Entry \disabled\ interpolation makes the launcher's separate platform layer unnecessary: the base bundle's cordis.patch.yml now gates both shell stacks on its own rows — bash-sandbox/tool-bash disable on win32, and their twins pwsh-sandbox/tool-pwsh mount only there with the inverted expression — so exactly one shell stack mounts per host from one shared patch file. windows.cordis.patch.yml and the launcher's windows-shell.ts injection (boot, live recomposition, config dumps) are deleted, with the workspace-constraints entry and the dsh-base exports/files entries following. The windows-shell spec pins the effective per-platform roster through the real bundle layers, and base.spec pins the four symmetric gates. The superseded active notes are updated and cross-linked; the loader note records the fold itself.
24 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
24 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base`
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English | [中文](README.zh.md)
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The shared dsh core as a profile bundle: [`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) inserts every base plugin row — model adapters, the shared [`agent-default-model`](../../core/agent-default-model/README.md) selection, tools, persistence, policy, settings/credentials, telemetry, and host-level subagent providers — over the empty profile root, as the first layer of every profile's `dsh.profile.bundles` list. Codex and Claude Code providers load dormant; Agent Presets independently decide whether their agent contributes either model-facing delegation tool. Later bundle layers (e.g. [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)) and the user's profile `cordis.patch.yml` override these rows by id; a patch replaces a row's whole `config`, so mode-specific values live in mode bundles, not here. The package has no runtime API; the profile composer resolves the patch through the `dsh.bundle.patch` manifest field, never through code.
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The patch gates both shell stacks by platform on its own rows: `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` carry `disabled: !!js process.platform === 'win32'` (bash has no Windows runner), and their twins `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` mount on win32 only with the inverted expression — one shared patch file, exactly one shell stack per host. The permission surface stays exactly as on POSIX: `sandbox`/`sandbox-policy` enforce the file-effect policy through the Windows ACL restricted-token runner (the win32 chain of `dsh-sandbox-local` → `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`), the permission switcher and the approval service run unchanged, and `fs-sandbox` keeps fencing `ctx.fs` writes — mounting `dsh-fs-local` alongside it would double-register `ctx.fs` and fail the load. A Windows host that prefers the unconfined local pwsh executor or full access overrides these rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` (the bash-restore recipe must be complete: disable `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` AND re-enable `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` — both executor families register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load). POSIX hosts see the pwsh rows disabled.
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The row set and its rationale are documented inline in the patch file; the [generated composition graph](../../../apps/cli/composition.md) renders it.
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## Model Experience
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Indirectly, through the inserted rows: this bundle selects the shipped persona-less prompt base, tool set, and DeepSeek adapter that mode bundles specialize, and contributes no model-visible text of its own.
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#### KV Cache effect
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None directly; each inserted row's package owns its effect.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **A patch replaces whole row configs** — profile overrides must restate every field a row keeps; there is no deep-merge layer.
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- **Claude's SDK platform CLI remains in the Profile install closure** — the base bundle depends on the Claude provider, whose production path resolves the host `claude`; removing the SDK's unused optional payload is deferred to the product installation-closure follow-up.
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- **The Windows temp grant is a private per-session subdirectory** — `workspace-write` confines writes to the workspace plus the session's own temp subdirectory (`<temp>\dsh-<hash>`, TMP/TEMP rewritten for confined children); `read-only` grants nothing. See `@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`.
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