kingwl
2dc62497ce
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
2.4 KiB
sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
The confinement half of the capability-seam split: an abstract provider interface, platform backends, and the shared policy home. Consumers hand ctx.sandbox the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; policy (SandboxPolicy: mode + workspace root) rides each call, so different consumers confine under different policies at the same instant. All product packages.
| Package | Role | ctx key |
|---|---|---|
sandbox/ |
Abstract process-sandbox seam (the SandboxProvider contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) plus the shared ESCALATION kit (approveEscalation, the strictly-wider ladder, the denial/hint markers) and the writableRoots derivation every enforcement dialect shares |
ctx.sandbox |
sandbox-local/ |
Local backends by platform chain: Linux bwrap else the landlock-run launcher (the npm-distributed node-addon-landlock-run family, built and released from its own repository), darwin sandbox-exec/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed |
(registers ctx.sandbox) |
sandbox-policy/ |
The policy home: the deployment default (mode + workspace-write boundary root) and the per-session sandbox/mode override (event + fold + write path). Both enforcing families read it, so bash and fs can never confine to different roots |
ctx.sandboxPolicy |
The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (ctx.bash, ctx.fs) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in the sandbox RFC.
Consumers today: bash/bash-sandbox (wraps ['bash', '-c', command] through ctx.sandbox) and fs/fs-sandbox (an in-process path fence, not an argv wrapper — reads ctx.sandboxPolicy and enforces the shared mode on write/edit). The cross-family boundary is the sandbox RFC's cross-family fs sandbox phase; the shared vocabulary lets both families teach the model one denial marker and one escalation flow.