Lifecycle and safety fixes from the external review:
- Observe abort while awaiting the initialize handshake, so a server that never
replies can't defeat the tool-timeout signal.
- On an aborted request the server won't cancel, tear the instance down after a
bounded grace instead of releasing the serialized queue with work still live
(prevents overlapping document lifecycles).
- Re-check provider disposal after the canonicalize/read awaits so a query can't
spawn an unowned server after disposeAll().
- Read the source through one open handle (stat + read on the same fd) to close
the realpath-vs-read TOCTOU; decode with a fatal UTF-8 decoder so a legitimate
U+FFFD is not misclassified as invalid.
- Validate and read the source BEFORE spawning a server (pre-start rejection).
- Require an explicit openClose for option-form textDocumentSync.
- Reject nonpositive teardown budgets and non-executable absolute commands at
load; surface unsupported operations as structured LSP_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
- Retain the stderr tail (fatal diagnostics land at exit), not the prefix.
- Catalog the seam vocabulary in docs/core-data-structures/lsp.md.
Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
Make Cordis construction and teardown ownership reentrancy-safe, then carry caller and provider ownership through reservation, setup, publication, quiescence, and sentinel retirement.
Stabilize registry carriers and factory/workflow boundaries, add adversarial lifecycle regressions, and align the rewritten RFC plus generated contracts with the enforced behavior.
Drain idle injection flushes before agent teardown, snapshot approval and subagent provider inputs, and gate subagent lifecycle events on real child readiness. Align the RFCs and generated contracts with the hardened behavior.
The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a
read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval
composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end —
config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned
header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user
notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and
both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs
confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the
fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model +
real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot
lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually
execute.
Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred
phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
dsh-bash grows the per-call policy carrier: BashExecRequest.sandboxMode
(request-optional, spec required-but-nullable — the owner pattern; resolve()
is the one explicit defaulting step) and the BashExecutor.sandboxMode
capability fact (undefined in the base class — composition truth the tool
layer can read). dsh-bash-local carries the field verbatim and confines
nothing.
dsh-bash-sandbox extends LocalBashExecutor and hands ctx.sandbox the exact
argv it is about to spawn. A denial is a RESULT FACT (the command RAN;
result.sandbox.denied is orthogonal to exitCode/signal), classified
conservatively against the wrap own dialect; a RUNNER failure outranks
denial — foreground re-throws the structured SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, a settled
background task stamps sandbox.runnerFailed — so a broken sandbox never
reads as a failing command and the command never runs unconfined.
dsh-tool-bash renders the markers and teaches the model not to retry around
a policy denial; escalation and per-session switching are staged follow-ups.
Dudu-0223
Tianyi Cui
Hypatia May
kingwl