeds it reads as an unusable rung, so a
|
||||
* host slow enough to trip the default — cold NFS mounts, heavily loaded
|
||||
* CI — would otherwise be misclassified `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with no
|
||||
* config escape. Bounds ONE probe, and the chain walk runs each at most once
|
||||
* per provider lifetime.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
probeTimeoutMs?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts:36`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence-jsonl`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `sessions`
|
||||
@@ -497,6 +587,36 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-query/session-query/src/config.ts:9`](../packages/session-query/session-query/src/config.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-skill`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Skill registry configuration. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** Maximum number of completed cwd/provider catalog snapshots kept in memory. */
|
||||
collectCacheMaxEntries?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:112`](../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-skill-local`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `skills`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Local filesystem skill provider configuration. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** DeepSeek Harness config root. Defaults to `$DSH_HOME` or `~/.dsh`. */
|
||||
dshHome?: string
|
||||
/** Shared agent config root. Defaults to `$DSH_AGENTS_HOME` or `~/.agents`. */
|
||||
agentsHome?: string
|
||||
/** Additional skill roots scanned after project roots and before user roots. */
|
||||
customSkillDirs?: string[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill-local/src/index.ts:39`](../packages/skill/skill-local/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-stdio-agent`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
@@ -506,7 +626,9 @@ Source: [`packages/session-query/session-query/src/config.ts:9`](../packages/ses
|
||||
* {@link @deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-core}'s forwarded `agents` list); `persona` is
|
||||
* the deployment persona (forwarded to the system-prompt plugin); `toolOrder`
|
||||
* is the explicit model-facing tool order (forwarded to the system-prompt plugin);
|
||||
* `persistenceRoot` is the JSONL backend's directory; `welcome` is the UI banner.
|
||||
* fresh sessions use `process.cwd()` as their workspace cwd; resumed sessions
|
||||
* keep their persisted cwd. `persistenceRoot` is the JSONL backend's directory;
|
||||
* `welcome` is the UI banner.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** Model name for the `main` agent (must have a registered adapter). */
|
||||
@@ -521,6 +643,8 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
persistenceRoot?: string
|
||||
/** stdin-chat banner printed once on start. Defaults to `'ready.'`. */
|
||||
welcome?: string
|
||||
/** Skill registry, local-provider, and model-facing consumer config forwarded to agent-core. */
|
||||
skills?: agentCore.SkillConfig
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* If set, the `main` agent RESUMES this persisted session id instead of
|
||||
* starting fresh. Sourced from an env var in the leaf `cordis.yml`
|
||||
@@ -530,9 +654,9 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Depends on: [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools)
|
||||
Depends on: [`agentCore`](../packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts) · [`ToolsConfig`](#deepseek-aidsh-tools)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/index.ts:63`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/index.ts:65`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-acp`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -735,6 +859,20 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/fs/tool-fs/src/index.ts:48`](../packages/fs/tool-fs/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-skill`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `tools` · `skills`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Model-facing skill catalog configuration. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** Maximum normalized description length rendered in the session catalog; minimum 3. */
|
||||
catalogDescriptionMaxLength?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts:19`](../packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `tools` · `subagents`
|
||||
@@ -832,7 +970,38 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
export type ToolPresentationMode = 'native' | 'code' | 'both'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:319`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:323`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Plugin config. All optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The deployment's default {@link ApprovalPolicy} for sessions without an
|
||||
* `approval/policy` override — `'ask'` delegates to the composed answerers
|
||||
* (fail-closed with none); `'never'` auto-rejects every ask without
|
||||
* prompting (the deterministic CI/unattended stance).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
policy?: ApprovalPolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A session's approval policy — what happens to an {@link ApprovalService}
|
||||
* ask BEFORE any interactive answerer sees it:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - `'ask'` (the default) — delegate to the composed answerers; with none
|
||||
* composed the chain falls through to the fail-closed `'unavailable'`
|
||||
* (exactly today's behavior).
|
||||
* - `'never'` — never prompt anyone: every ask resolves `'rejected'`
|
||||
* deterministically. The strict headless stance (CI, unattended runs) and
|
||||
* the only policy value stated in the system prompt — unlike `'ask'`, its
|
||||
* outcome is knowable without asking, so stating it cannot overclaim.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export type ApprovalPolicy = 'ask' | 'never'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:258`](../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-web`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -998,6 +1167,7 @@ Abstract service classes — a deployment loads a concrete implementation packag
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime` — abstract `CodeRuntime` ([`packages/code-runtime/code-runtime/src/index.ts`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime/src/index.ts))
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-compact` — abstract `CompactService` ([`packages/compact/compact/src/index.ts`](../packages/compact/compact/src/index.ts))
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs` — abstract `FileSystem` ([`packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts`](../packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts))
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox` — abstract `SandboxProvider` ([`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts))
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence` — abstract `SessionPersistence` ([`packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/src/index.ts`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/src/index.ts))
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-workflow` — abstract `WorkflowService` ([`packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts`](../packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context) {
|
||||
|
||||
A *client driver* is a UI plugin whose "user" is another program speaking a wire protocol rather than a human at a terminal. It owns the process's stdio (so it must run with **no stdout logger** — every non-protocol byte corrupts the stream), creates/resumes agents on demand through the `dsh-agent` factory seam, translates harness events (`session/event`, `agent/*`) into outbound protocol messages, and translates inbound requests back into `agent.send()` / `agent.cancel()`. Two harness-specific contracts make it correct: resolve each request exactly once off a settle signal (settle from the durable `turn/end` session event — the boundary is a session event, not an `agent/*` mirror — with `agent/status` as the fallback if a peer listener starved yours), and tear each agent down through its `AgentHandle.dispose()` (which stops the loop, `await`s its exit, and unregisters), not just `cancel()` — disposal must *reach* quiescence, not merely request it.
|
||||
|
||||
`packages/ui/acp` is the worked example: it bridges the agent to the Agent Client Protocol (JSON-RPC over stdio) so Zed and other ACP editors can drive it. See its README for the full method surface and the deferred-permission-gate note.
|
||||
`packages/ui/acp` is the worked example: it bridges the agent to the Agent Client Protocol (JSON-RPC over stdio) so Zed and other ACP editors can drive it. See its README for the full method surface and the permission-prompt answerer it registers on the approval seam.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Every product feature maps to a listener on a documented extension seam — the
|
||||
| AGENTS.md (subdir, on-touch) + file-change notices | `agent.inject()` from a watcher / tool-result listener |
|
||||
| Built-in tools | `ctx.tools.register()`; schemas flow into the assembly automatically — the `dsh-tool-*` families (bash, fs, web, subagent, todo) are the shipped examples |
|
||||
| ToolSearch / progressive disclosure | filter tools at `system-prompt/assemble` (the assembly carries the schemas; the loop logs the result as the request header, so disclosure stays reconstructable) |
|
||||
| Tool sandbox (landlock / sandbox-exec) | `tools/pre-execute` (deny), or a sandboxing `BashExecutor` on the `dsh-bash` seam |
|
||||
| Subprocess sandbox (landlock / sandbox-exec) | `tools/pre-execute` (deny), or a sandboxing `BashExecutor` on the `dsh-bash` seam |
|
||||
| Permission system / AskUserQuestion | `tools/pre-execute` (deny/ask); register an ask tool |
|
||||
| Plan mode | `tools/pre-execute` (deny writes) + a mode prompt section via `ctx.systemPrompt.section()` or `agent.inject()` (model-visible ⟺ logged: `agent/request` shapes call config only) |
|
||||
| Sub-agent delegation | the `ctx.subagents` provider registry (`dsh-subagent-spawn`/`-fork`/`-acp`) + `dsh-tool-subagent` exposing one configured provider to the model |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -163,6 +163,20 @@ Types: [Agent](../core-data-structures/core.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:464`](../../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `approval/*`
|
||||
|
||||
### `approval/request` — waterfall
|
||||
|
||||
Waterfall asking the composed answerers to decide one approval request. Dispatched only from ApprovalService.request — callers go through the service (which owns cancellation and the audit events), never through `ctx.waterfall` directly. A listener that can answer for this request's agent returns an outcome WITHOUT calling `next()` (the decision slot is single-occupancy, first listener to answer wins); a listener that does not recognize the agent MUST call `next()` so another answerer — or the fail-closed default `'unavailable'` — gets the question. Throwing is contained by the service and yields `'unavailable'`.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
'approval/request'(this: ApprovalService, req: ApprovalRequest, next: () => Promise<ApprovalOutcome>): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ApprovalOutcome](../core-data-structures/approval.md) · [ApprovalRequest](../core-data-structures/approval.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:64`](../../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `fs/*`
|
||||
|
||||
### `fs/edit-intent` — waterfall
|
||||
@@ -249,6 +263,28 @@ Awaited durability checkpoint. The agent loop awaits `ctx.parallel('session/flus
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/session/src/index.ts:57`](../../packages/core/session/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `skill/*`
|
||||
|
||||
### `skill/provider-added` — emit
|
||||
|
||||
A skill provider became resolvable in the `ctx.skills` registry. Consumers can observe this instead of depending on Cordis plugin load order, which is concurrent for sibling plugins.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
'skill/provider-added'(provider: SkillProvider): void
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:130`](../../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `skill/provider-removed` — emit
|
||||
|
||||
A skill provider left the registry because its plugin fiber was disposed.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
'skill/provider-removed'(name: string): void
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:136`](../../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `subagent/*`
|
||||
|
||||
### `subagent/end` — emit
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +359,7 @@ A tool was registered or unregistered (the available tool set changed).
|
||||
'tools/change'(): void
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:132`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:135`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `tools/execute` — waterfall
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -335,7 +371,7 @@ Around-dispatch waterfall wrapping the registry's core tool dispatch, between th
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ToolExecution](../core-data-structures/tools.md) · [ToolExecutionResult](../core-data-structures/tools.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:111`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:114`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `tools/post-execute` — waterfall
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -347,11 +383,11 @@ Waterfall AFTER a tool runs — where hook plugins inspect the result and accept
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ToolExecution](../core-data-structures/tools.md) · [ToolExecutionResult](../core-data-structures/tools.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:127`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:130`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `tools/pre-execute` — waterfall
|
||||
|
||||
Waterfall BEFORE a tool runs — the gate where sandbox, permission, and hook plugins allow or deny a call (Claude Code's `PreToolUse`). Listeners receive `(exec, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (allow), or return a PreToolDecision without calling `next()` to short-circuit. A `deny` skips dispatch and yields an `isError` result; the tool body never runs. Input rewrite is deliberately NOT offered here (see PreToolDecision); `ask` degrades to deny until the permission system lands (`FIXME(permissions)`).
|
||||
Waterfall BEFORE a tool runs — the gate where sandbox, permission, and hook plugins allow or deny a call (Claude Code's `PreToolUse`). Listeners receive `(exec, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (allow), or return a PreToolDecision without calling `next()` to short-circuit. A `deny` skips dispatch and yields an `isError` result; the tool body never runs. Input rewrite is deliberately NOT offered here (see PreToolDecision); `ask` is serviced by the `ctx.approval` seam when one is mounted, and degrades to deny otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
'tools/pre-execute'(this: ToolRegistry, exec: ToolExecution, next: () => Promise<PreToolDecision>): Promise<PreToolDecision>
|
||||
@@ -359,7 +395,7 @@ Waterfall BEFORE a tool runs — the gate where sandbox, permission, and hook pl
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ToolExecution](../core-data-structures/tools.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:91`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:94`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `workflow/*`
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ The agent-loop plugin (`ctx.agentLoop`): creates ReactLoopAgents, runs their loo
|
||||
The loop itself is deliberately thin — every behavior beyond "call the model, run the tools, repeat" belongs to plugins listening on the event taxonomy declared in @deepseek-ai/dsh-agent.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
create(id: AgentId, options: AgentOptions = {}): ReactLoopAgent
|
||||
create(id: AgentId, options: AgentOptions = {}, meta: Pick<SessionHeader, 'cwd'> = {}): ReactLoopAgent
|
||||
createAgent(options: CreateAgentOptions): AgentHandle
|
||||
async resume(options: ResumeAgentOptions): Promise<AgentHandle>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent-loop/src/index.ts:68`](../../packages/core/agent-loop/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent-loop/src/index.ts:70`](../../packages/core/agent-loop/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.agents` — `AgentRegistry`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,20 @@ Types: [Agent](../core-data-structures/core.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/agent/src/index.ts:117`](../../packages/core/agent/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.approval` — `ApprovalService`
|
||||
|
||||
The `ctx.approval` service: dispatches ApprovalRequests to the `approval/request` waterfall and audits every ask/outcome pair to the requesting agent's session log. Stateless between requests — grants are returned to the caller, never stored here.
|
||||
|
||||
Owns the policy tier too (`effective = fold(the session's 'approval/policy' events) ?? config.policy`): `request()` resolves `'never'` to `'rejected'` before dispatching any interactive answerer, a per-agent prompt section states a `'never'` policy (and only that one in prose — an `'ask'` promise could overclaim an answerer that headless compositions do not have), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice when a session's effective policy moved past what the model was last told.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
async request(req: ApprovalRequest): Promise<ApprovalOutcome>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ApprovalOutcome](../core-data-structures/approval.md) · [ApprovalRequest](../core-data-structures/approval.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:282`](../../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.bash` — `BashExecutor` (abstract seam)
|
||||
|
||||
Abstract bash execution service. Subclass, implement the abstract methods, and load the subclass as a plugin — it registers as `ctx.bash` (one implementation per context; loading a second throws, which is cordis' standard duplicate-service behavior).
|
||||
@@ -65,7 +79,7 @@ onTaskDone(listener: BashTaskListener): () => void
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [BashExecRequest](../core-data-structures/bash.md) · [BashExecSpec](../core-data-structures/bash.md) · [BashRunResult](../core-data-structures/bash.md) · [BashTask](../core-data-structures/bash.md) · [BashTaskRead](../core-data-structures/bash.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts:59`](../../packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts:62`](../../packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.codeRuntime` — `CodeRuntime` (abstract seam)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -147,6 +161,24 @@ Types: [GenerateOptions](../core-data-structures/core.md) · [StreamChunk](../co
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts:88`](../../packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.sandbox` — `SandboxProvider` (abstract seam)
|
||||
|
||||
Abstract process-sandbox service. Subclass, implement confine, and load the subclass as a plugin — it registers as `ctx.sandbox` (one implementation per context; loading a second throws, cordis' standard duplicate-service behavior).
|
||||
|
||||
Semantics every implementation must honor:
|
||||
|
||||
- confine either returns an argv whose runner ENFORCES the policy or fails closed — at `confine` time with SandboxUnavailableError (no backend for this host), or at EXECUTION time by the runner itself refusing to run the command (exiting without exec'ing it, identified by ConfinedArgv.runnerFailureSignatures). A silent unconfined passthrough is never a legal outcome on either path.
|
||||
- Probing exists to ARBITRATE between multiple candidate backends and may be skipped when a platform has exactly one: the sole candidate is selected directly and the runner's exec-time fail-closed refusal carries the safety property. When probing does run, it is functional (actually enforcing a profile, not a version check), at most once per provider lifetime; `confine` itself spawns nothing beyond that one-time probing.
|
||||
- The returned ConfinedArgv.enforcement states the backend's actual completeness for THIS host; `partial` is reported, never silently upgraded to `full`.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
abstract confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): ConfinedArgv
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ConfinedArgv](../core-data-structures/sandbox.md) · [SandboxPolicy](../core-data-structures/sandbox.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts:180`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.sessionPersistence` — `SessionPersistence` (abstract seam)
|
||||
|
||||
Abstract durable session-persistence service. Subclass, implement the abstract methods, and load the subclass as a plugin — it registers as `ctx.sessionPersistence` (one implementation per context; loading a second throws, cordis' standard duplicate-service behavior).
|
||||
@@ -199,6 +231,19 @@ fork(source: SessionForkSource, boundary?: number, childSessionId?: SessionId):
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/session/src/index.ts:405`](../../packages/core/session/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.skills` — `SkillService`
|
||||
|
||||
Registry of skill providers. It merges provider catalogs with stable first-wins duplicate handling, exposes sorted model-visible summaries, and loads full skill bodies on demand.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
registerProvider(provider: SkillProvider): () => void
|
||||
register(skill: SkillRegistration): () => void
|
||||
async list(options: SkillLookupOptions = {}): Promise<SkillSummary[]>
|
||||
async get(name: string, options: SkillLookupOptions = {}): Promise<SkillDefinition | undefined>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:157`](../../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.subagents` — `SubagentService`
|
||||
|
||||
The `subagents` service: a registry of named SubagentProviders and a capability-checked start surface.
|
||||
@@ -238,7 +283,7 @@ async execute(exec: ToolExecution): Promise<ToolExecutionResult>
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [ToolDefinition](../core-data-structures/tools.md) · [ToolExecution](../core-data-structures/tools.md) · [ToolExecutionResult](../core-data-structures/tools.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:345`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:349`](../../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.userInteraction` — `UserInteractionService`
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
||||
# User Approval
|
||||
|
||||
The user-approval seam of [dsh-user-approval](../../packages/ui/user-approval) answers one question: may this specific action proceed? It owns the shared request/outcome vocabulary, the `ctx.approval` dispatch service, the `approval/request` answerer waterfall, the log-only audit pair, and the per-session `ask`/`never` policy. UI channels such as [dsh-acp](../../packages/ui/acp) provide answerers; callers such as [dsh-tools](../../packages/core/tools) and [dsh-tool-bash](../../packages/bash/tool-bash) consume the closed outcome and fail closed unless it is `allowed-once`.
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts`](../../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## Identity and outcome
|
||||
|
||||
Every request receives a fresh `ApprovalRequestId`. The brand pairs the `approval/asked` and `approval/decided` audit events without making approval ids interchangeable with tool-call, session, or agent ids.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type ApprovalRequestId = Branded<'ApprovalRequestId'>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`ApprovalOutcome` is closed and fail-closed. `allowed-once` grants only the asked-about action; callers deny on `rejected`, `cancelled`, and `unavailable`. A missing, non-owning, throwing, or non-conforming answerer becomes `unavailable` rather than opening the gate.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type ApprovalOutcome = 'allowed-once' | 'rejected' | 'cancelled' | 'unavailable'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Per-session policy
|
||||
|
||||
`ApprovalPolicy` determines what happens before interactive answerers run. `ask` delegates to the composed answerer chain, whose no-answer default is `unavailable`; `never` deterministically returns `rejected` without dispatching any answerer. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event in the session log, falling back to the service config. `setApprovalPolicy(session, policy)` is the single write path, so replay reconstructs the override.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type ApprovalPolicy = 'ask' | 'never'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The prompt section states the deterministic `never` behavior and records either policy with a source-owned marker. The pre-step narrator reads that marker from the logged request header after restart; it does not infer state from deployment persona prose. An idle ACP switch is held in the bridge until the next `turn/start`, because approval audit and policy events must remain turn-enclosed for durable replay.
|
||||
|
||||
## Approval request
|
||||
|
||||
`ApprovalRequest` identifies the agent and tool action closely enough to route and audit the question. It deliberately omits tool arguments: an answerer attaches the prompt to the already-streamed tool call through `callId` instead of rendering a second copy that could drift.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface ApprovalRequest {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The agent on whose behalf the question is asked. Routes the question (a
|
||||
* UI answerer only answers for agents it owns) and receives the audit
|
||||
* events on its session log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
agent: Agent
|
||||
/** The tool the question is about (presentation and audit). */
|
||||
toolName: string
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The exact tool call being decided, when the asker has one — lets a UI
|
||||
* attach the prompt to the tool call it already streamed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
callId?: CallId
|
||||
/** The asker's human-readable explanation of WHY it is asking. */
|
||||
reason?: string
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Aborting withdraws the question: the request settles `'cancelled'`
|
||||
* immediately and a late answer from a still-pending answerer is discarded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
signal?: AbortSignal
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Dispatch and audit
|
||||
|
||||
`ctx.approval.request(req)` requires the requesting session to be inside an open turn. It appends `approval/asked`, obtains one outcome, appends the matching `approval/decided`, and resolves with that outcome. The `never` policy is enforced inside the service before waterfall dispatch, so even an answerer registered later with `prepend` cannot bypass it. Answerers return an outcome when they own the request or call `next()` to delegate; the first answer occupies the single decision slot.
|
||||
|
||||
The audit events are log-only and do not enter the model transcript. Model-visible behavior is the caller's derived tool result, while the request header records the prompt policy that the model actually saw. Service disposal removes its prompt section and pre-step narrator together; answerer listeners are independently effect-bound to their owning plugins.
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +44,20 @@ interface BashExecRequest {
|
||||
* ownerless background start (a non-agent caller).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
owner?: OwnerToken | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Explicit per-call sandbox-policy input, overriding the executor's
|
||||
* configured default mode for THIS call. Never a silent default: a
|
||||
* consumer sets it only from an explicit policy source — an
|
||||
* `'allowed-once'` grant a human just issued through `ctx.approval` (the
|
||||
* escalation flow in the sandbox RFC § Escalation, which outranks), or the
|
||||
* session's standing override folded from its own `bash/sandbox-mode`
|
||||
* events (the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching — the user's recorded per-session
|
||||
* choice). A sandboxing executor confines THIS call under the given mode;
|
||||
* a non-sandboxing executor carries the field and confines nothing (the
|
||||
* tool layer stamps neither escalation nor overrides without a sandboxing
|
||||
* executor — see {@link BashExecutor.sandboxMode}).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sandboxMode?: SandboxMode | undefined
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,6 +93,16 @@ interface BashExecSpec {
|
||||
* task. `start()` stores it; `run()` (foreground) ignores it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
owner: OwnerToken | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The sandbox mode this call executes under, REQUIRED-but-nullable for the
|
||||
* same visibility reason as `owner`. A sandboxing executor's `resolve()`
|
||||
* stamps the effective mode (the request's explicit override, else its
|
||||
* configured default) so `run()`/`start()` read the spec, never the config;
|
||||
* a non-sandboxing executor carries the request value through verbatim and
|
||||
* ignores it (`undefined` under such an executor means what its README says:
|
||||
* unconfined execution).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sandboxMode: SandboxMode | undefined
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +130,12 @@ interface BashRunResult {
|
||||
timeoutMs: number
|
||||
stdout: CollectedOutput
|
||||
stderr: CollectedOutput
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sandbox facts, present iff a sandboxing executor ran the command — an
|
||||
* unsandboxed executor (e.g. `dsh-bash-local`) never sets it. See
|
||||
* {@link BashSandboxInfo} for the `denied` classification semantics.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sandbox?: BashSandboxInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -122,9 +152,52 @@ interface CollectedOutput {
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## File sandbox: `BashSandboxInfo`
|
||||
|
||||
A sandbox-consuming executor (`dsh-bash-sandbox`) exposes its configured fallback through `BashExecutor.sandboxMode`. The tool layer folds each agent session's durable `bash/sandbox-mode` override, stamps the effective mode onto the request, states it in the per-agent prompt, and may replace it for one user-approved strictly wider call. The mode/enforcement vocabulary is owned and cataloged by the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox` seam](sandbox.md), whose provider wraps the executor's argv; modes govern FILE effects only, not network or process visibility.
|
||||
|
||||
A sandboxed run always reports the facts it executed under on `BashRunResult.sandbox`: `denied` is the executor's conservative classification of a failure as sandbox-caused (a failed exit whose stderr carries a filesystem-permission signature — never a clean exit or a signal kill), read from the collected stderr tail; `enforcement` reports how completely the selected backend governs the mode's file effects (`SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'` — `partial` when an older Landlock ABI governs only a subset of the requested accesses; absent under `danger-full-access`, where nothing is confined); `runnerFailed` marks the opposite of a denial — the sandbox RUNNER itself failed and the command never ran (stamped only on settled background tasks; a foreground run surfaces the same condition as the thrown `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error):
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface BashSandboxInfo {
|
||||
/** The mode the command actually ran under. */
|
||||
mode: SandboxMode
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True when the executor classifies this run's failure as the sandbox
|
||||
* denying a file operation. The classification is CONSERVATIVE (a failed
|
||||
* exit whose stderr carries a filesystem-permission signature) and reads
|
||||
* the COLLECTED stderr — the bounded in-memory tail per
|
||||
* {@link CollectedOutput} semantics, so a signature that survives only in a
|
||||
* spill file is missed toward `denied: false`. A plain command failure
|
||||
* keeps `denied: false` even under a sandboxed mode.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
denied: boolean
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How completely the runner enforced `mode`'s file effects — see
|
||||
* {@link SandboxEnforcement}. Absent exactly when `mode` is
|
||||
* `danger-full-access`: nothing is confined, so there is no enforcement to
|
||||
* report.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
enforcement?: SandboxEnforcement
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True when the executor classifies this failure as the SANDBOX RUNNER
|
||||
* itself failing (missing binary, refused profile, fail-closed refusal
|
||||
* before exec) — the command NEVER RAN; this is a sandbox failure, not a
|
||||
* task failure, and it outranks `denied` (a runner's own error text can
|
||||
* contain denial words). Only ever stamped on settled BACKGROUND tasks: a
|
||||
* foreground run surfaces the same condition as the thrown
|
||||
* `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error instead (the foreground path has an error
|
||||
* channel; a settled task's facts are its only channel).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
runnerFailed?: boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
One more piece completes the vocabulary: the `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error code (owned by the [sandbox seam](sandbox.md)) is what the `ctx.sandbox` provider throws — and the executor propagates — when a confined mode has no usable backend. A selected runner refusing its profile reaches the same fail-closed foreground error; a settled background task records `runnerFailed`. The model sees the current effective mode in the prompt, receives denial/runner facts in results, and can request a one-shot strictly wider retry through `sandbox_permissions` plus `justification`; `ctx.approval` must grant that exact call before anything executes. The complete policy and switching design is the [sandbox RFC](../rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Background tasks: `BashTask`
|
||||
|
||||
A long-running command started with `start()` is tracked as a `BashTask`. `BashTaskStatus` is `'running' | 'completed' | 'killed'`; `done` resolves when the underlying process closes and never rejects.
|
||||
A long-running command started with `start()` is tracked as a `BashTask`. `BashTaskStatus` is `'running' | 'completed' | 'killed'`; `done` resolves when the underlying process closes and never rejects. A sandboxing executor stamps `sandbox` once the task settles — classification runs against the settled task's collected stderr — so the field is absent while running and under an unsandboxed executor.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface BashTask {
|
||||
@@ -137,6 +210,16 @@ interface BashTask {
|
||||
signal: NodeJS.Signals | null
|
||||
/** Resolves when the underlying process closes (never rejects). */
|
||||
readonly done: Promise<void>
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sandbox facts for this task's execution, stamped by a sandboxing executor
|
||||
* once the task settles and BEFORE completion listeners are notified — an
|
||||
* `onTaskDone` consumer and a `done` awaiter both see it. Denial
|
||||
* classification runs against the settled task's collected stderr, so the
|
||||
* field cannot exist earlier: absent while the task is running and under an
|
||||
* executor that does not sandbox. See {@link BashSandboxInfo} for the
|
||||
* `denied` semantics.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sandbox?: BashSandboxInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@ Everything else is documented on a **sub-page**, not here. The rule that draws t
|
||||
| [session-query.md](session-query.md) | logical session/event records and bounded exact-event reads |
|
||||
| [tools.md](tools.md) | `ToolDefinition` full fields, the schema DSL, `ToolExecution`/`ToolResult`, tool-presentation UI types, the `tools/pre-execute`/`tools/post-execute` pipeline |
|
||||
| [user-interaction.md](user-interaction.md) | the UI-backed human question/answer seam: `AskUserQuestionRequest`, answer/options vocabulary, provider API, error taxonomy |
|
||||
| [approval.md](approval.md) | the one-shot user-approval seam: `ApprovalRequest`, `ApprovalOutcome`, per-session policy, audit and answerer contracts |
|
||||
| [bash.md](bash.md) | the bash executor seam: `BashExecRequest`/`Spec`, `BashRunResult`, background `BashTask`s |
|
||||
| [sandbox.md](sandbox.md) | the process-confinement seam: file-effect modes, `SandboxPolicy`, `ConfinedArgv`, enforcement and fail-closed errors |
|
||||
| [code-runtime.md](code-runtime.md) | the code-execution seam: `CodeRunRequest`/`Result`, binding namespaces, captured logs, the `CodeRunFailure` taxonomy |
|
||||
| [filesystem.md](filesystem.md) | the filesystem seam: `FsTarget`, read/write/edit outcomes, observed-file state, `FsErrorCode` |
|
||||
| [skills.md](skills.md) | the skill service: discovery priority, `SkillSummary`/`SkillDefinition`, session-prefix catalog, model-facing `skill` loading |
|
||||
| [compaction.md](compaction.md) | the compaction seam: the `compact/*` session events, `CompactionResult`, the `CompactService` interface |
|
||||
| [subagent.md](subagent.md) | the subagent seam: the named-provider registry, `SubagentStartRequest`/`Result`/`Run`, the start-time-vs-runtime capability split |
|
||||
| [web.md](web.md) | the web access seam: `WebSearchRequest`/`Result`, `WebFetchRequest`/`Result`, `WebFetchBody`, provider/capability status, `WebError` |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
# Process Sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
The process-sandbox seam of [dsh-sandbox](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox) wraps a same-world subprocess argv in a file-effect policy without coupling consumers to a platform runner. [dsh-sandbox-local](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) supplies the Linux bwrap/Landlock and macOS Seatbelt backends; [dsh-bash-sandbox](../../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) is the first consumer. Containers, microVMs, and remote execution are sibling implementations of whole capability seams, not providers of `ctx.sandbox`.
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## Modes and enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
`SandboxMode` governs filesystem effects only. `read-only` denies writes except the required `/dev/null` sink; `workspace-write` permits writes under the workspace root and the backend's promised temp area; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type SandboxMode = 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Only the first two modes can be sent to a provider. A `danger-full-access` consumer spawns its original argv and does not call `ctx.sandbox`.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, 'danger-full-access'>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Enforcement is a reported fact. `full` means the backend governs every file effect promised by the mode; `partial` means an active backend or older kernel ABI governs only a subset, so consumers that require the absolute promise must reject or surface that distinction.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Per-call policy
|
||||
|
||||
The policy is fully resolved and carried per call. This permits concurrent consumers and one-shot escalated retries to ask the same provider for different boundaries without mutating provider state.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SandboxPolicy {
|
||||
/** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
|
||||
mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
|
||||
/** Absolute root directory `workspace-write` may write under. */
|
||||
workspaceRoot: string
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Wrapped argv and classification dialects
|
||||
|
||||
`ConfinedArgv` is what the consumer spawns. Besides the replacement argv, it carries the backend's enforcement fact and two orthogonal stderr dialects. `denialSignatures` identify the confined command being blocked while the sandbox works correctly. `runnerFailureSignatures` identify the sandbox runner refusing or failing before it executes the command; consumers check these first and surface a sandbox infrastructure failure, never an ordinary task failure.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface ConfinedArgv {
|
||||
/** The wrapped argv (runner, profile, separator, then the caller's argv). */
|
||||
argv: string[]
|
||||
/** How completely the selected backend enforces the policy's file effects. */
|
||||
enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The selected backend's denial DIALECT: the case-insensitive stderr
|
||||
* substrings a file effect denied by THIS backend produces (EROFS text
|
||||
* under bwrap's read-only binds, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under
|
||||
* Seatbelt). A consumer that infers denials from a failed run's stderr
|
||||
* matches against exactly these rather than a cross-backend union — the
|
||||
* union claims denials a given backend never produces.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
denialSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* How the RUNNER ITSELF failing identifies itself: case-insensitive stderr
|
||||
* substrings produced when the sandbox binary is missing, refuses its
|
||||
* profile, or fails closed before exec'ing the command (`bwrap: `,
|
||||
* `landlock-run: `, `sandbox-exec: ` — each covers both the runner's own
|
||||
* error prefix and the shell's runner-not-found message). ORTHOGONAL to
|
||||
* {@link denialSignatures}: a denial is the confined COMMAND being blocked
|
||||
* (the sandbox working as designed); a runner failure means the command
|
||||
* NEVER RAN and must surface as a sandbox failure, not a task failure —
|
||||
* consumers check these signatures FIRST (a runner's own error text may
|
||||
* contain denial words, e.g. an unopenable grant root reporting
|
||||
* `Permission denied`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
An operator-configured local runner must supply at least one `runnerFailureSignatures` entry for its own pre-exec refusal dialect; the provider adds outer-shell missing and unexecutable forms automatically. This makes an executable custom runner rejecting its profile distinguishable from the wrapped command exiting with the same status.
|
||||
|
||||
## Provider and fail-closed errors
|
||||
|
||||
`ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy)` returns a `ConfinedArgv` or throws `SandboxUnavailableError` with code `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` when no usable backend exists. A selected runner can also fail closed at execution time, in which case its failure signature carries the same infrastructure meaning. Silent unconfined passthrough is never legal for a confined policy.
|
||||
|
||||
Provider probing arbitrates between multiple candidates and is cached for the provider lifetime. A platform with one candidate may select it directly; execution-time refusal retains the safety property. The local provider reports bwrap and Seatbelt as full and preserves the Landlock launcher's full/partial kernel verdict.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
# Skills
|
||||
|
||||
The [skill capability family](../../packages/skill) is split across three packages: the registry ([dsh-skill](../../packages/skill/skill), `ctx.skills`) merges provider catalogs; the local provider ([dsh-skill-local](../../packages/skill/skill-local)) scans project/custom/user directories; the consumer ([dsh-tool-skill](../../packages/skill/tool-skill)) owns the session-prefix catalog and model-facing `skill` tool. Skills are optional instructions, not session events, so their vocabulary lives here rather than in [core.md](core.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts`](../../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts), [`packages/skill/skill-local/src/index.ts`](../../packages/skill/skill-local/src/index.ts), and [`packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts`](../../packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts).
|
||||
|
||||
## Provider registry
|
||||
|
||||
`ctx.skills` is a multi-provider registry. Providers can represent local directories, embedded plugin data, HTTP catalogs, or another source. Provider plugins register synchronously during `apply()`; remote initialization, authentication, and discovery are awaited by `list()`. The registry validates candidates, resolves duplicate skill names first-wins by rank/provider order/local order, and sorts the final summaries by `name` for deterministic consumers. A provider `list()` rejection is logged and skipped without caching the degraded catalog; malformed candidates still fail fast because they violate the provider contract.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SkillProvider {
|
||||
name: string
|
||||
list(options: SkillLookupOptions): Promise<SkillCandidate[]>
|
||||
get(candidate: SkillCandidate, options: SkillLookupOptions): Promise<SkillDefinition | undefined>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Local discovery priority
|
||||
|
||||
The shipped local provider scans roots in rank order:
|
||||
|
||||
| Rank | Source | Root |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 100 | `project-dsh` | `<projectRoot>/.dsh/skills` |
|
||||
| 200 | `project-agents` | `<projectRoot>/.agents/skills` |
|
||||
| 300 | `custom` | `Config.customSkillDirs` |
|
||||
| 400 | `user-dsh` | `<dshHome>/skills` |
|
||||
| 500 | `user-agents` | `<agentsHome>/skills` |
|
||||
|
||||
The project root is the nearest ancestor containing `.git`; without one, the current cwd is used. When `ctx.fs` is available, the git-root walk probes `.git` through the filesystem service so remote or sandboxed workspaces do not fall back to the host filesystem boundary. The user DSH root skips its `.system` child, and DeepSeek Harness no longer ships built-in system skills from the local provider. Additional built-ins can be supplied later by another provider.
|
||||
|
||||
## Skill identity
|
||||
|
||||
Skill names are kebab-case (`^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$`). The local provider accepts directory bundles (`<name>/SKILL.md`) and flat Markdown files (`<name>.md`). Nested recursive `**/SKILL.md` discovery is intentionally outside v1.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type SkillSource = 'project-dsh' | 'project-agents' | 'runtime' | 'user-dsh' | 'user-agents' | 'custom' | (string & {})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Summaries, candidates, and complete definitions
|
||||
|
||||
`SkillSummary` is the registry's model-invocable summary shape. Consumers choose which fields to render; the session catalog uses only `name` and `description`, never the body or absolute file path. `disableModelInvocation` hides a skill from model listings while allowing trusted code to load it by name.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SkillSummary {
|
||||
name: string
|
||||
description: string
|
||||
whenToUse?: string
|
||||
disableModelInvocation?: boolean
|
||||
source: SkillSource
|
||||
provider: string
|
||||
resourceBase?: SkillResourceBase
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`SkillCandidate` is the provider-to-registry shape. `locator` is opaque provider state; the registry only stores it and gives it back to the winning provider's `get()`.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SkillCandidate extends SkillSummary {
|
||||
rank: number
|
||||
locator: unknown
|
||||
path?: string
|
||||
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`SkillDefinition` is the complete parsed result returned by `ctx.skills.get()` and used by the `skill` tool. `resourceBase` tells the tool how to render relative-resource guidance for local, URL, or provider-managed skills.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type SkillResourceBase =
|
||||
| { kind: 'directory'; path: string }
|
||||
| { kind: 'url'; url: string }
|
||||
| { kind: 'opaque'; description: string }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SkillDefinition extends SkillSummary {
|
||||
content: string
|
||||
path?: string
|
||||
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Runtime skills use the same complete shape and participate in the same first-wins collection order. The returned disposer removes the contribution and invalidates discovery caches.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
type SkillRegistration = Omit<SkillDefinition, 'provider'> & {
|
||||
provider?: string
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Lookup and configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Skill lookup is cwd-sensitive because providers may expose workspace-local skills, and its optional signal cancels provider work for the caller. If no git root is found, the local provider treats the supplied cwd itself as the project root.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface SkillLookupOptions {
|
||||
cwd?: string | undefined
|
||||
signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The registry owns only its discovery-cache bound. The local provider owns filesystem roots (`dshHome`, `agentsHome`, and `customSkillDirs`). The consumer owns its catalog description bound.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
interface Config {
|
||||
collectCacheMaxEntries?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Session catalog and tool contract
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-skill` contributes a user-role `<system-reminder>` through `agent/session-prefix`. The catalog contains sorted skill `name` and normalized, XML-escaped `description` only; it omits bodies, paths, sources, providers, and routing hints. Prefix discovery forwards the caller's abort signal through `SkillLookupOptions`. `catalogDescriptionMaxLength` is the consumer config for the description bound, with default `500` and integer minimum `3`. Its request-only, header-logged lifecycle is defined by the [session-prefix RFC](../rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-07-session-prefix.md).
|
||||
|
||||
The model-facing `skill({ name })` tool validates the kebab-case name, loads the complete definition for the calling agent cwd, reports an unresolved skill as unknown or no longer available, rejects `disableModelInvocation` skills, and returns a tool result containing `<skill_content name="...">`, `<skill_resources>`, and `<skill_instructions>`. `resourceBase` resolves explicitly referenced scripts, references, and assets only as needed; the loaded result does not enumerate a skill directory. The tool result is the model-visible path for complete instructions.
|
||||
@@ -10,15 +10,16 @@ This matrix shows which packages dispatch each harness-owned event and which pac
|
||||
| `agent/created` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:265`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent) (`emit`) | [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent) |
|
||||
| `agent/disposed` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:272`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent) (`emit`) | [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent) |
|
||||
| `agent/error` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:476`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `agent/pre-step` | `serial` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:357`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`serial`) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) |
|
||||
| `agent/prompt-submit` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:370`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex), [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) |
|
||||
| `agent/pre-step` | `serial` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:357`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`serial`) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| `agent/prompt-submit` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:370`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex), [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) |
|
||||
| `agent/queued` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:290`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `agent/request` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:394`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | - |
|
||||
| `agent/session-prefix` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:441`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | - |
|
||||
| `agent/session-prefix` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:441`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill) |
|
||||
| `agent/session-start` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:305`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`emit`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) |
|
||||
| `agent/status` | `emit` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:281`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`emit`) | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard), [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent) |
|
||||
| `agent/step-result` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:451`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | - |
|
||||
| `agent/turn-continuation` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/agent/src/types.ts:464`](../packages/core/agent/src/types.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) |
|
||||
| `approval/request` | `waterfall` | [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:64`](../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts) | [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) (`waterfall`) | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) |
|
||||
| `fs/edit-intent` | `waterfall` | [`packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts:123`](../packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) (`waterfall`) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) |
|
||||
| `fs/observed` | `emit` | [`packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts:138`](../packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) (`emit`) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) |
|
||||
| `fs/write-intent` | `waterfall` | [`packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts:109`](../packages/fs/fs/src/index.ts) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) (`waterfall`) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) |
|
||||
@@ -26,16 +27,18 @@ This matrix shows which packages dispatch each harness-owned event and which pac
|
||||
| `session/created` | `emit` | [`packages/core/session/src/index.ts:39`](../packages/core/session/src/index.ts) | [`session`](../packages/core/session) (`emit`) | [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| `session/event` | `emit` | [`packages/core/session/src/index.ts:47`](../packages/core/session/src/index.ts) | [`session`](../packages/core/session) (`emit`) | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent) |
|
||||
| `session/flush` | `parallel` | [`packages/core/session/src/index.ts:57`](../packages/core/session/src/index.ts) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) (`parallel`) | [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| `skill/provider-added` | `emit` | [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:130`](../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts) | [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `skill/provider-removed` | `emit` | [`packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts:136`](../packages/skill/skill/src/index.ts) | [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `subagent/end` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:98`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) (`events.dispatch`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude) |
|
||||
| `subagent/provider-added` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:72`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) (`emit`) | [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent) |
|
||||
| `subagent/provider-removed` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:83`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | - | [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent) |
|
||||
| `subagent/start` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:91`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) (`events.dispatch`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude) |
|
||||
| `system-prompt/assemble` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts:38`](../packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts) | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) (`waterfall`) | - |
|
||||
| `system-prompt/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts:44`](../packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts) | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `tools/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:132`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `tools/execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:111`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`timeout-policy`](../packages/timeout/timeout-policy) |
|
||||
| `tools/post-execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:127`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex), [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) |
|
||||
| `tools/pre-execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:91`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) |
|
||||
| `tools/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:135`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`emit`) | - |
|
||||
| `tools/execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:114`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`timeout-policy`](../packages/timeout/timeout-policy) |
|
||||
| `tools/post-execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:130`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex), [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) |
|
||||
| `tools/pre-execute` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:94`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) |
|
||||
| `workflow/agent-end` | `emit` | [`packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts:96`](../packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts) | [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) (`events.dispatch`) | - |
|
||||
| `workflow/agent-start` | `emit` | [`packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts:85`](../packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts) | [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) (`events.dispatch`) | - |
|
||||
| `workflow/end` | `emit` | [`packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts:106`](../packages/workflow/workflow/src/index.ts) | [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) (`events.dispatch`) | - |
|
||||
|
||||
+63
-17
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
subgraph group_bash["packages/bash"]
|
||||
pkg_bash["bash"]
|
||||
pkg_bash_local["bash-local"]
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox["bash-sandbox"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash["tool-bash"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_fs["packages/fs"]
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_fs_policy["fs-policy"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs["tool-fs"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_skill["packages/skill"]
|
||||
pkg_skill["skill"]
|
||||
pkg_skill_local["skill-local"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill["tool-skill"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_compact["packages/compact"]
|
||||
pkg_compact["compact"]
|
||||
pkg_compact_basic["compact-basic"]
|
||||
@@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_app_boot["app-boot"]
|
||||
pkg_stdio_agent["stdio-agent"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_ask_user["tool-ask-user"]
|
||||
pkg_user_approval["user-approval"]
|
||||
pkg_user_interaction["user-interaction"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_code_runtime["packages/code-runtime"]
|
||||
@@ -99,30 +106,37 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
subgraph group_guard["packages/guard"]
|
||||
pkg_repeat_tool_guard["repeat-tool-guard"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_sandbox["packages/sandbox"]
|
||||
pkg_sandbox["sandbox"]
|
||||
pkg_sandbox_local["sandbox-local"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_workflow["packages/workflow"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_workflow["tool-workflow"]
|
||||
pkg_workflow["workflow"]
|
||||
pkg_workflow_workerthread["workflow-workerthread"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
pkg_llm --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_bash --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_code_runtime_worker --> pkg_code_runtime
|
||||
pkg_llm_deepseek --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_llm_pi_ai --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_session --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_session --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_system_prompt --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_bash_local --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_local --> pkg_timeout
|
||||
pkg_fs --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_fs --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_web --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_sandbox --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_agent --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_agent --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_agent --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_agent --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_bash --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_bash --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_bash --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_fs_local --> pkg_fs
|
||||
pkg_fs_policy --> pkg_fs
|
||||
pkg_skill_local --> pkg_fs
|
||||
pkg_skill_local --> pkg_skill
|
||||
pkg_compact --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_compact --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_web_fetch_local --> pkg_timeout
|
||||
@@ -130,20 +144,19 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_web_search_deepseek --> pkg_web
|
||||
pkg_web_search_exa --> pkg_web
|
||||
pkg_web_search_perplexity --> pkg_web
|
||||
pkg_hook_protocol --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_hook_protocol --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_llm_replay --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_llm_replay --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_code_runtime
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_sandbox_local --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_sandbox_local --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_bash_local --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_local --> pkg_timeout
|
||||
pkg_compact_basic --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_compact_basic --> pkg_compact
|
||||
pkg_compact_basic --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_compact_basic --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_hook_protocol --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_hook_protocol --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_jsonl --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_jsonl --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_sqlite --> pkg_session
|
||||
@@ -154,11 +167,25 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_user_approval --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_user_approval --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_user_approval --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_user_approval --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_user_approval --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_user_interaction --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_user_interaction --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_workflow --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_workflow --> pkg_brand
|
||||
pkg_workflow --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_code_runtime
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_tools --> pkg_user_approval
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash_local
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_session
|
||||
@@ -168,13 +195,19 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_tool_bash --> pkg_user_approval
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs --> pkg_fs
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_tool_fs --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill --> pkg_skill
|
||||
pkg_tool_skill --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_subagent --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_subagent --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_subagent --> pkg_tools
|
||||
@@ -195,10 +228,13 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_hooks_codex --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_hooks_codex --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_user_approval
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_user_interaction
|
||||
pkg_tool_ask_user --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_tool_ask_user --> pkg_tools
|
||||
@@ -215,8 +251,11 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_invariants
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_skill
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_skill_local
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_system_prompt
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_tool_bash
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_tool_skill
|
||||
pkg_agent_core --> pkg_tools
|
||||
pkg_subagent_acp --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_subagent_acp --> pkg_llm
|
||||
@@ -274,53 +313,60 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| [`brand`](../packages/util/brand) | `util` | — |
|
||||
| [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) | `util` | — |
|
||||
| [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill) | `skill` | — |
|
||||
| [`subagent-subprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-subprocess) | `subagent` | — |
|
||||
| [`acp-snapshot`](../packages/support/acp-snapshot) | `support` | — |
|
||||
| [`app-boot`](../packages/ui/app-boot) | `ui` | — |
|
||||
| [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime) | `code-runtime` | — |
|
||||
| [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) | `llm` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand) |
|
||||
| [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | `bash` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand) |
|
||||
| [`code-runtime-worker`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker) | `code-runtime` | [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime) |
|
||||
| [`llm-deepseek`](../packages/llm/llm-deepseek) | `llm` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`llm-pi-ai`](../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai) | `llm` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`session`](../packages/core/session) | `core` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) | `core` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local) | `bash` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) |
|
||||
| [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) | `fs` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`web`](../packages/web/web) | `web` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) | `sandbox` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`agent`](../packages/core/agent) | `core` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
|
||||
| [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | `bash` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`fs-local`](../packages/fs/fs-local) | `fs` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) |
|
||||
| [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) | `fs` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) |
|
||||
| [`skill-local`](../packages/skill/skill-local) | `skill` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs), [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill) |
|
||||
| [`compact`](../packages/compact/compact) | `compact` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`web-fetch-local`](../packages/web/web-fetch-local) | `web` | [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout), [`web`](../packages/web/web) |
|
||||
| [`web-search-deepseek`](../packages/web/web-search-deepseek) | `web` | [`web`](../packages/web/web) |
|
||||
| [`web-search-exa`](../packages/web/web-search-exa) | `web` | [`web`](../packages/web/web) |
|
||||
| [`web-search-perplexity`](../packages/web/web-search-perplexity) | `web` | [`web`](../packages/web/web) |
|
||||
| [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol) | `hooks` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) | `session-persistence` | [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`llm-replay`](../packages/support/llm-replay) | `support` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
|
||||
| [`sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) | `sandbox` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) |
|
||||
| [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local) | `bash` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) |
|
||||
| [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | `compact` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`compact`](../packages/compact/compact), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol) | `hooks` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence-jsonl`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl) | `session-persistence` | [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence-sqlite`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite) | `session-persistence` | [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | `session-query` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) | `support` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
|
||||
| [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | `bash` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) |
|
||||
| [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | `bash` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | `bash` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | `fs` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill) | `skill` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) | `subagent` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web) | `web` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`web`](../packages/web/web) |
|
||||
| [`timeout-policy`](../packages/timeout/timeout-policy) | `timeout` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo) | `todo` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis) | `cordis` | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | `hooks` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) | `guard` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-workflow`](../packages/workflow/tool-workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) |
|
||||
| [`agent-core`](../packages/core/agent-core) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`agent-core`](../packages/core/agent-core) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`skill`](../packages/skill/skill), [`skill-local`](../packages/skill/skill-local), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`subagent-acp`](../packages/subagent/subagent-acp) | `subagent` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent), [`subagent-subprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-subprocess) |
|
||||
| [`subagent-inprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess) | `subagent` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent) | `subagent` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,40 @@ The on-disk envelope around every payload is `SessionEvent` — `type`, monotoni
|
||||
|
||||
## Events
|
||||
|
||||
### `approval/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `approval/asked` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
An approval question was put to the answerer chain — log-only audit (like `hook/*`; NOT a surface event, carries no `surfaceOp`). `id` pairs it with the `approval/decided` that always follows; `toolName` is the tool the question is about, `callId` the exact tool call when the asker had one, `reason` the asker's human-readable explanation (e.g. a hook's permission-decision reason).
|
||||
|
||||
```ts persistence-catalog
|
||||
'approval/asked': { id: ApprovalRequestId; toolName: string; callId?: CallId; reason?: string }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [CallId](core-data-structures/core.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:78`](../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
#### `approval/decided` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
The outcome of a prior `approval/asked` (same `id`) — log-only audit. Exactly one per ask, appended when the outcome is known: a decision, a cancellation, or the fail-closed `'unavailable'`.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts persistence-catalog
|
||||
'approval/decided': { id: ApprovalRequestId; outcome: ApprovalOutcome }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:89`](../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
#### `approval/policy` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
The session's approval policy was switched — log-only, durable, replayable, never in the model transcript (the model learns the policy from the prompt section and the narrator's notices). The LAST such event is the session's override (effectiveApprovalPolicy); who asked for it is derivable from position (an event after the log's last `request/header*` was a runtime switch by the user).
|
||||
|
||||
```ts persistence-catalog
|
||||
'approval/policy': { policy: ApprovalPolicy }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts:101`](../packages/ui/user-approval/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `assistant/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `assistant/chunk` — log-only
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +71,18 @@ Types: [ContentBlock](core-data-structures/core.md) · [TokenUsage](core-data-st
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/core/session/src/types.ts:320`](../packages/core/session/src/types.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `bash/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `bash/sandbox-mode` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
The session's sandbox mode was switched — log-only (like `approval/*`; NOT a surface event, carries no `surfaceOp`): durable and replayable, never in the model transcript. The LAST such event is the session's override (effectiveSandboxMode); who asked for it is derivable from position (an event after the log's last `request/header*` was a runtime switch by the user; see the tool layer's narrator).
|
||||
|
||||
```ts persistence-catalog
|
||||
'bash/sandbox-mode': { mode: SandboxMode }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/bash/bash/src/session-mode.ts:31`](../packages/bash/bash/src/session-mode.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `compact/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `compact/end` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-2
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ Generated by `pnpm run gen-rfc-index` from the RFC tree — never edit by hand;
|
||||
|
||||
| Title | First proposed |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| [Agent Client Protocol (ACP) support — drive the coding agent from external editors](proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) | 2026-06-14 |
|
||||
| [Multiplex concurrent ACP sessions over one connection](proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) | 2026-06-14 |
|
||||
| [Pre-tool input rewrite — a consistent design](proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md) | 2026-06-30 |
|
||||
| [Claude Code and Codex subagent backends (out-of-process delegation to external coding agents)](proposed/feature/2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md) | 2026-07-07 |
|
||||
| [SQLite FTS5 session search](proposed/feature/2026-07-10-sqlite-session-query-provider.md) | 2026-07-10 |
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +48,8 @@ Generated by `pnpm run gen-rfc-index` from the RFC tree — never edit by hand;
|
||||
|
||||
| Title | First proposed |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| [Agent Client Protocol (ACP) support — drive the coding agent from external editors](implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) | 2026-06-14 |
|
||||
| [Multiplex concurrent ACP sessions over one connection](implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) | 2026-06-14 |
|
||||
| [Code Mode — the model writes TypeScript against the tool registry](implemented/feature/2026-06-15-code-mode.md) | 2026-06-15 |
|
||||
| [Filesystem tool schemas — model-facing read/write/edit shapes](implemented/feature/2026-06-17-filesystem-tool-schemas.md) | 2026-06-17 |
|
||||
| [Rich ACP bash rendering — the terminal card via the `_meta` convention](implemented/feature/2026-06-18-acp-terminal-and-tool-rendering.md) | 2026-06-18 |
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +64,10 @@ Generated by `pnpm run gen-rfc-index` from the RFC tree — never edit by hand;
|
||||
| [SessionStore fork API](implemented/feature/2026-06-30-session-store-fork-api.md) | 2026-06-30 |
|
||||
| [Subagent lifecycle enrichment — lastAssistantMessage (observe-only)](implemented/feature/2026-06-30-subagent-observe-enrich.md) | 2026-06-30 |
|
||||
| [Dynamic workflows — a script-driven multi-agent orchestration seam](implemented/feature/2026-07-05-dynamic-workflows.md) | 2026-07-05 |
|
||||
| [Skill system — progressive disclosure instructions for agents](implemented/feature/2026-07-05-skill-system.md) | 2026-07-05 |
|
||||
| [The approval seam — one-shot permission decisions over a waterfall of answerers](implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) | 2026-07-06 |
|
||||
| [Explicit model-facing tool order](implemented/feature/2026-07-06-explicit-tool-order.md) | 2026-07-06 |
|
||||
| [The subprocess sandbox — confinement seam, native runners, escalation, and per-session modes](implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) | 2026-07-06 |
|
||||
| [The session prefix — request-only messages in front of the derived history](implemented/feature/2026-07-07-session-prefix.md) | 2026-07-07 |
|
||||
| [Repeat-tool-call guard plugin](implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md) | 2026-07-08 |
|
||||
| [The self-referential cordis toolset](implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md) | 2026-07-08 |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Sessions lived only in memory. The example `session-jsonl.ts` plugin (duplicated byte-for-byte in both examples) was write-only telemetry: it buffered `session/event` and appended JSON lines, with no read/replay path, no crash-safety (no fsync, no atomic write, a fire-and-forget dispose drain), no listing, and no format versioning. Nothing could rehydrate a past session from disk into a live agent, so durable resume ("continue yesterday's task"), durable forking, and the ACP `session/load` method ([ACP support](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) were all impossible.
|
||||
Sessions lived only in memory. The example `session-jsonl.ts` plugin (duplicated byte-for-byte in both examples) was write-only telemetry: it buffered `session/event` and appended JSON lines, with no read/replay path, no crash-safety (no fsync, no atomic write, a fire-and-forget dispose drain), no listing, and no format versioning. Nothing could rehydrate a past session from disk into a live agent, so durable resume ("continue yesterday's task"), durable forking, and the ACP `session/load` method ([ACP support](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) were all impossible.
|
||||
|
||||
The [event-sourced model](2026-06-11-event-sourced-sessions.md) makes the append-only log the single source of truth and derives LLM history from it. Persistence had to stay faithful to that: persist the existing `SessionEvent` directly, with no parallel "persisted message" type that the log is converted to and from. The backend also had to be swappable — a file store now, a database store later — behind one interface.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ Format versioning: the header carries a `version`; `load` rejects any non-curren
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Two new packages and the metadata seam in `dsh-session` (`session.header`, the `create(id?, options?)` signature). Bought: durable resume/fork, a read/replay path, crash tolerance, and the foundation the ACP `session/load` ([ACP support](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) needs — all over the existing event-sourced log, with the backend swappable behind one interface. The reusable `runPersistenceContract` suite holds every backend to the same append-only / contiguous-seq / lazy-materialization / serializability semantics. This completes [event-sourced sessions](2026-06-11-event-sourced-sessions.md)'s deferred "real persistence backend" and resolves its `TODO(review)` on the event vocabulary: persisting the log freezes its shape, and the `assistant/chunk` fidelity question is answered above (persist verbatim).
|
||||
Two new packages and the metadata seam in `dsh-session` (`session.header`, the `create(id?, options?)` signature). Bought: durable resume/fork, a read/replay path, crash tolerance, and the foundation the ACP `session/load` ([ACP support](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) needs — all over the existing event-sourced log, with the backend swappable behind one interface. The reusable `runPersistenceContract` suite holds every backend to the same append-only / contiguous-seq / lazy-materialization / serializability semantics. This completes [event-sourced sessions](2026-06-11-event-sourced-sessions.md)'s deferred "real persistence backend" and resolves its `TODO(review)` on the event vocabulary: persisting the log freezes its shape, and the `assistant/chunk` fidelity question is answered above (persist verbatim).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Agent Client Protocol (ACP) support — drive the coding agent from external editors
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The harness originally exposed agents only through a readline loop. That surface could carry text, but it gave an editor no structured way to create or resume sessions, correlate prompt completion, stream reasoning and tool activity, render tool-specific UI, ask for permission, or cancel one conversation without disturbing another. ACP defines those interactions as JSON-RPC over stdio, and Zed is the target client used to make concrete compatibility decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge must preserve the harness's existing ownership boundaries. It cannot depend on the concrete agent loop, bypass the tool registry, execute shell commands in the editor, or invent a second source of session truth. stdout is also the protocol transport, so any accidental log output corrupts the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp` is a UI/client-driver plugin under `packages/ui/acp`. It uses `@agentclientprotocol/sdk`'s `AgentSideConnection` over stdin/stdout and programs only interface services: the agent create/resume factory, session persistence, tool registry, user interaction, and optional approval/bash capabilities. It does not change the agent loop and is not a capability-seam implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge implements the following stable session path:
|
||||
|
||||
- `initialize` negotiates the protocol version, advertises text plus `resource_link` prompts, and advertises `loadSession`.
|
||||
- `session/new` validates an absolute `cwd`, stores it in `SessionHeader`, creates an agent through `ctx.agents`, and returns any composition-backed config options.
|
||||
- `session/load` validates the requested cwd against persisted metadata before constructing an agent, reserves the id across the asynchronous resume, replays user/assistant/tool events as ACP updates, and reports the resumed config-option fold.
|
||||
- `session/prompt` accepts text and resource links, rejects unsupported or empty content, allows one in-flight prompt per session, and settles against that prompt's owning `turn/end`. An error turn rejects the RPC; other closed turn reasons map through a total ACP stop-reason codec.
|
||||
- `session/cancel` calls the queue-aware agent cancel path and settles only the addressed session's prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
Tool-call presentation remains tool-owned. A tool's `presentCall` and `presentResult` return the `generic`, `terminal`, or `diff` render-intent variants; the bridge switches on that union and maps it to ACP. Presenter-less tools receive a generic fallback. Bash terminal cards use Zed's capability-gated `_meta.terminal_info`, `_meta.terminal_output`, and `_meta.terminal_exit` convention; the harness still executes the command through `ctx.bash`, preserving sandbox, environment scrub, ownership, and cwd. Clients without that extension receive ordinary text content. Filesystem tools provide diff cards and file locations without hard-coded tool-name branches in the bridge.
|
||||
|
||||
Permission handling is an answerer on the [user-approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md), not an ask-every-tool policy in ACP. An `approval/request` for a bridge-owned agent with a call id becomes `session/request_permission` on that agent's editor session, with one-shot allow/reject choices. Foreign or call-less requests delegate; a missing or failed answerer remains fail-closed. The plugin that asks—such as a pre-execute policy or bash escalation—owns the decision to ask.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge advertises ACP config options instead of session modes. `sandbox-mode` exists only when the mounted bash executor reports sandbox capability, and `approval-policy` exists only when `ctx.approval` is composed. Each option is an independent select whose current value is the session event fold over the composition default. `session/set_config_option` validates against the owning domain vocabulary and writes through `setSandboxMode` or `setApprovalPolicy`. An open-turn switch appends immediately; an idle switch is overlaid in the response and anchored at the next turn start. Until that anchor it is memory-only and a crash reverts to the durable fold. ACP session modes are deliberately not modeled because one mode list cannot represent these orthogonal knobs and config options are the forward protocol surface. Runtime model selection remains outside this decision; `AcpConfig.model` is connection-wide.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge also provides the ACP-backed `UserInteractionProvider`: `ask_user_question` requests become form elicitations on the owning session. Select, multi-select, option descriptions, and custom-answer override semantics are preserved.
|
||||
|
||||
Lifecycle ownership is explicit. The bridge holds an `AgentHandle` per live session. Disconnect and Cordis disposal cancel pending prompts, dispose every handle in parallel, await loop quiescence and persistence flush, and then remove the records. Stream notification failures are contained so a vanished client cannot corrupt an agent turn. The ACP app composition loads no stdout logger; a test guards stdout as framed JSON-RPC only.
|
||||
|
||||
The precise supported and deferred protocol rows live in [`packages/ui/acp/acp-feature-support.md`](../../../../packages/ui/acp/acp-feature-support.md); the package README is the operational contract.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**A prepended `tools/execute` listener that asks on every ACP-owned call** — rejected. It would hard-code permission policy into the UI bridge, ask even when no policy requires it, and could not serve approval requests that arise after execution begins. The shared user-approval seam keeps mechanism, asking policy, and UI answerer separate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Inject the concrete `agentLoop`** — rejected. Agent creation, resume, idle observation, and disposal are interface-level ownership operations on `dsh-agent`; a UI plugin does not need a dependency-rule exception.
|
||||
|
||||
**Execute bash through ACP `terminal/*`** — rejected. That would move execution outside the harness and bypass its sandbox, credential scrub, task ownership, cwd resolution, and session log. Terminal metadata is presentation only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Represent sandbox and approval as ACP session modes** — rejected. They are independent composable settings, while a single current mode is mutually exclusive. ACP config options represent both without a cross-product and match the protocol's forward direction.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hijack stdout defensively** — rejected. Process-wide monkey-patching is outside Cordis effect ownership and races the protocol transport. The app composition owns stdout purity.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Editors can create, load, prompt, cancel, render, ask, and reconfigure multiple harness sessions over one ACP connection without a loop-specific dependency. The session event log remains the durable source for replay, prompt settlement, cwd, and per-session configuration. Tool presentation and human-answer channels remain extensible plugin contracts instead of ACP-specific behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge deliberately does not implement session list/delete/resume/close capabilities, MCP passthrough, additional directories, image/audio/embedded-resource prompts, runtime model selection, plans, slash commands, usage updates, editor filesystem delegation, or the ACP terminal execution sub-protocol. The feature checklist records these as unsupported rather than silently accepting them.
|
||||
|
||||
An idle config selection is truthful in the live response but not durable until the next turn anchors it. Crashing before that boundary loses the pending selection; this is the cost of keeping session events turn-enclosed and replay-safe.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
The ACP suites cover the in-memory protocol codec, create/load replay, exact prompt settlement, cancellation races, unsupported content, tool presentation, terminal capability fallback, permission outcome mapping, config-option validation and persistence, multi-session isolation, disconnect/disposal quiescence, and HMR cleanup. Snapshot and built-bin tests exercise the app composition, while the real-API e2e self-skips without a key.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Multiplex concurrent ACP sessions over one connection
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
An ACP editor can keep several conversations alive over one agent subprocess. A single-active-session bridge would force extra processes and would not match Zed's client model, which tracks multiple session ids and concurrent loads. Multiplexing introduces isolation risks: events, prompt completion, cancellation, permission prompts, config selections, and predictable background-task ids must never cross session boundaries.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
The ACP bridge stores live sessions in `Map<SessionId, SessionRecord>` and keeps a `WeakMap<Agent, SessionId>` reverse index for agent-scoped callbacks. A record owns its agent handle, in-flight prompt, live tool-call presentation state, pending idle config switches, session cwd, and client capability snapshot. A separate loading-id set reserves each id before asynchronous resume so two pipelined loads cannot construct duplicate agents; distinct ids may load concurrently.
|
||||
|
||||
Every `session/event` and `agent/status` callback resolves the owning record before sending or settling anything. Each session permits one in-flight prompt independently. The prompt records a log watermark, captures its own `turn/start`, and settles only on the matching `turn/end`; a late end from a cancelled prior turn cannot resolve a newer prompt. `session/cancel` addresses one record and calls only that agent's queue-aware cancel path.
|
||||
|
||||
Permission ownership uses the same reverse index. The ACP `approval/request` answerer prompts only the editor session that owns the requesting agent and delegates foreign requests. User-interaction elicitations likewise route by agent ownership. Per-session sandbox and approval config values fold only that session's events, with pending idle switches stored on that record until the next turn anchors them.
|
||||
|
||||
Background bash tasks carry an opaque owner token equal to the owning session id. `bash_output` and `bash_kill` compare the caller's token with the executor's task ownership before reading or killing; a predictable task id alone grants no access. Ownership is stored with the executor task, so a tool plugin reload does not erase it.
|
||||
|
||||
Connection teardown clears the live map, settles each pending prompt as cancelled, and disposes all `AgentHandle`s in parallel. Each handle stops and awaits its loop, flushes the session while attached, unregisters the agent, and removes the session. Teardown is memoized and shared by client disconnect and plugin disposal.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**One live session per connection** — rejected. It adds process overhead and contradicts the target client's multi-session shape without removing multiplexing needs from the editor.
|
||||
|
||||
**A per-session `ctx.extend()`** — rejected. A child context does not by itself create a child plugin fiber, so listeners would still belong to the bridge fiber. The implemented bridge instead uses global listeners with explicit O(1) demultiplexing and per-session owned records; agent lifecycle is owned by `AgentHandle`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Agent object identity as bash-task ownership** — rejected. A resumed or replaced agent object may legitimately represent the same durable session. The opaque session token is the cross-boundary identity that should survive plugin reloads.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
N sessions can stream, prompt, request permission, switch config, and run background tasks concurrently without interleaving or cross-settling. A cancel or dispose in one session does not affect its neighbors. The bridge pays for explicit maps and isolation tests, but it does not add one listener set per session and therefore avoids listener fan-out during long-lived connections.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge still exposes no protocol method to close one live session independently. Today records leave together on connection teardown; session close/resume lifecycle capabilities remain deferred in the ACP feature checklist.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
The multi-session suite drives concurrent sessions through interleaved updates, independent in-flight prompts, targeted cancellation, same-id and distinct-id load races, permission routing, config isolation, and teardown. Tool-bash tests prove one session cannot read or kill another session's background task.
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The ACP bridge lets each tool own its call rendering via `presentCall`/`presentResult` (see [tool-call UI presentation](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) and `packages/core/tools`). For `bash` we surface the exact command as the `tool_call` title, the model's `description` as a content text block, `kind: 'execute'`, and the completed output wrapped in a fenced ` ```console ` text block.
|
||||
The ACP bridge lets each tool own its call rendering via `presentCall`/`presentResult` (see [tool-call UI presentation](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) and `packages/core/tools`). For `bash` we surface the exact command as the `tool_call` title, the model's `description` as a content text block, `kind: 'execute'`, and the completed output wrapped in a fenced ` ```console ` text block.
|
||||
|
||||
That is a correct, capability-free baseline, but not how the reference editors render a *terminal* tool at its best. An editor like Zed has a dedicated terminal tool-call card — a header showing the working directory, the command as the label, the command output rendered as a terminal, and an exit-status pill — but it only builds that card when the `tool_call` carries terminal metadata (below). With a plain text block the output appears as static markdown and there is no cwd header. (Zed also HIDES `rawInput` for `kind: 'execute'`, which is why the command IS the title — both reference adapters do the same. The human-readable description rides as a separate content block above the card; note this is a DELIBERATE divergence — claude-agent-acp DROPS the description in terminal mode and renders only the card — we keep the summary visible alongside.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Two different cwds, kept distinct on purpose. The hooks **themselves** run in th
|
||||
|
||||
- **Tool-input rewrite.** A CC/Codex `updatedInput` is logged + warned, not honored — input rewrite is a deferred consistency-design problem ([the pre-tool-input-rewrite RFC](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md)), because the pre-execution args are read by `tool/call` audit + `assistant/message` history + ACP/tool-bash presentation, so an honest rewrite is a design unit, not a field.
|
||||
- **Stop loop-guard** (`TODO(stop-loop-guard)`). CC/Codex break an infinite force-continue with `stop_hook_active` (true once a Stop hook fired this run) plus a max-consecutive cap; both are deferred. Today `stop_hook_active` is always `false`, so a Stop hook that unconditionally blocks would force-continue every step — a hook author must self-limit until the guard lands.
|
||||
- **Permission `ask`** degrades to `deny` at the `tools/pre-execute` seam (`FIXME(permissions)` in the interception-seams RFC) — there is no interactive permission prompt yet.
|
||||
- **Permission `ask`** — deferred at landing, since serviced: the [approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) resolves `ask` through `ctx.approval` (ACP prompts over `session/request_permission`), degrading to `deny` only where no approval service is composed.
|
||||
- **Hook `continue:false` (hard halt).** A hook can ask to halt the whole run (CC/Codex `continue:false`); the shared merge folds it into `MergedHookOutcome.stop`/`stopReason`, but no bridge acts on it (`TODO(hook-continue-false)`) — the interception seams have no "hard-halt the agent" primitive yet (a Decision blocks/steers a single point, not the run). Deferred with the loop-guard work; the halt request is recorded in the `hook/result` log, and the hook keeps its per-point effect (decision/context) meanwhile.
|
||||
- **Config discovery.** The path is explicit in `cordis.yml` and process-level (see above); the full multi-layer CC/Codex precedence walk, per-session project-local discovery, and the trust/hash model are not reimplemented (`TODO(per-session-hook-config)`).
|
||||
- **Session-start / subagent-start context is best-effort, not gated (`TODO(session-start-gating)`).** `agent/session-start` is a synchronous emit and the bridge runs its hook on a detached `.then`, so the injected `additionalContext` is not guaranteed to land before the first turn reaches the model — a slow hook can miss the first request (the context then arrives as a later injection). `subagent/start` is sharper: an in-process provider may have already queued the child's prompt before the listener runs, and a short-lived child can finish before the detached inject fires. Making startup context a gated/awaited primitive is a loop-level change deferred to the interception seams; today the contract is "injected as soon as the hook resolves", not "before the first request". The bridge tests do NOT wait on the injection where they assert the guaranteed-timing behavior, so they document the real (best-effort) timing rather than masking it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Add/reshape the interception seams so every one returns a small, seam-specifi
|
||||
|
||||
### What this PR does NOT do
|
||||
|
||||
It does **not** declare `hook/*` SessionEvents (the durable hook-invocation log) — those belong to the `dsh-hook-protocol` library, because a native plugin can already use the typed Decisions without a durable hook log. A worked native-plugin example/test in this PR (`packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts`) proves all the seams compose end-to-end through the REAL loop with NO `hook/*` involved — the concrete proof that "native hooks are just a plugin". Compaction (`PreCompact`/`PostCompact`), the Notification hook, Codex `PermissionRequest`, the permission/`ask` system, and the Stop loop-guard remain deferred (`FIXME(permissions)` marks the `ask`→deny degrade).
|
||||
It does **not** declare `hook/*` SessionEvents (the durable hook-invocation log) — those belong to the `dsh-hook-protocol` library, because a native plugin can already use the typed Decisions without a durable hook log. A worked native-plugin example/test in this PR (`packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts`) proves all the seams compose end-to-end through the REAL loop with NO `hook/*` involved — the concrete proof that "native hooks are just a plugin". Compaction (`PreCompact`/`PostCompact`), the Notification hook, Codex `PermissionRequest`, and the Stop loop-guard remain deferred; the permission/`ask` system has since landed as the [approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md), whose `ctx.approval` services the `ask` this PR shipped degraded to deny.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Skill system — progressive disclosure instructions for agents
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Agent products have converged on a skill pattern: keep the request prompt small by listing only available instruction bundles, then load the full body when the model decides a task matches. Codex, Claude Code, OpenCode, and Kimi Code differ in details, but all separate discovery metadata from complete instructions so a workspace can carry reusable behavior without paying the full prompt cost on every turn.
|
||||
|
||||
DeepSeek Harness uses the same primitive so project-specific review, plugin-authoring, and tool-usage guidance lives next to the workspace or the user's agent configuration instead of being hard-coded into the loop.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-skill` is the pure provider registry (`ctx.skills`), `@deepseek-ai/dsh-skill-local` is the shipped local filesystem provider, and `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-skill` owns the session-prefix catalog and model-facing loader tool. `dsh-agent-core` loads the registry, local provider, and consumer by default so stdio and ACP apps get the same behavior while embedded or remote providers contribute skills without changing the registry or consumer. Its `skills` config forwards `registry`, `local`, and `tool` branches to those owners.
|
||||
|
||||
Provider plugins register synchronously during `apply()`. Provider catalogs return ranked candidates from awaited `list()` calls, where remote providers perform initialization, authentication, and discovery while honoring the lookup abort signal. The registry validates each candidate, resolves same-name skills first-wins by rank, provider registration order, and provider-local order, then sorts summaries by skill name for deterministic consumers. It caches only completed catalog snapshots and retries when a provider/runtime revision changes during discovery, so an unload cannot freeze a stale, unresolvable skill into a session prefix. Runtime `ctx.skills.register(...)` remains a convenience for embedded in-process skills and uses project-over-user priority; `runtime` is reserved as the registry-owned provider name.
|
||||
|
||||
The local provider scans cwd-sensitive project roots, custom roots, and user roots in first-wins rank order: project `.dsh`, project `.agents`, `customSkillDirs`, user `.dsh`, then user `.agents`. The user `.dsh/skills` scan skips `.system` so a system-owned directory is not treated as normal user content. DeepSeek Harness does not ship built-in system skills; embedded or remote providers supply additional skills when configured.
|
||||
|
||||
Each skill is either `<name>/SKILL.md` or `<name>.md` with YAML frontmatter. `name` and `description` are required; `whenToUse`, `disableModelInvocation`, and `metadata` are optional. Names are kebab-case. YAML frontmatter is parsed with the `yaml` package instead of `js-yaml` or a hand-written parser: `yaml` is the already-declared modern parser for this package's limited frontmatter needs, and a narrow parser would either reject valid YAML users expect to work or grow into an unreviewed YAML subset.
|
||||
|
||||
Local skill filesystem I/O goes through `ctx.fs` when a filesystem service is loaded: project-root lookup probes `.git` with `resolve` and `stat`, root discovery uses `listDir`, and skill reads use `readText`. The Node filesystem remains a fallback for minimal contexts that mount `dsh-skill-local` without the fs seam. Missing roots, unreadable or malformed skill files, and transient provider `list()` failures degrade to warn-and-skip so one bad source does not make every agent request fail; malformed candidates still fail fast because they are provider contract violations.
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tool-skill` contributes one user-role `<system-reminder>` catalog through [`agent/session-prefix`](2026-07-07-session-prefix.md). The catalog contains sorted skill name and description only; it excludes bodies, paths, sources, providers, and routing hints. Descriptions are whitespace-normalized, XML-escaped, and capped by `catalogDescriptionMaxLength`, whose default is `500` and minimum is `3`. The session-prefix seam freezes the request-only catalog per loop instance and records it in the request header, preserving reconstructability without adding it to durable history. Full skill bodies are never included in the catalog.
|
||||
|
||||
The `skill({ name })` tool loads one full skill for the current agent cwd and returns a tool result containing `<skill_content name="...">`, `<skill_resources>`, and `<skill_instructions>`. `resourceBase` supplies a directory, URL, or opaque provider-managed base for explicitly referenced scripts, references, and assets; resources load only as needed, without directory enumeration. An unresolved name reports that the skill is unknown or no longer available; invalid names and skills marked `disableModelInvocation` retain distinct tool errors. The tool result is the model-visible disclosure path.
|
||||
|
||||
The data structures and catalog/tool contract are documented in [skills.md](../../../core-data-structures/skills.md), with service signatures in the generated [services catalog](../../../cordis-catalog/services.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Inject full skill bodies into every system prompt.** Rejected because it destroys progressive disclosure and makes every request pay for instructions that may not apply.
|
||||
|
||||
**Expose skills only as slash commands.** Rejected because model-initiated loading is the core capability; slash/ACP command advertisement does not change discovery.
|
||||
|
||||
**Put local filesystem scanning directly inside `ctx.skills`.** Rejected because coding agents, web agents, and future plugin ecosystems need different skill sources. A provider registry mirrors the subagent seam: the registry owns conflict resolution and consumers, while implementations own loading.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use a system-prompt section.** Rejected because the rendered system prompt is a single string, while the catalog is a user-role `<system-reminder>` message with request-only lifecycle requirements. [`agent/session-prefix`](2026-07-07-session-prefix.md) is the selected mechanism: it places the catalog ahead of derived history and records the composed message in the request header.
|
||||
|
||||
**Materialize built-in DSH authoring skills under `~/.dsh/skills/.system`.** Rejected because bundled skills do not write user home on startup, and embedded or remote providers supply configured skills.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recursively discover nested `**/SKILL.md`.** Rejected. Flat files and one-level directory bundles cover the configured roots while keeping duplicate handling and catalog order easy to reason about.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hand-parse frontmatter.** Rejected because the accepted schema includes an open `metadata` object. A narrow parser would either reject valid YAML users expect to work or grow into an unreviewed YAML subset.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
The agent-core spine includes one session-prefix contributor, one local provider, and one model-facing tool. Skill discovery is cwd-sensitive, so callers that create agents with different session cwd values can observe different project skill overrides by design.
|
||||
|
||||
The catalog is deterministic for a fixed root set and runtime registration revision, but disk changes are not watched; discovery is memoized until runtime registration invalidates the cache or the process restarts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred
|
||||
|
||||
Forked skill contexts (`context: fork`), direct user/slash invocation (`user-invocable`), parameter declarations and hints (`arguments` and `argument-hint`), and per-skill tool constraints (`allowed-tools` and `disallowed-tools`) are outside the shipped contract. The registry, local provider, and model-facing tool do not parse, advertise, or enforce these fields.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
|
||||
# RFC: The approval seam — one-shot permission decisions over a waterfall of answerers
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Two callers need to put one question — "may this specific action proceed?" — to a human, and neither has a channel. `tools/pre-execute`'s `ask` decision (produced today by the Claude-Code hook bridge's `permissionDecision: ask`) degrades to deny because nothing services it. The [sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)'s escalation phase needs the same channel for its post-denial one-shot retry. Without a shared seam, each would invent its own outcome vocabulary, UI routing, cancellation, and audit trail — and a deployment with no UI at all needs a guarantee that an unanswerable question can never grant anything.
|
||||
|
||||
The routing problem is ownership: an approval prompt must reach the editor session that owns the asking agent (the ACP bridge multiplexes N sessions over one connection), fail closed for agents nobody owns (in-process subagents, tests), and stay out of deployments that compose no UI (headless, CI).
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
One package, `dsh-user-approval` (`packages/ui/user-approval`), owning the vocabulary and the `ctx.approval` service — the MECHANISM. The POLICY — who answers, and whether a session is asked at all — lives outside it: answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners registered by the plugins that own the channel (the ACP bridge; future terminal UIs; test scripts), and a per-session policy tier can decide before any human is involved. Consumers (`dsh-tools`' ask routing, the sandbox escalation gate) resolve a question to a closed outcome and derive their own tool results from it. Deliberately ONE package, not the capability-seam three (see Alternatives).
|
||||
|
||||
### How a deployment uses it
|
||||
|
||||
One `cordis.yml` entry mounts the seam; not loading it is the opt-out — consumers degrade to their historical fail-closed behavior with zero approval code registered:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- id: approval
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
|
||||
# config:
|
||||
# policy: never # deployment default for sessions without an override; 'ask' when omitted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The entry alone provides mechanism, not a channel: with no answerer composed, every ask resolves `unavailable` and the asking tool call denies — fail-closed needs no configuration. Composing the ACP app (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`, as in [the sandbox example](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md)) completes the loop: its bridge registers an answerer that prompts the owning editor session via `session/request_permission`, so a hook's `ask` or an escalation request surfaces as a one-shot Allow/Reject prompt attached to the already-streamed tool call. `policy: never` is the unattended stance — every ask auto-rejects deterministically, stated in the system prompt, no human in the loop. `policy` is validated against the closed list at plugin load; anything else throws.
|
||||
|
||||
What a composed deployment observes: `allowed-once` lets exactly that call proceed; rejection, dismissal, and channel absence deny with three distinct reasons the model can tell apart; every ask lands a durable `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` pair on the asking agent's session log; nothing about a grant persists past the call that asked.
|
||||
|
||||
One ask under this composition, verbatim from the sandbox example's recorded `escalation-approved` scenario — the model requests a sandbox escalation, the gate asks, the bridge prompts the owning editor, the user clicks Allow once:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
tool/call bash {"command": "printf 'escalated\n' > escalated.txt && cat escalated.txt",
|
||||
"sandbox_permissions": "workspace-write",
|
||||
"justification": "the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace"}
|
||||
approval/asked {"toolName": "bash", "callId": "call_00_…",
|
||||
"reason": "escalate sandbox to workspace-write: the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace"}
|
||||
→ session/request_permission {"toolCall": {"toolCallId": "call_00_…"},
|
||||
"options": [{"optionId": "allow-once", "name": "Allow once", "kind": "allow_once"},
|
||||
{"optionId": "reject-once", "name": "Reject", "kind": "reject_once"}]}
|
||||
← the user picks "Allow once" on the prompt the editor attaches to the streamed bash call
|
||||
approval/decided {"outcome": "allowed-once"}
|
||||
tool/result "escalated" — this one call ran under the wider mode; the grant died with it
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `escalation-rejected` twin ends in `{"outcome": "rejected"}` instead: nothing executes, and the model's result carries the asker's verbatim fail-closed text (`the user rejected escalating this command to "workspace-write"`). A hook's `permissionDecision: ask` rides the identical wire; only the asker and its deny texts differ (§ Ask routing in dsh-tools). Headless, the same request skips the prompt entirely and settles `unavailable`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Design detail
|
||||
|
||||
#### The seam: mechanism and policy split
|
||||
|
||||
`ApprovalService.request(req)` always resolves to a closed `ApprovalOutcome` — `allowed-once` / `rejected` / `cancelled` / `unavailable` — and never rejects. The service is the mechanism: it dispatches the `approval/request` waterfall, races the request's `AbortSignal` (abort settles `cancelled`; a late answer is discarded, never double-audited), contains a throwing answerer as `unavailable`, normalizes a rogue non-vocabulary return to `unavailable`, and lands the log-only audit pair `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` (paired by the branded `ApprovalRequestId`) on the requesting agent's session log. Grants are one-shot by definition: `allowed-once` authorizes the single asked-about action, never a class of future ones, and the service stores nothing between requests. The one precondition: `request()` throws (before appending anything) when the agent's session has no open turn — the audit pair must be turn-enclosed, the turn being the durable log's commit/replay boundary (a bare event between turns is dropped as crash tail on reload); every shipped ask path runs mid-turn already, and idle asks are a deferred design.
|
||||
|
||||
Answerers are the policy, and they are `approval/request` waterfall listeners. The waterfall buys exactly what the seam needs: with zero listeners the dispatch falls through to the caller-supplied default — `unavailable`, so fail-closed needs no configuration and no code in any deployment; a listener that recognizes the request's agent answers by returning an outcome without calling `next()` (the decision slot is single-occupancy, first answer wins — the same documented semantics as the `fs/write-intent` gate); a listener that does not recognize the agent MUST delegate via `next()` so another answerer or the default gets the question; and listeners dispose with their owning fiber, so an unloaded UI plugin degrades the next ask to `unavailable` instead of leaving a dangling channel. Registration order across sibling plugins is not load-order deterministic (the loader starts siblings concurrently), so a deployment composes ONE terminal answerer and reserves `prepend` listeners for decide-or-delegate gates.
|
||||
|
||||
`ApprovalRequest` carries the asking `agent` (routes the question; receives the audit events), the `toolName`, the optional exact `callId`, the asker's human-readable `reason`, and the optional `signal`. The vocabulary is deliberately self-contained — it names the tool-call by the `CallId` brand from `dsh-llm` and never imports `dsh-tools` — because `dsh-tools` depends on `dsh-user-approval` (the ask routing) and a `ToolCallView` import would close a package cycle. It deliberately does NOT carry tool arguments: a UI answerer attaches the prompt to the already-streamed tool call via `callId` instead of re-rendering the call.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Ask routing in dsh-tools
|
||||
|
||||
`ToolRegistry.execute()` resolves an `ask` decision through the seam before the shared deny path: `allowed-once` proceeds to dispatch, and the three non-grants deny with distinct reasons — "the user rejected…", "…was cancelled", "…no approval channel is available" — so the model can tell a human "no" from an absent channel. The seam is consumed opportunistically (`ctx.get('approval')`, the `tool-bash`/`agent-loop` pattern), not statically injected: a deployment that composes no ApprovalService keeps the historical ask→deny degrade verbatim, an unmount mid-session degrades the same way on the next ask, and the registry's fiber never gates on the seam's presence. An agent-less execution also degrades — without an agent there is no session to audit to and no UI to route to.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The per-session policy tier
|
||||
|
||||
The seam also owns the session-scoped approval policy — the approval knob of the two-knob per-session switching design ([the sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Per-session modes is the pattern's home: one log-only event per knob, a pure fold, THE write path, ACP config-option advertisement, and turn-anchoring). `ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask' | 'never'`, and `effectiveApprovalPolicy(events) ?? Config.policy` (default `'ask'`) decides every request BEFORE any interactive answerer: the service resolves a `'never'` session to `'rejected'` INSIDE `request()`, before dispatching the waterfall at all — no listener registration, including a later `prepend`, can sit ahead of it — while `'ask'` dispatches unchanged (fail-closed `'unavailable'` with nobody composed, exactly the prior behavior). Visibility follows the switching design's two layers with one asymmetry: the prompt section states ONLY `'never'` (deterministic, availability-independent — "you will be prompted" would overclaim in a composition with no answerer, and absence under a logged header is exactly how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), the narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per switch, and the audit pair still lands on every ask, including the policy's auto-rejections.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The ACP answerer
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge registers the first real answerer: it resolves the owning session through its existing `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` reverse map, issues `session/request_permission` with the request's `callId` as the `toolCall` reference and the one-shot options `allow_once`/`reject_once`, and maps the response — selected `allow-once` → `allowed-once`, any other selection → `rejected` (an unknown optionId from a non-conforming client never grants), client `cancelled` → `cancelled`. A request for a foreign agent — or one without a `callId`, since the protocol prompt must attach to a tool call — delegates via `next()`. A rejected RPC (client gone mid-prompt) propagates to the service, which contains it as `unavailable`. Whether a call ASKS at all is policy — a hook or `tools/pre-execute` plugin returning `ask` — never the bridge's own judgment.
|
||||
|
||||
The reverse-map ownership seam [the ACP support RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) laid down is exactly what the answerer routes through, and per-session permission ownership (the blocker recorded in [the multi-session RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md)) is what it implements.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Audit, and what the model sees
|
||||
|
||||
`approval/asked` / `approval/decided` are log-only session events (the `hook/invoked`/`hook/result` precedent): durable, replayable, never in the model transcript. The model's entire view of an approval is the tool result the asker derives from the outcome — reconstructability holds because that result is an ordinary logged `tool/result`. One `decided` per `asked`, whatever the outcome, including an already-aborted signal (settled `cancelled` without dispatching) and a contained answerer failure.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Entities and dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
One package, no cycles: `dsh-user-approval` peers on `cordis`, `dsh-session` (event-map merge + append), `dsh-agent` (the `Agent` type), `dsh-llm` (`CallId`, via `dsh-brand`). `dsh-tools` and `dsh-acp` each peer on it; the escalation phase's asker lives in `dsh-tool-bash` (see [the sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Escalation), so the sandbox family keeps its ZERO-edge relation (the executor contributes the per-call override mechanism, and transport seams never ask humans questions). The seam is one package, not the capability-seam three: the service body (dispatch + audit) has no replaceable implementation — the replaceable part is the answerer listeners, and those live with their owners (the bridge; future terminal UIs; test scripts). `@cordisjs/plugin-capability` stays orthogonal (a static grant registry answers "is this already authorized", not "ask the user now"), and `subagent-acp`'s child-side `permission` auto-answer is untouched — routing a child's approvals to the parent session is deferred (§ Deferred).
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
Unit tier: the service's outcome branches (fail-closed default, first-wins slot, delegation, containment, rogue-value normalization, abort-before and abort-during with late-answer discard, fresh ids, fiber-disposal degradation) and the policy tier (both values × dispatch/decide, a `'never'` decision unbypassable even by an answerer prepended AFTER the service, audit pair intact) in `dsh-user-approval`; the ask routing matrix (grant dispatches; three non-grant reasons pinned verbatim; unmounted and agent-less degrades; the registry's own exhaustiveness backstop against a non-conforming stand-in) in `dsh-tools`; the answerer (wire shape of the prompt, outcome mapping, unknown-option conservatism, foreign-agent and call-less delegation) driven through a real bridge + scripted client in `dsh-acp`.
|
||||
|
||||
Snapshot tier: the harness accepts scripted permission answers (`permissionAnswers` in a scenario's `input.json`, consumed FIFO; an unscripted prompt answers `cancelled`, fail closed). The seam's wire is recorded end to end in the sandbox example's suite: both escalation branches drive `session/request_permission` through this seam over scripted answers (grant and rejection), and the recorded `mode-switching` scenario pins the `'never'` prompt sentence and the policy-switch notice ([the sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Testing).
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred
|
||||
|
||||
- **`allow_always` grant storage** — honoring a persistent grant means designing storage, scope identity (call? path? prefix? session? time window?), and revocation; until designed, only the one-shot options are advertised ([the sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) § Escalation records the open scope question).
|
||||
- **A recorded hook-driven `ask` scenario** — the wire is recorded via the sandbox example's escalation branches; the hook-producer variant stays on the unit tier and the hook matrix's `hook-cc-pretool-ask`, with its deny texts pinned verbatim there.
|
||||
- **Routing a child agent's approvals to the parent session** — `subagent-acp`'s child today auto-answers its own `permission` requests; surfacing them to the parent's editor is its own design.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **A single registered provider instead of waterfall listeners** — rejected: a `registerProvider()` surface forces every composition question — allowlist pre-filters, external hook deciders, scripted test answers, a policy gate in front of a human — inside one provider implementation. The waterfall gets composition, fail-closed absence, and HMR disposal from machinery the runtime already has; the seam's JSDoc pins the single-decision-slot convention instead of inventing a provider registry.
|
||||
- **[The ACP support RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)'s inline `tools/pre-execute` permission gate** — rejected, and superseded by this seam: prompting for every bridge-owned call hardwires the asking POLICY into the UI plugin, cannot serve a second asker (sandbox escalation happens after execution starts, with no pre-execute moment), and leaves hooks' `ask` — the vocabulary the interception seams already ship — unserviced.
|
||||
- **A generic user-interaction seam (`ctx.userInteraction`) instead** — rejected: the two share a skeleton (route by agent, block for a human, handle absence), but approval's contract is narrower in every dimension that matters: a closed outcome vocabulary instead of free text, a protocol-native prompt attached to a tool call instead of a generic form, mandatory fail-closed absence, and audit events. The generic seam has since shipped (`packages/ui/user-interaction`, the `ask_user_question` tool over ACP elicitation) and approval deliberately still does not ride it — an elicitation form is not a permission prompt, and a free-text answer is not a closed outcome; sharing provider plumbing stays open if the two ever converge.
|
||||
- **Static optional injection in `dsh-tools`** — rejected: the vendored cordis `Inject` type has no optional flag — the object form maps service names to intercept config, and a declared inject gates the fiber. `ctx.get('approval')` is the documented opportunistic-consumption pattern (the `tool-bash` owner-token lookup, the loop's persistence probe), reads presence per call, and degrades correctly across HMR without extra machinery.
|
||||
- **The capability-seam three-package split** — rejected: interface/implementation/consumer fits a seam whose implementation is swappable (bash-local vs bash-sandbox). Here the service body is fixed mechanism and the variable part is listeners that live with their owners — splitting would manufacture an implementation package with nothing in it ("don't split preemptively").
|
||||
- **Offering `allow_always` now** — rejected: the protocol can express it, but honoring it means designing grant storage, scope identity, and revocation (§ Deferred). Advertising an option the harness cannot honor manufactures doomed grants.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
What shipped pins — the suites in Testing hold each:
|
||||
|
||||
- With an ApprovalService and an answerer composed, a hook's `ask` reaches a human and `allowed-once` dispatches the tool; every other outcome denies with its distinct reason.
|
||||
- A `'never'` session auto-rejects every ask without prompting anyone, states the policy in its prompt, and narrates switches (the shared switching mechanics are pinned in [the sandbox RFC](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)).
|
||||
- Every unanswerable path fails closed to `unavailable`: no service (degrade, verbatim historical text), no listener, a foreign or agent-less request, a throwing answerer, a rogue return value, a dead client connection.
|
||||
- Every `request()` lands exactly one `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` pair on the asking agent's log, replayable, invisible to the model transcript.
|
||||
- Prompts route per-session through the bridge's ownership map; one session's prompt can never reach another session's editor.
|
||||
- A deployment that composes nothing new behaves byte-identically (the snapshot suite's goldens are unchanged).
|
||||
|
||||
Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Two decide-eager answerers race for the slot.** Sibling-plugin listener order is not deterministic, so the seam cannot referee competing terminal answerers — mitigated by convention (one terminal answerer per deployment; `prepend` only for decide-or-delegate gates) rather than a priority mechanism the event bus does not have.
|
||||
- **Production exercise rests on one composition.** `ask` has two producer families — the hook bridges through `tools/pre-execute`, and sandbox escalation through its own gate — with the wire recorded in the sandbox example's snapshot suite, so the seam's real-world coverage is that one composition until more deployments compose it.
|
||||
- **Ownership keys on `Agent` object identity.** The answerer resolves sessions through the bridge's existing WeakMap; every current path hands the same object through the loop and the seams, but a future boundary that clones or proxies agents would make the bridge delegate and fail closed — safe, but silently UI-less — and would need session-id matching instead.
|
||||
|
||||
## FAQ
|
||||
|
||||
Behavioral and usage questions only — every "why not X?" design question lives in [Alternatives considered](#alternatives-considered), whose job is exactly that.
|
||||
|
||||
- **What happens in a deployment with no answerer at all (headless, CI)?** Every ask falls through the empty waterfall to `unavailable` and the tool call denies with the "no approval channel is available" reason. Fail-closed is the zero-listener default, not a configuration.
|
||||
- **Can a grant persist — "always allow this"?** No. `allowed-once` authorizes the single asked-about action and the service stores nothing between requests; `allow_always` is deliberately not advertised until grant storage is designed (§ Deferred).
|
||||
- **What does the model see of an approval?** Only the tool result the asker derives from the outcome — the audit pair never enters the transcript. The three non-grant reasons are distinct, so the model can tell a human "no" from a dismissed prompt from a missing channel.
|
||||
- **Who decides whether a call asks in the first place?** Policy producers: a hook returning `permissionDecision: ask`, any `tools/pre-execute` listener, or the sandbox escalation gate. The seam and the bridge only route and answer; neither injects its own judgment about what deserves a prompt.
|
||||
- **What happens when the user dismisses the prompt, or the turn aborts mid-ask?** Dismissal maps to `cancelled` with its own deny text. An already-aborted signal settles `cancelled` without dispatching; an abort during the ask discards the late answer — one audit pair either way, never two.
|
||||
- **What if the client answers with an option the harness never offered?** Any selection other than the offered `allow_once` maps to `rejected` — an unknown optionId from a non-conforming client can never grant.
|
||||
- **How do subagents' approvals route?** An agent no answerer owns delegates through the whole waterfall and fails closed — in-process subagents are unanswerable today by design. `subagent-acp`'s child-side auto-answer is untouched; routing a child's asks to the parent's editor is deferred (§ Deferred).
|
||||
- **What does `policy: 'never'` actually change at runtime?** The service resolves every ask for that session to `rejected` before dispatching any answerer (in-service, so no registration order can bypass it); the system prompt states the policy; switches are narrated at boundaries; the audit pair still lands for every auto-rejection.
|
||||
- **What happens across a hot reload, or when the UI plugin unloads mid-session?** Answerers dispose with their owning fiber, so the next ask degrades to `unavailable` instead of hanging on a dead channel; remounting re-registers the answerer with no catch-up state.
|
||||
- **Where does the user see what they are approving?** On the tool call itself: the prompt attaches to the already-streamed call via `callId` — arguments included — and adds the asker's human-readable `reason`; the request carries no argument copy of its own.
|
||||
|
||||
## Prior art
|
||||
|
||||
In-repo precedents this design copies or contrasts with:
|
||||
|
||||
- The `fs/write-intent` gate (`packages/fs/fs/`) — the documented single-occupancy decision-slot waterfall semantics (first answer wins, delegate via `next()`) the answerer contract reuses.
|
||||
- `hook/invoked`/`hook/result` — the log-only audit-pair precedent `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` follows; [the hook-bridges RFC](2026-06-30-hook-bridges.md) ships `permissionDecision: ask`, the first producer.
|
||||
- [The interception-seams RFC](2026-06-30-interception-seams.md) — the `tools/pre-execute` `allow`/`deny`/`ask` vocabulary whose `ask` this seam services.
|
||||
- [The ACP support RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) — the `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` ownership seam the answerer routes through; [the multi-session RFC](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) — the per-session permission-ownership blocker this implements.
|
||||
- The opportunistic `ctx.get()` consumption pattern (`tool-bash`'s owner-token lookup, the loop's persistence probe) — how `dsh-tools` consumes the seam without gating its fiber on it.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
|
||||
# RFC: The subprocess sandbox — confinement seam, native runners, escalation, and per-session modes
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
A coding agent needs this product path: bash subprocesses — and the hook commands that ride them — execute under a restricted file sandbox by default; if and only if the sandbox actually denies an operation, the model may request one user approval for that same operation and, once granted, retry it once with wider permissions. An every-tool boundary is deliberately NOT the claim: fs/web/todo execute in-process where an `execve` wrapper is meaningless (§ In-process tools), and the cross-family boundary is staged follow-up work (§ Deferred phases). Without a shared vocabulary, every tool reinvents approval fields, denial parsing, retry matching, and permission-state hints.
|
||||
|
||||
The harness is an SDK, so confinement must be a capability developers COMPOSE: whether to sandbox, and which backend per platform, belongs in the leaf `cordis.yml` as a first-class entry — not inside one executor's private machinery. And the first-choice runner, `bwrap`, is unusable on exactly the hosts a sandbox matters most (minimal containers, disabled unprivileged userns, LSMs that deny `mount`), so a fallback runner has to ship with the SDK rather than be assumed on the host.
|
||||
|
||||
Confinement alone leaves two gaps. A denial with no escalation path is terminal — the model can only give up, which pressure-cooks operators into configuring `workspace-write` or `danger-full-access` globally and defeats the sandbox. And the model-visible knobs (the sandbox mode, the approval policy) change over an agent's lifetime — an ACP user flips a per-session setting, an operator edits `cordis.yml` while the process is down — while the model must never act on a stale belief about them: what IS the state on every request, what changed while the agent lives, and what changed while nobody was watching all need answers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
One seam, one per-platform chain of local backends, one consumer, and two levers on top: a per-call escalation path and per-session runtime modes. Everything below composes from the leaf `cordis.yml`; nothing touches `agent-loop`. The scope is deliberately bounded: the phases this RFC names but does not design — per-session workspace root, cross-family fs enforcement, the `subagent-acp` consumer, more environments, a Windows chain — are listed under § Deferred phases, each a follow-up design, not a config knob.
|
||||
|
||||
### How a deployment uses it
|
||||
|
||||
Three `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed product path; [`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md) is this composition, live:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- id: sandbox
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local' # the per-platform runner provider (ctx.sandbox)
|
||||
- id: bash
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox' # the confined executor, replacing dsh-bash-local behind ctx.bash
|
||||
config:
|
||||
mode: read-only # the deployment default every session starts from
|
||||
workspaceRoot: !!js process.cwd() # the boundary workspace-write may write under
|
||||
- id: approval
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval' # the escalation gate's channel (the approval RFC)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `bash` entries and loading `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` instead is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text.
|
||||
|
||||
Misconfiguration fails loud: `mode` outside the closed vocabulary is rejected at plugin load, and a host with no usable backend throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` — at `confine()` before the command ever spawns — rather than degrading to unconfined execution. `runnerCommand` on `dsh-sandbox-local` is the operator's explicit assertion of a bwrap-compatible runner (chain and probes skipped); it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests.
|
||||
|
||||
What the model then experiences: denied file effects come back as result facts with a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus standing instructions not to retry around them; under a confining executor the schema offers `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` for the one-approval escalated retry (validated strictly wider than the session's effective mode at execution); the system prompt deliberately does NOT state the sandbox mode — the model learns the boundary from the marker (which names the mode) when it hits it, instead of preemptively refusing work a standing declaration discourages. What an ACP editor experiences: a `sandbox-mode` and an `approval-policy` config-option select per session (each advertised only when its knob is composable), switchable at runtime; a sandbox switch simply changes what subsequent commands may do, while an approval-policy switch to `'never'` is stated in the prompt and narrated.
|
||||
|
||||
The product path, concretely (the escalation arc is verbatim from the recorded `escalation-approved` scenario; the denial leg is pinned on the real-kernel e2e tier):
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
tool/result … [sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode] ← the write RAN; the kernel refused it
|
||||
tool/call bash {"command": "printf 'escalated\n' > escalated.txt && cat escalated.txt",
|
||||
"sandbox_permissions": "workspace-write",
|
||||
"justification": "the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace"}
|
||||
→ the editor is prompted on this very call (session/request_permission through the approval seam); Allow once
|
||||
tool/result "escalated" — THIS call ran under workspace-write and its result facts say so; the session stays read-only
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Reject instead and nothing executes: the result is the verbatim `the user rejected escalating this command to "workspace-write"`, and the teaching makes that final — no re-ask.
|
||||
|
||||
### Design detail
|
||||
|
||||
#### Grounding — verified against the code
|
||||
|
||||
- Runtime OS subprocesses exist at exactly two sites: the `ctx.bash` seam's single spawn (`packages/bash/bash-local/src/run.ts`; hook commands flow through `ctx.bash`, so bash confinement covers them transitively) and `subagent-acp`'s child agents (`packages/subagent/subagent-acp/src/run.ts`) — the second consumer that makes a shared seam due rather than preemptive under the [capability seams RFC](../architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md)'s "don't split preemptively" rule.
|
||||
- Everything else executes inside the harness process (fs is in-process `node:fs`, web is in-process `fetch`, every `ToolDefinition.execute()` closes over `ctx`): an OS sandbox wraps `execve` and cannot wrap an in-process function call, so "sandbox any tool" is policy at each tool's seam, never a mechanical transport change.
|
||||
- `tools/pre-execute` (`allow`/`deny`/`ask`) exists, with `ask` serviced by [the approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md); the fs intent gates are version guards with no mode input yet.
|
||||
- `dsh-bash`'s request/spec split (`BashExecRequest` → `resolve()` → `BashExecSpec`) carries per-call fields the way escalation needs — `owner` is the template: request-optional, spec required-but-nullable, carried verbatim — and the result types already speak `SandboxMode`, so a per-call policy field adds no dependency edge.
|
||||
- The pinned-header snapshot design means a schema/description change churns at most one pinning fixture per suite, and the escalation fields are advertised only under a sandboxing executor — so they live in exactly one pinned header, the sandbox example suite's `mode-switching` fixture.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The seam: `ctx.sandbox`
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-sandbox` owns the vocabulary and the `SandboxProvider` contract: `confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of the caller's own — wrapped so the process and everything it spawns run confined — plus the `enforcement` completeness the selected backend achieves, its denial dialect (`denialSignatures`, the stderr substrings that backend's kernel prints on a denied file effect), and its runner-failure dialect (`runnerFailureSignatures`, how the runner ITSELF failing — and therefore the command never running — identifies itself); with no usable backend it throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, never a silent unconfined passthrough. The vocabulary: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, FILE effects only — network and process visibility are not claimed), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`), `SandboxPolicy` (mode + workspace root).
|
||||
|
||||
Policy rides each CALL, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a new call with a wider policy — inexpressible under a config-fixed provider mode.
|
||||
|
||||
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only: a backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups, because an agent whose bash runs in a container while its fs tools write the host lives in two split worlds.
|
||||
|
||||
Left open, for the phase that needs them: whether network restriction arrives as a separate `network_mode` or merges into `sandbox_mode` once a runner enforces both, and whether `SandboxPolicy` grows extra writable-root grants now (the launcher already speaks `--rw <path>`) or only when escalation needs them.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Local backends and the shipped launcher
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-sandbox-local` selects BY PLATFORM, once per lifetime, and caches the verdict: each platform names its runner chain, a chain of one is selected directly — probing arbitrates between candidates, and a sole candidate leaves nothing to arbitrate — and a chain of several is probed FUNCTIONALLY in preference order (build and enforce a real profile, never `--version` — a present-but-unusable `bwrap` must fail its probe). Linux: `bwrap` first (its mount profile is closest to the mode vocabulary: whole tree read-only, fresh `/dev`+`/proc`, `workspace-write` adds an ephemeral `/tmp` and rebinds the workspace root; deliberately no `--unshare-pid` and no network claim), else the npm-distributed `landlock-run` Landlock launcher. darwin: `sandbox-exec` speaking a Seatbelt (SBPL) profile — allow-default with `(deny file-write*)` plus write allow-lists, every granted root canonicalized because Seatbelt matches resolved paths (`/tmp` IS `/private/tmp`) — unprobed, the sole candidate. A platform with no chain fails closed at `confine()`; an unprobed runner that turns out unusable fails closed at EXECUTION instead — it refuses to run the command, and every wrap carries `runnerFailureSignatures` (the runner's own error prefix, which also matches the shell's runner-not-found message) so the consumer classifies that as a SANDBOX failure, never a task failure: on either path the command neither runs unconfined nor slips through as a plain failure. A non-empty `runnerCommand` config is the operator's assertion of a runner that fully enforces the bwrap-shaped profile — chain and probes skipped; it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests. It is not exempt from fail-closed execution: its wrap carries argv0-scoped outer-shell failure shapes (`exec: <argv0>: not found`, `<argv0>: No such file or directory`, `<argv0>: Permission denied`) as its runner-failure dialect, so a missing or unexecutable configured runner classifies as a sandbox failure like every other rung — never as a failing command, and never as a denial.
|
||||
|
||||
The launcher is a ~300-line C program (plain C11 over the raw Landlock UAPI — no libraries beyond a statically linked musl, so the audit surface is that one file plus the kernel's stable syscall contract): `--ro <path>` / `--rw <path>` grants, `--`, the wrapped argv; it installs the ruleset on itself and `exec`s (rulesets are inherited across `execve`, and it sets `no_new_privs` before restricting); `--probe` enforces a maximal ruleset in a short-lived child and exits 0 only when the kernel actually enforces; launcher failures exit 125 without exec'ing.
|
||||
|
||||
The launcher lives in its own repository and reaches the harness as the npm package family [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) (the per-platform-package pattern of `node-addon-require-builtin` and esbuild): an entry package — `dsh-sandbox-local`'s one runtime dependency — plus per-platform binary packages selected at install time by npm's `os`/`cpu` fields. The entry package owns the launcher's CLI contract end to end (`launcherPath()` resolution with a never-existing fallback, the functional `probe()`, `grantArgs()` flag spelling), versioned together with the binary so probe-report parsing can never drift against it; the harness keeps only the policy side, `landlockProfileArgs()` mapping the mode vocabulary to grants. Native-only per-architecture builds, pack gates (binary presence, executability, ELF architecture), and the byte-pinned publish rehearsal are that repository's release pipeline; this repo's Landlock CI legs install the published family from the registry — the true consumer path — and prove real-kernel confinement through it.
|
||||
|
||||
FIXME: Revisit the separate-repository boundary and try to maintain the launcher source and its platform package family inside this monorepo, so the native release surface and harness contract evolve together.
|
||||
|
||||
Profile parity is honest rather than identical: under Landlock, `read-only` grants `--ro /` plus `--rw /dev/null` (the node, not `/dev` — the host's `/dev/shm` is a persistent shared tmpfs), and `workspace-write` grants the HOST `/tmp` where bwrap's is ephemeral; under Seatbelt, `read-only` likewise grants only the `/dev/null` literal, and `workspace-write` grants the host `/tmp` plus the per-user darwin temp dir (`os.tmpdir()` — the platform's real temp area for mkstemp-family tools; omitting it would deny what the mode promises). Every wrap carries the rung's denial dialect (`denialSignatures`: EROFS text under bwrap, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt) so consumers match the active backend rather than a cross-runner union. Enforcement is honest per ABI level: an older kernel enforces the subset its ABI governs (path truncate is ungoverned before ABI v3), the probe's report line distinguishes the cases, and every confined result carries the structured `enforcement: 'full' | 'partial'` fact — refusing partial enforcement would deny the fallback to precisely the older-kernel hosts that need it. The bwrap and Seatbelt profiles govern every promised file effect by construction, so their passing probes always report `full`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The bash consumer
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-bash-sandbox` extends `LocalBashExecutor` (spawn mechanics, process-group kills, spill files, background tasks, credential scrub inherited verbatim) and hands `ctx.sandbox` the exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv it is about to spawn. A sandbox denial is a RESULT FACT, not an error: the command RAN and the kernel refused a file operation, so `result.sandbox.denied` is orthogonal to `exitCode`/`signal`. Classification is conservative text inference over the collected stderr tail against the WRAP's own dialect, so a backend is never credited with a denial text its kernel does not speak (bare EPERM under a Linux runner names non-file boundaries the mode vocabulary does not govern); the known residual false positive is non-sandbox text in the active dialect (an ssh auth failure under Landlock, a refused `kill` under Seatbelt), and a structured runner signal wins once one exists. A RUNNER failure is the opposite of a denial and outranks it in classification (a runner's error text can itself contain denial words): the wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` matching a failed run means the sandbox broke and the command NEVER RAN — the foreground path re-throws it as the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error (the late twin of the confine-time throw, carrying the runner's first stderr line), a settled background task stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed` and `bash_output` renders its own marker — so a broken sandbox can never read as a failing command.
|
||||
|
||||
The model's view is result facts only: the static tool description explains the denial marker (`[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]`), encourages attempting commands that may be denied, and forbids retrying around a denial; when the escalation fields are advertised, a denied result additionally carries the escalation hint itself, so the sanctioned same-turn retry is prompted at the decision point rather than depending on the model recalling the description (§ Escalation). No prompt section states the sandbox mode (§ Per-session modes).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Escalation: one approved wider retry after a denial
|
||||
|
||||
The seam level is mechanism only. `BashExecRequest` carries `sandboxMode?: SandboxMode`, an explicit per-call policy input; `BashExecSpec` carries it required-but-nullable (the `owner` pattern: a forgotten field is a visible `undefined`, and `resolve()` is the one explicit defaulting step); `BashExecutor` exposes the capability fact `get sandboxMode(): SandboxMode | undefined` — `undefined` in the base class, the configured mode in `SandboxBashExecutor` — so the tool layer can advertise only what the mounted executor honors: composition truth, not configuration. The seam honors ANY explicit mode, including a narrower one; the wider-only ladder is escalation policy and lives in the tool. A non-sandboxing executor (`dsh-bash-local`) carries the field verbatim and confines nothing — the field reaching it means the caller bypassed the tool's gate, and its honest behavior stays unconfined execution, not a guess at enforcement it does not have.
|
||||
|
||||
`SandboxBashExecutor.resolve()` stamps the effective mode — escalation grant > session override > configured default — so `run()`/`start()` read the spec, never the config. The `danger-full-access` branch, the confine call, and the result facts all key off the spec's mode, and the per-task facts map carries each task's mode alongside its wrap facts (`notifyTaskDone()` stamps from the map entry): one escalated call — foreground or background — reports the mode it ACTUALLY ran under while every neighbor keeps its own.
|
||||
|
||||
The tool gate advertises two extra parameters exactly when `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports a confining mode at registration: `sandbox_permissions`, an enum of the closed escalation-target vocabulary — `workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`, every mode a session could ever escalate TO — and `justification`, required together with it. The enum is deliberately NOT cut down to the modes wider than the executor's DEFAULT: schemas are registry-global while the effective mode is per-session and switchable, so a default-relative ladder strands a session overridden NARROWER than the default (with a `danger-full-access` default and a `read-only` override it would advertise nothing at all — confined, but with no lever). Strict widening is instead enforced at EXECUTION against the call's effective mode (session override ?? executor default): a request that is not strictly wider fails closed with its own text and prompts no one. An escalating call resolves approval BEFORE anything executes — no `ctx.approval` composed, or no agent on the execution, fails closed with its own text; otherwise `ctx.approval.request({ agent, toolName: 'bash', callId, reason, signal })` with the audit-self-contained reason `escalate sandbox to ${mode}: ${justification}`, while the UI attaches the prompt to the already-streamed call (the command is visible there; the approval RFC's no-arguments rule holds). The four outcomes map to distinct results: `allowed-once` stamps `sandboxMode` onto the bash request and proceeds; `rejected`, `cancelled`, and `unavailable` each produce their own error text, so the model can tell a human "no" from a dismissed prompt from a missing channel. The grant is consumed by the very call that asked; nothing is stored.
|
||||
|
||||
The tool description teaches — and a denied result itself prompts — the SAME-TURN flow when the fields exist: on a denial a wider mode would cure, escalate immediately in that turn by retrying the exact command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest mode that suffices) + `justification`, without detouring through chat to ask first — the approval prompt raised by the retry IS how the user consents. Never speculatively: an escalation is grounded in a real denial — normally the one the command just hit, up front only when the session already denied the same access — and a prompt stating approvals are disabled turns the exception off entirely; a rejected escalation is final for that command. Denial-grounding is deliberately model discipline plus human judgment, not harness bookkeeping — the human sees the exact command and justification on the prompt (see Alternatives for why hard-matching is rejected). No new session events anywhere: the attempt is an ordinary `tool/call` whose logged arguments carry the two fields, the decision is the approval seam's `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` pair, the outcome is an ordinary `tool/result` whose sandbox facts name the mode it ran under. The asker lives in `dsh-tool-bash`, NOT the executor: a transport seam has no `agent`, no `callId`, and no business asking humans questions.
|
||||
|
||||
Left open, recorded for the phase that picks them up: what a grant's scope identity is beyond the sandbox mode — the exact call, a path, a command prefix, the session, a time window — the question `allow_always` grant storage must answer before that option can be advertised; how cancellation behaves while an approval prompt is pending; and how escalation is defined for `run_in_background` denials that arrive via `bash_output`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Per-session modes: the session log as the store
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
effective(session) = findLast(the session's own knob events)?.value ?? the composition-config default
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The default is composition config (`cordis.yml`) — operator-owned, process-wide. A runtime switch is a SESSION-SCOPED override recorded as one log-only event in that session's own log. Restart immunity (resuming a session replays its log, so overrides come back with zero catch-up machinery) and multi-session isolation (one editor tab's `workspace-write` cannot disturb another's `read-only`) both fall out by construction, and no external config store exists anywhere.
|
||||
|
||||
**One event per knob, owned by its domain** — the merge-extensible `SessionEventMap` idiom every existing event family already follows (`approval/*` in `dsh-user-approval`, `hook/*` in the hooks packages):
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
interface SessionEventMap {
|
||||
'bash/sandbox-mode': { mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access' }
|
||||
'approval/policy': { policy: 'ask' | 'never' }
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Each owner exports the same three-piece kit: the event declaration, a pure fold (`effectiveSandboxMode(events)` / `effectiveApprovalPolicy(events)` — a `findLast`, typed to the domain's closed union), and THE write path (`setSandboxMode(session, mode)` / `setApprovalPolicy(session, policy)` — a switch IS its event; nothing mutates state out of band). No shared owner service, no generic facts map, no registry: a third knob copies the ~40-line pattern into its own package. Execution follows the fold on both sides — the bash tool's per-call stamp reads it as the middle rung of the § Escalation precedence chain, and the approval seam's `'never'` gate is [the approval RFC](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md)'s side of the same pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
**Visibility is deliberately asymmetric between the knobs.** The SANDBOX mode is stated nowhere and its switches are not narrated: a standing "you are read-only" declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively (observed live: sessions where the model would not even attempt a write it could have escalated), while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under at exactly the moment the boundary matters — behavior, not belief, carries the state, and a switch simply changes what the next command does. The APPROVAL policy keeps both layers, because its failure mode is the opposite: an auto-rejected ask under `'never'` returns "the user rejected …" wording no behavior can disambiguate, so the prompt states `'never'` (and ONLY `'never'` — an `'ask'` promise is unknowable without asking, and absence under a logged header is how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per policy switch: idle flip-flops collapse to one notice at the next turn's first step, a net-zero round trip to none, and a mid-turn change is narrated no later than the next step. Its "last told" is in-memory with a log-derived fallback (the folded header's system text parsed against the closed candidate sentence; LAST occurrence wins, so a persona quoting it cannot shadow the real section), so restarts lose nothing; attribution is positional (a knob event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`, a drift with no such event reads `changed by the operator/config`).
|
||||
|
||||
**The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` (category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with `currentValue` folded from each session's own log, in `session/new` and `session/load` responses. `session/set_config_option` validates against the same closed lists, routes to the domain setter, and returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
|
||||
|
||||
**Anchoring: turn-enclosure is the commit boundary.** The turn-enclosure contract makes a bare between-turns append invalid (the JSONL backend treats a post-`turn/end` tail as crash garbage; dev invariants throw). A switch while a turn is open appends immediately — openness read from the LOG (last boundary event is `turn/start`), not `agent.status`, which stays `running` between queued turns. An idle switch is held on the bridge's session record and anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit` — inside the turn, before anything in it assembles or executes, last write per knob, and OUTSIDE any `session/event` emit (appending from inside that feed reorders events for later-registered listeners — a bug the dev invariants caught live). Until anchored, the switch exists only in bridge memory: responses overlay it truthfully, and a crash before the next turn reverts it — `session/load` then reports the fold's truth, so the editor UI self-corrects rather than lies.
|
||||
|
||||
#### In-process tools
|
||||
|
||||
fs/web/todo execute in-process, so their sandbox semantics are policy at their seams: the fs intent gates deciding by the shared mode vocabulary (§ Deferred phases, cross-family) make `read-only` a real boundary instead of a bash-only approximation — until then the contract says so honestly. No generic per-tool sandbox runtime: a host-mediated tool leaves the process only by returning declarative effects the host validates, which is a rewrite, not a wrapper.
|
||||
|
||||
FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine whether sandboxing becomes a global harness capability that applies uniformly to every tool, instead of expressing in-process enforcement independently at each tool seam.
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit tier (no real runner anywhere): profile dialects, per-platform chain selection (sole candidate unprobed, no chain fails closed, multi-candidate probe order), verdict caching, the fail-closed end, probe-report parsing, and the launcher/`sandbox-exec` CLI contracts via fake runner scripts in `dsh-sandbox-local`; wrapping, policy hand-off, fact stamping, and runner-failure-outranks-denial classification (foreground throw, background `runnerFailed` fact) against a fake provider in `dsh-bash-sandbox`; the error's structured identity in `dsh-sandbox`. The escalation matrix spans the three bash packages: verbatim carry-through in `dsh-bash-local`, stamp/branch/per-task-facts in `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and the capability gate, `justification` pairing, fail-closed texts (pinned verbatim), and grant stamping in `dsh-tool-bash`. The switching surface pins the folds, the stamping precedence, the `'never'` gate, per-session section rendering, the full narrator matrix (cold start, coalescing, net-zero, resume drift with operator wording, positional attribution, persona-shadow hardening), and the bridge's advertisement gating, validation rejections, idle-vs-mid-turn anchoring (dev invariants mounted), and `session/load` reporting over a real two-process JSONL round trip.
|
||||
- Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`): the real `cordis.yml` tree advertises both options, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
|
||||
- With-key e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
|
||||
- Snapshot tier (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded mode-switching arc as the suite's pinned header — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing both switches, the prompt-section delta and one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs confined under `workspace-write`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Replay re-executes every fixture's bash calls under the host's real runner (ci.yml's snapshot lane installs bubblewrap). Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the tiers above.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred phases
|
||||
|
||||
Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at that time, and lands with unit, real-API e2e, and snapshot coverage at the tiers it touches.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Per-session workspace root** — the executor's write boundary stays config-fixed for its lifetime while each ACP session has its own cwd; a per-session root rides the same per-call policy carrier once designed.
|
||||
- **Cross-family boundary** — the fs intent gates decide by the shared mode, making `read-only`/`workspace-write` real boundaries beyond bash.
|
||||
- **Second consumer** — `subagent-acp` optionally confines child agents (per-call policy; unconfined default — a child agent must write its own persistence).
|
||||
- **More environments** — an environment-coherent capability group example (e.g. bash+fs against one container).
|
||||
- **Windows chain** — `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` is reserved and empty (fail-closed); filling it means a confinement runner from the AppContainer/restricted-token family, shipped from its own repository on the `node-addon-landlock-run` template, plus its profile dialect and denial/runner-failure signatures.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Command-string heuristic preflight** — rejected: cannot understand expansion/subprocesses/symlinks; the strict attempt (run it, let the kernel decide) is the only trustworthy denial signal.
|
||||
- **Functionally probe even a platform's sole backend** — rejected: probing arbitrates between candidates; with one there is nothing to decide, and probe cost taxes the first confined command of every session (prohibitive for heavy future backends). The runner's own exec-time fail-closed refusal plus `runnerFailureSignatures` classification carries the safety property instead.
|
||||
- **Commit the built launcher binaries** — rejected: a binary in a diff is unreviewable and churns history; reviewed source + native CI builds + the launcher repo's byte-pinned publish rehearsal keep bytes out of every tree.
|
||||
- **Compile the launcher on install** — rejected: pushes a C toolchain onto every consumer; a fallback that exists only where a compiler happens to be is not a fallback.
|
||||
- **Cross-compile both architectures from one builder** — rejected: requires carrying a pinned cross toolchain (rustup targets, zig, or a container image) solely to rebuild two ~70 KB binaries; per-architecture native runners already exist and each builds its own platform package (the `node-addon-require-builtin` model, the launcher repo's own pipeline).
|
||||
- **No fallback (bwrap or fail closed)** — rejected: concentrates failure on the hosts a sandbox matters most, degrading to `danger-full-access` by resignation.
|
||||
- **Keep the mechanism inside `dsh-bash-sandbox`** — rejected: blocks the existing second consumer, makes future phases read mode out of a bash plugin's config, and cannot express escalation.
|
||||
- **Config-fixed mode on the provider** — rejected: one mode per process; cannot serve concurrent consumers with different policies nor the one-shot widened retry.
|
||||
- **One interface spanning containers/VMs too** — rejected: `confine(argv)` presupposes a shared filesystem; environment isolation is capability-sibling backends deployed as coherent groups.
|
||||
- **Generic ToolRuntime wrapping any tool** — rejected: mechanically false for in-process tools (closures over `ctx`); the declarative-effects rewrite is unjustified for fs/web/todo.
|
||||
- **Ask inside the executor (`dsh-bash-sandbox`)** — rejected: no `agent` to route through, no `callId` to attach the prompt to; adding them teaches a transport seam about sessions and UIs — the tool layer holds both and owns the model-facing vocabulary.
|
||||
- **Auto-retry inside the same tool call** — rejected: a hidden re-entry the log cannot reconstruct: one `tool/call` would have produced two executions with different policies — the retry is a NEW logged call with its own arguments and result facts.
|
||||
- **Advertise the escalation fields unconditionally** — rejected: under `dsh-bash-local` they are a dead lever — advertising an option the harness cannot honor manufactures doomed grants; capability-gating costs one registration-time read.
|
||||
- **A default-relative escalation ladder (advertise only the modes wider than the executor's registration-time default)** — rejected: per-session overrides make the default the wrong baseline — a session switched narrower than the default loses exactly the lever it needs, and under a `danger-full-access` default the fields vanish entirely while a `read-only`-overridden session stays confined with no escalation path. The enum pins the closed target vocabulary; strict widening is a per-call execution check against the session's effective mode.
|
||||
- **Per-session dynamic tool schemas** — rejected: schemas are registry-global by design (one assembly vocabulary, the pinned-header snapshot contract), and re-registering per session would buy only what the execution-time strict-wider check already guarantees, at the cost of a per-session schema surface and header churn on every switch.
|
||||
- **Hard-match the retry to a prior denial** — rejected: command-string identity is fragile (quoting, `workdir`, env prefixes, a pipeline retried as its failing stage) — false-rejects honest retries or is trivially satisfied; the real boundary is the human seeing command + justification. Revisit only if `allow_always` grant storage ever needs machine-checkable scopes.
|
||||
- **A generic `env/state` facts map with an owner service** — rejected: approval and sandbox compose independently, so neither's state may drag in a third package; single-key folds are one `findLast` each, dissolving the owner service; no invariant spans the knobs, so atomic multi-key patches bought nothing.
|
||||
- **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
|
||||
- **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no".
|
||||
- **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header*` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
|
||||
- **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs; config options are the spec's designed surface and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
What shipped pins — the tiers in Testing hold each:
|
||||
|
||||
- A denied command retried with `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` prompts the user through the composed answerer chain; a grant runs THAT call under the wider mode (result facts say so) while every other call keeps its own effective mode; every non-grant outcome produces its distinct error text and executes nothing.
|
||||
- The escalation fields exist exactly when the mounted executor confines; a request that is not strictly wider than the call's effective mode fails closed with its own text and prompts no one; a deployment with no ApprovalService fails escalating calls closed and leaves plain calls untouched.
|
||||
- The system prompt never states the sandbox mode (an approval `'never'` policy is the one stated knob), and the whole exchange — headers, knob events, notices, approvals, results — reconstructs from the session log alone, with no event types beyond the two knob events.
|
||||
- N idle-time flips produce at most one anchored event per knob (a net-zero sequence anchors none — a no-op push from a client echoing current selections records nothing); an approval-policy switch is narrated in at most one coalesced notice; a mid-turn sandbox switch is honored by the next call's stamp.
|
||||
- A resumed session's overrides apply and are reported to the editor with no special-casing; a default changed while the process was down is narrated before the session's first new request, attributed to the operator.
|
||||
- Two concurrent sessions never see each other's state, notices, or config options.
|
||||
- `agent-loop` is untouched — everything rides `systemPrompt.section`, `SessionEventMap` merging, `agent.inject()`, `agent/pre-step`, `agent/prompt-submit`, and the ACP handler surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
|
||||
- **The one-wrapper illusion is given up knowingly.** A `tools/pre-execute` wrapper plus prompt conventions does not solve sandbox approval — the correct design costs structured denials, native runner probes, per-call policy carriage, and consistent cross-family enforcement, and this design pays it.
|
||||
- **`read-only` is not yet a cross-family boundary.** Until the fs intent gates decide by the shared mode, the claim holds for bash only; the contract says so honestly (§ In-process tools).
|
||||
- **Windows has no backend.** Its chain slot is reserved empty — fail-closed, never a fallthrough; filling it is a deferred phase.
|
||||
- **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal surfaces at execution as the runner-failure classification — re-thrown `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
|
||||
- **Landlock confinement is only as complete as the running kernel's ABI.** Reported as `enforcement: 'partial'` rather than refused — the deliberate trade that keeps the fallback available on older-kernel hosts.
|
||||
- **The launcher arrives as a registry dependency.** Trusted through its own repository's release pipeline (reviewed C source, native CI builders, byte-pinned publish rehearsal) plus this repo's version pin — the real-kernel e2e legs are what vouch for behavior through the installed bytes.
|
||||
- **The model may over-ask.** Escalating without denial grounding, or picking `danger-full-access` where `workspace-write` suffices: the description steers and the enum forces the ladder, but the human prompt is the actual gate; the `approval/asked` reasons make over-asking auditable, and a `prepend` policy answerer can auto-reject patterns a deployment never wants.
|
||||
- **The advertised target set is static while the effective mode is per-session** (schemas are registry-global) — a session already at the widest mode is still offered the fields. Harmless by construction: the strict-wider check at execution, not the enum, is the safety boundary — a non-widening request fails with its own text and never prompts anyone.
|
||||
- **A granted escalation is not a working sandbox.** An unavailable backend still fails closed even for a granted escalation to a confining mode — at `confine()` when the platform has no chain or every probe fails, at execution when an unprobed sole runner refuses (classified as a sandbox failure, not a command failure) — while a granted `danger-full-access` run never touches the provider at all: there the grant, not the probe, is the authority.
|
||||
- **An idle switch lives in bridge memory until the next turn anchors it.** A crash in that window reverts it (reported honestly on `session/load`), and a session that never runs another turn never persists it — accepted, with the loop-owned idle commit turn named as future work if durability becomes a requirement.
|
||||
- **The approval narrator's restart baseline parses prompt prose.** The closed candidate sentence is owned by the writing module itself, so a wording change is a coordinated writer+parser edit in one file; a session whose headers predate the section silently adopts the current policy without a notice.
|
||||
- **The approval section is still a dynamic prompt surface** (a `'never'` switch breaks provider prompt-prefix caching for that session). Accepted: policy switches are rare, and a model acting on a stale `'never'` is worse. The sandbox knob no longer touches the prompt at all.
|
||||
- **The model may hold a stale belief about the sandbox mode** (nothing announces a switch). Accepted deliberately: the next attempt's marker or success corrects it, and the observed failure mode of announcing — preemptive refusal — is worse than one wasted retry.
|
||||
|
||||
## FAQ
|
||||
|
||||
Behavioral and usage questions only — every "why not X?" design question lives in [Alternatives considered](#alternatives-considered), whose job is exactly that.
|
||||
|
||||
- **A command came back with `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` — did it fail?** It RAN, and the kernel refused a file effect: the denial is a result fact orthogonal to exit code. The teaching forbids retrying around it; the one sanctioned move is the same command retried once with an escalation request.
|
||||
- **How is a BROKEN sandbox told apart from a failing command?** Runner failure outranks denial in classification: a failed run matching the wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` means the command NEVER ran — foreground re-throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` with the runner's stderr line, a background task stamps `sandbox.runnerFailed` and renders its own marker. A broken sandbox can never read as a failing command, and the command never runs unconfined.
|
||||
- **What happens on a platform with no backend — Windows today?** `confine()` throws the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the command never spawns; `win32` is a reserved EMPTY chain, pinned by test to fail closed identically until a Windows runner fills it (§ Deferred phases).
|
||||
- **`bwrap` is installed on my host but unusable (disabled unprivileged userns, an LSM denying `mount`) — what happens?** The chain probe is functional — it builds and enforces a real profile rather than checking `--version` — so a present-but-unusable `bwrap` fails its probe, selection falls to the registry-installed Landlock launcher, and the verdict is cached for the provider's lifetime.
|
||||
- **Does the sandbox restrict network or process visibility?** No — `SandboxMode` claims FILE effects only; the bwrap profile deliberately does not unshare pid, and no backend claims network. Whether network restriction becomes its own knob is left open in § The seam.
|
||||
- **Which tools actually run confined?** OS subprocesses through `ctx.bash` — the bash tools, and hook commands transitively. fs/web/todo execute in-process, where an `execve` wrapper is mechanically meaningless; their `read-only` semantics arrive with the cross-family deferred phase, and until then the contract says bash-only honestly.
|
||||
- **Does a granted escalation persist, or cover background tasks?** Neither: the grant is consumed by the very call that asked (foreground or background), that one call reports the mode it actually ran under, and every neighbor keeps its own. How escalation should be DEFINED for a background denial that only surfaces later via `bash_output` is left open in § Escalation.
|
||||
- **When does an editor's mode switch take effect?** Mid-turn: appended immediately, honored by the very next call's stamp. Idle: held on the bridge's session record, anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit`, with N flips coalescing to at most one event (none if net-zero); a crash before anchoring reverts it and `session/load` reports the truth. The model is not told — its next command simply behaves under the new mode.
|
||||
- **What survives a restart — and what if the operator changed the config default while the process was down?** Overrides replay from the session log (`effective = fold ?? config`), so a resumed session keeps its modes with zero catch-up machinery; a default that drifted offline changes behavior the same way a switch does (the approval policy, being stated, is additionally narrated with operator/config attribution).
|
||||
- **What does `enforcement: 'partial'` on a result mean?** The selected backend enforces the subset its kernel ABI governs — e.g. Landlock before ABI v3 does not govern path truncate — and says so structurally instead of refusing the host; the probe's report line distinguishes the cases. The bwrap and Seatbelt profiles govern every promised file effect by construction, so they always report `full`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Prior art
|
||||
|
||||
In-repo precedents this design copies or contrasts with:
|
||||
|
||||
- [The capability-seams RFC](../architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md) — the interface/implementation/consumer split and the "don't split preemptively" timing rule the second consumer satisfied.
|
||||
- The `dsh-bash` request/spec split and its `owner` field ([the bash vocabulary catalog](../../../core-data-structures/bash.md)) — the per-call carrier template `sandboxMode` rides, and the explicit-`resolve()` defaulting convention.
|
||||
- [The approval seam RFC](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) — the channel escalation asks through; its answerer waterfall, audit pair, and one-package rationale are recorded there.
|
||||
- [Event-sourced sessions](../architecture/2026-06-11-event-sourced-sessions.md) and [the turn-enclosure invariant](../architecture/2026-06-15-turn-enclosure-invariant.md) — the log-as-store foundation the per-session modes fold over, and the commit boundary the anchoring design obeys.
|
||||
- [The interception-seams RFC](2026-06-30-interception-seams.md) — the `tools/pre-execute` vocabulary the escalation gate deliberately does not reuse (an escalating call has no pre-execute moment of its own).
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The ACP server app loads `@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-deepseek`, whose `apply` throws w
|
||||
A snapshot run asserts **two** normalized surfaces, because the harness's external surfaces are distinct:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The **stdout transcript** — the framed `session/update` JSON-RPC the editor sees. Catches regressions in the ACP bridge's event→update translation (`streamSessionEventUpdate`). Compared against a committed `stdout.golden.jsonl`.
|
||||
2. The **re-persisted session JSONL** — the log the replay run itself persists, compared against the scenario's `session.jsonl`. Catches regressions in the loop, tool dispatch, and turn/step structure that never surface on stdout. There is no separate session golden: `session.jsonl` is BOTH the replay source (recorded scenarios) and the expected produced log. Both sides pass through `normalizeSessionLog` before comparing — the fixture is raw-harvested (its own real session id / cwd / timestamps) and the replay output has fresh ones, so each is scrubbed against ITS OWN volatile values (the fixture's read from its header line) and the comparison is on normalized form. Request-header CONTENT (the composed system prompt + tool schemas) is additionally scrubbed to `{{system}}`/`{{tools}}` tokens on both sides — in the stored fixtures too — for every scenario except the one that pins it ([pinned-header RFC](2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md)). For an authored override scenario the same `session.jsonl` holds the expected produced log; `replay.override.json` drives the model, and `llm-replay` ignores the fixture for model chunks when an override exists, so committing the expected log there does not affect replay.
|
||||
2. The **re-persisted session JSONL** — the log the replay run itself persists, compared against the scenario's `session.jsonl`. Catches regressions in the loop, tool dispatch, and turn/step structure that never surface on stdout. There is no separate session golden: `session.jsonl` is both the replay source (recorded scenarios) and the expected produced log. Both sides pass through `normalizeSessionLog` before comparing — the fixture is raw-harvested (its own real session id / cwd / timestamps) and the replay output has fresh ones, so each is scrubbed against its own volatile values (the fixture's read from its header line) and the comparison is on normalized form. Every stored JSONL additionally scrubs composed prompt text to `{{system}}`; each header class's pinning scenario stores that prompt readably in `system-prompt.golden.md` and keeps the complete tool schemas in its JSONL, while other scenarios scrub schemas to `{{tools}}` ([pinned-header RFC](2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md)). For an authored override scenario the same `session.jsonl` holds the expected produced log; `replay.override.json` drives the model, and `llm-replay` ignores the fixture for model chunks when an override exists, so committing the expected log there does not affect replay.
|
||||
|
||||
The two are genuinely additive: stdout is the bridge's *lossy projection* of the log (it drops `assistant/message.usage`, `step/*`, exact `seq`/`time`, and renders tool I/O differently), so a loop/tool/turn-structure regression can change the JSONL while leaving the stdout projection identical, and a bridge-translation regression can change stdout while the JSONL is untouched. Asserting the JSONL equality also echoes the proposed [universal replay fixture](../../proposed/testing/2026-06-11-deterministic-and-stress-testing.md) idea.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-8
@@ -4,29 +4,30 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Every model-driving ACP snapshot fixture (`session.jsonl`) embedded the full composed system prompt and the complete tool-schema list in its `request/header` event — roughly 8 KB on one line, per fixture. That content is identical across the suite (byte-identical tool list everywhere, including subagent children; identical prompt modulo each recording's temp cwd), so any change touching a tool description or a system-prompt line had to update every fixture: re-record everything against the live API (churning model responses and stdout goldens along the way) or hand-edit ~35 giant header lines. Introducing the dynamic-workflows feature — one new tool plus one prompt paragraph — rewrote every snapshot fixture in the repo, burying the behavioral diff a reviewer should be reading.
|
||||
An ACP snapshot suite needs to prove the exact composed system prompt and tool-schema list sent in each `request/header`, but duplicating that content inside every `session.jsonl` makes a prompt or schema edit rewrite dozens of giant one-line JSON records. Keeping one raw header avoids the duplication but still makes prompt review poor: prose is JSON-escaped onto one line and mixed with thousands of characters of tool schemas.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Exactly one scenario — `text-turn`, flagged `pinsHeader` in the `acp.snapshot.ts` scenario table — commits and compares the full request-header content; the pin mechanics live in [`dsh-acp-snapshot`](../../../../packages/support/acp-snapshot/README.md), whose suite factory enforces one pin per consuming suite. Every other fixture stores and compares that content as stable tokens via the pure normalizer `scrubRequestHeaders` in that package's `normalize.ts`: a `request/header` event's `header.system` becomes `"{{system}}"` and `header.tools` becomes `"{{tools}}"`; a `request/header-delta` keeps its structural facts — the system delta's `keepStart`/`keepEnd` line positions with one `{{system}}` token per inserted line, the tools delta's added/removed/changed tool names — and tokenizes only the bulk (prompt text, schema bodies), so two different deltas still compare different. The scrub is composed in front of `normalizeSessionLog` on BOTH sides of a non-pinning scenario's log compare and applied to the harvested logs record mode writes, so a re-record cannot smuggle the content back. Absent fields stay absent — WHETHER a header carried a prompt or tools is behavior and stays visible — and `config`/`reason` stay verbatim: a model swap churns every fixture by design (it invalidates the recorded responses), while a prompt or schema edit churns none of them (replay derives model behavior exclusively from `assistant/chunk` events and never reads header content — see `dsh-llm-replay`).
|
||||
Exactly one scenario per header-composition class is flagged `pinsHeader`. Its directory splits the pin by review format: `system-prompt.golden.md` contains the normalized composed prompt as ordinary Markdown, while `session.jsonl` keeps the full tool-schema list, config, and reason but stores `header.system` as `"{{system}}"`. Every other JSONL stores both the system prompt and tool list as `"{{system}}"` / `"{{tools}}"`. The pin mechanics live in [`dsh-acp-snapshot`](../../../../packages/support/acp-snapshot/README.md), whose suite factory enforces one pin per class.
|
||||
|
||||
A system-prompt or tool-schema change therefore lands as exactly one committed-fixture diff — the pinned `text-turn` header line — updated by hand or by re-recording that one scenario (`pnpm run test:snapshot:record` with `-t text-turn`).
|
||||
The pure `scrubSystemPrompts` normalizer applies to every stored session fixture and tokenizes both an initial header's prompt and a header delta's inserted prompt lines. `scrubRequestHeaders` additionally tokenizes tool schemas and session-prefix content for non-pinning scenarios while retaining structural facts: system-delta positions and arity, added/removed/changed tool names, prefix message count, field presence, config, and reason. Record and refresh write-back apply the appropriate scrub before writing JSONL and regenerate the Markdown prompt from the normalized live header, so neither path can reintroduce prompt text into JSONL or leave the readable snapshot stale.
|
||||
|
||||
Guards make the split self-enforcing. On disk (fixture meta-tests): every non-pinning `session*.jsonl` must be a fixed point of `scrubRequestHeaders` (unscrubbed content crept in — apply the scrub), the pinning scenario's fixture must NOT be one (the pin lost its content), and exactly one scenario must pin. Live (every non-pinning scenario run): each `request/header` the run produces — parent, spawn child, fork child, initial or resume — must equal the pinned fixture's header after both sides normalize their own volatile values, and no `request/header-delta` may appear at all (a mid-run header change diverges from the pin by construction, and its content would be invisible under the scrub), so the single-pin premise is asserted rather than assumed.
|
||||
Guards make the split self-enforcing. On disk, every `session*.jsonl` is a fixed point of `scrubSystemPrompts`, only non-pinning fixtures are fixed points of the full header scrub, `system-prompt.golden.md` exists exactly beside pinning fixtures, and each class has one pin. Live, every `request/header` produced by a parent, spawn child, fork child, initial request, or resume must match both halves of its class's pin after volatile-value normalization. A header without a string prompt or any `request/header-delta` fails loud because the two static pin artifacts cannot represent it.
|
||||
|
||||
One pin covers the whole suite because every session — parent, spawn child, fork child — composes the identical tool list and the identical prompt modulo cwd, and the uniformity guard fails the suite the moment that stops holding. If header composition ever becomes session-dependent by design (a restricted subagent toolset, say), the divergent shape gets its own pinning scenario.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Re-record or hand-edit every fixture per change** — the status quo; the churn this RFC removes.
|
||||
- **Scrub at compare time only, keeping fixtures raw** — the compares go green without fixture edits, but every committed fixture then carries a permanently stale copy of the prompt and schemas: dead weight that misleads readers and still rewrites wholesale on the next re-record. Storing the tokens keeps the fixture honest about what it does and does not pin.
|
||||
- **Re-record or hand-edit every fixture per change** — preserves exact headers but buries behavioral diffs under duplicated prompt and schema content.
|
||||
- **Scrub at compare time only, keeping fixtures raw** — lets compares pass while committed fixtures retain stale duplicate content and rewrite wholesale on the next recording. Stored tokens state honestly what each JSONL does not pin.
|
||||
- **Scrub everywhere, pin nowhere** — loses the only end-to-end record of the composed header as actually sent (prompt assembly, registered-tool order, full schemas). The generated tool catalog documents each tool in isolation; only a real fixture pins the composed set.
|
||||
- **Keep the one full pin entirely in JSONL** — removes suite-wide duplication but leaves system-prompt changes as an escaped one-line diff entangled with the tool list. Markdown gives prompt prose its natural review format without weakening the header assertion.
|
||||
- **Slim the session log itself (log a content digest, store the header elsewhere)** — violates the reconstructability contract: the product log must reproduce each request bit-for-bit ([reconstructable-requests RFC](../architecture/2026-07-05-reconstructable-requests.md)). Header bulk is a test-artifact concern, solved in test normalization; the live log is untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
All 37 snapshot scenarios replay green with the scrubbed fixtures (the committed fixtures were rewritten once through `scrubRequestHeaders` itself; `text-turn` untouched). The fixed-point, pin-retains-content, exactly-one-pin, live header-uniformity, and no-unpinned-delta guards run inside the suite, and `scrubRequestHeaders` has unit coverage for both header event types, delta structure preservation (line positions, insert arity, tool names), absent-field preservation, config/reason retention, byte-for-byte pass-through of other lines, and idempotence.
|
||||
The suite replays every scenario against the split pins. Unit coverage exercises both scrub levels, Markdown formatting, record/refresh regeneration, normalized prompt extraction, fixed-point enforcement, required-file symmetry, header uniformity, and delta rejection.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
A tool-description or system-prompt change churns one committed fixture line instead of every fixture in the suite, so snapshot diffs read as behavior again, and ~270 KB of duplicated header bytes leave the repo. The cost: non-pinning fixtures no longer display header content, so reading one shows tokens where the prompt and schemas were — the pinned `text-turn` fixture is the place to look, and the live uniformity guard guarantees it speaks for every session in the suite. A header change surfaces as a suite-wide test failure whose fix is the one pinned line, rather than as ~35 fixture rewrites.
|
||||
A system-prompt change produces a normal line-oriented Markdown diff in one file per affected composition class; a tool-description change produces one pinned JSONL line per class; ordinary behavioral fixtures remain untouched. Session fixtures display tokens for omitted content, and the live uniformity guard makes each split pin authoritative for every session in its class. The pinning scenario carries one extra generated artifact whose terminal newline is canonicalized for repository hygiene.
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The machinery lives in [`packages/support/acp-snapshot`](../../../../packages/su
|
||||
|
||||
**`src/normalize.ts`** — the pure normalizers, hook-free by policy: when a future event carries a new volatile field (an approval duration, say), the shared normalizer learns it in the same change, keeping one home for what "normalized" means rather than per-suite scrub extensions.
|
||||
|
||||
**`src/suite.ts`** — the `Scenario` type and `defineAcpSnapshotSuite(options)`, registering the per-scenario compares, record-mode fixture write-back, the header pin with its live uniformity guard, and the fixture guard block (no orphan scenario dirs, required files present, exactly one pin, non-pinning fixtures are `scrubRequestHeaders` fixed points). The pinned-header contract ([pinned-header RFC](2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md)) is per-suite: each suite flags exactly one `pinsHeader` scenario (the factory throws on zero, a meta-test rejects more than one; WHICH scenario pins is the table's reviewable choice), and the uniformity guard compares only that suite's sessions. The pure helpers (`childFixturePaths`, `fixtureContext`, `normalizedHeaders`, `headerDeltaCount`) are exported for direct unit coverage.
|
||||
**`src/suite.ts`** — the `Scenario` type and `defineAcpSnapshotSuite(options)`, registering the per-scenario compares, record/refresh fixture write-back, the header pin with its live uniformity guard, and the fixture guard block (no orphan scenario dirs, required files present, exactly one pin per class, every JSONL a `scrubSystemPrompts` fixed point, non-pinning fixtures also `scrubRequestHeaders` fixed points). The pinned-header contract ([pinned-header RFC](2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md)) is per-suite: each header class flags exactly one `pinsHeader` scenario, whose `system-prompt.golden.md` and JSONL tool list split the composed header into reviewable artifacts; the uniformity guard compares both against every live header in that class. The pure helpers (`childFixturePaths`, `fixtureContext`, `normalizedHeaders`, `normalizedSystemPrompts`, `formatSystemPromptSnapshot`, `headerDeltaCount`) are exported from the module for direct unit coverage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Agent Client Protocol (ACP) support — drive the coding agent from external editors
|
||||
|
||||
Status: proposed
|
||||
|
||||
> **Implementation status (MVP landed):** steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 are implemented in `packages/ui/acp` + `examples/acp-agent`. **Step 5 (the `session/request_permission` permission gate) is deferred** — the bridge ships a pass-through (tools run with the executor's full authority) marked `TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)`, and lays down only the `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` ownership seam the gate will build on. Status stays `proposed` until the gate lands. `session/cancel` is the queue-aware `agent.cancel()`: it aborts a running step, clears queued + steering work, and drops a turn that is about to start, so a queued-but-not-yet-started prompt never runs and a later prompt cannot be batched into the cancelled turn. **Per-session `cwd` is now honored** (lifting the original "launch the server in the workspace root" restriction — see § Deferred): `session/new` accepts any absolute `cwd`, and `session/load` requires the request `cwd` to match the persisted session `cwd` so the editor and bash executor agree on the workspace.
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The coding agent is reachable only through the readline `stdio-chat` plugin: it reads lines from stdin, calls `agent.send()`, and prints the assistant token stream (`session/event` `assistant/chunk`) to stdout. There is no structured protocol, so the agent cannot be embedded in an editor — no streaming render, no tool-call display, no permission UI, no resumable sessions.
|
||||
|
||||
Editors are converging on the Agent Client Protocol (ACP), which Zed and others speak: JSON-RPC 2.0 over newline-delimited stdio, modeled on the Language Server Protocol. An editor boots the agent as a subprocess and exchanges `initialize` / `session/new` / `session/prompt`, rendering streamed `session/update` notifications and `session/request_permission` prompts. The goal is for the agent to be a drop-in ACP server — implement the protocol once and run in any ACP client, with no per-editor glue.
|
||||
|
||||
This RFC has a hard prerequisite on [session persistence](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-14-session-persistence.md): it assumes durable session persistence (the `SessionPersistence` service and the async `AgentLoop.resume` seam) is implemented, so resuming a session via `session/load` is in scope. None of those APIs exist yet — `AgentLoop` currently exposes only the synchronous `create` — so ACP must land after, or in the same change as, [session persistence](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-14-session-persistence.md), and pins to its `resume(agentId, resumeSessionId)` contract. Session persistence persists every `SessionEvent` verbatim (including `assistant/chunk`), so a loaded session has the stream chunks needed to replay turns to the client.
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal
|
||||
|
||||
A new plugin package `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp` — a client-driver / UI plugin, the structured analogue of `stdio-chat`. It is NOT a change to the loop and NOT an [capability seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md) interface/implementation/consumer capability split; it consumes the existing `agent/*` event taxonomy and the `tools/pre-execute`/`tools/post-execute` waterfalls.
|
||||
|
||||
It depends on the official `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` (the `AgentSideConnection` class) — Apache-2.0, actively versioned. The SDK declares a `zod` peer dependency and imports `zod/v4` at runtime, so `packages/ui/acp` must declare `zod` itself (per the workspace dependency constraints). This is the renamed successor to `@zed-industries/agent-client-protocol`, which is now deprecated on npm.
|
||||
|
||||
The mapping between ACP and existing harness seams — each row names the seam and any required extension:
|
||||
|
||||
| ACP (client ⇄ agent) | Harness seam | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `initialize` | static handler | negotiate `protocolVersion` (echo the supported version, else error); advertise text-only `promptCapabilities` and `loadSession: true`; report agent name/version |
|
||||
| `session/new {cwd, mcpServers, additionalDirectories}` → `{sessionId}` | the `dsh-agent` create factory (see Dependency note + Plan) | the seam must accept `{ sessionId, meta }` so the ACP-generated `sessionId` becomes the live/persisted session id and the validated `cwd` is attached as the `SessionHeader` (today `AgentLoop.create(id)` hardcodes `${id}-session` and takes no metadata); reject a 2nd session (single-session MVP, see [ACP multi-session](2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md)); `cwd` validated (require absolute) — any absolute cwd is honored: it becomes the session's `SessionHeader.cwd` and the default bash workdir (per-session cwd, see § Deferred → RESOLVED), so the server need not launch in the workspace; non-empty `mcpServers` and `additionalDirectories` are rejected for the MVP because silently ignoring requested servers/roots would desync the client's tool and filesystem-scope UI |
|
||||
| `session/load {sessionId, cwd, mcpServers, additionalDirectories}` | the `dsh-agent` resume factory ([session persistence](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-14-session-persistence.md) + Dependency note) | load `{ meta, events }`, seed the session, re-derive history via `deriveMessages()`, replay prior turns to the client as `session/update` per the ACP load contract; `mcpServers` and `additionalDirectories` rejected as in `session/new` |
|
||||
| `session/prompt {prompt}` | `agent.send()` (idle) | text blocks → `TextBlock`; reject image/audio per advertised capabilities; one in-flight prompt per session |
|
||||
| resolve `session/prompt` → `{stopReason}` | the `turn/end` `session/event` (its `reason`) | map the harness kebab `TurnEndReason` to the ACP snake_case `StopReason` wire enum: `completed`→`end_turn`, `max-tokens`→`max_tokens`, `aborted`(cancel)→`cancelled`, plus `refusal`/`max_turn_requests` when applicable; honor the batch-into-one-turn and send-not-synchronously-running settle semantics |
|
||||
| `session/update: agent_message_chunk` | `session/event` `assistant/chunk` `text-delta` only | do NOT also emit on `block-end(TextBlock)` — it carries the fully-assembled block and would duplicate the streamed text |
|
||||
| `session/update: agent_thought_chunk` | `session/event` `assistant/chunk` `reasoning-delta` | |
|
||||
| `session/update: tool_call` (pending→in_progress) | `session/event` `tool/call` | demux via a Session→sessionId map; `kind` inferred from the tool name |
|
||||
| `session/update: tool_call_update` (completed/failed) | `session/event` `tool/result` | a throwing `tools/execute` yields NO `tool/result` → fail the pending tool UI from `agent/error`/turn-end |
|
||||
| `session/request_permission {sessionId, toolCall, options}` | prepended `tools/execute` listener | no-op unless `exec.agent` is ACP-owned; await the outcome; `selected/allow_*` → `next()`; `reject_*`/`cancelled` → veto `ToolExecutionResult{isError}` |
|
||||
| `session/cancel` (notification) | `agent.cancel(reason)` | the queue-aware cancel (abort running step, clear queued + steering, drop an about-to-start turn); settle the in-flight prompt as `cancelled`; resolve any pending permission as `cancelled` exactly once |
|
||||
|
||||
The permission gate is the first real consumer of the `tools/execute` veto seam (the documented "single veto/sandbox/permission seam" plus the deferred "Permission system" TODO in [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md)). It is a single global listener registered with `prepend: true` so it runs before any other tool wrapper. `ToolExecution.agent` is optional and the `Agent` interface carries no origin marker, so the bridge tracks ownership itself: it records each agent it creates in a `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` and the gate no-ops (calls `next()` immediately) for any `exec.agent` it does not own — non-ACP agents and the no-agent case pass straight through. For an owned agent it resolves the session, issues `session/request_permission`, and stores the pending resolver on that session's record so the outcome — or a `session/cancel`/connection-close — settles it exactly once.
|
||||
|
||||
Lifecycle and disposal: the connection, listeners, and in-flight permission promises register via `ctx.effect`/`ctx.on`; teardown is async and must *reach* quiescence, not just request it — close the connection, settle/reject pending permissions, and dispose each owned agent through its `AgentHandle.dispose()` (which stops the loop, `await`s its exit, and unregisters). Owner teardown goes through that handle seam, not the loop's concrete `agent.done` (which exists only on `ReactLoopAgent`); a non-owner that merely wants to *observe* the current work settling without tearing the agent down awaits the interface-level `agent.whenIdle()`. Every listener contains its `send()` exceptions (log, never reject the turn) because stream chunks are emitted inside the model step, so a throwing listener would corrupt the turn.
|
||||
|
||||
**Dependency note (architecture rule).** [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md) states "plugins depend on interface packages, never on `dsh-agent-loop`." Creating and resuming agents is currently only on the concrete `AgentLoop` (`ctx.agentLoop`), so this RFC proposes adding an **abstract create/resume factory** to the `dsh-agent` interface (registry-level `create({ sessionId, meta })` / `resume(...)`), implemented by the loop, so `dsh-acp` injects only `agents` (the interface) and the dependency rule holds. The alternative — injecting the concrete `agentLoop` and recording a documented exception in the architecture doc — is explicitly the non-preferred fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Package scaffold `packages/ui/acp/` per [the cookbook](../../../cookbook/adding-a-package.md); add `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` and `zod`. Add the abstract create/resume factory to `dsh-agent` (the interface) so the bridge can `inject: ['agents', 'sessions', 'tools', 'sessionPersistence']` without depending on the concrete loop; `sessionPersistence` is required because `session/load` advertises `loadSession: true`. (Fallback only if the factory is judged not worth it: inject `agentLoop` directly and record the architecture-rule exception in `docs/architecture.md`.)
|
||||
2. Connection plus `initialize`/`session/new`: wire `AgentSideConnection` to stdin/stdout; protocolVersion negotiation; the single-session guard; create the live session through the new `{ sessionId, meta }` factory seam (so the ACP `sessionId` and validated `cwd` become the session's id and header); the `sessionId↔agent` and `Session↔sessionId` maps.
|
||||
3. Internal edit — turn-end reason fidelity (sanctioned: edit internals to fit ACP). Extend `TurnEndReasonMap` in the proper places: (a) declaration-merge a `max-tokens` variant in the owning package (`packages/core/session/src/types.ts`, alongside `completed|aborted|error|disposed`) — add `max-tokens` because `FinishReasonMap` produces it (DeepSeek maps `length` → `max-tokens`); do not add `refusal`, since no current adapter produces it (unknown DeepSeek finish reasons collapse to `error`), but leave a comment in `TurnEndReasonMap` noting `refusal` should be added when an adapter first emits it (`FinishReasonMap` is merge-extensible); (b) make `agent-loop`'s `loop.ts` populate the reason from the model `finish` chunk — `assembler.finish` lives inside `runStep`, so `runStep` must return it up to `runTurn`, and the rule is "the last step's finish reason wins, but any `max-tokens` in the turn surfaces as `max-tokens`"; (c) no consumer exhaustively switches over `TurnEndReason` today (the invariants plugin switches on `SessionEventType`, and `deriveMessages` ignores `turn/end`), so adding `max-tokens` is a non-breaking extension — but recheck before landing; (d) update [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md) (the CI-verified loop-lifecycle/event-taxonomy doc) and the affected package READMEs/JSDoc (`dsh-session`, `dsh-agent`, `dsh-agent-loop`) per the repo doc-sync policy. This replaces a fragile "observe the finish chunk in the bridge" hack with a real, documented contract.
|
||||
4. Prompt-turn streaming plus load: translate `session/event` (the `assistant/chunk` token stream plus boundaries and tool activity) into `session/update`; resolve `session/prompt` on settle, mapping the harness `TurnEndReason` to the ACP `StopReason` wire enum (`completed`→`end_turn`, `max-tokens`→`max_tokens`, `aborted`→`cancelled`) — a small total function with a test asserting the exact wire strings, since the SDK rejects an unknown `stopReason`. Concrete correlation, since the loop batches queued messages into one turn and `send()` does not synchronously flip to running: install the `session/event` listener before `send()`; capture the prompt's owning turn from its `turn/start` record, then resolve on that turn's `turn/end` (with `agent/status` idle/disposed as a fallback); reject an empty/whitespace prompt up front rather than calling `send()` (no turn would ever start, so the RPC would hang). Implement `session/load` on the session-persistence resume seam.
|
||||
5. Permission gate: a single `tools/execute` listener registered with `prepend: true`, owning a `WeakMap<Agent, sessionId>` of bridge-created agents; no-op (`next()`) for unowned/no-agent calls; for owned calls → `session/request_permission` → allow (`next()`) / veto; settle the stored resolver exactly once on outcome, cancel, or connection close.
|
||||
6. Example wiring (extract a shared base). `@cordisjs/plugin-include` is itself a plugin entry that resets `ctx.baseUrl` and loads a path, so a child `cordis.yml` can nest-include a shared base; the extraction is safe because every dependent plugin declares `inject` (loader groups initialize via `Promise.all`, so YAML order is NOT the dependency mechanism — never rely on it). Extract the provider/tool core (`llm, sessions, system-prompt, tools, agents, invariants, llm-deepseek, bash-local, tool-bash`) into `examples/base.yml`; have both `coding-agent` and a new `examples/acp-agent/` include it and add their own UI plugin plus logger. Keep `agent-loop` per-example (NOT in the base): `AgentLoop` creates its configured agents in its constructor, and the two examples disagree — `coding-agent` needs a pre-created `main` (its `stdio-chat` calls `ctx.agents.get('main')`), while `acp-agent` must pre-create none (ACP `session/new` creates agents). So `coding-agent` declares `agent-loop` with `agents: [{ id: main, … }]` and `acp-agent` with `agents: []`. `acp-agent` loads `dsh-session-persistence-jsonl` (from [session persistence](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-14-session-persistence.md) — required for `session/load`), omits the stdout logger (see Risks), and adds `pnpm run demo:acp` plus the Zed `agent_servers` snippet.
|
||||
7. Tests (the repo cares a lot here): a property-based test for the protocol shape (precedent: [property-based testing](../../implemented/testing/2026-06-11-property-based-testing.md)) — fuzz arbitrary harness event sequences and assert ACP-stream invariants (never a `tool_call_update` before its `tool_call`; exactly one `session/prompt` resolution per prompt; monotonic, well-formed ordering; `stopReason` in the legal set); codec unit tests over an in-memory `Duplex` pair (drive `AgentSideConnection` without a subprocess; assert exact frames for `initialize`, `session/new`, a full prompt turn); the mandatory HMR-safety test (dispose the fiber; assert the connection closed, all `ctx.on` listeners gone, any in-flight `request_permission` settled); failure-path tests (connection closes mid-stream; closes with a permission pending; a notification `send()` rejects but the turn survives; `finish{kind:'error'|'aborted'}`; a `tools/execute` throw with no `tool/result`; a second `session/new` rejected; a `session/prompt` while one is in flight; an empty prompt rejected without hanging; a `session/load` re-derives identical history and replays it); and an e2e (`*.e2e.ts`, self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`) that boots `examples/acp-agent`, connects a `ClientSideConnection`, sends a real prompt, owns and disposes the harness in `afterEach`, and verifies the world (files on disk), not the agent's self-report.
|
||||
8. Docs: module/JSDoc plus a package README; extend [the extension cookbook](../../../cookbook/extension-cookbook.md) with the client-driver pattern. Flip Status to `implemented` on landing; record a decision in this RFC only if it proves durable, contested, and surprising (candidates: the `tools/execute` permission-ownership rule, the npm-dependency choice) — not auto-required.
|
||||
|
||||
Deferred (each names its owning future work):
|
||||
|
||||
- Multiplexing concurrent sessions → [ACP multi-session](2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md).
|
||||
- ~~`cwd` honoring.~~ **RESOLVED.** Originally there was no path from `session/new.cwd` to the bash workdir (`tool-bash` forwarded only an explicit `args.workdir`; `LocalBashExecutor.resolve` defaulted to its own config or `process.cwd()`), so the MVP validated `cwd` (require absolute) AND required the server to launch in the workspace root, erroring on a mismatch. This is now lifted: the validated `cwd` is stored as `SessionHeader.cwd`, and `dsh-tool-bash` defaults the bash workdir to the calling agent's `session.header.cwd` (an explicit model `workdir` still wins; a relative one resolves against it). Any absolute `cwd` is honored — the server need not launch in the workspace, and N sessions can each target a different directory. Widening scope beyond the single cwd (`additionalDirectories`) remains deferred.
|
||||
- Client `terminal/*` proxying (a live editor terminal) and `fs/*` (editor-rendered diffs) — a future `BashExecutor` over the [capability seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md) bash seam, gated on `clientCapabilities.terminal`.
|
||||
- Image/audio prompts (blocked on the DeepSeek adapter, which skips `image` blocks today), modes, auth, `available_commands`/slash-commands, `plan`, and `usage_update`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **A process-wide stdout hijack inside `dsh-acp`** (defensively monkey-patching `console.log` / `process.stdout.write`) — rejected: it lives outside Cordis' effect-scoped, HMR-friendly plugin model, races the connection's own stdout handoff, and fights the logger. The stdout guarantee is config-only.
|
||||
- **Injecting `agentLoop` directly instead of the abstract create/resume factory** — the recorded fallback, taken only if the factory seam is judged not worth it, with the architecture-rule exception recorded in `docs/architecture.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- The `acp-agent` example speaks ACP over stdio end-to-end: `initialize`, `session/new` with a validated absolute `cwd` honored as the session workspace, streamed `session/update` frames per prompt turn, `session/load` re-deriving identical history, and `session/prompt` resolving with the correct wire `stopReason`.
|
||||
- stdout carries only framed JSON-RPC (asserted by test); the permission gate settles every `session/request_permission` exactly once — on outcome, cancel, or connection close.
|
||||
- The plan's test set runs green: the property-based protocol invariants, the codec unit tests over an in-memory duplex pair, the HMR-safety test, the failure-path matrix, and the self-skipping real-API e2e that verifies the world.
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks
|
||||
|
||||
stdout is the protocol — guaranteed by config, not by monkey-patching. The console logger writes through `console.log` to stdout, so any stdout UI/logger plugin corrupts JSON-RPC. The guarantee is config-only: the `acp-agent` example loads no stdout plugin (no console logger, no `stdio-chat`) and, if logging is wanted, uses a stderr exporter. A defensive process-wide `process.stdout.write`/`console.log` hijack inside `dsh-acp` is explicitly rejected — it lives outside Cordis' effect-scoped, HMR-friendly plugin model, races the connection's own stdout handoff, and fights the logger. A test asserts the example emits only framed JSON-RPC on stdout.
|
||||
|
||||
New third-party runtime dependency plus protocol drift: `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` is young (0.25.x, recently renamed) and evolving. Pin the version and isolate churn to the one bridge package. This is not a vendoring-policy violation — [vendoring Cordis as source](../../implemented/process/2026-06-11-vendor-cordis-as-source.md) vendors the framework; genuine third-party deps already live on npm (`@earendil-works/pi-ai`).
|
||||
|
||||
Turn-settle and prompt-correlation hazards: honor "queued messages batch into one turn" and "`send()` does not synchronously flip to running" (see `stdio-chat.ts` and the defensive-patterns section of [docs/architecture.md](../../../architecture.md)); gate resolution on an observed running→idle transition and handle the empty-prompt / no-work branch so an RPC can't hang.
|
||||
|
||||
Permission-await and disposal hangs: a pending `request_permission` whose connection closes or whose turn aborts must settle exactly once; disposal must reach quiescence — tear each owned agent down through `AgentHandle.dispose()` (which stops the loop and awaits its exit), rather than orphaning awaits on a closed pipe.
|
||||
|
||||
The 100% per-file coverage gate (repo policy) makes a branch-heavy protocol bridge real work. Accepted deliberately, surfaced so it isn't a surprise at PR time.
|
||||
|
||||
ACP protocol-shape details (exact method names, `session/update` variants, permission option kinds, stop reasons) are taken from the ACP spec and the `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` types; they are not independently verifiable until the dependency is added, so the implementation pins the SDK version and conforms to its types rather than to this RFC's prose where they differ.
|
||||
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Multiplex concurrent ACP sessions over one connection
|
||||
|
||||
Status: proposed
|
||||
|
||||
> **Implementation status:** the multi-session bridge (steps 1, 3, 4) and the bash task-ownership isolation are implemented in `packages/ui/acp` + `packages/bash/tool-bash`. **Per-session *permission* ownership is deferred** — it depends on [the ACP support permission gate](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) (`TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)`), which is itself deferred; the `agent→sessionId` reverse map the gate will route through is in place. Step 2's per-session disposer scope is now implemented (see [agent lifecycle & ownership seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-agent-lifecycle-and-ownership-seams.md)): the factory returns a per-agent `AgentHandle` whose `dispose()` stops the loop, awaits quiescence, unregisters the agent, and removes its session, so a bare client disconnect leaves no registered agent or session-store entry. Status stays `proposed` until per-session permission ownership lands.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Target-client note:** Zed is the current target ACP client, and its ACP client maintains a `HashMap<SessionId, AcpSession>` plus `pending_sessions` for concurrent `session/load` calls. The competing simplification to return to one live session per connection was rejected after checking that target-client shape; this RFC remains the path for finishing multiplexing and per-session permission ownership. See [the rejected simplification](../../rejected/simplification/2026-06-20-single-session-acp-bridge.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
[ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md) ships with a single active session per connection: a second `session/new` is rejected. Editors expect to run several conversations over one agent subprocess — a user opens multiple threads, or a client pre-warms sessions. The single-session guard is a deliberate MVP scope cut, not an architectural limit; this RFC lifts it.
|
||||
|
||||
This paragraph is historical: the multi-session bridge has landed. The remaining proposed work is per-session permission ownership plus the lifecycle seams now tracked in [agent lifecycle and ownership seams](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-agent-lifecycle-and-ownership-seams.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal
|
||||
|
||||
The harness core already supports many agents (`AgentRegistry.list()` and `AgentLoop.create` impose no count limit), so multiplexing is a bridge-layer change in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp`, not a loop or core change.
|
||||
|
||||
- Lift the single-session guard in `session/new`; allow N live sessions, each mapped to its own `ReactLoopAgent`.
|
||||
- The bridge's `sessionId→agent` and `Session→sessionId` maps (introduced single-entry by [the ACP support RFC](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) become true multi-entry, plus a third `agent→sessionId` reverse map: the `tools/execute` permission gate receives only `exec.agent` (no sessionId), so it needs an O(1) reverse lookup to find the owning session. Every `agent/*` event and every `session/event` is demuxed strictly by id, so two sessions streaming at once never interleave their `session/update` notifications.
|
||||
- Per-session prompt queues: [the ACP support RFC](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)'s single-entry in-flight-prompt state becomes multi-entry — one in-flight prompt *per session*, tracked per `sessionId`.
|
||||
- Per-session cancel routing: `session/cancel` cancels only its own session's agent (via the queue-aware `agent.cancel()`) and settles only that session's in-flight prompt. The cancel is scoped to that one agent — a per-agent `AbortController` for the running step plus the agent's own queued/steering FIFOs — so it never touches another session's stream or pending prompt.
|
||||
- Per-session permission ownership: a `session/request_permission` and its outcome are bound to the originating session via the reverse map, so a permission prompt or a cancel in one session can never resolve another session's pending permission.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Generalize the two id maps to multi-entry and add the `agent→sessionId` reverse map; add a per-session record holding the agent, the in-flight-prompt state, the pending-permission registry, and the session's disposer scope (see step 2).
|
||||
2. Give each session a real per-session disposer scope, NOT `ctx.extend()` — in Cordis `ctx.extend()` only creates a child context/prototype, but `ctx.on()` registered on it is still owned by the current plugin fiber, so disposing it would not remove that session's listeners. Use a genuine child fiber (load a per-session sub-plugin, e.g. `ctx.plugin(...)` returning a fork, or collect each session's `ctx.on` disposers in its session record and call them on teardown). Demux every `agent/*` and `session/event` by id into the right session record. Note the single global `tools/execute` listener stays on the bridge root (it must see all agents) and routes via the reverse map.
|
||||
3. Lift the `session/new` guard; keep `session/load` ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) working per session.
|
||||
4. Tests for cross-session isolation: two sessions streaming and permission-prompting concurrently never interleave; a cancel/abort in one session leaves the other's stream and pending permission untouched; per-session in-flight-prompt enforcement holds independently; disposing one session leaves the others running.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**A per-session `ctx.extend()` scope** — rejected: in Cordis, `ctx.extend()` only creates a child context/prototype, and `ctx.on()` registered on it is still owned by the current plugin fiber, so disposing it would not remove that session's listeners. A genuine child fiber (or a per-session collection of disposers) is required.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- N concurrent sessions stream and permission-prompt without interleaving their `session/update` notifications; a cancel in one session leaves every other session's stream, queued prompts, and pending permissions untouched.
|
||||
- Disposing one session removes exactly its own listeners; connection teardown reaches quiescence across all sessions.
|
||||
- One session's agent cannot read or kill another session's background bash task.
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks
|
||||
|
||||
Listener fan-out cost: each session adds listeners; ensure disposal of one session removes exactly its own and the connection teardown ([from ACP support](2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md)) still reaches quiescence across all sessions.
|
||||
|
||||
The subtle correctness trap is cross-session leakage — a cancel or abort on one session settling another session's pending permission. The per-session permission ownership rule (routed via the `agent→sessionId` reverse map) and its isolation test are the guard.
|
||||
|
||||
Shared background-task state: the bash executor's task ids are global and predictable (`bash-1`, `bash-2`, …), and `bash_output`/`bash_kill` look up by id without checking the caller. Under one session this is benign; under N sessions one session's agent could read or kill another's background task. This is a pre-existing `tool-bash` gap that multi-session turns into a real isolation hole — fixing it (validate the caller against the task owner) belongs with this RFC or a companion `tool-bash` change.
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: rejected — Zed is the current target ACP client and its ACP implementa
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The ACP bridge now supports multiple live sessions on one JSON-RPC connection. That capability brings multi-entry session maps, reverse session/agent lookups, per-session prompt state, loading ids, demux for every event, cross-session teardown, and isolation concerns for future permission prompts and background tasks. The older [multi-session ACP proposal](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) still tracks the unfinished permission-ownership piece; this RFC is the competing simplification path.
|
||||
The ACP bridge now supports multiple live sessions on one JSON-RPC connection. That capability brings multi-entry session maps, reverse session/agent lookups, per-session prompt state, loading ids, demux for every event, cross-session teardown, and isolation concerns for future permission prompts and background tasks. The older [multi-session ACP proposal](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) still tracks the unfinished permission-ownership piece; this RFC is the competing simplification path.
|
||||
|
||||
The product target has proven it needs concurrent editor conversations over one harness process: Zed's ACP connection owns multiple sessions and load states. The snapshot replay tier still avoids concurrent model streams because its replay entries are positional; that is a test-fixture limitation, not a reason to remove bridge multiplexing.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Remove the multi-session maps and demux where a single `SessionRecord | undefine
|
||||
- `session/new` and `session/load` reject while that record exists.
|
||||
- Event handlers no longer demux across a `Map<sessionId, record>`.
|
||||
- Multi-session tests are removed or moved under the proposal that continues to defend multiplexing.
|
||||
- The existing [multi-session ACP proposal](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) is updated to link this RFC and remains the live direction.
|
||||
- The existing [multi-session ACP proposal](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md) is updated to link this RFC and remains the live direction.
|
||||
|
||||
## What we give up
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+25
-1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ This table connects model-visible tool names to the plugin package and service s
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash` | `bash`, `bash_kill`, `bash_output` | `ctx.tools`, `ctx.bash` | `tool/call`, `tool/result`, `context/message via agent.inject() for background completion notices` | - | The bash/bash_output/bash_kill tools are model-facing consumers of the bash executor seam. |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-cordis` | `cordis_inspect`, `cordis_mount`, `cordis_unmount` | `ctx.tools` | `tool/call`, `tool/result`, `live plugin-tree mutations (mount/unmount)` | - | Ships in examples/cordis-agent only (a deliberate opt-in — mounted code gets the real ctx, see docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md). Plugins the model mounts may register ADDITIONAL model-visible tools at runtime; the request-header ToolsDelta logs those tool-set changes. |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs` | `edit`, `read`, `write` | `ctx.tools`, `ctx.fs`, `ctx.systemPrompt` | `tool/call`, `fs/write-intent or fs/edit-intent for mutations`, `fs/observed after successful file operations`, `tool/result` | - | The read-before-write/edit policy is added by `@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-policy` (an `fs/*` event-gate plugin, no schema change); a deployment that loads these tools is expected to also load it. The tool schemas above are identical with or without the policy plugin. |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-skill` | `skill` | `ctx.tools`, `ctx.skills` | `tool/call`, `tool/result` | - | - |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent` | `subagent` | `ctx.tools`, `ctx.subagents` | `tool/call`, `tool/result`, `child session events through the chosen provider` | `subagent`, `subagent_fork` | The registered tool name is the load-time `toolName` config (default `subagent`); the schema above is that default. The shipped example agents load this package once per subagent backend, so the model additionally sees `subagent_fork` (bound to the fork backend) with an identical schema — see `examples/coding-agent/cordis.yml` and `examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml`. |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-todo` | `todo_write` | `ctx.tools`, `owning Agent session` | `tool/call`, `todo/write`, `tool/result` | - | todo_write is session-owned state; UIs render the latest todo/write event as a checklist or ACP plan. |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-workflow` | `workflow` | `ctx.tools`, `ctx.workflows`, `ctx.systemPrompt`, `a calling Agent (exec.agent parents the script children)` | `tool/call`, `tool/result` | - | - |
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ Registered by the tool registry itself under `mode: code` / `mode: both` (see th
|
||||
|
||||
### `bash`
|
||||
|
||||
Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`.
|
||||
Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -370,6 +371,29 @@ Source: [`packages/fs/tool-fs/src/index.ts`](../packages/fs/tool-fs/src/index.ts
|
||||
|
||||
The read-before-write/edit policy is added by `@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-policy` (an `fs/*` event-gate plugin, no schema change); a deployment that loads these tools is expected to also load it. The tool schemas above are identical with or without the policy plugin.
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-skill`
|
||||
|
||||
### `skill`
|
||||
|
||||
Load the full instructions for an available skill. Call this with the exact skill name from the session skill catalog before acting on a task that names or clearly matches that skill.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "object",
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"name": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"description": "The exact skill name from the available skills list."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"required": [
|
||||
"name"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts`](../packages/skill/tool-skill/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent`
|
||||
|
||||
### `subagent`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
toolCall["Session event: <code>tool/call</code><br/>logged before execution"]
|
||||
presentCall["UI pending card<br/>presentCall(args)"]
|
||||
pre["<code>tools/pre-execute</code> waterfall<br/>hooks, permission, sandbox"]
|
||||
denied["deny or ask<br/>tool body skipped"]
|
||||
denied["denied<br/>tool body skipped"]
|
||||
approval["<code>ctx.approval</code> one-shot prompt<br/>absent or unanswerable: deny"]
|
||||
around["<code>tools/execute</code> waterfall<br/>timeout, retry, metrics (around dispatch)"]
|
||||
toolBody["Registered tool execute() body"]
|
||||
fsGate["<code>fs/write-intent</code> or <code>fs/edit-intent</code><br/>tool-fs mutations only"]
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +26,10 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
toolCall --> pre
|
||||
pre -->|allow| around
|
||||
around --> toolBody
|
||||
pre -->|deny or ask| denied
|
||||
pre -->|deny| denied
|
||||
pre -->|ask| approval
|
||||
approval -->|allowed-once| around
|
||||
approval -->|rejected, cancelled, unavailable| denied
|
||||
denied --> post
|
||||
toolBody --> fsGate
|
||||
fsGate --> toolBody
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +41,6 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
toolResult --> presentResult
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Filesystem read-before-edit checks live below `tool-fs` on the `fs/*` event gate; hook bridges and future permission prompts live on the generic pre/post tool waterfalls; and around-dispatch concerns like the tool-call timeout policy (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy`) wrap core dispatch on `tools/execute`. That split lets the same hooks observe bash, fs, web, todo, and subagent calls without coupling those tools to one policy service. Code Mode rides the same pipeline twice over: `run_code` is itself a registered tool body, and each tool call its program makes re-enters `ctx.tools.execute()` through BOTH waterfalls — serialized one at a time, logged as a `tool/code-dispatch` session event, with a deny surfacing to the program as a binding rejection (a sub-call's `additionalContext` is deliberately dropped — no safe outlet mid-run preserves call/result adjacency).
|
||||
Filesystem read-before-edit checks live below `tool-fs` on the `fs/*` event gate; hook bridges and the approval seam's permission prompts live on the generic pre/post tool waterfalls; and around-dispatch concerns like the tool-call timeout policy (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy`) wrap core dispatch on `tools/execute`. That split lets the same hooks observe bash, fs, web, todo, and subagent calls without coupling those tools to one policy service.
|
||||
|
||||
Maintenance mode: curated Mermaid flow; exact tool schemas and event signatures live in generated catalogs.
|
||||
+3
-2
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Runnable demos showing how the harness is wired. **Examples are NOT workspaces** — each `examples/*/package.json` is a private, dependency-free stub, never built. They are booted as unbuilt `tsx` subprocesses via the cordis Loader reading a `cordis.yml`; the `@deepseek-ai/dsh-*` plugin names in those YAML files resolve through the root `tsconfig.json` `paths` map, not through `node_modules`.
|
||||
|
||||
Because examples are not under the `packages/*/src` coverage gate, an example that grows real, reusable *logic* should extract it into a `packages/` package (where it gets the per-file 100% gate and a README). Keep only example-specific glue here: the `cordis.yml` wiring, demo-only mocks/teaching artifacts, and the e2e/snapshot scenarios. There is no `start.ts` — the boot glue (Loader tail, `.env` load, snapshot-mode selection, stdin-dispose lifecycle) lives in each app package's `bin` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-stdio-agent`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`), which the `demo:*` scripts invoke against the leaf `cordis.yml`.
|
||||
Because examples are not under the `packages/*/src` coverage gate, an example that grows real, reusable *logic* should extract it into a `packages/` package (where it gets the per-file 100% gate and a README). Keep only example-specific glue here: the `cordis.yml` wiring, demo-only mocks/teaching artifacts, and the e2e/snapshot scenarios. There is no `start.ts` — the boot glue lives in each app package's `bin` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-stdio-agent`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`), which the `demo:*` scripts invoke against the leaf `cordis.yml`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Every example ships e2e smokes (keyless + with-key)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Each example must have **both** kinds of end-to-end smoke, because they catch di
|
||||
|
||||
**Exception — keyless-by-nature examples.** An example whose model is itself a mock/deterministic stand-in (no real provider) has no meaningful with-key smoke; the keyless smoke is the complete requirement. State the exception inline in the test.
|
||||
|
||||
A keyless smoke that spawns the example from a temp cwd must set `TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH` to the repo-root tsconfig — the unbuilt `paths` map is found by searching UP from cwd, so a temp cwd outside the repo would otherwise fall back to stale built `lib/`. Pass `--expose-internals` when the example's `cordis.yml` loads the HMR plugin (mirror the `demo:*` script).
|
||||
A keyless smoke that spawns the example from a temp cwd must set `TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH` to the repo-root tsconfig (the unbuilt `paths` map is found by searching UP from cwd), and pass `--expose-internals` when the `cordis.yml` loads the HMR plugin (mirror the `demo:*` script).
|
||||
|
||||
## Current state
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ A keyless smoke that spawns the example from a temp cwd must set `TSX_TSCONFIG_P
|
||||
| `echo-agent` | `tests/echo.e2e.ts` — boots the real `cordis.yml`, drives the echo tool round-trip and the direct canned reply | **N/A — keyless by nature** (the `mock-echo` model has no real provider) |
|
||||
| `coding-agent` | `tests/keyless-smoke.e2e.ts` — boots the full real tree (dummy key, no prompt → no model call), asserts banner + clean exit; `tests/code-mode-keyless-smoke.e2e.ts` — the same boot guard for the Code Mode overlay | `tests/{full-loop,coding-task,resume,compaction,todo-write}.e2e.ts` — real model + real bash + real todo_write, world-verified; `tests/code-mode.e2e.ts` — a real model composes two bash calls in one `run_code` program; collapsed header, dispatch events, written file all verified |
|
||||
| `cordis-agent` | `tests/keyless-smoke.e2e.ts` — boots the real tree incl. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-cordis` by package name; the tool logic is unit-tested in `packages/cordis/tool-cordis` | `tests/cordis-tools.e2e.ts` — real model mounts a listener (tagged line fires), builds+calls its own tool, composes two mounts via provide/inject |
|
||||
| `sandbox-acp-agent` | `escalation.e2e.ts` — boots the real tree (sandbox + approval + bridge) keyless: initialize + `session/new` | same file — denied → escalates → a scripted client grants (the write must land) or rejects (it must not); skips without key/runner |
|
||||
| `acp-agent` | `pnpm run test:snapshot` — boots the real ACP subprocess and replays a recorded session keyless (incl. the hook matrix: a scenario per hook point × outcome for BOTH the Claude and Codex bridges — block, deny, ask, context-fold, force-continue); `tests/acp.e2e.ts` also asserts stdout purity without a key | `tests/acp.e2e.ts` — real ACP prompt, verifies a file the agent wrote; `tests/hooks.e2e.ts` — a real `PreToolUse` hook blocks bash, verifies the file is NOT written |
|
||||
|
||||
See [the root AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) for repo-wide conventions and [docs/architecture.md](../docs/architecture.md) for the design.
|
||||
@@ -32,3 +32,9 @@ Run with: `pnpm run demo:cordis` (needs `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`). See [cordis-agent/R
|
||||
An agent demo exposed as an **Agent Client Protocol (ACP)** server over JSON-RPC stdio, via the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`](../packages/ui/acp-agent) app — drive it from Zed or any other ACP client. Also the home of the keyless snapshot tests.
|
||||
|
||||
Run with: `pnpm run demo:acp` (needs `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`); `pnpm run demo:code-mode acp` boots the same server in Code Mode via the `code-mode.cordis.yml` overlay. See [acp-agent/README.md](acp-agent/README.md) for the Zed setup and the snapshot-test design.
|
||||
|
||||
## sandbox-acp-agent
|
||||
|
||||
The coding agent with its bash executor swapped for the sandbox stack ([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) + [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) — the one-entry executor swap the `ctx.bash` capability seam exists for), served over ACP with [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) mounted — the first composition where the approval loop is LIVE: a sandbox denial escalated by the model becomes a `session/request_permission` prompt in the editor, and "Allow once" runs exactly that command under the wider mode.
|
||||
|
||||
Run with: `pnpm run demo:sandbox-acp` (needs `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`; bwrap, a Landlock-enforcing kernel, or macOS for confined runs). See [sandbox-acp-agent/README.md](sandbox-acp-agent/README.md).
|
||||
@@ -37,4 +37,4 @@ This example is the home of the harness's **snapshot tests** — they boot this
|
||||
|
||||
## MVP limitations
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge supports N concurrent sessions per connection, each in its own workspace `cwd` (RFC 011). Remaining limits: prompts support ACP's baseline `text` and `resource_link` blocks only, `additionalDirectories` and `mcpServers` are rejected, and the tool-permission gate is deferred (`TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)` — tools run with the executor's full authority). See `packages/ui/acp/README.md` for the full contract.
|
||||
The bridge supports N concurrent sessions per connection, each in its own workspace `cwd` (RFC 011). Remaining limits: prompts support ACP's baseline `text` and `resource_link` blocks only, and `additionalDirectories` and `mcpServers` are rejected. Permission prompts (`session/request_permission`) are wired through the approval seam, but this example composes no ask-producing policy, so tools run with the executor's full authority. See `packages/ui/acp/README.md` for the full contract.
|
||||
@@ -20,11 +20,9 @@
|
||||
tools:
|
||||
mode: both
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working
|
||||
directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and
|
||||
factual.
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
- insert:
|
||||
- id: code-runtime
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,11 +19,9 @@
|
||||
tools:
|
||||
mode: both
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working
|
||||
directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and
|
||||
factual.
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
- insert:
|
||||
- id: code-runtime
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
|
||||
@@ -20,11 +20,9 @@
|
||||
tools:
|
||||
mode: code
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working
|
||||
directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and
|
||||
factual.
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
- insert:
|
||||
- id: code-runtime
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,11 +20,9 @@
|
||||
tools:
|
||||
mode: code
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working
|
||||
directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and
|
||||
factual.
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
- insert:
|
||||
- id: code-runtime
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker'
|
||||
@@ -44,11 +44,9 @@
|
||||
# loop resolves per session (every ACP session carries the client's cwd,
|
||||
# so the persona can state the workspace).
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working
|
||||
directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and
|
||||
factual.
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
# The subagent seam + both in-process backends + two model-facing tools, as leaf
|
||||
# entries after the app (which provides ctx.agents/ctx.tools). spawn (a fresh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,16 @@ function spawnAcpAgent(cwd: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Spawn
|
||||
const child = spawn(
|
||||
process.execPath,
|
||||
['--import', tsxLoader, binScript, configPath],
|
||||
{ cwd, env: { ...env, TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig }, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] },
|
||||
{
|
||||
cwd,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...env,
|
||||
TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig,
|
||||
DSH_HOME: join(cwd, '.dsh'),
|
||||
DSH_AGENTS_HOME: join(cwd, '.agents'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
const stderr: string[] = []
|
||||
child.stderr.setEncoding('utf8')
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +89,9 @@ function spawnAcpAgent(cwd: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Spawn
|
||||
return Promise.resolve()
|
||||
},
|
||||
requestPermission(_params: RequestPermissionRequest): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {
|
||||
// Permission gate is deferred (TODO(rfc010-permission-gate)); the bridge
|
||||
// never requests permission yet, so just allow if it ever does.
|
||||
// This example composes no ask-producing policy (no hooks), so the
|
||||
// bridge never prompts here; answer cancelled (fail closed) if it ever
|
||||
// does — an unexpected prompt must not grant anything.
|
||||
return Promise.resolve({ outcome: { outcome: 'cancelled' } })
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +160,13 @@ describe('acp-agent over real stdio (no key required)', () => {
|
||||
// which this purity test never triggers). So this runs WITHOUT real creds.
|
||||
const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['--import', tsxLoader, binScript, configPath], {
|
||||
cwd: workdir,
|
||||
env: { ...process.env, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY ?? 'sk-dummy-for-boot', TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig },
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY ?? 'sk-dummy-for-boot',
|
||||
TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig,
|
||||
DSH_HOME: join(workdir, '.dsh'),
|
||||
DSH_AGENTS_HOME: join(workdir, '.agents'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
})
|
||||
const out: string[] = []
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ function snapshotModeFromEnv(value: string | undefined): SnapshotSuiteOptions['m
|
||||
const SCENARIOS: Scenario[] = [
|
||||
{ name: 'handshake', hasModelTurn: false, recorded: false },
|
||||
{ name: 'reject-extra-dirs', hasModelTurn: false, recorded: false },
|
||||
// text-turn is the pinned-header scenario: the minimal single text turn,
|
||||
// whose fixture is the ONE place the full system prompt + tool schemas are
|
||||
// committed and compared verbatim.
|
||||
// text-turn is the pinned-header scenario: the minimal single text turn.
|
||||
// Its system-prompt.golden.md and JSONL tool list pin the composed header.
|
||||
{ name: 'text-turn', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true, pinsHeader: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'tool-call-turn', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'fs-terminal-card', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'todo-plan', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'skill-load', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: false, pinsHeader: true, headerClass: 'skill' },
|
||||
{ name: 'workspace-edit', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'fs-read', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'fs-write', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
You are an AI agent powered by the DeepSeek Harness SDK.
|
||||
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the deepseek-v4-flash model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Use the read tool — not shell commands like cat — to inspect text files. Results include line numbers. Use offset and limit to continue reading large files.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the edit tool for targeted changes to existing UTF-8 text files. It replaces literal old_string with new_string; by default old_string must appear exactly once. If old_string appears multiple times, provide a more specific old_string or set replace_all to true. Read the file first (the default fs-policy requires it), unless you just created or edited it in this session.
|
||||
|
||||
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the workflow tool ONLY when the user explicitly asks for a workflow or for large multi-agent orchestration: you write a JavaScript script (the tool description documents the exact format) that fans work out across many subagents with phases and structured results. For one or two delegations, prefer plain subagent calls.
|
||||
|
||||
## Writing code for run_code
|
||||
|
||||
Pass `run_code` the body of an async TypeScript function (erasable syntax only — no `enum` or namespaces; type annotations are advisory, the code runs type-stripped). Inside the program:
|
||||
|
||||
- Call tools as `await tools.name(args)` — quoted access for exotic names: `tools["my-tool"](args)`. Every call resolves to the tool's text output as a string. Tool arguments must be JSON-serializable.
|
||||
- A FAILED tool call rejects with an `Error` carrying the tool's error text — `try/catch` it to handle and continue.
|
||||
- Calls execute sequentially, even under `Promise.all`.
|
||||
- Emit results with `return` and/or `console.log(...)`. ONLY what you print or return comes back to you — intermediate tool results never enter the conversation, so extract just what you need.
|
||||
|
||||
The available tools:
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
declare const tools: {
|
||||
/** Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`. */
|
||||
bash(args: {
|
||||
/** The bash command to execute. */
|
||||
command: string;
|
||||
/** Clear, concise description of what this command does in active voice, 5-10 words (shown in the UI). Examples: "ls" → "List files in current directory"; "git status" → "Show working tree status"; "npm install" → "Install package dependencies". */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry. */
|
||||
timeoutMs?: number;
|
||||
/** Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it. */
|
||||
workdir?: string;
|
||||
/** Run in the background and return a task id immediately. No timeout applies. */
|
||||
run_in_background?: boolean;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Ask the executor to kill a running background bash task by task id. */
|
||||
bash_kill(args: {
|
||||
/** Task id returned by the bash tool. */
|
||||
task_id: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Read new output from a background bash task started with `bash` + `run_in_background`. Returns only output produced since the previous bash_output call, plus the task status. Tasks keep running while you do other work; poll again later for more output. */
|
||||
bash_output(args: {
|
||||
/** Task id returned by the bash tool. */
|
||||
task_id: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Edit an existing UTF-8 text file by replacing literal text. */
|
||||
edit(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to edit, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** Literal text to replace. Must match exactly. */
|
||||
old_string: string;
|
||||
/** Literal replacement text. Use an empty string to delete the match. */
|
||||
new_string: string;
|
||||
/** Replace all matches. Defaults to false; when false, old_string must appear exactly once. */
|
||||
replace_all?: boolean;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Read a UTF-8 text file and return line-numbered content. */
|
||||
read(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to read, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** 1-based first line to return. Defaults to 1. */
|
||||
offset?: number;
|
||||
/** Maximum number of lines to return. Defaults to 2000. */
|
||||
limit?: number;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Load the full instructions for an available skill. Call this with the exact skill name from the session skill catalog before acting on a task that names or clearly matches that skill. */
|
||||
skill(args: {
|
||||
/** The exact skill name from the available skills list. */
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Delegate a self-contained task to a subagent (a separate agent that works in its own context) and return its final result. Use this to offload focused, independent work — research, a scoped implementation, an analysis — so it does not consume this conversation's context. The subagent runs to completion and you receive only its final answer, not its intermediate steps. Give it a complete, standalone prompt: it does not see this conversation. */
|
||||
subagent(args: {
|
||||
/** A short (3-5 word) description of the delegated task, for display. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** The complete, self-contained task for the subagent. It does not share this conversation's context, so include everything it needs. */
|
||||
prompt: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Delegate a task to a subagent that INHERITS this conversation: a child agent seeded with all completed turns so far (it does not see the current in-flight turn), returning only its final result. Use this when the subtask builds on this conversation's context — a follow-up analysis, a review, a continuation — without consuming this conversation's context for the work itself. You receive only its final answer, not its intermediate steps. */
|
||||
subagent_fork(args: {
|
||||
/** A short (3-5 word) description of the delegated task, for display. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** The task for the subagent. It already sees this conversation's completed turns, so build on them freely and state only what is new. */
|
||||
prompt: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Record and update a structured task list for the current work. Send the ENTIRE list every call — it REPLACES the previous list (there are no partial updates, no per-item edits). Use it to plan multi-step work and show progress: add one todo per concrete step before you start. Keep AT MOST ONE todo `in_progress` at a time; while work remains, exactly one active task should be `in_progress`. Mark a todo `completed` the moment it is done (do not batch completions), and allow no `in_progress` item only once all work is complete. Skip the list for trivial single-step tasks. Statuses: `pending` (not started), `in_progress` (being worked on now), `completed` (finished). */
|
||||
todo_write(args: {
|
||||
/** The COMPLETE task list, replacing any previous list. */
|
||||
todos: ({
|
||||
/** What the task is — a short imperative line. */
|
||||
content: string;
|
||||
/** pending (not started) | in_progress (now) | completed (done). */
|
||||
status: "pending" | "in_progress" | "completed";
|
||||
})[];
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagents at scale. Use this for work that fans out across many independent pieces — an audit over many files, a migration, multi-angle research, adversarial verification of findings — where you write the orchestration as a script instead of delegating turn by turn. The workflow's identity rides the `meta` parameter as JSON: required `name` (short kebab-case) and `description` strings, optional `whenToUse` string and `phases` array (`{title, detail?, model?}`). The `script` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO `export const meta` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with `return <value>` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result. Script-body hooks: - `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), `model` (override). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly. - `pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives `(prev, item, index)`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to `null` and skips its remaining stages. - `parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to `null`. - `phase(title)` — start a progress phase; `log(message)` — narrate progress; `args` — the tool call's `args` input, verbatim. Misused hooks (bad arguments, unknown options, unsupported schemas, tripped caps) throw errors that ALWAYS kill the script — they never dissolve into a per-item `null`. Constraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs are provided — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes. */
|
||||
workflow(args: {
|
||||
/** The plain-JS workflow script body (top-level await allowed; NO `export const meta` statement; end with `return <json-value>`). */
|
||||
script: string;
|
||||
/** The workflow identity block (plain JSON — never code). */
|
||||
meta: {
|
||||
/** Short kebab-case workflow name. */
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
/** One-line description of what the workflow does. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** Optional guidance on when this workflow applies. */
|
||||
whenToUse?: string;
|
||||
/** Optional phase declarations matched by phase() calls. */
|
||||
phases?: {
|
||||
/** The phase title phase() calls match by exact string. */
|
||||
title: string;
|
||||
/** Optional one-line description of the phase. */
|
||||
detail?: string;
|
||||
/** Optional model override this phase is expected to use. */
|
||||
model?: string;
|
||||
}[];
|
||||
};
|
||||
/** Optional JSON input exposed to the script as the `args` global (wrap a bare list as a field, e.g. {"files": [...]}). */
|
||||
args?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Create or fully replace a UTF-8 text file. */
|
||||
write(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to write, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** Full UTF-8 text content to write. */
|
||||
content: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
You are an AI agent powered by the DeepSeek Harness SDK.
|
||||
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the deepseek-v4-flash model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Use the read tool — not shell commands like cat — to inspect text files. Results include line numbers. Use offset and limit to continue reading large files.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the edit tool for targeted changes to existing UTF-8 text files. It replaces literal old_string with new_string; by default old_string must appear exactly once. If old_string appears multiple times, provide a more specific old_string or set replace_all to true. Read the file first (the default fs-policy requires it), unless you just created or edited it in this session.
|
||||
|
||||
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the workflow tool ONLY when the user explicitly asks for a workflow or for large multi-agent orchestration: you write a JavaScript script (the tool description documents the exact format) that fans work out across many subagents with phases and structured results. For one or two delegations, prefer plain subagent calls.
|
||||
|
||||
## Writing code for run_code
|
||||
|
||||
Pass `run_code` the body of an async TypeScript function (erasable syntax only — no `enum` or namespaces; type annotations are advisory, the code runs type-stripped). Inside the program:
|
||||
|
||||
- Call tools as `await tools.name(args)` — quoted access for exotic names: `tools["my-tool"](args)`. Every call resolves to the tool's text output as a string. Tool arguments must be JSON-serializable.
|
||||
- A FAILED tool call rejects with an `Error` carrying the tool's error text — `try/catch` it to handle and continue.
|
||||
- Calls execute sequentially, even under `Promise.all`.
|
||||
- Emit results with `return` and/or `console.log(...)`. ONLY what you print or return comes back to you — intermediate tool results never enter the conversation, so extract just what you need.
|
||||
|
||||
The available tools:
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
declare const tools: {
|
||||
/** Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`. */
|
||||
bash(args: {
|
||||
/** The bash command to execute. */
|
||||
command: string;
|
||||
/** Clear, concise description of what this command does in active voice, 5-10 words (shown in the UI). Examples: "ls" → "List files in current directory"; "git status" → "Show working tree status"; "npm install" → "Install package dependencies". */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry. */
|
||||
timeoutMs?: number;
|
||||
/** Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it. */
|
||||
workdir?: string;
|
||||
/** Run in the background and return a task id immediately. No timeout applies. */
|
||||
run_in_background?: boolean;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Ask the executor to kill a running background bash task by task id. */
|
||||
bash_kill(args: {
|
||||
/** Task id returned by the bash tool. */
|
||||
task_id: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Read new output from a background bash task started with `bash` + `run_in_background`. Returns only output produced since the previous bash_output call, plus the task status. Tasks keep running while you do other work; poll again later for more output. */
|
||||
bash_output(args: {
|
||||
/** Task id returned by the bash tool. */
|
||||
task_id: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Edit an existing UTF-8 text file by replacing literal text. */
|
||||
edit(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to edit, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** Literal text to replace. Must match exactly. */
|
||||
old_string: string;
|
||||
/** Literal replacement text. Use an empty string to delete the match. */
|
||||
new_string: string;
|
||||
/** Replace all matches. Defaults to false; when false, old_string must appear exactly once. */
|
||||
replace_all?: boolean;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Read a UTF-8 text file and return line-numbered content. */
|
||||
read(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to read, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** 1-based first line to return. Defaults to 1. */
|
||||
offset?: number;
|
||||
/** Maximum number of lines to return. Defaults to 2000. */
|
||||
limit?: number;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Load the full instructions for an available skill. Call this with the exact skill name from the session skill catalog before acting on a task that names or clearly matches that skill. */
|
||||
skill(args: {
|
||||
/** The exact skill name from the available skills list. */
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Delegate a self-contained task to a subagent (a separate agent that works in its own context) and return its final result. Use this to offload focused, independent work — research, a scoped implementation, an analysis — so it does not consume this conversation's context. The subagent runs to completion and you receive only its final answer, not its intermediate steps. Give it a complete, standalone prompt: it does not see this conversation. */
|
||||
subagent(args: {
|
||||
/** A short (3-5 word) description of the delegated task, for display. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** The complete, self-contained task for the subagent. It does not share this conversation's context, so include everything it needs. */
|
||||
prompt: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Delegate a task to a subagent that INHERITS this conversation: a child agent seeded with all completed turns so far (it does not see the current in-flight turn), returning only its final result. Use this when the subtask builds on this conversation's context — a follow-up analysis, a review, a continuation — without consuming this conversation's context for the work itself. You receive only its final answer, not its intermediate steps. */
|
||||
subagent_fork(args: {
|
||||
/** A short (3-5 word) description of the delegated task, for display. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** The task for the subagent. It already sees this conversation's completed turns, so build on them freely and state only what is new. */
|
||||
prompt: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Record and update a structured task list for the current work. Send the ENTIRE list every call — it REPLACES the previous list (there are no partial updates, no per-item edits). Use it to plan multi-step work and show progress: add one todo per concrete step before you start. Keep AT MOST ONE todo `in_progress` at a time; while work remains, exactly one active task should be `in_progress`. Mark a todo `completed` the moment it is done (do not batch completions), and allow no `in_progress` item only once all work is complete. Skip the list for trivial single-step tasks. Statuses: `pending` (not started), `in_progress` (being worked on now), `completed` (finished). */
|
||||
todo_write(args: {
|
||||
/** The COMPLETE task list, replacing any previous list. */
|
||||
todos: ({
|
||||
/** What the task is — a short imperative line. */
|
||||
content: string;
|
||||
/** pending (not started) | in_progress (now) | completed (done). */
|
||||
status: "pending" | "in_progress" | "completed";
|
||||
})[];
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagents at scale. Use this for work that fans out across many independent pieces — an audit over many files, a migration, multi-angle research, adversarial verification of findings — where you write the orchestration as a script instead of delegating turn by turn. The workflow's identity rides the `meta` parameter as JSON: required `name` (short kebab-case) and `description` strings, optional `whenToUse` string and `phases` array (`{title, detail?, model?}`). The `script` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO `export const meta` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with `return <value>` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result. Script-body hooks: - `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), `model` (override). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly. - `pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives `(prev, item, index)`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to `null` and skips its remaining stages. - `parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to `null`. - `phase(title)` — start a progress phase; `log(message)` — narrate progress; `args` — the tool call's `args` input, verbatim. Misused hooks (bad arguments, unknown options, unsupported schemas, tripped caps) throw errors that ALWAYS kill the script — they never dissolve into a per-item `null`. Constraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs are provided — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes. */
|
||||
workflow(args: {
|
||||
/** The plain-JS workflow script body (top-level await allowed; NO `export const meta` statement; end with `return <json-value>`). */
|
||||
script: string;
|
||||
/** The workflow identity block (plain JSON — never code). */
|
||||
meta: {
|
||||
/** Short kebab-case workflow name. */
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
/** One-line description of what the workflow does. */
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
/** Optional guidance on when this workflow applies. */
|
||||
whenToUse?: string;
|
||||
/** Optional phase declarations matched by phase() calls. */
|
||||
phases?: {
|
||||
/** The phase title phase() calls match by exact string. */
|
||||
title: string;
|
||||
/** Optional one-line description of the phase. */
|
||||
detail?: string;
|
||||
/** Optional model override this phase is expected to use. */
|
||||
model?: string;
|
||||
}[];
|
||||
};
|
||||
/** Optional JSON input exposed to the script as the `args` global (wrap a bare list as a field, e.g. {"files": [...]}). */
|
||||
args?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
/** Create or fully replace a UTF-8 text file. */
|
||||
write(args: {
|
||||
/** Path to write, resolved by the filesystem backend. */
|
||||
file_path: string;
|
||||
/** Full UTF-8 text content to write. */
|
||||
content: string;
|
||||
}): Promise<string>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"steps": [
|
||||
{ "op": "initialize" },
|
||||
{ "op": "newSession" },
|
||||
{ "op": "prompt", "text": "Load the snapshot-skill skill with the skill tool, then reply DONE." }
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":1,"agentInfo":{"name":"deepseek-harness-acp","version":"0.0.1"},"agentCapabilities":{"loadSession":true,"promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false}},"authMethods":[]}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}"}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"Load the requested skill."}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"tool_call","toolCallId":"call_skill_load","title":"Load skill snapshot-skill","kind":"read","status":"in_progress","rawInput":"snapshot-skill"}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"tool_call_update","toolCallId":"call_skill_load","status":"completed","content":[{"type":"content","content":{"type":"text","text":"<skill_content name=\"snapshot-skill\">\n<skill_resources>\nBase directory for this skill: {{cwd}}/.dsh/skills/snapshot-skill\nResolve relative paths mentioned by this skill against the base directory before using them. Load referenced resources only as needed.\n</skill_resources>\n\n<skill_instructions>\nFollow these snapshot-only instructions.\nResolve referenced resources relative to this skill directory.\n</skill_instructions>\n</skill_content>"}}]}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"The skill is loaded."}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"DONE"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"stopReason":"end_turn"}}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
You are an AI agent powered by the DeepSeek Harness SDK.
|
||||
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the deepseek-v4-flash model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Use the read tool — not shell commands like cat — to inspect text files. Results include line numbers. Use offset and limit to continue reading large files.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the edit tool for targeted changes to existing UTF-8 text files. It replaces literal old_string with new_string; by default old_string must appear exactly once. If old_string appears multiple times, provide a more specific old_string or set replace_all to true. Read the file first (the default fs-policy requires it), unless you just created or edited it in this session.
|
||||
|
||||
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the workflow tool ONLY when the user explicitly asks for a workflow or for large multi-agent orchestration: you write a JavaScript script (the tool description documents the exact format) that fans work out across many subagents with phases and structured results. For one or two delegations, prefer plain subagent calls.
|
||||
+7
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: snapshot-skill
|
||||
description: Exercise project skill discovery and loading in snapshot tests.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Follow these snapshot-only instructions.
|
||||
Resolve referenced resources relative to this skill directory.
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
You are an AI agent powered by the DeepSeek Harness SDK.
|
||||
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the deepseek-v4-flash model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Use the read tool — not shell commands like cat — to inspect text files. Results include line numbers. Use offset and limit to continue reading large files.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the write tool to create files or completely replace file contents. Existing files are overwritten, so read an existing file first (the default fs-policy requires it) and prefer edit for targeted changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the edit tool for targeted changes to existing UTF-8 text files. It replaces literal old_string with new_string; by default old_string must appear exactly once. If old_string appears multiple times, provide a more specific old_string or set replace_all to true. Read the file first (the default fs-policy requires it), unless you just created or edited it in this session.
|
||||
|
||||
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the workflow tool ONLY when the user explicitly asks for a workflow or for large multi-agent orchestration: you write a JavaScript script (the tool description documents the exact format) that fans work out across many subagents with phases and structured results. For one or two delegations, prefer plain subagent calls.
|
||||
@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ async function bootAndEof(): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number }> {
|
||||
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
||||
reject(new Error(`code-mode overlay did not exit within 10s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 10_000)
|
||||
reject(new Error(`code-mode overlay did not exit within 30s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('exit', (code) => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer)
|
||||
@@ -87,5 +87,5 @@ describe('code-mode overlay keyless smoke (real code-mode.cordis.yml via the Loa
|
||||
const { stdout, code } = await bootAndEof()
|
||||
expect(code).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('code-mode agent ready.')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ async function bootAndEof(): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number }> {
|
||||
// A dummy key so llm-deepseek's apply() (key-PRESENT check only) boots.
|
||||
// No prompt is sent, so the adapter never streams — no network call.
|
||||
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: 'keyless-smoke-no-call',
|
||||
DSH_HOME: join(cwd, '.dsh'),
|
||||
DSH_AGENTS_HOME: join(cwd, '.agents'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -76,8 +78,8 @@ async function bootAndEof(): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number }> {
|
||||
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
||||
reject(new Error(`coding-agent did not exit within 10s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 10_000)
|
||||
reject(new Error(`coding-agent did not exit within 30s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('exit', (code) => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer)
|
||||
@@ -96,5 +98,5 @@ describe('coding-agent keyless smoke (real cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
|
||||
const { stdout, code } = await bootAndEof()
|
||||
expect(code).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('agent REPL ready.')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ async function bootAndEof(): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number }> {
|
||||
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
||||
reject(new Error(`cordis-agent did not exit within 10s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 10_000)
|
||||
reject(new Error(`cordis-agent did not exit within 30s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('exit', (code) => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer)
|
||||
@@ -90,5 +90,5 @@ describe('cordis-agent keyless smoke (real cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
|
||||
const { stdout, code } = await bootAndEof()
|
||||
expect(code).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('cordis-agent ready.')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -31,4 +31,4 @@ node --expose-internals --import tsx packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/bin.ts examples
|
||||
|
||||
Type a message and press Enter. "echo <text>" triggers a tool call round-trip (the mock model requests the `echo` tool, which echoes the text uppercased, and the next model step acknowledges it).
|
||||
|
||||
The session is persisted under `.sessions/` relative to the directory you launch the demo from. `pnpm run demo:echo` runs from the repo root, so the logs land in `<repo-root>/.sessions/` (a session with no cwd goes in the `_no-cwd/` bucket, one `.jsonl` log per session). Clean up with: `rm -rf .sessions`
|
||||
The session is persisted under `.sessions/` relative to the directory you launch the demo from. `pnpm run demo:echo` runs from the repo root, so the logs land in `<repo-root>/.sessions/cwd-<hash>/` (one `.jsonl` log per session). Clean up with: `rm -rf .sessions`
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Boot echo-agent, write `lines` to its stdin, close stdin, and resolve with
|
||||
* the full stdout once the process exits (the stdio UI exits on EOF after the
|
||||
* agent settles). Rejects on a non-zero exit or a 10s timeout.
|
||||
* agent settles). Rejects on a non-zero exit or a 30s timeout.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function runEcho(lines: string[]): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number }> {
|
||||
workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'echo-smoke-'))
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,16 @@ async function runEcho(lines: string[]): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number
|
||||
// requires it (mirrors the `demo:echo` script). The whole point is to boot
|
||||
// the example EXACTLY as it really runs, through the bin + Loader.
|
||||
['--expose-internals', '--import', tsxLoader, binScript, configPath],
|
||||
{ cwd, env: { ...process.env, TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig }, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] },
|
||||
{
|
||||
cwd,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig,
|
||||
DSH_HOME: join(cwd, '.dsh'),
|
||||
DSH_AGENTS_HOME: join(cwd, '.agents'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
child = proc
|
||||
let stdout = ''
|
||||
@@ -75,8 +84,8 @@ async function runEcho(lines: string[]): Promise<{ stdout: string; code: number
|
||||
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
proc.kill('SIGKILL')
|
||||
reject(new Error(`echo-agent did not exit within 10s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 10_000)
|
||||
reject(new Error(`echo-agent did not exit within 30s. stdout:\n${stdout}\nstderr:\n${stderr}`))
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on('exit', (code) => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer)
|
||||
@@ -96,19 +105,19 @@ describe('echo-agent keyless smoke (real cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
|
||||
const { stdout, code } = await runEcho([])
|
||||
expect(code).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('echo-agent ready.')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
|
||||
it('runs the echo tool round-trip for an "echo …" line', async () => {
|
||||
const { stdout } = await runEcho(['echo hello world'])
|
||||
// mock-llm.ts emits a tool-call for the echo tool; echo-tool.ts uppercases.
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('[tool call] echo')
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('[tool result] ECHO: HELLO WORLD')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
|
||||
it('streams a direct canned reply for a non-echo line', async () => {
|
||||
const { stdout } = await runEcho(['just chatting'])
|
||||
// The direct-response branch of mock-llm.ts quotes the input back.
|
||||
expect(stdout).toContain('just chatting')
|
||||
expect(stdout).not.toContain('[tool call]')
|
||||
}, 15_000)
|
||||
}, 45_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
# sandbox-acp-agent
|
||||
|
||||
The coding agent with its bash executor swapped for the sandbox stack ([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/) + [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../packages/bash/bash-sandbox/) — the one-entry executor swap the `ctx.bash` capability seam exists for), served over the **Agent Client Protocol**, plus [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval`](../../packages/ui/user-approval/) — which makes this the first composition where the approval loop is LIVE end to end: bash runs under `read-only`, a denial comes back as the structured marker, the model retries once with `sandbox_permissions` + `justification`, the ACP bridge's answerer turns that ask into a `session/request_permission` prompt in your editor, and "Allow once" runs exactly that command under the wider mode ([sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
pnpm run demo:sandbox-acp # needs DEEPSEEK_API_KEY; drive it from Zed or any ACP client
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Zed setup is the same as [acp-agent](../acp-agent/README.md) with this example's command; only the leaf `cordis.yml` differs (the sandbox stack + the approval entry in place of the local bash executor and the extra tool stacks).
|
||||
|
||||
- **Every approval is one-shot** (`Allow once` / `Reject` — no `allow_always`: the harness has no grant storage yet), and a dismissed prompt or a rejected ask fails closed with its own error text; so does every ask when no editor is attached to answer.
|
||||
- **Two session config options are live** ([sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)): a capable client shows `Sandbox` (`read-only`/`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`) and `Approvals` (`ask`/`never`) selectors per session — a switch is one log-only event on that session's log and execution follows it; the sandbox mode is deliberately NOT stated in the prompt or narrated (the model learns the boundary from the denial marker — behavior, not belief), while an approval switch to `never` is stated and narrated; a resumed session reports its overrides back on `session/load`.
|
||||
- **The write boundary is config-fixed**: an escalated `workspace-write` run may write under the launch directory (`workspaceRoot: process.cwd()`) plus the platform temp area — a per-session root is config-phase future work in the [sandbox RFC](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
|
||||
- **No usable runner fails closed per command** (structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`), and the filesystem tools stay unloaded for the same reason as `sandbox-agent`: they would bypass the bash sandbox.
|
||||
|
||||
Tests: `tests/escalation.e2e.ts` — keyless, it boots the real `cordis.yml` through the Loader as an ACP subprocess, proves the whole tree (sandbox executor + approval service + bridge) initializes and opens a session, and drives the config options end to end (both advertised with composition currents, switches honored and echoed as complete state, out-of-vocabulary values rejected); with a key and a usable runner, a scripted ACP client plays the human — the real model gets denied, escalates, the client answers `allow-once`, and the retried write must land on disk. `tests/acp.snapshot.ts` (the [shared snapshot kit](../../packages/support/acp-snapshot/) over this composition's `cordis.snapshot.yml` replay overlay) pins four scenarios as committed wire bytes: the keyless config-option exchange, the recorded `mode-switching` arc (the suite's pinned header — both switches, their prompt-section deltas, one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode), and both recorded escalation branches (`session/request_permission` answered allow-once / reject-once). Replay re-executes every recorded bash call under the host's real runner — Seatbelt works out of the box on macOS; on Linux install bubblewrap (or build the Landlock launcher) first, exactly what ci.yml's snapshot lane does. No fixture carries a real denial: denial stderr is backend dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform (the rationale comment atop the suite file).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
# Snapshot-test REPLAY overlay for the sandboxed composition: the SAME app
|
||||
# tree as cordis.yml, derived from it by an include — the one difference is
|
||||
# the model backend. A keyless replay run cannot boot the real adapter
|
||||
# (llm-deepseek's apply() throws without DEEPSEEK_API_KEY), so the include
|
||||
# patches the live tree at load time: the llm-deepseek entry is disabled by
|
||||
# id, and the llm-replay entry (which serves a recorded session JSONL — no
|
||||
# API key, no network) is inserted. Every other entry — the sandbox provider,
|
||||
# the confined bash executor, the approval seam, the app — IS the live tree.
|
||||
# The sandbox provider probes for a platform runner per EXECUTION, not at
|
||||
# boot, so a protocol-only scenario (session config options) replays on hosts
|
||||
# with no runner at all.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The dsh-acp-agent bin selects this file for DSH_SNAPSHOT=replay (the
|
||||
# sibling-swap of whatever config path it was handed). The replay fixture
|
||||
# path comes from $DSH_SNAPSHOT_FILE, set by the snapshot harness. stdout
|
||||
# stays reserved for the ACP JSON-RPC protocol.
|
||||
- id: base
|
||||
name: '@cordisjs/plugin-include'
|
||||
config:
|
||||
path: ./cordis.yml
|
||||
patches:
|
||||
# The name is an assertion, not an override: the include skips the patch
|
||||
# (warning) when the id points at a different plugin, so this can never
|
||||
# disable the wrong entry.
|
||||
- id: llm-deepseek
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-deepseek'
|
||||
disabled: true
|
||||
- insert:
|
||||
- id: llm-replay
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-replay'
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
# The sandbox-acp-agent plugin tree: the sandboxed coding agent served over the
|
||||
# Agent Client Protocol, with the approval seam composed — the first LIVE
|
||||
# approval composition. A sandbox denial escalated by the model
|
||||
# (sandbox_permissions + justification) reaches the EDITOR as a
|
||||
# session/request_permission prompt through the ACP bridge's answerer, and an
|
||||
# "Allow once" runs exactly that command under the wider mode.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# CRITICAL: this tree loads NO stdout logger and NO hmr — stdout is reserved
|
||||
# for the ACP JSON-RPC protocol (a property of @deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent,
|
||||
# same as examples/acp-agent).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Requires DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (and optionally DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL) — the
|
||||
# dsh-acp-agent bin loads the gitignored repo-root .env first (on STDERR only).
|
||||
|
||||
# The DeepSeek adapter.
|
||||
- id: llm-deepseek
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-deepseek'
|
||||
config:
|
||||
apiKey: !!js process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
|
||||
baseURL: !!js process.env.DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL
|
||||
models:
|
||||
- deepseek-v4-flash
|
||||
|
||||
# The sandbox stack: the platform-runner provider (bwrap → per-platform
|
||||
# Landlock launcher → Seatbelt, functionally probed), then the confined bash executor.
|
||||
# read-only is the fail-safe default; the write boundary for an escalated
|
||||
# workspace-write run is workspaceRoot + the platform's temp area. NOTE: the
|
||||
# workspace root is CONFIG-FIXED for the executor's lifetime (the launch dir
|
||||
# here), while each ACP session has its own cwd — a per-session root is config-
|
||||
# phase future work in the sandbox RFC.
|
||||
- id: sandbox
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
- id: bash
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
config:
|
||||
mode: read-only
|
||||
workspaceRoot: !!js process.cwd()
|
||||
|
||||
# The approval seam (ctx.approval — mechanism only, no config): with it
|
||||
# mounted, the bash tool's escalation gate has a channel, and the ACP bridge
|
||||
# inside dsh-acp-agent answers for the sessions it owns by prompting the
|
||||
# editor. Without an editor attached nothing can answer, and every ask fails
|
||||
# closed.
|
||||
- id: approval
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
|
||||
|
||||
# The ACP server app: the agent-core spine + JSONL persistence + the ACP
|
||||
# bridge (whose approval answerer completes the loop).
|
||||
- id: acp-agent
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent'
|
||||
config:
|
||||
model: deepseek-v4-flash
|
||||
# Persistence root: $DSH_SNAPSHOT_SESSIONS_ROOT when the snapshot harness
|
||||
# sets it (so a record run's logs land where the harness harvests them),
|
||||
# else the local ./.sessions default.
|
||||
persistenceRoot: !!js process.env.DSH_SNAPSHOT_SESSIONS_ROOT ?? './.sessions'
|
||||
persona: |
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the {{model}} model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}. Your bash tool runs under a file sandbox — a `[sandbox: file access denied …]` result is policy, not a command bug.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "sandbox-acp-agent-example",
|
||||
"description": "Runnable demo: the sandboxed coding agent as an ACP server, with sandbox-escalation approval prompts answered by the editor",
|
||||
"private": true,
|
||||
"version": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"type": "module"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
|
||||
import { defineAcpSnapshotSuite, type Scenario, type SnapshotSuiteOptions } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-snapshot'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Snapshot suite for the SANDBOXED composition (`../cordis.yml`, swapped to
|
||||
* the sibling `cordis.snapshot.yml` replay overlay by the bin under
|
||||
* `DSH_SNAPSHOT=replay`). Replay swaps only the MODEL for the recorded
|
||||
* transcript — every bash call re-executes for real under the host's actual
|
||||
* runner (Seatbelt on macOS, bwrap on Linux CI: ci.yml's snapshot lane
|
||||
* installs bubblewrap for exactly this), so the recorded scenarios double as
|
||||
* cross-backend confinement regression: an allowed command a runner change
|
||||
* starts denying fails replay outright. Their commands are limited to
|
||||
* `cat`/`printf` shapes whose bytes are identical across those backends and
|
||||
* across GNU/BSD userlands.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Deliberately ABSENT: a scenario whose transcript carries a real sandbox
|
||||
* DENIAL. The harness-authored `[sandbox: file access denied …]` marker is
|
||||
* byte-stable, but the denied command's own stderr is the backend's dialect
|
||||
* (bwrap EROFS "Read-only file system", Landlock EACCES "Permission
|
||||
* denied", Seatbelt EPERM "Operation not permitted", GNU vs BSD phrasing on
|
||||
* top), and stderr reaches both compared surfaces — such a fixture replays
|
||||
* only on the platform that recorded it. The denial→marker path stays on
|
||||
* dsh-tool-bash's unit tests and the real-kernel sandbox e2e legs
|
||||
* (.github/workflows/sandbox.yml); the escalation scenarios below sidestep
|
||||
* it by having the USER assert the prior denial, so the recorded model
|
||||
* escalates without a platform-variant denial in the log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const SCENARIOS: Scenario[] = [
|
||||
// Protocol-only (keyless, authored): the session config-option surface
|
||||
// this composition adds — both advertised selects on session/new, the
|
||||
// complete refreshed state every session/set_config_option answers with,
|
||||
// and both rejection shapes — as committed wire bytes. No bash runs, so
|
||||
// this one still replays on runner-less hosts.
|
||||
{ name: 'config-options', hasModelTurn: false, recorded: false },
|
||||
// The runtime mode-switching arc, and NECESSARILY the pinned-header
|
||||
// scenario: an approval-policy switch rewrites its prompt section, and the
|
||||
// resulting request/header-delta is legal only in the pinning scenario
|
||||
// (the factory's uniformity guard). The pin commits this composition's
|
||||
// full header — persona, tool schemas WITH the escalation fields — plus
|
||||
// the approval delta and its "changed by the user" notice verbatim. The
|
||||
// SANDBOX switch is deliberately silent (no section, no notice — the
|
||||
// sandbox RFC's visibility asymmetry): the recorded arc proves it by
|
||||
// BEHAVIOR, a confined write landing under the switched mode with no
|
||||
// header change.
|
||||
{ name: 'mode-switching', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true, pinsHeader: true, expectedHeaderDeltas: 1 },
|
||||
// The approval wire end-to-end, under the DEFAULT read-only/ask (a switch
|
||||
// would emit a header-delta the uniformity guard forbids here): the
|
||||
// escalating bash call streams, session/request_permission attaches to it
|
||||
// (allow-once / reject-once), and the scripted answer drives each branch —
|
||||
// an approved run executes CONFINED under the granted workspace-write; a
|
||||
// rejected one executes nothing and fails with the deterministic
|
||||
// rejection text.
|
||||
{ name: 'escalation-approved', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
{ name: 'escalation-rejected', hasModelTurn: true, recorded: true },
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
function snapshotModeFromEnv(value: string | undefined): SnapshotSuiteOptions['mode'] {
|
||||
switch (value) {
|
||||
case undefined:
|
||||
case '':
|
||||
case 'replay':
|
||||
return 'replay'
|
||||
case 'record':
|
||||
return 'record'
|
||||
case 'refresh':
|
||||
return 'refresh'
|
||||
default:
|
||||
throw new Error(`unknown DSH_SNAPSHOT mode: ${value}`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defineAcpSnapshotSuite({
|
||||
agent: {
|
||||
binScript: fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../packages/ui/acp-agent/src/bin.ts', import.meta.url)),
|
||||
configPath: fileURLToPath(new URL('../cordis.yml', import.meta.url)),
|
||||
tsconfigPath: fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../tsconfig.json', import.meta.url)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
snapshotsDir: join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'snapshots'),
|
||||
scenarios: SCENARIOS,
|
||||
mode: snapshotModeFromEnv(process.env.DSH_SNAPSHOT),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
|
||||
import { spawn, spawnSync, type ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams } from 'node:child_process'
|
||||
import { Readable, Writable } from 'node:stream'
|
||||
import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import {
|
||||
ClientSideConnection,
|
||||
ndJsonStream,
|
||||
PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
||||
type Agent as AcpAgent,
|
||||
type Client,
|
||||
type RequestPermissionRequest,
|
||||
type RequestPermissionResponse,
|
||||
type SessionNotification,
|
||||
} from '@agentclientprotocol/sdk'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* examples/sandbox-acp-agent end to end.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Keyless smoke: boot the REAL `cordis.yml` through the `dsh-acp-agent` bin as
|
||||
* an ACP subprocess and drive initialize + session/new — the real-Loader-path
|
||||
* guard (postmortem 0001) for THIS tree's export shapes, which now include the
|
||||
* sandbox executor AND the approval service. No prompt is sent, so neither the
|
||||
* model nor a sandbox runner is ever exercised.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* With-key escalation flow (self-skips without DEEPSEEK_API_KEY or a usable
|
||||
* platform runner): a scripted ACP client plays the human. The real model is
|
||||
* denied under `read-only`, escalates with `sandbox_permissions` +
|
||||
* `justification`, the bridge prompts THIS client over
|
||||
* `session/request_permission`, the client answers `allow-once`, and the
|
||||
* retried write must land ON DISK (world-verified). The session cwd is a temp
|
||||
* dir under the platform temp area, which `workspace-write` grants — so either
|
||||
* escalation target the model picks can land the write.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const binScript = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../packages/ui/acp-agent/src/bin.ts', import.meta.url))
|
||||
const configPath = fileURLToPath(new URL('../cordis.yml', import.meta.url))
|
||||
const tsxLoader = fileURLToPath(import.meta.resolve('tsx'))
|
||||
// The subprocess runs from a temp cwd OUTSIDE the repo; point tsx at the repo
|
||||
// tsconfig so the unbuilt `paths` map resolves (see examples/AGENTS.md).
|
||||
const repoTsconfig = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../tsconfig.json', import.meta.url))
|
||||
|
||||
// A usable confining runner, probed the same way the executor suites do:
|
||||
// bwrap on Linux, Seatbelt's sandbox-exec on macOS. Without one the strict
|
||||
// attempt would fail closed (SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE) instead of producing the
|
||||
// denial this flow starts from.
|
||||
const hasBwrap = spawnSync('bwrap', ['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--proc', '/proc', '--die-with-parent', '--', 'true'], {
|
||||
timeout: 5_000,
|
||||
stdio: 'ignore',
|
||||
}).status === 0
|
||||
const hasSeatbelt = process.platform === 'darwin' && spawnSync('sandbox-exec', ['-p', '(version 1)(allow default)', 'true'], {
|
||||
timeout: 5_000,
|
||||
stdio: 'ignore',
|
||||
}).status === 0
|
||||
const hasRunner = hasBwrap || hasSeatbelt
|
||||
|
||||
interface Spawned {
|
||||
child: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams
|
||||
client: ClientSideConnection
|
||||
updates: SessionNotification['update'][]
|
||||
permissionRequests: RequestPermissionRequest[]
|
||||
stderr: string[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Boot the example as an ACP subprocess; the scripted client answers every permission prompt with `answer`. */
|
||||
function spawnSandboxAcpAgent(cwd: string, answer: 'allow-once' | 'reject-once'): Spawned {
|
||||
const child = spawn(
|
||||
process.execPath,
|
||||
['--import', tsxLoader, binScript, configPath],
|
||||
{
|
||||
cwd,
|
||||
// A dummy key lets the deepseek adapter boot keyless (presence-checked at
|
||||
// apply, used only on a real model call); the with-key tests carry the
|
||||
// real key, so the fallback is inert there.
|
||||
env: { ...process.env, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY ?? 'sk-dummy-for-boot', TSX_TSCONFIG_PATH: repoTsconfig },
|
||||
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
const stderr: string[] = []
|
||||
child.stderr.setEncoding('utf8')
|
||||
child.stderr.on('data', (chunk: string) => stderr.push(chunk))
|
||||
|
||||
const updates: SessionNotification['update'][] = []
|
||||
const permissionRequests: RequestPermissionRequest[] = []
|
||||
const stream = ndJsonStream(
|
||||
Writable.toWeb(child.stdin) as WritableStream<Uint8Array>,
|
||||
Readable.toWeb(child.stdout) as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>,
|
||||
)
|
||||
const makeClient = (_agent: AcpAgent): Client => ({
|
||||
sessionUpdate(params: SessionNotification): Promise<void> {
|
||||
updates.push(params.update)
|
||||
return Promise.resolve()
|
||||
},
|
||||
requestPermission(params: RequestPermissionRequest): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {
|
||||
permissionRequests.push(params)
|
||||
const option = params.options.find(o => o.optionId === answer)
|
||||
// The scripted human: pick the requested option when the prompt offers
|
||||
// it; an unexpected prompt shape cancels (fail closed, never grants).
|
||||
if (option === undefined) return Promise.resolve({ outcome: { outcome: 'cancelled' } })
|
||||
return Promise.resolve({ outcome: { outcome: 'selected', optionId: option.optionId } })
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
const client = new ClientSideConnection(makeClient, stream)
|
||||
return { child, client, updates, permissionRequests, stderr }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let spawned: Spawned | undefined
|
||||
let workdir: string | undefined
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
if (spawned !== undefined && spawned.child.exitCode === null) spawned.child.kill('SIGKILL')
|
||||
spawned = undefined
|
||||
if (workdir !== undefined) await rm(workdir, { recursive: true, force: true })
|
||||
workdir = undefined
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('sandbox-acp-agent keyless smoke (real cordis.yml via the Loader)', () => {
|
||||
it('boots the tree — sandbox executor + approval service + bridge — and opens a session', async () => {
|
||||
workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-smoke-'))
|
||||
spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
|
||||
const { client } = spawned
|
||||
// A dummy key boots the adapter; no prompt is ever sent, so no model call
|
||||
// and no sandbox runner probe happen. This drives the fiber tree the same
|
||||
// way an editor would, which is what catches a broken export/inject shape.
|
||||
const init = await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
|
||||
expect(init.protocolVersion).toBe(PROTOCOL_VERSION)
|
||||
const { sessionId } = await client.newSession({ cwd: workdir, mcpServers: [] })
|
||||
expect(sessionId.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
|
||||
it('advertises both session config options and honors a switch end to end (no key, no model)', async () => {
|
||||
workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-config-'))
|
||||
spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
|
||||
const { client } = spawned
|
||||
await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
|
||||
// This tree composes bash-sandbox (mode: read-only) + approval → both
|
||||
// knobs advertise, currents from composition config.
|
||||
const created = await client.newSession({ cwd: workdir, mcpServers: [] })
|
||||
const advertised = created.configOptions ?? []
|
||||
expect(advertised.map(option => [option.id, 'currentValue' in option ? option.currentValue : undefined]))
|
||||
.toEqual([['sandbox-mode', 'read-only'], ['approval-policy', 'ask']])
|
||||
// A switch responds with the COMPLETE refreshed state (the spec contract),
|
||||
// and the new currents survive in the response of a second switch.
|
||||
const afterSandbox = await client.setSessionConfigOption({
|
||||
sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'sandbox-mode', value: 'workspace-write',
|
||||
})
|
||||
const afterApproval = await client.setSessionConfigOption({
|
||||
sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'approval-policy', value: 'never',
|
||||
})
|
||||
const currents = (afterApproval.configOptions ?? []).map(option =>
|
||||
[option.id, 'currentValue' in option ? option.currentValue : undefined])
|
||||
expect(afterSandbox.configOptions?.find(option => option.id === 'sandbox-mode'))
|
||||
.toMatchObject({ currentValue: 'workspace-write' })
|
||||
expect(currents).toEqual([['sandbox-mode', 'workspace-write'], ['approval-policy', 'never']])
|
||||
// An out-of-vocabulary value is a protocol error, never a silent default.
|
||||
await expect(client.setSessionConfigOption({
|
||||
sessionId: created.sessionId, configId: 'sandbox-mode', value: 'yolo',
|
||||
})).rejects.toThrow(/unknown sandbox-mode value/)
|
||||
}, 30_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe.skipIf(!process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY || !hasRunner)('sandbox-acp-agent e2e: the live approval loop', () => {
|
||||
it('denial → model escalation → editor prompt → allow-once → the retried write lands on disk', async () => {
|
||||
workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-e2e-'))
|
||||
spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'allow-once')
|
||||
const { client, permissionRequests } = spawned
|
||||
|
||||
await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
|
||||
const { sessionId } = await client.newSession({ cwd: workdir, mcpServers: [] })
|
||||
const res = await client.prompt({
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: `Use the bash tool to create the file ${workdir}/escalated.txt containing exactly "ACP_ESCALATION_OK". `
|
||||
+ 'If the sandbox denies it, retry once with sandbox_permissions and a one-sentence justification, then stop.' }],
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(['end_turn', 'max_tokens']).toContain(res.stopReason)
|
||||
|
||||
// The WORLD: the approved escalated retry landed the write read-only denied.
|
||||
const proof = await readFile(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')
|
||||
expect(proof).toContain('ACP_ESCALATION_OK')
|
||||
|
||||
// The CHANNEL: the grant came through a real session/request_permission
|
||||
// prompt attached to the escalating tool call, offering exactly the
|
||||
// one-shot options.
|
||||
expect(permissionRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
|
||||
const prompt = permissionRequests[0]
|
||||
if (prompt === undefined) throw new Error('expected a permission request')
|
||||
expect(prompt.sessionId).toBe(sessionId)
|
||||
expect(typeof prompt.toolCall.toolCallId).toBe('string')
|
||||
expect(prompt.options.map(o => o.optionId).sort()).toEqual(['allow-once', 'reject-once'])
|
||||
}, 240_000)
|
||||
|
||||
it('a rejected escalation stays denied: no write lands, the turn still ends', async () => {
|
||||
workdir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'sandbox-acp-e2e-'))
|
||||
spawned = spawnSandboxAcpAgent(workdir, 'reject-once')
|
||||
const { client, permissionRequests } = spawned
|
||||
|
||||
await client.initialize({ protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION, clientCapabilities: {} })
|
||||
const { sessionId } = await client.newSession({ cwd: workdir, mcpServers: [] })
|
||||
const res = await client.prompt({
|
||||
sessionId,
|
||||
prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: `Use the bash tool to create the file ${workdir}/refused.txt containing "NO". `
|
||||
+ 'If the sandbox denies it, retry once with sandbox_permissions and a one-sentence justification. If that is rejected, stop and say so.' }],
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(['end_turn', 'max_tokens']).toContain(res.stopReason)
|
||||
|
||||
// The WORLD: rejected means the file never appeared.
|
||||
await expect(readFile(join(workdir, 'refused.txt'), 'utf8')).rejects.toThrow()
|
||||
// And the rejection really flowed through a prompt (not a missing channel).
|
||||
expect(permissionRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
|
||||
}, 240_000)
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"steps": [
|
||||
{ "op": "initialize" },
|
||||
{ "op": "newSession" },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOption", "configId": "sandbox-mode", "value": "workspace-write" },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOption", "configId": "approval-policy", "value": "never" },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOptionExpectError", "configId": "sandbox-mode", "value": "yolo" },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOptionExpectError", "configId": "reasoning-effort", "value": "max" }
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
{"type":"session","version":0,"id":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","createdAt":0}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":1,"agentInfo":{"name":"deepseek-harness-acp","version":"0.0.1"},"agentCapabilities":{"loadSession":true,"promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false}},"authMethods":[]}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","configOptions":[{"id":"sandbox-mode","name":"Sandbox","description":"The file sandbox mode bash commands in this session run under.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"read-only","options":[{"value":"read-only","name":"read-only"},{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write"},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access"}]},{"id":"approval-policy","name":"Approvals","description":"ask: permission prompts reach you; never: they are rejected automatically.","type":"select","currentValue":"ask","options":[{"value":"ask","name":"ask"},{"value":"never","name":"never"}]}]}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"configOptions":[{"id":"sandbox-mode","name":"Sandbox","description":"The file sandbox mode bash commands in this session run under.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"workspace-write","options":[{"value":"read-only","name":"read-only"},{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write"},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access"}]},{"id":"approval-policy","name":"Approvals","description":"ask: permission prompts reach you; never: they are rejected automatically.","type":"select","currentValue":"ask","options":[{"value":"ask","name":"ask"},{"value":"never","name":"never"}]}]}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"result":{"configOptions":[{"id":"sandbox-mode","name":"Sandbox","description":"The file sandbox mode bash commands in this session run under.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"workspace-write","options":[{"value":"read-only","name":"read-only"},{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write"},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access"}]},{"id":"approval-policy","name":"Approvals","description":"ask: permission prompts reach you; never: they are rejected automatically.","type":"select","currentValue":"never","options":[{"value":"ask","name":"ask"},{"value":"never","name":"never"}]}]}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":5,"error":{"code":-32602,"message":"Invalid params: unknown sandbox-mode value \"yolo\""}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":6,"error":{"code":-32602,"message":"Invalid params: unknown config option \"reasoning-effort\""}}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"steps": [
|
||||
{ "op": "initialize" },
|
||||
{ "op": "newSession" },
|
||||
{ "op": "prompt", "text": "The sandbox already denied writing escalated.txt in this workspace earlier. Retry it now exactly once: one single bash call with the command printf 'escalated\\n' > escalated.txt && cat escalated.txt, with sandbox_permissions set to workspace-write and the justification 'the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace'. Do not run it without sandbox_permissions first. I will approve the permission prompt. After the result, reply with the single word DONE and stop." }
|
||||
],
|
||||
"permissionAnswers": [
|
||||
{ "kind": "allow_once" }
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
|
||||
{"type":"session","version":0,"id":"8f399407-f505-45e5-9058-0994ff7b0865","createdAt":1783486769425,"cwd":"/var/folders/2g/b32ct0qn1d728l_v6tdkjytr0000gn/T/acp-snap-cwd-xKPr5d"}
|
||||
{"type":"turn/start","seq":0,"time":1783486769426,"data":{"turn":1,"trigger":{"kind":"message","source":{"kind":"user"}}}}
|
||||
{"type":"user/message","seq":1,"time":1783486769426,"data":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"The sandbox already denied writing escalated.txt in this workspace earlier. Retry it now exactly once: one single bash call with the command printf 'escalated\\n' > escalated.txt && cat escalated.txt, with sandbox_permissions set to workspace-write and the justification 'the user asked to write escalated.txt in the workspace'. Do not run it without sandbox_permissions first. I will approve the permission prompt. After the result, reply with the single word DONE and stop."}],"source":{"kind":"user"}},"surfaceOp":"append"}
|
||||
{"type":"step/start","seq":2,"time":1783486769427,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
|
||||
{"type":"request/header","seq":3,"time":1783486769427,"data":{"header":{"config":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"system":"{{system}}","tools":"{{tools}}"},"reason":"initial"}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":4,"time":1783486770051,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"reasoning"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":5,"time":1783486770052,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"The"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":6,"time":1783486770179,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" user"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":7,"time":1783486770212,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" wants"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":8,"time":1783486770213,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" me"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":9,"time":1783486770214,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" to"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":10,"time":1783486770214,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" ret"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":11,"time":1783486770215,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"ry"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":12,"time":1783486770215,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" the"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":13,"time":1783486770242,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" command"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":14,"time":1783486770243,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" with"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":15,"time":1783486770277,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" sand"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":16,"time":1783486770278,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"box"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":17,"time":1783486770278,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"_per"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":18,"time":1783486770306,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"missions"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":19,"time":1783486770307,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" set"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":20,"time":1783486770335,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" to"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":21,"time":1783486770337,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" workspace"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":22,"time":1783486770338,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"-w"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":23,"time":1783486770338,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"rite"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":24,"time":1783486770338,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"."}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":25,"time":1783486770368,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" They"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":26,"time":1783486770369,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" explicitly"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":27,"time":1783486770430,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" said"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":28,"time":1783486770431,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" they"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":29,"time":1783486770431,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" will"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":30,"time":1783486770458,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" approve"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":31,"time":1783486770459,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" the"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":32,"time":1783486770459,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" permission"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":33,"time":1783486770474,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" prompt"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":34,"time":1783486770474,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"."}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":35,"time":1783486770475,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" Let"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":36,"time":1783486770475,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" me"}}}
|
||||
{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":37,"time":1783486770475,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" proceed"}}}
|
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" explain"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" one"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" short"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" sentence"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" and"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" stop"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"."}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" escalation"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" request"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" to"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" write"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" to"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" the"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" was"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" rejected"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":","}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" so"}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" the"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" command"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" was"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" not"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" executed"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"."}}}}
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||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"stopReason":"end_turn"}}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"steps": [
|
||||
{ "op": "initialize" },
|
||||
{ "op": "newSession" },
|
||||
{ "op": "prompt", "text": "Use the bash tool to run exactly: cat notes.txt. Then reply with the single word DONE and stop." },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOption", "configId": "sandbox-mode", "value": "workspace-write" },
|
||||
{ "op": "prompt", "text": "Use the bash tool to run exactly this one command in a single call: printf 'switched\\n' > out.txt && cat out.txt. Then reply with the single word DONE and stop." },
|
||||
{ "op": "setConfigOption", "configId": "approval-policy", "value": "never" },
|
||||
{ "op": "prompt", "text": "Without using any tools, state your current approval policy in one short sentence and stop." }
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
|
||||
{"type":"session","version":0,"id":"eee406bd-e76b-4d87-8fb7-0ffa2dc94fe6","createdAt":1783613224994,"cwd":"/var/folders/2g/b32ct0qn1d728l_v6tdkjytr0000gn/T/acp-snap-cwd-mNdf7I"}
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||||
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|
||||
{"type":"step/start","seq":2,"time":1783613224997,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
|
||||
{"type":"request/header","seq":3,"time":1783613224997,"data":{"header":{"config":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"system":"{{system}}","tools":[{"name":"bash","description":"Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`. Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command IS denied and a wider mode would let it succeed, escalate immediately in the SAME turn — the ONE sanctioned exception to a denial: retry the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the approval prompt raised by that retry IS how the user consents. If the session states approval prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one THIS command just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. A rejected escalation is final for THAT command — stop and explain, never work around it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.","parameters":{"type":"object","properties":{"command":{"type":"string","description":"The bash command to execute."},"description":{"type":"string","description":"Clear, concise description of what this command does in active voice, 5-10 words (shown in the UI). Examples: \"ls\" → \"List files in current directory\"; \"git status\" → \"Show working tree status\"; \"npm install\" → \"Install package dependencies\"."},"timeoutMs":{"type":"number","description":"Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry."},"workdir":{"type":"string","description":"Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it."},"run_in_background":{"type":"boolean","description":"Run in the background and return a task id immediately. No timeout applies."},"sandbox_permissions":{"type":"string","description":"The wider sandbox mode this command needs. Only valid as a one-shot retry of a command the sandbox just denied; requires justification and user approval.","enum":["workspace-write","danger-full-access"]},"justification":{"type":"string","description":"Required with sandbox_permissions: one sentence for the user explaining why this exact command needs the wider access."}},"required":["command","description"]}},{"name":"bash_kill","description":"Ask the executor to kill a running background bash task by task id.","parameters":{"type":"object","properties":{"task_id":{"type":"string","description":"Task id returned by the bash tool."}},"required":["task_id"]}},{"name":"bash_output","description":"Read new output from a background bash task started with `bash` + `run_in_background`. Returns only output produced since the previous bash_output call, plus the task status. Tasks keep running while you do other work; poll again later for more output.","parameters":{"type":"object","properties":{"task_id":{"type":"string","description":"Task id returned by the bash tool."}},"required":["task_id"]}},{"name":"skill","description":"Load the full instructions for an available skill. Call this with the exact skill name from the session skill catalog before acting on a task that names or clearly matches that skill.","parameters":{"type":"object","properties":{"name":{"type":"string","description":"The exact skill name from the available skills list."}},"required":["name"]}}]},"reason":"initial"}}
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||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"The"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" user"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" wants"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" me"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" to"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" state"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" my"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" current"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" approval"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" policy"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" without"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" using"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" any"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" tools"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"."}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" From"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" the"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" context"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":","}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" the"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" approval"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" policy"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" is"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" \""}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"never"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"\""}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" —"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" meaning"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" actions"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" that"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" require"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" approval"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" are"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" rejected"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" automatically"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":","}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" and"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" I"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" should"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" not"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" request"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" sand"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"box"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" escalation"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"."}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"Appro"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"vals"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" are"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" never"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" asked"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":";"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" any"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" action"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" requiring"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" approval"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" is"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" automatically"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" rejected"}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_message_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"."}}}}
|
||||
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":7,"result":{"stopReason":"end_turn"}}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
You are an AI agent powered by the DeepSeek Harness SDK.
|
||||
|
||||
You are a coding assistant powered by the deepseek-v4-flash model. Your working directory is {{cwd}}. Your bash tool runs under a file sandbox — a `[sandbox: file access denied …]` result is policy, not a command bug.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify your work by running the code or tests. Keep answers brief and factual.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:ask -->
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- request/header-delta 1: keepStart=9, keepEnd=0 -->
|
||||
|
||||
Approval prompts are disabled in this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically — do not request sandbox escalation (do not set `sandbox_permissions`).
|
||||
<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:never -->
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
hello from the sandboxed workspace
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"$schema": "https://unpkg.com/knip@5/schema.json",
|
||||
"exclude": ["duplicates"],
|
||||
"ignoreBinaries": ["bwrap", "sandbox-exec"],
|
||||
"ignoreWorkspaces": ["vendor/*"],
|
||||
"workspaces": {
|
||||
".": {
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +19,14 @@
|
||||
"entry": ["tests/**/*.spec.ts"],
|
||||
"project": ["src/**/*.ts", "tests/**/*.ts"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"packages/bash/bash-sandbox": {
|
||||
"entry": ["tests/**/*.spec.ts", "tests/**/*.e2e.ts"],
|
||||
"project": ["src/**/*.ts", "tests/**/*.ts"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"packages/sandbox/sandbox-local": {
|
||||
"entry": ["tests/**/*.spec.ts", "tests/**/*.e2e.ts"],
|
||||
"project": ["src/**/*.ts", "tests/**/*.ts"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"packages/util/brand": {
|
||||
"project": ["src/**/*.ts"],
|
||||
"ignoreDependencies": ["cordis"]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
|
||||
"demo:code-mode": "node scripts/demo-code-mode.mjs",
|
||||
"demo:cordis": "node --expose-internals --import tsx packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/bin.ts examples/cordis-agent/cordis.yml",
|
||||
"demo:acp": "node --import tsx packages/ui/acp-agent/src/bin.ts examples/acp-agent/cordis.yml",
|
||||
"demo:sandbox-acp": "node --import tsx packages/ui/acp-agent/src/bin.ts examples/sandbox-acp-agent/cordis.yml",
|
||||
"postinstall": "node scripts/install-lefthook.mjs"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
|
||||
+5
-3
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
||||
# Packages
|
||||
|
||||
Harness packages use the `@deepseek-ai/dsh-*` scope and Cordis plugin model. Authoring conventions live in [packages/AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) and the root [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) § Conventions.
|
||||
Harness packages use the `@deepseek-ai/dsh-*` scope. Each is a Cordis plugin: a default `Service` subclass or functional plugin declaring ctx keys/events through declaration merging and contributing through `ctx.effect()`, `ctx.on()`, or `ctx.waterfall()`. Authoring conventions: [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) and root [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) § Conventions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Hierarchy
|
||||
|
||||
Packages are grouped by modular role at `packages/<group>/<pkg>/`. The group directory is a pure container (no `package.json` of its own); the package name stays `@deepseek-ai/dsh-<pkg>` regardless of group. **Each group README is the canonical per-package map** — package roles, ctx keys, and the product-vs-support split live there, next to the code.
|
||||
Packages are grouped by modular role at `packages/<group>/<pkg>/`. The group directory is a pure container (no `package.json`); the package name stays `@deepseek-ai/dsh-<pkg>` regardless of group. **Each group README is the canonical per-package map** — package roles, ctx keys, and the product-vs-support split live there, next to the code.
|
||||
|
||||
| Group | Role | Release expectation |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ Packages are grouped by modular role at `packages/<group>/<pkg>/`. The group dir
|
||||
| [`llm/`](llm/README.md) | LLM capability family: the abstract service + provider adapters | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`bash/`](bash/README.md) | Bash capability family: the executor seam, a local impl, and the model-facing tool | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`code-runtime/`](code-runtime/README.md) | Code-execution capability family: the abstract runtime seam for model-written programs + a worker-thread backend | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`sandbox/`](sandbox/README.md) | Process-confinement seam; bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt backends | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`fs/`](fs/README.md) | Filesystem capability family: the abstract seam, a local impl, and the model-facing file tools | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`skill/`](skill/README.md) | Skill capability family: the provider registry, local provider, and model-facing catalog/loader | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`compact/`](compact/README.md) | Compaction capability family: the abstract seam + a basic backend (tool deferred) | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`subagent/`](subagent/README.md) | Subagent capability family: the provider-registry seam and the model-facing delegation tool | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`workflow/`](workflow/README.md) | Workflow capability family: the script-engine seam, the worker-thread engine, and the model-facing `workflow` tool | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ Packages are grouped by modular role at `packages/<group>/<pkg>/`. The group dir
|
||||
| [`hooks/`](hooks/README.md) | Hook bridges + the shared Claude Code / Codex wire-protocol library | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence/`](session-persistence/README.md) | Persistence capability family: the seam + JSONL/SQLite backends | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`session-query/`](session-query/README.md) | Session retrieval family: logical corpus, surface records, and bounded exact reads | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`ui/`](ui/README.md) | Editor/client integration surfaces: ACP bridge, app packages, user-interaction seam, ask-user tool | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`ui/`](ui/README.md) | Editor/client integration surfaces: ACP bridge, app packages, user-approval and user-interaction seams, ask-user tool | Product — stable surface |
|
||||
| [`support/`](support/README.md) | Dev/test/example infrastructure (invariants, replay adapter, subagent mock) | Support — lower compatibility expectations |
|
||||
| [`util/`](util/README.md) | Low-level zero-dependency utilities shared across groups (the `Branded<B>` primitive) | Support — small, stable, harness-dep-free |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
|
||||
# bash/ — bash capability family
|
||||
|
||||
The canonical three-package capability seam (see [capability seams](../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md)): an abstract executor interface, a concrete local implementation, and the model-facing tool that consumes it. All **product** packages.
|
||||
The canonical three-package capability seam (see [capability seams](../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md)): an abstract executor interface, concrete implementations, and the model-facing tool that consumes it. All **product** packages.
|
||||
|
||||
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `bash/` | Abstract bash executor seam (interface + vocabulary) | `ctx.bash` |
|
||||
| `bash/` | Abstract bash executor seam (interface + vocabulary; sandbox result facts carry the [`sandbox/`](../sandbox/README.md) seam's mode/enforcement vocabulary) | `ctx.bash` |
|
||||
| `bash-local/` | Local-subprocess `BashExecutor` implementation | (registers `ctx.bash`) |
|
||||
| `bash-sandbox/` | Sandbox-consuming `BashExecutor` (wraps every command argv via `ctx.sandbox`, stamps denial/enforcement facts; extends `bash-local`'s mechanics) | (registers `ctx.bash`) |
|
||||
| `tool-bash/` | Model-facing `bash`/`bash_output`/`bash_kill` tool schemas | (registers on `ctx.tools`) |
|
||||
|
||||
The interface lives at `bash/bash/`. A sandboxed executor would replace `bash-local` without touching the interface or the tool — the split is what makes that possible.
|
||||
The interface lives at `bash/bash/`. `bash-sandbox` replacing `bash-local` without touching the interface or the tool is the split doing exactly what it exists for — a leaf `cordis.yml` picks one executor entry, plus a `ctx.sandbox` provider entry for the confined one (see [examples/sandbox-acp-agent](../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/)).
|
||||
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi;
|
||||
|
||||
## Sandboxing
|
||||
|
||||
`TODO(permissions/sandbox)`: execution policy does NOT belong in this package. Use the `tools/pre-execute` deny/ask gate or implement a sandboxing `BashExecutor` — see docs/architecture.md § Extending The Harness. Reference points: Claude Code wraps commands in sandbox-exec/bubblewrap; Codex applies seatbelt/landlock plus an execpolicy prefix-rule engine.
|
||||
Execution policy does NOT belong in this package: this executor always runs commands unconfined. Confinement is [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../bash-sandbox/README.md), which extends this executor verbatim and confines commands under the `ctx.sandbox` seam's bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt backends ([sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs on the `tools/pre-execute` gate.
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
|
||||
// Carry the owner through verbatim (required-but-nullable on the spec):
|
||||
// the executor never interprets it — the consumer's access policy does.
|
||||
owner: request.owner,
|
||||
// Carry a sandbox-mode override through verbatim: this executor never
|
||||
// confines, so the field is inert here (the seam contract) — a
|
||||
// sandboxing subclass overrides resolve() to stamp its default instead.
|
||||
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,6 +216,18 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
|
||||
return this.tasks.get(id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Full collected stderr of a tracked task from stream start (bounded by the
|
||||
* in-memory cap; bytes only in the spill file are not re-read). A protected
|
||||
* seam for subclasses that classify a settled task's outcome — reading here
|
||||
* does NOT advance the consumer's {@link readOutput} cursor. An unknown id
|
||||
* (a task already dropped by disposal) reads as empty.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
protected collectedStderr(id: BashTaskId): string {
|
||||
const task = this.tasks.get(id)
|
||||
return task === undefined ? '' : task.running.stderr.readFrom(0).text
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ownerOf(id: BashTaskId): OwnerToken | undefined {
|
||||
// Unknown id and known-but-ownerless both read as undefined — the consumer
|
||||
// treats undefined as "open" and a truly unknown id fails at readOutput/kill.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox
|
||||
|
||||
Sandbox-consuming implementation of the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash`](../bash/) executor seam. Load it **instead of** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local`, together with a [`ctx.sandbox`](../../sandbox/sandbox/) provider (e.g. [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../../sandbox/sandbox-local/)) — the model-facing tool layer (`dsh-tool-bash`) is untouched; that swap is exactly what the seams exist for.
|
||||
|
||||
Every command is confined by handing the provider the exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv this executor is about to spawn and spawning the returned (wrapped) argv instead. WHICH platform runner confines it — and whether one is usable at all (fail closed with a structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, never a silent unconfined run) — is the provider's concern; this package owns the bash side only.
|
||||
|
||||
| Mode | File effects |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `read-only` (default) | No writes anywhere (of `/dev`, only the `/dev/null` node is writable, so `>/dev/null` keeps working) |
|
||||
| `workspace-write` | Writes only under `workspaceRoot` + `/tmp` (ephemeral under bwrap, the host `/tmp` under Landlock, `/private/tmp` plus the per-user temp dir under Seatbelt) |
|
||||
| `danger-full-access` | No confinement; the provider is never consulted. Execution is `dsh-bash-local`'s verbatim — foreground results still carry `sandbox: { mode, denied: false }` (no `enforcement`: nothing was confined), background tasks carry no sandbox facts |
|
||||
|
||||
Semantics:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Denials are result facts.** A failed run whose stderr carries the selected backend's own denial dialect — the signatures the provider stamps on every wrap (EROFS text under bwrap, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt) — is reported as `BashRunResult.sandbox.denied: true` (conservative classification, read from the collected stderr tail); every CONFINED run also carries the mode it executed under (`result.sandbox.mode`) and the provider's enforcement completeness (`result.sandbox.enforcement`: `full`, or `partial` on an older Landlock ABI).
|
||||
- **Runner failures are sandbox failures, never task failures.** A failed run matching the wrap's `runnerFailureSignatures` (the runner's own error prefix — also what the shell prints for a missing runner) means the sandbox itself broke and the command NEVER RAN; the check outranks denial classification because a runner's error text can contain denial words. The foreground path re-throws it as the structured fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error, with the runner's first stderr line as the cause; a settled background task stamps `task.sandbox.runnerFailed` instead (no error channel remains after settle), which `bash_output` renders as its own marker.
|
||||
- **Config-time default, per-call policy.** The DEFAULT mode is fixed by this entry's config for the executor's lifetime; `resolve()` stamps it onto every spec, and an explicit request-level `sandboxMode` override — set by the tool layer only for a call whose wider mode a human granted through `ctx.approval` ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)) — makes THAT call run, classify, and report under its own mode while every neighbor keeps the default (background facts are stamped per task at settle). The capability fact `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports the configured default so the tool layer advertises escalation only when this executor is mounted. The model learns of the sandbox only through result facts — the static bash tool description explains the denial marker; there is no current-mode statement in the system prompt.
|
||||
- **File effects only.** Network and process visibility are deliberately not restricted — the mode vocabulary does not pretend to cover what the backend does not enforce.
|
||||
- Process mechanics (spawn, process-group kills, output collection/spill, background tasks, credential scrub) are inherited verbatim from [`dsh-bash-local`](../bash-local/); the runner ladder, probes, and the per-platform Landlock launcher packages live with [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../sandbox/sandbox-local/).
|
||||
|
||||
Deny-only at the seam: a denial is a reported fact, and this executor never negotiates permissions itself — the approval question lives in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-bash`), which drives the override this package honors.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- id: sandbox
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
- id: bash
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
config:
|
||||
mode: read-only
|
||||
workspaceRoot: !!js process.cwd()
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The keyless consumer-integration proofs are `tests/bwrap.e2e.ts`, `tests/landlock.e2e.ts`, and `tests/seatbelt.e2e.ts` (the real provider + real runner driven through `ctx.bash`, world-verified, each self-skipping where its runner is absent); see [`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`](../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/) for the runnable demo.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox",
|
||||
"description": "Sandbox-consuming implementation of the DeepSeek Harness bash executor seam (confines every command via ctx.sandbox, reports denial/enforcement result facts)",
|
||||
"version": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"private": true,
|
||||
"type": "module",
|
||||
"main": "lib/index.js",
|
||||
"types": "lib/types/index.d.ts",
|
||||
"exports": {
|
||||
".": {
|
||||
"types": "./lib/types/index.d.ts",
|
||||
"default": "./lib/index.js"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"./src/*": "./src/*",
|
||||
"./package.json": "./package.json"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"files": [
|
||||
"lib/index.js",
|
||||
"lib/types/**/*.d.ts",
|
||||
"lib/types/**/*.d.ts.map",
|
||||
"src"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"license": "BSD-3-Clause",
|
||||
"peerDependencies": {
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"schemastery": "^3.18.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"node-addon-landlock-run": "0.0.0-test.0",
|
||||
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* `SandboxBashExecutor`: the sandbox-consuming implementation of the
|
||||
* `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash` executor seam. Every spawned command is wrapped by
|
||||
* the `ctx.sandbox` provider (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox`) according to the
|
||||
* configured {@link SandboxMode}: the executor hands the provider the exact
|
||||
* `['bash', '-c', command]` argv it is about to spawn and spawns the wrapped
|
||||
* argv instead. WHICH platform runner confines it — and whether one is
|
||||
* usable at all (the provider fails CLOSED with a structured
|
||||
* `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error rather than passing the argv through) — is the
|
||||
* provider's concern (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local` first).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Extends `LocalBashExecutor` so all process mechanics — spawn, process-group
|
||||
* kills, timeout escalation, output collection and spill files, background
|
||||
* tasks, the credential scrub — are the local implementation's, verbatim.
|
||||
* This package adds only the seam consumption and the result facts, which is
|
||||
* exactly the split the capability seam was designed for (a sandboxing
|
||||
* executor replaces `dsh-bash-local` without touching `dsh-tool-bash`, and
|
||||
* swapping the confinement backend never touches this package).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A failed run whose stderr carries the selected backend's own denial
|
||||
* dialect (the signatures the provider stamps on every wrap) is classified
|
||||
* as a sandbox denial on `BashRunResult.sandbox`, and every confined result
|
||||
* also carries how completely the selected runner enforces the mode
|
||||
* (`sandbox.enforcement`, from the provider's wrap). A failure carrying the
|
||||
* backend's RUNNER-FAILURE signature instead means the sandbox itself broke
|
||||
* and the command never ran: the foreground path re-throws it as the
|
||||
* structured fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error (late twin of the
|
||||
* provider's confine-time throw), a settled background task stamps
|
||||
* `sandbox.runnerFailed` — either way a broken sandbox can never read as a
|
||||
* failing command, and the command never slips through unconfined.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Deny-only at the seam, escalation at the tool: a denial is a reported FACT
|
||||
* here, and the one-shot user-approved escalated retry of a denied action
|
||||
* (docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) is driven by
|
||||
* `dsh-tool-bash` through `ctx.approval` — this executor's contribution is the
|
||||
* per-call `sandboxMode` override it honors in {@link resolve}: an escalated
|
||||
* call runs (and classifies, and reports) under ITS granted mode while every
|
||||
* neighboring call keeps its session's standing mode (or the configured
|
||||
* default when that session has no override).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { resolve } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import z from 'schemastery'
|
||||
import type { BashExecRequest, BashExecSpec, BashRunResult, BashTask, BashTaskId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
|
||||
import { SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
import type { ConfinedSandboxMode, SandboxEnforcement, SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
import { LocalBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
|
||||
import type { Config as LocalConfig } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Plugin config: the local executor's knobs plus the sandbox policy. All
|
||||
* optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults (`mode: 'read-only'` is the
|
||||
* fail-safe default; an example that wants a workspace-writable agent opts in
|
||||
* explicitly). The runner choice is NOT configured here: which platform
|
||||
* backend confines the command is the `ctx.sandbox` provider's config.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface Config extends LocalConfig {
|
||||
/** File-sandbox mode commands run under (default: `read-only`). */
|
||||
mode?: SandboxMode
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Root directory `workspace-write` mode may write under (default: the
|
||||
* executor's default working directory — `cwd`, else `process.cwd()`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
workspaceRoot?: string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Quote one string as a single-quoted POSIX shell word (embedded single
|
||||
* quotes become `'\''`), so a wrapped argv element survives the outer
|
||||
* `bash -c` re-parse byte-for-byte.
|
||||
* @param text - the raw argv element to quote.
|
||||
* @returns the single-quoted shell word.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function shellQuote(text: string): string {
|
||||
return `'${text.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`)}'`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Conservative sandbox-denial classifier: a run counts as denied only when it
|
||||
* FAILED (nonzero exit — a signal kill is not a denial) and its stderr
|
||||
* carries one of the SELECTED BACKEND's own denial signatures — the dialect
|
||||
* the provider stamps on every wrap (`ConfinedArgv.denialSignatures`:
|
||||
* `Read-only file system` under bwrap's EROFS mounts, `Permission denied`
|
||||
* under Landlock's EACCES, `Operation not permitted` under Seatbelt's
|
||||
* EPERM). Matching the backend's dialect rather than a cross-backend union
|
||||
* keeps the classifier from claiming denials the active backend never
|
||||
* produces (bare EPERM text under a Linux runner names non-file boundaries —
|
||||
* mount, kill, ptrace — that fail the same way unsandboxed). Text inference
|
||||
* is the fallback signal until a runner provides a structured one (which
|
||||
* wins once it exists); it errs toward NOT claiming a denial, and its known
|
||||
* residual imprecision is non-sandbox text in the active dialect (an ssh
|
||||
* auth failure reads as a denial under Landlock, a refused `kill` under
|
||||
* Seatbelt).
|
||||
* @param result - the settled foreground run to classify.
|
||||
* @param signatures - the active wrap's denial dialect, case-insensitive
|
||||
* stderr substrings.
|
||||
* @returns whether the run's failure reads as a sandbox denial.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function classifyDenial(result: BashRunResult, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
||||
return matchesSignature(result.exitCode, result.stderr.text, signatures)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Runner-failure classifier: a failed run whose stderr carries the SELECTED
|
||||
* BACKEND's own runner-failure signature (`ConfinedArgv.
|
||||
* runnerFailureSignatures`: the runner's error prefix, which also matches
|
||||
* the shell's runner-not-found message) means the SANDBOX itself failed and
|
||||
* the command never ran. Checked BEFORE {@link classifyDenial} — a runner's
|
||||
* error text can contain denial words (an unopenable grant root reports
|
||||
* `Permission denied`) — and surfaced as the fail-closed
|
||||
* `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error on the foreground path, `sandbox.runnerFailed`
|
||||
* on a settled background task. Same conservative-text-inference stance and
|
||||
* residual imprecision as the denial classifier (a failing task that itself
|
||||
* prints the runner's prefix reads as a runner failure).
|
||||
* @param result - the settled foreground run to classify.
|
||||
* @param signatures - the active wrap's runner-failure signatures,
|
||||
* case-insensitive stderr substrings.
|
||||
* @returns whether the run's failure reads as the runner itself failing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function classifyRunnerFailure(result: BashRunResult, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
||||
return matchesSignature(result.exitCode, result.stderr.text, signatures)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The classifier core shared by foreground results and settled background
|
||||
* tasks: failed AND signature present. Lowercases BOTH sides — the seam
|
||||
* declares its signatures case-insensitive, and producers compose them from
|
||||
* runtime data of any case (an `argv0` path, `No such file or directory`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function matchesSignature(exitCode: number | null, stderr: string, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
|
||||
if (exitCode === null || exitCode === 0) return false
|
||||
const lowered = stderr.toLowerCase()
|
||||
return signatures.some(signature => lowered.includes(signature.toLowerCase()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Sandbox-consuming bash executor. Registers as `ctx.bash` (loading it
|
||||
* INSTEAD OF `dsh-bash-local`, together with a `ctx.sandbox` provider, is
|
||||
* the whole swap — the tool layer is untouched). Its configured mode is the
|
||||
* fallback exposed by {@link sandboxMode}; `dsh-tool-bash` folds a session's
|
||||
* durable `bash/sandbox-mode` override and stamps the effective mode onto each
|
||||
* request, while an approved escalation may stamp a strictly wider mode for
|
||||
* one call. The tool's per-agent prompt section states that same effective
|
||||
* mode, and each run's `result.sandbox` reports what actually executed plus
|
||||
* enforcement completeness.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export class SandboxBashExecutor extends LocalBashExecutor {
|
||||
static inject = ['sandbox']
|
||||
|
||||
// The sandbox-specific fields intersect the local executor's Config as an
|
||||
// inline schema call: the config catalog walks `static Config` statically.
|
||||
static override Config: z<Config> = z.intersect([
|
||||
LocalBashExecutor.Config,
|
||||
z.object({
|
||||
mode: z.union(['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'] as const).default('read-only'),
|
||||
workspaceRoot: z.string(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
private readonly mode: SandboxMode
|
||||
private readonly workspaceRoot: string
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Per-task facts, keyed by task id from `start()` until the settle stamp
|
||||
* consumes them: the mode the task runs under (per-call — an escalated task
|
||||
* differs from its neighbors) plus its wrap facts. The seam returns facts
|
||||
* PER WRAP — a provider may legally vary enforcement or dialect between
|
||||
* calls — so overlapping background tasks must each classify against their
|
||||
* OWN wrap; a single latest-wrap field would let a later `start()` clobber
|
||||
* an earlier task's facts before it settles. A `danger-full-access` task
|
||||
* has NO entry (nothing confined it), which is what the settle stamp keys
|
||||
* off.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private readonly taskFacts = new Map<BashTaskId, {
|
||||
mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
|
||||
enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
|
||||
denialSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
}>()
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) {
|
||||
super(ctx, config)
|
||||
// schemastery (static Config) already filled the defaulted fields — the
|
||||
// cast records that runtime fact (mirrors LocalBashExecutor's config
|
||||
// cast). `workspaceRoot` and `cwd` have NO schema default, so their
|
||||
// fallback chain is real branching.
|
||||
this.mode = config.mode as SandboxMode
|
||||
this.workspaceRoot = resolve(config.workspaceRoot ?? config.cwd ?? process.cwd())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** The configured default mode — the capability fact the tool layer reads. */
|
||||
override get sandboxMode(): SandboxMode {
|
||||
return this.mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Stamp the effective mode onto the spec — the request's explicit override
|
||||
* (an approved escalation), else this executor's configured default — so
|
||||
* defaulting stays an explicit resolve step and `run()`/`start()` read the
|
||||
* spec, never the config.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
override resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
|
||||
return { ...super.resolve(request), sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode ?? this.mode }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override async run(spec: BashExecSpec): Promise<BashRunResult> {
|
||||
// resolve() always stamps the mode; the cast records that invariant
|
||||
// (mirrors the constructor's config casts).
|
||||
const mode = spec.sandboxMode as SandboxMode
|
||||
if (mode === 'danger-full-access') {
|
||||
const result = await super.run(spec)
|
||||
return { ...result, sandbox: { mode, denied: false } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
const confined = this.confine(spec.command, mode)
|
||||
const result = await super.run({ ...spec, command: confined.command })
|
||||
// Runner failure outranks denial: the sandbox itself failed and the
|
||||
// command NEVER RAN — surface the same structured fail-closed error a
|
||||
// confine-time discovery throws (late detection, same outcome), with
|
||||
// the runner's own first stderr line as the cause. Returning it as a
|
||||
// task result would let a broken sandbox read as a failing command.
|
||||
if (classifyRunnerFailure(result, confined.runnerFailureSignatures)) {
|
||||
throw new SandboxUnavailableError(mode, result.stderr.text.trim().split('\n')[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { ...result, sandbox: { mode, denied: classifyDenial(result, confined.denialSignatures), enforcement: confined.enforcement } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override start(spec: BashExecSpec): BashTask {
|
||||
// Same stamped-by-resolve invariant as run().
|
||||
const mode = spec.sandboxMode as SandboxMode
|
||||
if (mode === 'danger-full-access') return super.start(spec)
|
||||
// Sandbox facts are stamped at settle time by {@link notifyTaskDone}
|
||||
// (denial classification runs against the settled task's collected
|
||||
// stderr). The map entry lands synchronously after spawn, strictly
|
||||
// before the earliest possible settle (a process exit reaches us no
|
||||
// sooner than the next tick).
|
||||
const confined = this.confine(spec.command, mode)
|
||||
const task = super.start({ ...spec, command: confined.command })
|
||||
const { enforcement, denialSignatures, runnerFailureSignatures } = confined
|
||||
this.taskFacts.set(task.id, { mode, enforcement, denialSignatures, runnerFailureSignatures })
|
||||
return task
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Stamp the sandbox facts BEFORE completion listeners run: the base
|
||||
* executor notifies from inside the task's settle path, so overriding the
|
||||
* notification point is what makes `task.sandbox` visible to `onTaskDone`
|
||||
* consumers and `done` awaiters alike. Each task classifies against the
|
||||
* facts of ITS OWN wrap and reports ITS OWN mode (consumed from the
|
||||
* per-task map here — settle is the entry's end of life): with per-call
|
||||
* escalation, tasks under different modes settle side by side, so keying
|
||||
* anything off the configured default would misreport them. A
|
||||
* `danger-full-access` task has no map entry and carries no facts (nothing
|
||||
* confined it); a signal-killed task (null exit code) is never a denial,
|
||||
* mirroring the foreground classifier.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
protected override notifyTaskDone(task: BashTask): void {
|
||||
const facts = this.taskFacts.get(task.id)
|
||||
if (facts !== undefined) {
|
||||
this.taskFacts.delete(task.id)
|
||||
const stderr = this.collectedStderr(task.id)
|
||||
// Runner failure outranks denial (the command never ran; the runner's
|
||||
// own error text can contain denial words). A settled task has no
|
||||
// error channel left, so the fact IS the surface here — the foreground
|
||||
// path throws instead.
|
||||
const runnerFailed = matchesSignature(task.exitCode, stderr, facts.runnerFailureSignatures)
|
||||
task.sandbox = {
|
||||
mode: facts.mode,
|
||||
denied: !runnerFailed && matchesSignature(task.exitCode, stderr, facts.denialSignatures),
|
||||
enforcement: facts.enforcement,
|
||||
...(runnerFailed ? { runnerFailed } : {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
super.notifyTaskDone(task)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Wrap one shell command via the `ctx.sandbox` provider: hand over the
|
||||
* exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv this executor would spawn, get back
|
||||
* the confined argv, and re-assemble it into the `exec …` command string
|
||||
* the inherited spawn path runs (the outer `bash -c` that `runBash` spawns
|
||||
* `exec`s into the runner, so no extra shell lingers). Provider errors
|
||||
* (fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`) propagate to the caller unchanged.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private confine(command: string, mode: ConfinedSandboxMode): {
|
||||
command: string
|
||||
enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
|
||||
denialSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
|
||||
} {
|
||||
const confined = this.ctx.sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', command], { mode, workspaceRoot: this.workspaceRoot })
|
||||
return {
|
||||
command: `exec ${confined.argv.map(shellQuote).join(' ')}`,
|
||||
enforcement: confined.enforcement,
|
||||
denialSignatures: confined.denialSignatures,
|
||||
runnerFailureSignatures: confined.runnerFailureSignatures,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export default SandboxBashExecutor
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
|
||||
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
|
||||
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
||||
import { homedir } from 'node:os'
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import { bwrapProfileArgs, LocalSandboxProvider } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* KEYLESS consumer-integration proof under bwrap: the REAL
|
||||
* `LocalSandboxProvider` (nothing forced — bwrap is the ladder's first rung,
|
||||
* so a passing probe selects it) underneath the REAL `SandboxBashExecutor`,
|
||||
* driven through the executor's public run/start paths. Verifies the WORLD
|
||||
* (files exist or don't) plus the stamped result facts — in particular that
|
||||
* bwrap's EROFS denial text classifies as `denied: true` through the
|
||||
* wrap-carried dialect; the backend-only confinement proofs live with
|
||||
* `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Self-skips wherever the functional probe fails — no `bwrap` on PATH, or a
|
||||
* host that denies unprivileged user namespaces.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HOME-based dirs on purpose: bwrap's `/tmp` is an ephemeral mount, so only
|
||||
* paths outside it prove the workspace-root boundary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const probe = spawnSync('bwrap', [...bwrapProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' })
|
||||
const bwrapUsable = probe.status === 0
|
||||
|
||||
let ctx: Context | undefined
|
||||
const tempDirs: string[] = []
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
|
||||
ctx = undefined
|
||||
await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-bwrap-e2e-'))
|
||||
tempDirs.push(dir)
|
||||
return dir
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function sandboxedBash(workspace: string, mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write'): Promise<SandboxBashExecutor> {
|
||||
ctx = new Context()
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { mode, cwd: workspace, workspaceRoot: workspace, timeoutMs: 30_000 })
|
||||
return ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe.skipIf(!bwrapUsable)('bash-sandbox: real bwrap confinement through ctx.bash', () => {
|
||||
it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, and EROFS text classifies as a denial', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'workspace-write')
|
||||
|
||||
const inside = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `printf bwrap-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(inside.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('bwrap-ok')
|
||||
|
||||
const denied = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(denied.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(denied.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies a background denial once the task settles', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/bg-denied.txt` }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'bg-denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an approved escalated retry — the spec-level workspace-write override — lands the exact write read-only denied', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const command = `printf escalated > ${workdir}/escalated.txt`
|
||||
const strict = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command }))
|
||||
expect(strict.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(strict.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
const retried = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command, sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
expect(retried.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(retried.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('escalated')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
||||
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
|
||||
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
|
||||
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
||||
import { homedir, tmpdir } from 'node:os'
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import { launcherPath } from 'node-addon-landlock-run'
|
||||
import { LocalSandboxProvider } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* KEYLESS consumer-integration proof: the REAL `LocalSandboxProvider` (bwrap
|
||||
* rung forced off, so the npm-distributed `landlock-run` confines) underneath the
|
||||
* REAL `SandboxBashExecutor`, driven through the executor's public run/start
|
||||
* paths. Verifies the WORLD (files exist or don't) plus the stamped result
|
||||
* facts; the backend-only confinement proofs live with
|
||||
* `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Self-skips when the running kernel does not enforce Landlock; the
|
||||
* launcher binary itself arrives with `pnpm install` (`node-addon-landlock-run`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const probe = spawnSync(launcherPath(), ['--probe'], { timeout: 5_000, encoding: 'utf8' })
|
||||
const landlockUsable = probe.status === 0
|
||||
/** The kernel's enforcement level from the probe report — stamped facts below must match it. */
|
||||
const enforcement = /partially enforced/.test(probe.stdout ?? '') ? 'partial' : 'full'
|
||||
|
||||
let ctx: Context | undefined
|
||||
const tempDirs: string[] = []
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
|
||||
ctx = undefined
|
||||
await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-landlock-e2e-'))
|
||||
tempDirs.push(dir)
|
||||
return dir
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function sandboxedBash(workspace: string, mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write'): Promise<SandboxBashExecutor> {
|
||||
ctx = new Context()
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
|
||||
;(ctx.sandbox as LocalSandboxProvider).internals = { probeBwrap: () => false }
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { mode, cwd: workspace, workspaceRoot: workspace, timeoutMs: 30_000 })
|
||||
return ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe.skipIf(!landlockUsable)('bash-sandbox: real Landlock confinement through ctx.bash', () => {
|
||||
it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, the result carries denial + enforcement facts', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(tmpdir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'workspace-write')
|
||||
|
||||
const inside = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `printf landlock-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(inside.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('landlock-ok')
|
||||
|
||||
const denied = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(denied.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(denied.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies a background denial once the task settles', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/bg-denied.txt` }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'bg-denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an approved escalated retry — the spec-level workspace-write override — lands the exact write read-only denied', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const command = `printf escalated > ${workdir}/escalated.txt`
|
||||
const strict = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command }))
|
||||
expect(strict.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(strict.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: enforcement })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
const retried = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command, sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
expect(retried.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(retried.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: enforcement })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('escalated')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SandboxBashExecutor tests: the CONSUMER side of the sandbox seam. A fake
|
||||
* `ctx.sandbox` provider (injected as a real cordis service) makes wrapping,
|
||||
* policy hand-off, fail-closed propagation, classification, and fact
|
||||
* stamping all deterministic without any real runner; the real-provider
|
||||
* integration proof lives in `tests/landlock.e2e.ts`. Denials are produced
|
||||
* with plain unix permissions (a 0555 directory), which exercises the same
|
||||
* stderr signature the classifier keys on.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs'
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
|
||||
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import type { BashRunResult, CollectedOutput } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
|
||||
import { SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, SandboxProvider, SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
import type { ConfinedArgv, SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
import { classifyDenial, classifyRunnerFailure, SandboxBashExecutor, shellQuote } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
import type { Config } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
|
||||
const spillDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-bash-sandbox-spec-'))
|
||||
|
||||
/** One recorded provider call: the argv handed over and the policy it rode with. */
|
||||
interface ConfineCall {
|
||||
argv: string[]
|
||||
policy: SandboxPolicy
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** The Linux file-denial dialects the fake wraps carry — matches the unix-permission denials the tests below produce. */
|
||||
const UNIX_SIGNATURES = ['read-only file system', 'permission denied'] as const
|
||||
|
||||
/** The runner-failure prefix the fake wraps carry (a fake-runner: error line marks the sandbox itself failing). */
|
||||
const RUNNER_FAILURE = ['fake-runner: '] as const
|
||||
|
||||
/** A passthrough wrap: the caller's argv unchanged, asserted full — commands run unconfined, deterministically. */
|
||||
const passthrough = (argv: readonly string[]): ConfinedArgv =>
|
||||
({ argv: [...argv], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureSignatures: RUNNER_FAILURE })
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Boot a context with a recording fake `ctx.sandbox` (behavior injectable
|
||||
* per test) and the executor under test on top of it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function setup(config: Config = {}, behavior: (argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy) => ConfinedArgv = passthrough) {
|
||||
const calls: ConfineCall[] = []
|
||||
class FakeSandboxProvider extends SandboxProvider {
|
||||
confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): ConfinedArgv {
|
||||
calls.push({ argv: [...argv], policy })
|
||||
return behavior(argv, policy)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const ctx = new Context()
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(FakeSandboxProvider)
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { graceMs: 200, ...config })
|
||||
const bash = ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
|
||||
bash.internals = { spillDir }
|
||||
return { ctx, bash, calls }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function output(text: string): CollectedOutput {
|
||||
return { text, truncated: false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function runResult(exitCode: number | null, stderr: string): BashRunResult {
|
||||
return { exitCode, signal: null, timedOut: false, aborted: false, timeoutMs: 1000, stdout: output(''), stderr: output(stderr) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('the provider hand-off', () => {
|
||||
it('hands the provider the exact bash argv and the per-call policy, and runs the returned argv', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup()
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo \'a b\' "c\'d"' }))
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('a b c\'d\n')
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(calls).toEqual([{
|
||||
argv: ['bash', '-c', 'echo \'a b\' "c\'d"'],
|
||||
policy: { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: resolve(process.cwd()) },
|
||||
}])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a wrapped argv from the provider is what actually spawns (prefix survives, quoting round-trips)', async () => {
|
||||
// The fake wraps with `env MARKER=...` — a real (if tiny) runner prefix:
|
||||
// the sentinel only prints if the executor spawned the WRAPPED argv.
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({ argv: ['env', 'DSH_WRAP=1', ...argv], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureSignatures: RUNNER_FAILURE }))
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'printf "%s" "$DSH_WRAP"' }))
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('1')
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('workspace-write rides the policy, workspaceRoot falling back to cwd when not configured', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup({ mode: 'workspace-write', cwd: tmpdir() })
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(calls[0]?.policy).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: resolve(tmpdir()) })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an explicit workspaceRoot wins over cwd', async () => {
|
||||
const { calls, bash } = await setup({ mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: '/ws', cwd: tmpdir() })
|
||||
await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
expect(calls[0]?.policy.workspaceRoot).toBe(resolve('/ws'))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('the provider is consulted per wrap (no caching in the consumer): run and start each hand off', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup()
|
||||
await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(calls).toHaveLength(2)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('shellQuote survives embedded single quotes (the argv re-assembly primitive)', () => {
|
||||
expect(shellQuote('a\'b')).toBe(String.raw`'a'\''b'`)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('fail closed', () => {
|
||||
it('propagates the provider\'s structured SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE on run() and start()', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup({}, () => { throw new SandboxUnavailableError('read-only') })
|
||||
const spec = bash.resolve({ command: 'echo hi' })
|
||||
await expect(bash.run(spec)).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'SandboxUnavailableError', code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE })
|
||||
expect(() => bash.start(spec)).toThrow(SandboxUnavailableError)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('danger-full-access', () => {
|
||||
it('runs unwrapped: the provider is never consulted, facts carry no enforcement', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup({ mode: 'danger-full-access' })
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo free' }))
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('free\n')
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'danger-full-access', denied: false })
|
||||
expect(calls).toHaveLength(0)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('start() passes through unwrapped and stamps nothing at settle', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup({ mode: 'danger-full-access' })
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo free-bg' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
expect(bash.readOutput(task.id).delta).toContain('free-bg')
|
||||
expect(calls).toHaveLength(0)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('per-call sandboxMode override (the escalation mechanism)', () => {
|
||||
it('exposes the configured default as the capability fact, and resolve() stamps it', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
expect(bash.sandboxMode).toBe('read-only')
|
||||
expect(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }).sandboxMode).toBe('read-only')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an explicit override outranks the default at resolve(), and the wrap policy follows it', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup()
|
||||
expect(bash.resolve({ command: 'true', sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }).sandboxMode).toBe('workspace-write')
|
||||
await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true', sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
expect(calls.map(call => call.policy.mode)).toEqual(['workspace-write', 'read-only'])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an escalated run reports the mode it ACTUALLY ran under', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true', sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('escalating to danger-full-access bypasses the provider entirely — the grant, not a probe, is the authority there', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup()
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo free', sandboxMode: 'danger-full-access' }))
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('free\n')
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'danger-full-access', denied: false })
|
||||
expect(calls).toHaveLength(0)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('overlapping background tasks settle with their OWN modes (an escalated task next to a default one)', async () => {
|
||||
// With per-call policy, tasks under different modes are in flight at
|
||||
// once — anything keyed off the configured default would misreport the
|
||||
// escalated one at its settle stamp.
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const escalated = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'sleep 0.3; echo "x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 1', sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
const plain = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
await plain.done
|
||||
await escalated.done
|
||||
expect(escalated.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(plain.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an escalated danger-full-access background task carries no facts (nothing confined it)', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash, calls } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo bg-free', sandboxMode: 'danger-full-access' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
expect(bash.readOutput(task.id).delta).toContain('bg-free')
|
||||
expect(calls).toHaveLength(0)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('classifyDenial', () => {
|
||||
it('never classifies a clean exit or a signal kill as a denial', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(0, 'Permission denied'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(null, 'Permission denied'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies failed runs by the wrap\'s own dialect, conservatively', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'touch: cannot touch /x: Read-only file system'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(true)
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'sh: /x: Permission denied'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(true)
|
||||
// Bare EPERM is not a Linux runner's dialect: mount/kill/ptrace fail with
|
||||
// it unsandboxed too, and the mode vocabulary governs file effects only —
|
||||
// claiming a file denial here would tell the model the sandbox blocked
|
||||
// something it never governed.
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'mount: Operation not permitted'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'No such file or directory'), UNIX_SIGNATURES)).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('matches exactly the active backend\'s dialect: EPERM classifies under Seatbelt, EACCES does not under bwrap', () => {
|
||||
// The same stderr flips meaning with the backend: under Seatbelt, EPERM
|
||||
// text IS how the kernel refuses a governed file write; under bwrap's
|
||||
// EROFS-only dialect, `Permission denied` is ordinary DAC, not the
|
||||
// sandbox — per-wrap signatures are what keep both classifications honest.
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'bash: /etc/x: Operation not permitted'), ['operation not permitted'])).toBe(true)
|
||||
expect(classifyDenial(runResult(1, 'sh: /x: Permission denied'), ['read-only file system'])).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('classifyRunnerFailure', () => {
|
||||
it('matches the dialect case-insensitively on BOTH sides — the seam declares it so, and producers compose signatures from runtime data (an argv0 path, the shell\'s `No such file or directory`)', () => {
|
||||
const signatures = ['exec: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: not found', '/Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory']
|
||||
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(runResult(127, 'bash: /Opt/Runners/bwrap: No such file or directory'), signatures)).toBe(true)
|
||||
expect(classifyRunnerFailure(runResult(127, 'BASH: LINE 1: EXEC: /OPT/RUNNERS/BWRAP: NOT FOUND'), signatures)).toBe(true)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('result facts', () => {
|
||||
it('reports a real permission failure as a sandbox denial with the mode it ran under', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const lockedDir = join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-sandbox-denied-')), 'locked')
|
||||
mkdirSync(lockedDir)
|
||||
chmodSync(lockedDir, 0o555)
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo x > ${lockedDir}/f` }))
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('carries the provider\'s partial-enforcement fact through unchanged', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({ argv: [...argv], enforcement: 'partial', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureSignatures: RUNNER_FAILURE }))
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'partial' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('background sandbox facts', () => {
|
||||
it('stamps a settled denial: nonzero exit + permission stderr under a confined mode', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 1' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a foreground runner failure throws the fail-closed error, never a task result', async () => {
|
||||
// The wrap's runner prefix on a failed run means the SANDBOX broke and
|
||||
// the command never ran — the late twin of the confine-time throw, with
|
||||
// the runner's own first stderr line carried as the cause.
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const run = bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "fake-runner: ruleset rejected" >&2; exit 125' }))
|
||||
await expect(run).rejects.toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE }))
|
||||
await expect(run).rejects.toThrow('fake-runner: ruleset rejected')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a foreground runner failure outranks denial: runner error text may contain denial words', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
await expect(bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "fake-runner: cannot open rule path: /x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 125' })))
|
||||
.rejects.toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE }))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a settled background runner failure stamps runnerFailed (no error channel remains), not denied', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "fake-runner: cannot open rule path: /x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 125' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full', runnerFailed: true })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('completion listeners already see the stamped facts (stamp precedes notify)', async () => {
|
||||
const { ctx, bash } = await setup({}, argv => ({ argv: [...argv], enforcement: 'partial', denialSignatures: UNIX_SIGNATURES, runnerFailureSignatures: RUNNER_FAILURE }))
|
||||
const seen: unknown[] = []
|
||||
ctx.bash.onTaskDone((task) => { seen.push(task.sandbox) })
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 1' }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(seen).toEqual([{ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'partial' }])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('overlapping background tasks keep their OWN wrap facts (per-task, not latest-wrap)', async () => {
|
||||
// The seam returns facts PER WRAP — a legal provider may vary them
|
||||
// between calls. The slow task settles AFTER the quick one started, so a
|
||||
// latest-wrap field would classify its denial against the quick task's
|
||||
// dialect (missing it) and stamp the wrong enforcement.
|
||||
const wraps: Array<Pick<ConfinedArgv, 'enforcement' | 'denialSignatures'>> = [
|
||||
{ enforcement: 'partial', denialSignatures: ['permission denied'] },
|
||||
{ enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: ['read-only file system'] },
|
||||
]
|
||||
let call = 0
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup({}, (argv) => {
|
||||
const wrap = wraps[Math.min(call++, wraps.length - 1)] as Pick<ConfinedArgv, 'enforcement' | 'denialSignatures'>
|
||||
return { argv: [...argv], ...wrap, runnerFailureSignatures: RUNNER_FAILURE }
|
||||
})
|
||||
const slow = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'sleep 0.4; echo "x: Permission denied" >&2; exit 1' }))
|
||||
const quick = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }))
|
||||
await quick.done
|
||||
await slow.done
|
||||
expect(slow.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'partial' })
|
||||
expect(quick.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a signal-killed task is never a denial (null exit code)', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo "Permission denied" >&2; sleep 30' }))
|
||||
// Let the stderr land before the kill so the classifier sees the
|
||||
// signature and must still refuse it on the null exit code alone.
|
||||
await vi.waitFor(() => { expect(bash.readOutput(task.id).delta).toContain('Permission denied') })
|
||||
bash.kill(task.id)
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('disposal kills wrapped background tasks (inherited HMR safety)', async () => {
|
||||
const { ctx, bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'sleep 30' }))
|
||||
await ctx.fiber.dispose()
|
||||
expect(task.status).toBe('killed')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
|
||||
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
|
||||
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
||||
import { homedir } from 'node:os'
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path'
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { Context } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import { LocalSandboxProvider, seatbeltProfileArgs } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
|
||||
import { SandboxBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* KEYLESS consumer-integration proof on macOS: the REAL `LocalSandboxProvider`
|
||||
* (Linux rungs forced off, so `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt confines) underneath
|
||||
* the REAL `SandboxBashExecutor`, driven through the executor's public
|
||||
* run/start paths. Verifies the WORLD (files exist or don't) plus the
|
||||
* stamped result facts — in particular that Seatbelt's EPERM denial text
|
||||
* classifies as `denied: true` through the wrap-carried dialect; the
|
||||
* backend-only confinement proofs live with `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Self-skips wherever the functional probe fails — every non-macOS host, or
|
||||
* a macOS whose `sandbox-exec` refuses the profile.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const probe = spawnSync('sandbox-exec', [...seatbeltProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' })
|
||||
const seatbeltUsable = probe.status === 0
|
||||
|
||||
let ctx: Context | undefined
|
||||
const tempDirs: string[] = []
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
await ctx?.fiber.dispose()
|
||||
ctx = undefined
|
||||
await Promise.all(tempDirs.splice(0).map(dir => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
async function tempDir(base: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(base, 'dsh-seatbelt-e2e-'))
|
||||
tempDirs.push(dir)
|
||||
return dir
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function sandboxedBash(workspace: string, mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write'): Promise<SandboxBashExecutor> {
|
||||
ctx = new Context()
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
|
||||
;(ctx.sandbox as LocalSandboxProvider).internals = { probeBwrap: () => false, probeLandlock: () => 'unusable' }
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(SandboxBashExecutor, { mode, cwd: workspace, workspaceRoot: workspace, timeoutMs: 30_000 })
|
||||
return ctx.bash as SandboxBashExecutor
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe.skipIf(!seatbeltUsable)('bash-sandbox: real Seatbelt confinement through ctx.bash', () => {
|
||||
it('read-only denies a write — the file must NOT exist, and EPERM text classifies as a denial', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('workspace-write lands a write inside the workspace root and still denies one beside it', async () => {
|
||||
// HOME-based dirs on purpose: workspace-write grants /tmp and the
|
||||
// per-user temp dir wholesale, so only paths outside both prove the
|
||||
// workspace-root boundary.
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const outside = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'workspace-write')
|
||||
|
||||
const inside = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `printf seatbelt-ok > ${workdir}/allowed.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(inside.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(inside.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'allowed.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('seatbelt-ok')
|
||||
|
||||
const denied = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${outside}/denied.txt` }))
|
||||
expect(denied.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(denied.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(outside, 'denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies a background denial once the task settles', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: `echo hi > ${workdir}/bg-denied.txt` }))
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'bg-denied.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an approved escalated retry — the spec-level workspace-write override — lands the exact write read-only denied', async () => {
|
||||
const workdir = await tempDir(homedir())
|
||||
const bash = await sandboxedBash(workdir, 'read-only')
|
||||
const command = `printf escalated > ${workdir}/escalated.txt`
|
||||
const strict = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command }))
|
||||
expect(strict.exitCode).not.toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(strict.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'read-only', denied: true, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(existsSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'))).toBe(false)
|
||||
const retried = await bash.run(bash.resolve({ command, sandboxMode: 'workspace-write' }))
|
||||
expect(retried.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(retried.sandbox).toEqual({ mode: 'workspace-write', denied: false, enforcement: 'full' })
|
||||
expect(readFileSync(join(workdir, 'escalated.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('escalated')
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"extends": "../../../tsconfig.base.json",
|
||||
"compilerOptions": {
|
||||
"rootDir": "src",
|
||||
"outDir": "lib/types"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"include": [
|
||||
"src"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"references": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../../vendor/cosmokit"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../../vendor/cordis"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../../vendor/schemastery"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../util/brand"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../llm/llm"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../sandbox/sandbox"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../bash/bash"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"path": "../../bash/bash-local"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
The **bash executor seam**: an abstract `BashExecutor` service (`ctx.bash`) defining WHAT a bash backend does — run commands, manage background tasks — without saying HOW.
|
||||
|
||||
This package is one third of the bash capability, split so each concern can evolve (and be swapped) independently:
|
||||
This package is the interface quarter of the bash capability, split so each concern can evolve (and be swapped) independently:
|
||||
|
||||
| Package | Role |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash` (this) | the interface: abstract service + vocabulary types |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` | an implementation: local subprocesses |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox` | an implementation: `dsh-bash-local`'s mechanics with every spawn confined via [`ctx.sandbox`](../../sandbox/sandbox/), denials reported as result facts |
|
||||
| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash` | the model-facing tool schemas over `ctx.bash` |
|
||||
|
||||
The split mirrors the LLM seam (`LlmService`/`LlmAdapter`) and the agent-tool survey: pi hides execution behind a `BashOperations` interface (local shell / SSH / VM backends), Codex behind an exec-server protocol. A future sandboxed, containerized, or remote executor implements this interface and the tool schemas don't change.
|
||||
The split mirrors the LLM seam (`LlmService`/`LlmAdapter`) and the agent-tool survey: pi hides execution behind a `BashOperations` interface (local shell / SSH / VM backends), Codex behind an exec-server protocol. `dsh-bash-sandbox` is exactly that swap in action — a sandboxing executor behind the same interface, tool schemas untouched; a containerized or remote executor slots in the same way.
|
||||
|
||||
## Service API (`ctx.bash`)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ The split mirrors the LLM seam (`LlmService`/`LlmAdapter`) and the agent-tool su
|
||||
| `run(spec)` | Foreground execution. Resolves when the command finishes. **Rejects only for infrastructure failures** (unusable workdir, missing shell, pre-aborted signal); nonzero exits, timeout kills, and abort kills resolve with a descriptive `BashRunResult`. |
|
||||
| `start(spec)` | Background execution. Returns a `BashTask` handle immediately; **no timeout applies** (stop tasks via `kill`). |
|
||||
| `get(id)` / `list()` | Task lookup. |
|
||||
| `sandboxMode` | The capability fact for the tool layer: the default mode a SANDBOXING executor confines under (`undefined` in the base class — "this executor does not sandbox"). `dsh-tool-bash` reads it at registration to advertise the escalation fields only when the composition honors them. |
|
||||
| `ownerOf(id)` | The opaque OWNER token recorded for a background task at `start` (from the spec's `owner`), or `undefined` for an unknown id OR a known-but-ownerless task. The executor stores/returns it verbatim and NEVER interprets it — the access POLICY lives in the consumer (`dsh-tool-bash`), which compares `ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token. Storing ownership here (disposed with the executor's fiber) is what makes it survive a consumer HMR reload. |
|
||||
| `readOutput(id)` | **Incremental** output read — consecutive reads never re-deliver. Reads that lost data to buffer bounds flag `lossy` and point at full-stream spill files. Throws for unknown ids. |
|
||||
| `kill(id)` | Kill a running task. Returns `false` when it already finished; throws for unknown ids. |
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ Implementations subclass `BashExecutor`, implement the abstract methods, and cal
|
||||
|
||||
## Vocabulary
|
||||
|
||||
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner) before execution; `owner` is optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** (`OwnerToken | undefined`) on the resolved spec, so a forgotten owner is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. The task id (`BashTaskId`) and the `owner` token (`OwnerToken`) are [branded](../../util/brand) — `OwnerToken` is a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId` (the seam never imports `dsh-session`; the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts its `SessionId` into one). `run()` returns `BashRunResult` (exitCode, signal, timedOut, aborted, timeoutMs, stdout/stderr as `CollectedOutput`) and `start()`/`readOutput()` use `BashTask`/`BashTaskRead` for the background side. See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.
|
||||
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner?, sandboxMode?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner, sandboxMode) before execution; `owner` and `sandboxMode` are optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** on the resolved spec, so a forgotten one is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. `sandboxMode` is the explicit per-call sandbox-policy input: an escalation grant a human just issued ([the sandbox RFC § Escalation](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md), which outranks) or the session's standing override ([the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)); a sandboxing executor's `resolve()` stamps its configured default when the request carries none, and a non-sandboxing executor carries the field verbatim and confines nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
The seam also owns the per-session mode override vocabulary (the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching): the log-only `'bash/sandbox-mode'` session event, the pure fold `effectiveSandboxMode(events)` (last event wins; `undefined` means "apply the executor default"), and THE write path `setSandboxMode(session, mode)` — the session log is the store, so an override survives restart by replay and two sessions can never see each other's mode. Writers must respect turn-enclosure: the ACP bridge anchors an idle switch at the next turn rather than appending between turns. The task id (`BashTaskId`) and the `owner` token (`OwnerToken`) are [branded](../../util/brand) — `OwnerToken` is a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId` (the seam never imports `dsh-session`; the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts its `SessionId` into one). `run()` returns `BashRunResult` (exitCode, signal, timedOut, aborted, timeoutMs, stdout/stderr as `CollectedOutput`) and `start()`/`readOutput()` use `BashTask`/`BashTaskRead` for the background side. A sandboxing executor additionally stamps `sandbox` result facts on results and settled tasks (`BashSandboxInfo`: the mode it executed under, the conservative `denied` classification, and — for confined modes — the backend's `enforcement` completeness); the mode/enforcement vocabulary is owned by the [`dsh-sandbox`](../../sandbox/sandbox/) seam, and the facts are documented in [core-data-structures/bash.md](../../../docs/core-data-structures/bash.md). See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
`stdin` and `env` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) to feed a hook command its JSON payload on stdin and its `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`/`CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT` env. The model-facing `dsh-tool-bash` tool does not expose them as parameters — a model already has equivalent power through shell syntax (`FOO=bar cmd`, a heredoc), so they would be redundant tool params. This is not a security boundary: the implementation's credential scrub (not these fields) is what keeps the harness's ambient secrets out of a spawned command. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (unlike `owner`'s required-but-nullable): a missing one means "none", the safe default. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
|
||||
@@ -23,10 +23,14 @@
|
||||
"license": "BSD-3-Clause",
|
||||
"peerDependencies": {
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-brand": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "^0.0.1",
|
||||
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-brand": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "workspace:^",
|
||||
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -15,13 +15,16 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { Context, Service } from 'cordis'
|
||||
import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
import type { BashExecRequest, BashExecSpec, BashRunResult, BashTask, BashTaskId, BashTaskListener, BashTaskRead, OwnerToken } from './types.ts'
|
||||
|
||||
export { BashTaskId, OwnerToken } from './types.ts'
|
||||
export { SANDBOX_MODES, effectiveSandboxMode, setSandboxMode } from './session-mode.ts'
|
||||
export type {
|
||||
BashExecRequest,
|
||||
BashExecSpec,
|
||||
BashRunResult,
|
||||
BashSandboxInfo,
|
||||
BashTask,
|
||||
BashTaskListener,
|
||||
BashTaskRead,
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +73,22 @@ export abstract class BashExecutor extends Service {
|
||||
}, 'bash listener teardown')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The sandbox mode this executor confines commands under BY DEFAULT, or
|
||||
* `undefined` when it does not sandbox at all — the capability fact the
|
||||
* tool and ACP layers read to advertise sandbox controls honestly. The
|
||||
* getter proves a sandboxing executor is mounted and supplies its fallback
|
||||
* mode; a session override may make the effective mode narrower or wider,
|
||||
* so strict escalation widening is checked per call rather than encoded in
|
||||
* this default-relative capability fact. The base class reports
|
||||
* `undefined`; a sandboxing implementation overrides the getter.
|
||||
* @returns the configured default mode of a sandboxing executor;
|
||||
* `undefined` for an executor that never confines.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
get sandboxMode(): SandboxMode | undefined {
|
||||
return undefined
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Resolve a caller's {@link BashExecRequest} into a fully-specified
|
||||
* {@link BashExecSpec}, applying this implementation's config defaults and
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Per-session sandbox-mode override: the session log as the store. A runtime
|
||||
* switch (an ACP `session/set_config_option`, a test scenario) is recorded as
|
||||
* one `bash/sandbox-mode` event on the session it applies to;
|
||||
* `effective = fold(events) ?? the executor's configured default`, so an
|
||||
* override survives restart by replay, two sessions can never see each
|
||||
* other's state, and there is no external config store. The event is
|
||||
* log-only (the `approval/*` precedent): the model learns the mode from the
|
||||
* prompt section and the boundary notices in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash`,
|
||||
* never from the event itself. EXECUTION honors the fold in the tool layer —
|
||||
* it stamps the effective mode onto each call's `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`
|
||||
* (weakest-precedence: an escalation grant for the call outranks it) — the
|
||||
* executor itself stays a config-fixed default plus per-call overrides.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @module dsh-bash/session-mode
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import type { Session, SessionEvent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
|
||||
import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
||||
|
||||
declare module '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session' {
|
||||
interface SessionEventMap {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The session's sandbox mode was switched — log-only (like `approval/*`;
|
||||
* NOT a surface event, carries no `surfaceOp`): durable and replayable,
|
||||
* never in the model transcript. The LAST such event is the session's
|
||||
* override ({@link effectiveSandboxMode}); who asked for it is derivable
|
||||
* from position (an event after the log's last `request/header*` was a
|
||||
* runtime switch by the user; see the tool layer's narrator).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
'bash/sandbox-mode': { mode: SandboxMode }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Every {@link SandboxMode}, for option advertisement and runtime validation of untrusted mode strings. */
|
||||
export const SANDBOX_MODES: readonly SandboxMode[] = ['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access']
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The session's sandbox-mode override: the last `bash/sandbox-mode` event in
|
||||
* the log, or undefined when the session never switched (callers apply the
|
||||
* executor's configured default). The pure fold — resume needs no catch-up
|
||||
* machinery because replaying the log IS the state.
|
||||
* @param events - session events in log order (other event types are skipped).
|
||||
* @returns the mode of the last switch event, or undefined without one.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function effectiveSandboxMode(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): SandboxMode | undefined {
|
||||
for (let index = events.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) {
|
||||
const event = events[index] as SessionEvent
|
||||
if (event.type === 'bash/sandbox-mode') return event.data.mode
|
||||
}
|
||||
return undefined
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* THE write path for a session's sandbox-mode override: appends exactly one
|
||||
* `bash/sandbox-mode` event — the switch IS its event; nothing mutates mode
|
||||
* state out of band. Takes effect on the session's next bash call and next
|
||||
* prompt assembly (the consumers fold on every read).
|
||||
* @param session - the session the override belongs to.
|
||||
* @param mode - the mode every subsequent bash call in this session runs
|
||||
* under (until the next switch).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function setSandboxMode(session: Session, mode: SandboxMode): void {
|
||||
session.append('bash/sandbox-mode', { mode })
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user