fix(bundle): drop fs-local from the Windows layer — duplicate ctx.fs registration failed load

The Windows platform layer re-enables the base fs-sandbox row (removing its disable), but still inserted dsh-fs-local: both extend FileSystem and provide ctx.fs, so every shipped win32 profile failed at load. Delete the insert; fs-sandbox stays the single fs provider exactly as on POSIX. Sync the roster specs, the base/reference README pairs, the sandbox core doc (read-only grants no sink on Windows), the windows-shell JSDoc, and re-record the i18n pairings.
2026-08-08 02:11:15 +08:00
parent 94991499c8
commit 7574769818
13 changed files with 41 additions and 36 deletions
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write apps/cli/reference/README.md
-README.md: 07b162517b90215a6552810124f15c435144f7d4
-README.zh.md: 80030707474e59e76583ed7edc5ddce56334cc03
+README.md: 8264e2e9f57a6687a1cddae15012324790b555ad
+README.zh.md: 84bd37e43a982a307a2df8045f7f3703e5b9a8b4
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Process shutdown gives the plugin tree up to five seconds to dispose. The first

 All modes treat the invoking directory as the default workspace root, load applicable `AGENTS.md` or `CLAUDE.md` instructions with a 65,536-byte render budget, and use an in-memory SQLite session content index. Long-lived surfaces watch valid edits of both `cordis.patch.yml` layers (profile and home) and reapply them transactionally; one-shot runs read the files once at startup.

-New sessions default to the `workspace-write` permission preset. Bash and filesystem mutations are restricted to the session workspace and platform temporary roots; reads, network access, and process visibility are not confined. `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` changes the process fallback. Stored General-settings permissions affect later Web sessions, not an already-open one. On win32 hosts booting a shipped profile, the Windows platform layer removes the permission, sandbox, and approval rows entirely: the pwsh shell and the fs tools run unconfined with no workspace boundary (Windows has no OS sandbox runner — landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only — so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary the shell could bypass), and `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` and stored permission settings have no effect there.
+New sessions default to the `workspace-write` permission preset. Bash and filesystem mutations are restricted to the session workspace and platform temporary roots; reads, network access, and process visibility are not confined. `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` changes the process fallback. Stored General-settings permissions affect later Web sessions, not an already-open one. On win32 hosts booting a shipped profile, the same permission surface runs over the Windows ACL restricted-token runner: the pwsh executor and the fs tools enforce the workspace boundary through `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl` exactly as on POSIX (the Windows `workspace-write` grant is the workspace plus the real temp directory; `read-only` grants nothing).

 `DSH_TOOLS_MODE` selects `native`, `code`, or `both` for the process; another value fails at boot. [`config/core-web.cordis.yml`](../config/core-web.cordis.yml) is an optional RL-compatible `--patch` overlay that pins native mode, renders only `DSH_SYSTEM_PROMPT` or `You are a helpful software engineer assistant.` as the system prompt, disables Workspace instructions and every Web runtime prompt contribution, and exposes only persistent `bash` and `str_replace_editor` while retaining the shipped host, browser, workspace, persistence, and permission composition.

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ dsh web --dump-config

 所有模式都将调用目录作为默认 workspace 根目录，以 65,536 字节渲染预算加载适用的 `AGENTS.md` 或 `CLAUDE.md` 指令，并使用内存 SQLite 会话内容索引。常驻 surface 监视两个 `cordis.patch.yml` 层（profile 与 home）的有效编辑并以事务方式重新应用；一次性运行只在启动时读取这些文件一次。

-新会话默认使用 `workspace-write` 权限预设。Bash 和文件系统修改仅限于会话 workspace 与平台临时根目录；读取、网络访问和进程可见性不受限制。`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` 更改进程后备值。General settings 中存储的权限影响后续 Web 会话，不改变已打开的会话。在 win32 主机启动交付 profile 时，Windows 平台层会整体移除 permission、sandbox 与 approval 行：pwsh shell 与 fs 工具不受限运行，不存在 workspace 边界（Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner——landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属——因此交付姿态是诚实的 danger-full-access，而不是一个 shell 可以绕过的边界），`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` 与存储的权限设置在彼处也不生效。
+新会话默认使用 `workspace-write` 权限预设。Bash 和文件系统修改仅限于会话 workspace 与平台临时根目录；读取、网络访问和进程可见性不受限制。`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` 更改进程后备值。General settings 中存储的权限影响后续 Web 会话，不改变已打开的会话。在 win32 主机启动交付 profile 时，同一权限面运行在 Windows ACL 受限令牌 runner 之上：pwsh 执行器与 fs 工具通过 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl` 执行与 POSIX 完全一致的 workspace 边界（Windows 的 `workspace-write` 授权是工作区加真实 temp 目录；`read-only` 不授予任何写入）。

 `DSH_TOOLS_MODE` 为进程选择 `native`、`code` 或 `both`；其他值会导致启动失败。[`config/core-web.cordis.yml`](../config/core-web.cordis.yml) 是可选的 RL 兼容 `--patch` overlay：它固定使用 `native` 模式，仅将 `DSH_SYSTEM_PROMPT` 或 `You are a helpful software engineer assistant.` 渲染为系统提示词，禁用 Workspace 指令与所有 Web 运行时提示词贡献，并且在保留随附宿主、浏览器、workspace、持久化和权限组合的同时，仅暴露持久 `bash` 和 `str_replace_editor`。

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /**
 * The Windows shell platform layer: on win32 hosts the shipped profile
- * compositions swap the POSIX-only bash stack for the PowerShell stack
- * (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local` + `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`), matching
- * the Windows-pwsh-default roadmap. The layer is the base bundle's
+ * compositions swap the POSIX-only bash stack for the sandbox-confined
+ * PowerShell stack (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox` +
+ * `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`), matching the Windows-pwsh-default roadmap. The layer is the base bundle's
 * `windows.cordis.patch.yml`, injected by the launcher between the bundle
 * layers and the user layers so a user patch can still override it — the
 * only override channel is composition config, like every other roster
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import {
 const WINDOWS_PATCH = `- id: bash-sandbox
  disabled: true
 - insert:
-    - id: pwsh-local
-      name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local'
+    - id: pwsh-sandbox
+      name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox'
 `

 /** One fake bundle layer rooted in a temp directory. */
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ describe('resolveWindowsShellLayer', () => {
    expect(layer?.label.endsWith(WINDOWS_SHELL_PATCH_FILENAME)).toBe(true)
    expect(layer?.patches).toEqual([
      { id: 'bash-sandbox', disabled: true },
-      { insert: [{ id: 'pwsh-local', name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local' }] },
+      { insert: [{ id: 'pwsh-sandbox', name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox' }] },
    ])
  })

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ describe('the shipped Windows composition (real bundle layers)', () => {
  // suite composes the shipped patch files, not test fixtures.
  const anchor = fileURLToPath(new URL('../package.json', import.meta.url))

-  it('composes the win32 danger-full-access roster through the real patch layers', () => {
+  it('composes the win32 confined roster through the real patch layers', () => {
    home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-windows-home-'))
    initProfile(join(home, PROFILES_DIR, 'web'), ['@deepseek-ai/dsh-base', '@deepseek-ai/dsh-web-app'])
    const profile = loadProfile('dsh', 'web', anchor, home)
@@ -85,19 +85,24 @@ describe('the shipped Windows composition (real bundle layers)', () => {
      message => warnings.push(message),
    )
    const byId = new Map(rows.map(row => [row.id, row]))
-    for (const id of ['bash-sandbox', 'tool-bash', 'permission', 'ui-permission',
-      'sandbox', 'sandbox-policy', 'fs-sandbox', 'approval']) {
+    // Only the POSIX bash stack leaves the roster: the permission surface
+    // (sandbox/sandbox-policy/fs-sandbox, permission, approval) stays enabled
+    // exactly as on POSIX — the confined pwsh executor is what changes.
+    for (const id of ['bash-sandbox', 'tool-bash']) {
      expect(byId.get(id)?.disabled, `row ${id}`).toBe(true)
    }
-    for (const id of ['pwsh-local', 'tool-pwsh', 'fs-local']) {
+    for (const id of ['permission', 'ui-permission', 'sandbox', 'sandbox-policy', 'fs-sandbox', 'approval']) {
+      expect(byId.get(id)?.disabled, `row ${id}`).not.toBe(true)
+    }
+    for (const id of ['pwsh-sandbox', 'tool-pwsh']) {
      expect(byId.has(id), `inserted row ${id}`).toBe(true)
    }
-    // The web-app layer provides ui-permission, so the full web profile
-    // composes without any no-match warning.
+    // The patch touches only base-owned rows plus inserts, so the full web
+    // profile composes without any no-match warning.
    expect(warnings).toEqual([])
  })

-  it('leaves POSIX untouched and base-only profiles warned but harmless', () => {
+  it('leaves POSIX untouched and base-only profiles compose without warnings', () => {
    home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-windows-home-'))
    initProfile(join(home, PROFILES_DIR, 'web'), ['@deepseek-ai/dsh-base', '@deepseek-ai/dsh-web-app'])
    const profile = loadProfile('dsh', 'web', anchor, home)
@@ -106,10 +111,11 @@ describe('the shipped Windows composition (real bundle layers)', () => {
    const posixById = new Map(posixRows.map(row => [row.id, row]))
    expect(posixById.get('bash-sandbox')?.disabled).not.toBe(true)
    expect(posixById.has('pwsh-local')).toBe(false)
+    expect(posixById.has('pwsh-sandbox')).toBe(false)

-    // A base-only custom profile (the DEFAULT_PROFILE_BUNDLES template):
-    // ui-permission has no row to patch, so the shipped layer warns once per
-    // composition — never fails — exactly as its header comment documents.
+    // A base-only custom profile (the DEFAULT_PROFILE_BUNDLES template): the
+    // patch touches only base-owned rows (bash-sandbox/tool-bash) plus its
+    // inserts, so the composition produces no no-match warning.
    initProfile(join(home, PROFILES_DIR, 'base-only'), ['@deepseek-ai/dsh-base'])
    const baseOnly = loadProfile('dsh', 'base-only', anchor, home)
    const baseWarnings: string[] = []
@@ -119,6 +125,6 @@ describe('the shipped Windows composition (real bundle layers)', () => {
      [...baseOnly.layers.map(layer => layer.patches), win32!.patches],
      message => baseWarnings.push(message),
    )
-    expect(baseWarnings.some(message => message.includes('ui-permission'))).toBe(true)
+    expect(baseWarnings).toEqual([])
  })
 })
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write docs/core-data-structures/sandbox.md
-sandbox.md: 9e5feafe046f18dad49aeaf281793f0b8e03c240
-sandbox.zh.md: a1314d1b78eb0d46ea4c8ca5aa330ee83bf89132
+sandbox.md: af2b9043c52f35b7f38b368de1420d0e2856a963
+sandbox.zh.md: 5638e76769639525b1884756805d0e0cef1e870e
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox

 ## Modes and enforcement

-`SandboxMode` governs filesystem effects only. `read-only` denies writes except the required `/dev/null` sink; `workspace-write` permits writes under the workspace root and the backend's promised temp area; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
+`SandboxMode` governs filesystem effects only. `read-only` denies every write — the POSIX runners additionally grant the `/dev/null` sink their shells require, while the Windows ACL runner grants nothing; `workspace-write` permits writes under the workspace root and the backend's promised temp area; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.

 ```ts type-equiv
 /**
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@

 ## 模式与强制执行

-`SandboxMode` 仅管控文件系统效果。`read-only` 拒绝所有写入（必需的 `/dev/null` 接收器除外）；`workspace-write` 允许在工作区根目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；`danger-full-access` 绕过隔离。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。
+`SandboxMode` 仅管控文件系统效果。`read-only` 拒绝所有写入——POSIX runner 还会授予其 shell 所需的 `/dev/null` 接收器，而 Windows ACL runner 不授予任何写入；`workspace-write` 允许在工作区根目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；`danger-full-access` 绕过隔离。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。

 ```ts type-equiv
 /**
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/bundle/base/README.md
-README.md: 9e2a6305fff592eb63f927dfcc4f32437edeb1cc
-README.zh.md: 6159c23047bba4ced3345125901cc0c3ff7cd960
+README.md: de89e8c5d1fcf78fcd47ebdb98c1d1fc3bb0bd5f
+README.zh.md: 45ab3d9fa3c750984d903475b3c9e027e9e95d1c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ English | [中文](README.zh.md)

 The shared dsh core as a profile bundle: [`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) inserts every base plugin row — model adapters, tools, persistence, policy, settings/credentials, repository Plugins, telemetry — over the empty profile root, as the first layer of every profile's `dsh.profile.bundles` list. Later bundle layers (e.g. [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)) and the user's profile `cordis.patch.yml` override these rows by id; a patch replaces a row's whole `config`, so mode-specific values live in mode bundles, not here. The package has no runtime API; the profile composer resolves the universal patch through the `dsh.bundle.patch` manifest field, and the launcher reads the Windows platform layer below from code on win32 hosts.

-Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only sandboxed stacks — the bash executor/tool, the permission switcher (dsh-permission requires a confining executor), the sandbox/fs-policy stack, and the approval service — and inserts the PowerShell executor and tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`) plus the unconfined `dsh-fs-local`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce; nothing in the roster asks for approval, so the approval service is absent. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the bash stack restores it through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` (disable `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enable `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` — both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load). POSIX hosts never receive it.
+Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only bash stack (`bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`) and inserts the sandbox-confined PowerShell stack (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`). The permission surface stays exactly as on POSIX: `sandbox`/`sandbox-policy` enforce the file-effect policy through the Windows ACL restricted-token runner (the win32 chain of `dsh-sandbox-local` → `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`), the permission switcher and the approval service run unchanged, and `fs-sandbox` keeps fencing `ctx.fs` writes — mounting `dsh-fs-local` alongside it would double-register `ctx.fs` and fail the load. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the unconfined local pwsh executor or full access overrides these rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` (the bash-restore recipe must be complete: disable `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` AND re-enable `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` — both executor families register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load). POSIX hosts never receive it.

 The row set and its rationale are documented inline in the patch file; the [generated composition graph](../../../apps/cli/composition.md) renders it.

@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ None directly; each inserted row's package owns its effect.
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work

 - **A patch replaces whole row configs** — profile overrides must restate every field a row keeps; there is no deep-merge layer.
- **Windows has no sandbox and no approval** — no OS runner exists on win32 (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the Windows platform layer removes the whole sandbox stack (`sandbox`/`sandbox-policy`/`fs-sandbox` disabled, `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs`), the permission switcher leaves the roster, and the approval service is disabled — nothing on Windows asks for approval, so the model is never told approval exists. Everything degrades to danger-full-access: the shell is unconfined and the fs tools make no confinement claims.
+- **The Windows temp grant is the real temp directory** — `workspace-write` confines writes to the workspace plus the host temp area (the same backend-defined choice the Landlock rung makes); `read-only` grants nothing. See `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`.
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@

 以 profile 组合包形式交付的共享 dsh 核心：[`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) 在空的 profile 根之上插入全部基础插件行——模型适配器、工具、持久化、策略、settings／credentials、repository 插件、遥测——作为每个 profile 的 `dsh.profile.bundles` 列表中的第一层。后续的组合包层（例如 [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)）和用户 profile 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 按 id 覆盖这些行；patch 会替换目标行的整个 `config`，因此模式专属的值放在各模式组合包中，而不是这里。该包没有运行时 API；profile 组合器通过 manifest（元数据清单）的 `dsh.bundle.patch` 字段解析通用 patch，启动器在 win32 主机上通过代码读取下面的 Windows 平台层。

-启动交付 profile 的 Windows 主机还会额外收到 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用仅 POSIX 的受限栈——bash 执行器/工具、权限切换器（dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器）、sandbox/fs 策略栈与 approval 服务——并插入 PowerShell 执行器与工具（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`、`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`）以及不限权的 `dsh-fs-local`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此交付姿态是诚实的 danger-full-access，而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界；清单里没有任何动作需要审批，因此 approval 服务缺席。启动器在 win32 主机上把它应用于 bundle 层与用户层之间；偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 恢复 bash 栈（禁用 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`——两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）。POSIX 主机永远不会收到它。
+启动交付 profile 的 Windows 主机还会额外收到 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用仅 POSIX 的 bash 栈（`bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`），并插入沙盒受限的 PowerShell 栈（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`、`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`）。权限面与 POSIX 完全一致：`sandbox`/`sandbox-policy` 通过 Windows ACL 受限令牌 runner（`dsh-sandbox-local` 的 win32 链 → `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`）执行文件效果策略，权限切换器与 approval 服务原样运行，`fs-sandbox` 继续围栏 `ctx.fs` 写入——在其旁再挂载 `dsh-fs-local` 会重复注册 `ctx.fs` 并在加载时失败。启动器在 win32 主机上把该层应用于 bundle 层与用户层之间；偏好不限权本地 pwsh 执行器或完整访问的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖这些行（bash 恢复配方必须完整：禁用 `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`——两个执行器家族注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）。POSIX 主机永远不会收到它。

 行集合及其设计依据以行内注释写在 patch 文件里；[生成的组合图](../../../apps/cli/composition.md)负责渲染它。

@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@
 ## 已知限制与延期工作

 - **patch 会替换整行 `config`**：profile 覆盖必须重述该行需要保留的每个字段；不存在深度合并层。
- **Windows 上没有沙箱、没有 approval**：win32 上不存在 OS 级 runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此 Windows 平台层移除整个 sandbox 栈——`sandbox`/`sandbox-policy`/`fs-sandbox` 被禁用，由 `dsh-fs-local` 提供 `ctx.fs`——权限切换器离开清单，approval 服务也被禁用：Windows 上没有任何动作需要审批，模型也不会被告知审批存在。一切退化为 danger-full-access：shell 不限权，fs 工具也不做任何限权声明。
+- **Windows 的临时目录授权是真实 temp 目录**——`workspace-write` 把写入限制在工作区与宿主 temp 区域（与 Landlock 档位相同的后端定义选择）；`read-only` 不授予任何写入。见 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`。
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ describe('dsh-base bundle', () => {
    const inserted = parsed
      .flatMap(patch => patch.insert ?? [])
      .map(row => row.id)
-    expect(inserted).toEqual(['pwsh-sandbox', 'tool-pwsh', 'fs-local'])
+    expect(inserted).toEqual(['pwsh-sandbox', 'tool-pwsh'])
    // The patch no longer touches the permission/approval surface at all.
    expect(parsed.find(patch => patch.id === 'approval')).toBeUndefined()
    expect(parsed.find(patch => patch.id === 'permission')).toBeUndefined()
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@
 # stack is the SANDBOXED PowerShell executor plus the full permission
 # surface: sandbox/sandbox-policy enforce the file-effect policy, the
 # permission switcher and the approval service run exactly as on POSIX, and
-# fs-sandbox fences the in-process filesystem view. Only the POSIX bash
+# the fs row stays the base's sandboxed provider (fs-sandbox) — mounting
+# dsh-fs-local alongside it would double-register ctx.fs and fail the load.
+# Only the POSIX bash
 # stack (bash-sandbox/tool-bash) is disabled — bash has no Windows runner.
 # A Windows host that prefers the unconfined local pwsh executor or full
 # access overrides these rows through its profile or home cordis.patch.yml.
@@ -27,6 +29,3 @@

    - id: tool-pwsh
      name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh'
-
-    - id: fs-local
-      name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local'