Harden XEdDSA unsigned-packet policy and add coverage (#10858)

Audit of the XEdDSA packet-signing implementation (#10478) surfaced several
issues in when unsigned packets are accepted on receive or emitted on send.
This fixes them and adds regression coverage.

- Unicast NodeInfo exchange no longer breaks against signer nodes: the
  NodeInfoModule downgrade drop is gated to broadcasts, since senders never
  sign unicast (want_response replies, directed exchanges).
- Replace the payload-size sign heuristic with an exact encoded-size gate
  (signedDataFits) and mirror it on the receive side, removing a dead band
  where 167-168 B broadcasts were signed then failed TOO_LARGE.
- Extract the receive policy into checkXeddsaReceivePolicy() and apply it to
  plaintext-MQTT decoded downlink, which previously skipped signature
  verification and downgrade protection entirely.
- Reject signatures whose length is neither 0 nor 64 as malformed, so a
  crafted partial signature can't inflate the size estimate and dodge the
  unsigned-downgrade drop.
- Hold cryptLock on the MQTT verify path (shared Ed25519 key cache).
- Clear any client-preset signature on packets we originate, on all builds.
- Randomized (hedged) signing per the Signal XEdDSA spec: bump the
  meshtastic/Crypto pin to the build where XEdDSA::sign mixes 32 bytes of
  caller randomness into the nonce as Z (meshtastic/Crypto#3), and seed those
  bytes in xeddsa_sign from HardwareRNG (checked, with a seeded-CSPRNG
  fallback). test_crypto pins that repeated signs differ and both verify.

Adds test coverage: test_packet_signing groups A-E (receive matrix, send
policy, NodeInfo backstop, encoding invariants, decoded-ingress policy),
test_mqtt end-to-end downlink cases, and a test_crypto randomization check.
This commit is contained in:
Ben Meadors
2026-07-02 11:48:58 -05:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by GitHub
parent d4db80ebb7
commit 0e84c1a827
19 changed files with 614 additions and 69 deletions
+4 -2
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ bool NodeInfoModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, mes
}
NodeNum sourceNum = getFrom(&mp);
const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(sourceNum);
if (node && nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node) && !mp.xeddsa_signed) {
LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned NodeInfo from node 0x%08x that previously signed", sourceNum);
// Broadcasts only: senders never sign unicast NodeInfo, so dropping it would break exchanges
// with signer nodes. Backstops ingress that skips Router's downgrade drop (e.g. decoded MQTT).
if (node && nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node) && !mp.xeddsa_signed && isBroadcast(mp.to)) {
LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned NodeInfo broadcast from node 0x%08x that previously signed", sourceNum);
return true;
}