kingwl
2dc62497ce
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
14 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
14 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
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The confinement half of the [capability-seam split](../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): an abstract provider interface, platform backends, and the shared policy home. Consumers hand `ctx.sandbox` the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; policy (`SandboxPolicy`: mode + workspace root) rides each call, so different consumers confine under different policies at the same instant. All **product** packages.
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| Package | Role | ctx key |
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| `sandbox/` | Abstract process-sandbox seam (the `SandboxProvider` contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) plus the shared ESCALATION kit (`approveEscalation`, the strictly-wider ladder, the denial/hint markers) and the `writableRoots` derivation every enforcement dialect shares | `ctx.sandbox` |
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| `sandbox-local/` | Local backends by platform chain: Linux `bwrap` else the `landlock-run` launcher (the npm-distributed [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) family, built and released from its own repository), darwin `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed | (registers `ctx.sandbox`) |
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| `sandbox-policy/` | The policy home: the deployment default (mode + `workspace-write` boundary root) and the per-session `sandbox/mode` override (event + fold + write path). Both enforcing families read it, so bash and fs can never confine to different roots | `ctx.sandboxPolicy` |
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The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in [the sandbox RFC](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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Consumers today: [`bash/bash-sandbox`](../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]` through `ctx.sandbox`) and [`fs/fs-sandbox`](../fs/fs-sandbox/) (an in-process path fence, not an argv wrapper — reads `ctx.sandboxPolicy` and enforces the shared mode on write/edit). The cross-family boundary is the sandbox RFC's [cross-family fs sandbox](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) phase; the shared vocabulary lets both families teach the model one denial marker and one escalation flow.
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