creatixchu
01d68dee4e
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host — open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain. The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence: Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl, tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.
27 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
27 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# @deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection
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English | [中文](README.zh.md)
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Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared api client + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the `AbstractApiClient` seam, and the loop's sink/config types. The platform subclasses (WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient), the ConnectionController loop, and the fixture data source are package-internal — apply selects and drives them; tests reach them via src. Contract: api-contracts v3 §3.
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## /api browser-trust fence
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The node half guards every request under `/api` before bridging (`src/api-request-trust.ts`): the `Host` header must be a loopback authority or an exact `host[:port]` entry from the plugin's `trustedHosts` config (DNS-rebinding defense), an attached `Origin` must equal that authority, and an explicit `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` marker is refused. Requests without browser markers (curl, tests, native clients) pass — without a browser there is no confused deputy. Failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch. A non-loopback (`--host 0.0.0.0`) deployment must therefore list the authorities it is reached by in `trustedHosts`; the fence is deliberately not an authentication layer — reachability policy stays with the webserver binding, and auth remains deferred work. Decision record: [the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
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## Keyless fixture
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Any `fixture` query parameter selects the in-memory carrier. `fixture=empty` starts with no Workspace or Session; `fixturePrompt=reject` rejects prompts before acceptance; `fixtureAttach=fail` publishes a Session but rejects its Workspace attachment; `fixtureSessionCreate=drop-response` publishes and frames a Session before dropping the create response; and `fixtureFrames=workspace-first` reverses the default session-first create-frame order. Workspace creation by name/path and caller-preallocated SessionIds remain deterministic enough for assembled Web tests to reconcile list and frame arrival.
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## Model Experience
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None, as the wire consumer layer moves already-composed messages between browser and host; nothing here reaches a model request.
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#### KV Cache effect
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None; this package neither assembles nor sends a provider request.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **history's implicit resume is arguable** — opening history on an unattached session pulls an agent up host-side; the pure-persistence-read alternative is recorded in the rt-core reconciliation ledger, unchanged in P-I. This package's consumers see it as latency on first open.
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- **`ToolEventView`/`ToolCallView`/`ToolResultView` re-exports are scheduled for removal** — they fall when the toolview migration deletes the host `viewFor` line (presentation belongs to the client); the fixture keeps a local `viewFor` mirror until then.
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