Update MAX_SATELLITE_NODES and WARM_NODE_COUNT definitions for ESP32-S3 PSRAM support

- Delete unused clearNVS() (no callers; should have been removed in #10264).

- Move purgeIncompatibleBleBonds() after the "Init the NimBLE" log so bond-cleanup output doesn't appear to precede module init; it still runs before BLEDevice::init() reads the store.

.claude/settings.json

@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "python3 -c \"import json,sys,subprocess,shutil,os; f=json.load(sys.stdin).get('tool_input',{}).get('file_path',''); t=shutil.which('trunk') or os.path.expanduser('~/.cache/trunk/launcher/trunk'); f and os.path.exists(t) and subprocess.run([t,'fmt','--force',f],stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)\" 2>/dev/null || true",
-            "statusMessage": "Formatting..."
+            "command": "f=$(tr -d '\\n' | grep -o '\"file_path\"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*\"[^\"]*\"' | head -1 | sed 's/.*:[[:space:]]*\"//; s/\"$//'); [ -n \"$f\" ] && [ -f \"$f\" ] || exit 0; t=$(command -v trunk || echo \"$HOME/.cache/trunk/launcher/trunk\"); [ -x \"$t\" ] || { echo \"trunk-fmt hook: trunk not found; its launcher needs curl or wget to bootstrap the CLI (see 'Formatting & the trunk toolchain' in .github/copilot-instructions.md)\" >&2; exit 1; }; out=$(\"$t\" fmt --force \"$f\" 2>&1) || { echo \"trunk-fmt hook: trunk fmt failed on $f: $out\" >&2; exit 1; }",
+            "timeout": 120,
+            "statusMessage": "Formatting (trunk)..."
           }
         ]
       }

.github/copilot-instructions.md

@@ -191,7 +191,24 @@ Writers go through `setNodeStatus`, `updatePosition`, `updateTelemetry` (which d
 
 ### Eviction
 
-Every code path that drops a node from the header table must also evict the satellites. The single chokepoint is `eraseNodeSatellites(NodeNum)`; it's already called from `getOrCreateMeshNode`'s oldest-boring eviction, `removeNodeByNum`, both branches of `resetNodes`, `cleanupMeshDB`, `addFromContact`'s ignored-branch, and `AdminModule`'s `set_ignored_node`. Add new eviction sites here, not by calling `.erase()` directly.
+Every code path that drops a node from the header table must also evict the satellites. The single chokepoint is `eraseNodeSatellites(NodeNum)`; it's already called from `getOrCreateMeshNode`'s oldest-boring eviction, `demoteOldestHotNodesToWarm` (the over-cap warm-tier migration), `removeNodeByNum`, both branches of `resetNodes`, `cleanupMeshDB`, `addFromContact`'s ignored-branch, and `AdminModule`'s `set_ignored_node`. Add new eviction sites here, not by calling `.erase()` directly. (Note: `enforceSatelliteCaps`/`evictSatelliteOverCap` call `.erase()` directly on purpose — that's a satellite-only cap trim where the node _stays_ in the header, a different operation from this chokepoint.)
+
+### Warm tier (long-tail identity)
+
+On every arch except STM32WL and bare nRF52832 (`WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0`), a node evicted from the header table is not forgotten outright: `WarmNodeStore` (`src/mesh/WarmNodeStore.{h,cpp}`) keeps a 40 B `{num, last_heard, public_key}` record per evicted node — primarily so PKI DMs to/from a long-tail node keep decrypting without re-running a NodeInfo exchange (the rest of `NodeInfoLite` rebuilds from traffic in seconds).
+
+- **Write:** `getOrCreateMeshNode`'s eviction and `demoteOldestHotNodesToWarm` (the over-cap boot migration) call `warmStore.absorb(num, last_heard, key)` _before_ the node leaves the header.
+- **Read-back:** `getOrCreateMeshNode` calls `warmStore.take()` to rehydrate `last_heard` + key when a warm node is re-admitted; `copyPublicKey()` falls back to the warm tier so the PKI send path finds keys for evicted peers.
+- **Persistence:** nRF52840 uses a 12 KB raw-flash record-ring at `0xEA000` (below LittleFS; append + replay + compact-on-rotate, link-guarded by `nrf52840_s140_v7.ld` and `extra_scripts/nrf52_warm_region.py`). Everywhere else: a `/prefs/warm.dat` snapshot flushed by `saveIfDirty()` on the node-DB save cadence.
+- **Tunables** (`mesh-pb-constants.h`): `WARM_NODE_COUNT` (per-arch; `0` disables the tier) and `MAX_NUM_NODES` (hot cap — 120 on nRF52840/generic ESP32 to fit the 28 KB LittleFS; ESP32-S3 keeps its flash-scaled 100/200/250, portduino 250). Verbose migration/self-care tracing routes through `LOG_MIGRATION`, gated by `MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE`.
+
+### Satellite caps
+
+Only the freshest `MAX_SATELLITE_NODES` nodes keep satellite payloads; the rest of the header table carries just the `NodeInfoLite`. The cap is **per-platform**: 40 on RAM-constrained parts (nRF52840, generic ESP32) since the four maps live in internal SRAM (not PSRAM, ~408 B/node across the four), and 250 on flash-rich hosts (ESP32-S3, portduino) so every hot node can carry rich data as before the cap existed. `enforceSatelliteCaps()` trims each map to the cap on load (returns whether it trimmed); `evictSatelliteOverCap()` trims before each insert. Eviction is by the owning node's hot `last_heard` (stalest first, demoted/absent nodes rank as `last_heard==0`); self is never trimmed.
+
+### On-boot self-care
+
+`NodeDB::nodeDBSelfCare()` runs once identity is established (the constructor after key (re)gen, and `reloadFromDisk()` — _not_ inside `loadFromDisk`, where `getNodeNum()` is still 0). It confirms self is present (warns if a non-empty DB is missing us — a foreign/over-cap file), pins self to index 0, demotes/trims only **non-self** overflow into the warm tier, then rewrites `nodes.proto` **once** and only if it healed something — and never while encrypted storage is locked (it would persist placeholder defaults). `loadFromDisk` deliberately leaves the loaded store untrimmed for this pass.
 
 ### Sync flow: thin NodeInfo + post-COMPLETE_ID replay (no opt-in)
 
@@ -283,6 +300,15 @@ firmware/
 
 ## Coding Conventions
 
+### Formatting & the trunk toolchain
+
+`trunk fmt` is the project formatter (`trunk_check` CI rejects unformatted code). For Claude Code users, `.claude/settings.json` ships a PostToolUse hook that runs `trunk fmt --force` on every file the agent writes or edits. The hook is pure sh/grep/sed — no python or jq required — but trunk itself must be able to run:
+
+- Trunk's launcher (`~/.cache/trunk/launcher/trunk`, or `trunk` on PATH) downloads the CLI version pinned in `.trunk/trunk.yaml` on first use and again whenever that pin is bumped. **The launcher needs `curl` or `wget`**; without one it fails with "Cannot download… please install curl or wget", and the hook surfaces that as a warning on every write.
+- No curl/wget available (e.g. a minimal WSL image)? Bootstrap by hand with any Python (PlatformIO bundles one at `~/.platformio/penv/bin/python`): download `https://trunk.io/releases/<ver>/trunk-<ver>-linux-x86_64.tar.gz` and place the `trunk` binary at `~/.cache/trunk/cli/<ver>-linux-x86_64/trunk` (chmod +x), where `<ver>` is the `cli.version` from `.trunk/trunk.yaml`.
+- The hook fails loudly by design (visible warning, non-blocking). Silent no-op formatting hooks hide real breakage — don't re-add `2>/dev/null || true` around the whole thing.
+- More generally: don't assume a stock Linux userland in hooks or helper scripts — minimal WSL/container images may lack `python3`, `curl`, `wget`, and `jq`. Prefer plain sh + coreutils, or PlatformIO's bundled Python for anything heavier.
+
 ### General Style
 
 - Follow existing code style - run `trunk fmt` before commits

.github/workflows/flasher-link-comment.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+name: Post Web Flasher Link Comment
+
+on:
+  workflow_run:
+    workflows: [CI]
+    types: [completed]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+  actions: read
+
+jobs:
+  post-flasher-link:
+    if: >
+      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request' &&
+      github.event.workflow_run.conclusion != 'cancelled' &&
+      github.repository == 'meshtastic/firmware'
+    continue-on-error: true
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      # Per-board manifests carry the firmware's own metadata (activelySupported,
+      # displayName, ...) generated from each target's custom_meshtastic_* config.
+      - name: Download board manifests
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
+        continue-on-error: true
+        with:
+          github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
+          pattern: manifest-*
+          path: ./manifests
+          merge-multiple: true
+
+      - name: Post or update web flasher link comment
+        uses: actions/github-script@v8
+        with:
+          script: |
+            const marker = '<!-- web-flasher-link -->';
+            const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
+            const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
+
+            // Resolve the PR by matching the run's head SHA against the repo's open
+            // PRs. workflow_run.pull_requests is empty for fork PRs, and
+            // listPullRequestsAssociatedWithCommit won't return an open fork PR by
+            // its head commit — but pulls.list includes fork PRs. Matching on head
+            // SHA also enforces that the run is for the PR's current commit, so stale
+            // re-runs of an outdated commit won't match.
+            const openPrs = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.list, {
+              owner, repo, state: 'open', per_page: 100,
+            });
+            const pr = openPrs.find((p) => p.head.sha === run.head_sha);
+            if (!pr) {
+              core.info(`No open pull request matches commit ${run.head_sha}; skipping.`);
+              return;
+            }
+            const prNumber = pr.number;
+
+            // Restrict to trusted authors. NOTE: author_association is computed for
+            // the GITHUB_TOKEN, which cannot see *private/concealed* org memberships —
+            // those members come back as CONTRIBUTOR, not MEMBER. So gating on MEMBER
+            // alone silently excludes most maintainers. We allow the trusted set the
+            // token can actually identify (members, collaborators, and anyone with a
+            // previously merged PR). For strict members-only you'd need an org-read
+            // App/PAT token to call orgs.checkMembershipForUser.
+            const allowedAssociations = ['OWNER', 'MEMBER', 'COLLABORATOR', 'CONTRIBUTOR'];
+            if (!allowedAssociations.includes(pr.author_association)) {
+              core.info(`Author association ${pr.author_association} is not trusted; skipping.`);
+              return;
+            }
+
+            // Require at least one per-arch firmware artifact from gather-artifacts
+            const artifacts = await github.paginate(github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts, {
+              owner, repo, run_id: run.id, per_page: 100,
+            });
+            const archRe = /^firmware-(esp32|esp32s3|esp32c3|esp32c6|nrf52840|rp2040|rp2350|stm32)-(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.[0-9a-f]+)$/;
+            const archArtifacts = artifacts.filter((a) => archRe.test(a.name) && !a.expired);
+            if (archArtifacts.length === 0) {
+              core.info('No per-arch firmware artifacts found; skipping.');
+              return;
+            }
+
+            const version = archRe.exec(archArtifacts[0].name)[2];
+            const expiresAt = archArtifacts[0].expires_at
+              ? new Date(archArtifacts[0].expires_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10)
+              : null;
+
+            // Read each built board's manifest (.mt.json). activelySupported,
+            // displayName and architecture come straight from the board's
+            // custom_meshtastic_* platformio config, so the list is in sync with
+            // the firmware itself — no external device database needed.
+            const fs = require('fs');
+            let boards = [];
+            try {
+              boards = fs.readdirSync('./manifests')
+                .filter((f) => f.endsWith('.mt.json'))
+                .map((f) => {
+                  try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(`./manifests/${f}`, 'utf8')); }
+                  catch { return null; }
+                })
+                .filter((m) => m && m.activelySupported === true && m.platformioTarget)
+                .map((m) => ({
+                  board: m.platformioTarget,
+                  platform: m.architecture || '',
+                  // displayName is maintainer-authored text; escape table-breaking pipes
+                  displayName: String(m.displayName || m.platformioTarget).replace(/\|/g, '\\|'),
+                  image: Array.isArray(m.images) && m.images[0] ? String(m.images[0]) : '',
+                }))
+                .sort((a, b) => a.board.localeCompare(b.board));
+            } catch (e) {
+              core.warning(`Could not read board manifests: ${e.message}`);
+            }
+
+            const flasherUrl = `https://flasher.meshtastic.org/?pr=${prNumber}`;
+            // Device illustrations are served by the flasher from the same image
+            // names the manifest declares (custom_meshtastic_images). The flasher
+            // serves its SPA shell (HTML, 200) for unknown paths, so confirm each
+            // image really resolves to an image before linking it.
+            const imageBase = 'https://flasher.meshtastic.org/img/devices/';
+            await Promise.all(boards.map(async (b) => {
+              if (!b.image) return;
+              try {
+                const res = await fetch(`${imageBase}${encodeURIComponent(b.image)}`);
+                const type = res.headers.get('content-type') || '';
+                if (!res.ok || !type.startsWith('image/')) b.image = '';
+              } catch { b.image = ''; }
+            }));
+
+            const boardLines = boards
+              .map((b) => {
+                const img = b.image ? `<img src="${imageBase}${encodeURIComponent(b.image)}" alt="" height="34">` : '';
+                return `| ${img} | ${b.displayName} | [\`${b.board}\`](${flasherUrl}&device=${encodeURIComponent(b.board)}) | ${b.platform} |`;
+              })
+              .join('\n');
+
+            // Shields.io badges. Only non-user-controlled, charset-constrained values
+            // (version, commit sha, counts, dates) go into badge URLs — never board
+            // names or the PR title — so the rendered comment cannot be spoofed.
+            const shieldText = (s) =>
+              encodeURIComponent(String(s).replace(/-/g, '--').replace(/_/g, '__').replace(/ /g, '_'));
+            const shield = (label, message, color) =>
+              `https://img.shields.io/badge/${shieldText(label)}-${shieldText(message)}-${color}`;
+            const buttonUrl =
+              `https://img.shields.io/badge/${shieldText('Flash this PR in the Web Flasher')}-2C2D3C?style=for-the-badge`;
+            const badges = [
+              `![firmware](${shield('firmware', version, '67EA94')})`,
+              `![commit](${shield('commit', run.head_sha.slice(0, 7), '2C2D3C')})`,
+              `![boards](${shield('boards', boards.length, '5C6BC0')})`,
+            ];
+            if (expiresAt) badges.push(`![expires](${shield('expires', expiresAt, '9A4E00')})`);
+
+            // Only render the board table when there are supported boards to list
+            const boardTable = boards.length > 0 ? [
+              `<details><summary>Supported boards built by this PR (${boards.length})</summary>`,
+              '',
+              '| | Device | Board | Platform |',
+              '| --- | --- | --- | --- |',
+              boardLines,
+              '',
+              '</details>',
+              '',
+            ] : [];
+
+            const body = [
+              marker,
+              '## ⚡ Try this PR in the Web Flasher',
+              '',
+              `[![Flash this PR in the Web Flasher](${buttonUrl})](${flasherUrl})`,
+              '',
+              badges.join(' '),
+              '',
+              '> [!WARNING]',
+              '> This is an automated, unreviewed CI test build. Back up your device configuration',
+              '> before flashing, and only flash devices you are able to recover.',
+              '',
+              ...boardTable,
+              `*Build artifacts expire${expiresAt ? ` on ${expiresAt}` : ' after 30 days'}. Updated for \`${run.head_sha.slice(0, 7)}\`.*`,
+            ].join('\n');
+
+            // Sticky comment: update in place when the marker is found
+            const comments = await github.paginate(github.rest.issues.listComments, {
+              owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, per_page: 100,
+            });
+            const existing = comments.find((c) => c.body?.includes(marker));
+            if (existing) {
+              await github.rest.issues.updateComment({ owner, repo, comment_id: existing.id, body });
+            } else {
+              await github.rest.issues.createComment({ owner, repo, issue_number: prNumber, body });
+            }

.github/workflows/flasher-link-placeholder.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+name: Post Web Flasher Build Placeholder
+
+# Drops an immediate "build in progress" comment when a PR opens, so the web
+# flasher entry shows up right away. The real CI-driven workflow
+# (flasher-link-comment.yml) later replaces it in place via the shared marker.
+#
+# SECURITY: this uses pull_request_target (write token, runs for fork PRs) but is
+# safe because it never checks out or runs PR code and posts a fully static body
+# — no PR title, branch name, or other untrusted input is used anywhere.
+
+on:
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  post-placeholder:
+    if: github.repository == 'meshtastic/firmware'
+    continue-on-error: true
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Post web flasher build-in-progress placeholder
+        uses: actions/github-script@v8
+        with:
+          script: |
+            const marker = '<!-- web-flasher-link -->';
+            const { owner, repo } = context.repo;
+            const pr = context.payload.pull_request;
+
+            // Trusted authors only (matches the real workflow). author_association
+            // can't reflect private org membership for the token, so concealed
+            // members appear as CONTRIBUTOR — include it, or maintainers are excluded.
+            const allowedAssociations = ['OWNER', 'MEMBER', 'COLLABORATOR', 'CONTRIBUTOR'];
+            if (!allowedAssociations.includes(pr.author_association)) {
+              core.info(`Author association ${pr.author_association} is not trusted; skipping.`);
+              return;
+            }
+
+            // Only seed a placeholder when no flasher comment exists yet — never
+            // overwrite a real (or existing placeholder) comment.
+            const comments = await github.paginate(github.rest.issues.listComments, {
+              owner, repo, issue_number: pr.number, per_page: 100,
+            });
+            if (comments.some((c) => c.body?.includes(marker))) {
+              core.info('Flasher comment already exists; nothing to do.');
+              return;
+            }
+
+            const body = [
+              marker,
+              '## ⚡ Try this PR in the Web Flasher',
+              '',
+              '> [!NOTE]',
+              '> Building this pull request… the flash button, badges and supported-board',
+              '> list will appear here automatically once CI finishes.',
+            ].join('\n');
+
+            await github.rest.issues.createComment({
+              owner, repo, issue_number: pr.number, body,
+            });

.github/workflows/main_matrix.yml

@@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ jobs:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
         check: ${{ fromJson(needs.setup.outputs.check) }}
-    # Use 'arctastic' self-hosted runner pool when checking in the main repo
-    runs-on: ${{ github.repository_owner == 'meshtastic' && 'arctastic' || 'ubuntu-latest' }}
+    # Runs on GitHub-hosted runners so checks don't compete with builds for the
+    # self-hosted 'arctastic' pool (which builds use).
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     if: ${{ github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' && github.repository == 'meshtastic/firmware' }}
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -286,11 +287,11 @@ jobs:
             --limit 1 --json databaseId --jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
           if [ -n "$RUN_ID" ]; then
             ARTIFACT_NAME=$(gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${RUN_ID}/artifacts" \
-              --jq '.artifacts[] | select(.name | startswith("firmware-sizes-")) | .name' | head -1)
+              --jq '.artifacts[] | select(.name | startswith("firmware-sizes-")) | select(.expired == false) | .name' | head -1)
             if [ -n "$ARTIFACT_NAME" ]; then
               gh run download "$RUN_ID" -R "${{ github.repository }}" \
                 --name "$ARTIFACT_NAME" --dir ./baseline-develop/
-              cp "./baseline-develop/${ARTIFACT_NAME}/current-sizes.json" ./develop-sizes.json
+              cp "./baseline-develop/current-sizes.json" ./develop-sizes.json
               echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
             else
               echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -311,11 +312,11 @@ jobs:
             --limit 1 --json databaseId --jq '.[0].databaseId // empty')
           if [ -n "$RUN_ID" ]; then
             ARTIFACT_NAME=$(gh api "repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${RUN_ID}/artifacts" \
-              --jq '.artifacts[] | select(.name | startswith("firmware-sizes-")) | .name' | head -1)
+              --jq '.artifacts[] | select(.name | startswith("firmware-sizes-")) | select(.expired == false) | .name' | head -1)
             if [ -n "$ARTIFACT_NAME" ]; then
               gh run download "$RUN_ID" -R "${{ github.repository }}" \
                 --name "$ARTIFACT_NAME" --dir ./baseline-master/
-              cp "./baseline-master/${ARTIFACT_NAME}/current-sizes.json" ./master-sizes.json
+              cp "./baseline-master/current-sizes.json" ./master-sizes.json
               echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
             else
               echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

.github/workflows/test_native.yml

@@ -37,13 +37,33 @@ jobs:
           sed -i -e "s#${PWD}#.#" coverage_base.info # Make paths relative.
 
       - name: Integration test
+        # Cap the whole step: if the simulator ever fails to exit (e.g. the
+        # exit_simulator admin path regresses again) the job must fail fast,
+        # not run to GitHub's 6-hour limit.
+        timeout-minutes: 5
         run: |
           .pio/build/coverage/meshtasticd -s &
           PID=$!
+          trap 'kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT
           timeout 20 bash -c "until ls -al /proc/$PID/fd | grep socket; do sleep 1; done"
           echo "Simulator started, launching python test..."
           python3 -c 'from meshtastic.test import testSimulator; testSimulator()'
-          wait
+          # The Python harness sends exit_simulator and exits; the simulator is
+          # expected to terminate on its own. Give it a moment, then verify.
+          # If it is still alive the exit handshake is broken — fail loudly and
+          # do NOT fall through to `wait`, which would otherwise block until the
+          # job's hard timeout.
+          for i in $(seq 1 10); do
+            kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null || break
+            sleep 1
+          done
+          if kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; then
+            echo "::error title=Simulator did not exit::meshtasticd ignored exit_simulator and is still running after the integration test. The exit_simulator admin path is broken (see AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf, ARCH_PORTDUINO bypass). Killing it to avoid a 6-hour CI overrun."
+            kill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+            wait "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          wait "$PID" 2>/dev/null || true
 
       - name: Capture coverage information
         if: always() # run this step even if previous step failed
@@ -141,6 +161,14 @@ jobs:
           name: platformio-test-report-${{ steps.version.outputs.long }}
           merge-multiple: true
 
+      - name: Drop no-status testsuites from the report
+        # PlatformIO emits a self-closing <testsuite tests="0"/> row for every test_* dir
+        # crossed with every hardware variant it cannot run on the native host (~4900 rows).
+        # They carry no pass/fail/skip status and bury the suites that actually ran. Strip
+        # them so the Test Report lists only suites with a real status. Only the copy the
+        # reporter renders is trimmed; the uploaded artifact keeps the full XML.
+        run: sed -i -E 's#<testsuite [^>]*tests="0"[^>]*/>##g' testreport.xml
+
       - name: Test Report
         uses: dorny/test-reporter@v3.0.0
         with:

AGENTS.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Key rotation to never trigger casually: only the **full** factory reset (`factor
 - **One MCP call per serial port at a time.** The port lock is exclusive; concurrent calls deadlock. Sequence: open → read/mutate → close, then next device.
 - **`userPrefs.jsonc` is session state during tests.** The `_session_userprefs` fixture snapshots + restores it; never edit it from inside a test.
 - **Don't speculate about firmware root causes.** When evidence doesn't support a classification, say "unknown" and list what would disambiguate.
-- **Run `trunk fmt` before proposing a commit.** The `trunk_check` CI gate will reject unformatted code.
+- **Run `trunk fmt` before proposing a commit.** The `trunk_check` CI gate will reject unformatted code. Claude Code runs it automatically via the PostToolUse hook in `.claude/settings.json`; trunk's launcher needs `curl` or `wget` to bootstrap its pinned CLI — see **Formatting & the trunk toolchain** in `.github/copilot-instructions.md` for the no-curl bootstrap procedure.
 - **`confirm=True` on destructive MCP tools is a real gate, not a formality.** Don't bypass it via auto-approve settings.
 - **Keep code comments minimal — one or two lines, max.** Comment only when the _why_ isn't obvious from the code; never restate what the next line does. No multi-paragraph block comments explaining straightforward changes. The diff and commit message carry the rationale; the code carries the behavior.
 - **Use `Throttle` for time-based rate limiting, not raw `millis()` math.** `src/mesh/Throttle.h` provides `Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(lastMs, intervalMs)` (returns true while inside the cooldown) and `Throttle::execute(&lastMs, intervalMs, func)` (function-pointer form that updates the timestamp on fire). Use these for any "did N ms pass since X" check — raw `millis() > lastMs + N` is rollover-unsafe (breaks after ~49.7 days) and inconsistent with the rest of the codebase. The helpers compute `now - lastMs` with unsigned subtraction, which wraps correctly.

SECURITY.md

@@ -10,3 +10,35 @@
 ## Reporting a Vulnerability
 
 We support the private reporting of potential security vulnerabilities. Please go to the Security tab to file a report with a description of the potential vulnerability and reproduction scripts (preferred) or steps, and our developers will review.
+
+Before filing, please read the Security Model below. Behavior whose only precondition is local API access to a node, or possession of a channel's pre-shared key, is intended by design and is not considered a vulnerability.
+
+## Security Model
+
+Meshtastic is an off-grid mesh protocol that runs on constrained microcontrollers within a 256 byte LoRa packet limit. These constraints shape its security design and rule out the heavier schemes used by IP-based protocols. This section summarizes what the firmware protects, the assumptions it rests on, and its known limits. Fuller write-ups are in the documentation:
+
+- Encryption overview: https://meshtastic.org/docs/overview/encryption/
+- Technical reference: https://meshtastic.org/docs/development/reference/encryption-technical/
+- Known limitations and future work: https://meshtastic.org/docs/about/overview/encryption/limitations/
+
+### Cryptographic mechanisms
+
+- Channels are encrypted with a pre-shared key (PSK) using AES256-CTR. Channel traffic is encrypted but not authenticated, so anyone holding the PSK can read channel messages and can send messages as any node on that channel.
+- Direct messages and admin messages use public key cryptography (x25519 key exchange with AES-CCM), providing confidentiality, authentication, and integrity between nodes on 2.5.0 or newer that have exchanged keys.
+- Admin sessions use short-lived session IDs to limit replay of control messages.
+
+### Local trust boundary
+
+A client connected to a node over Bluetooth, USB serial, WiFi, or Ethernet has full local API access. From that connection it can read decrypted traffic, send messages as the node, change configuration (subject to managed mode), and read the node's private key for backup. This is intended behavior. The firmware trusts the local link the same way a phone or laptop trusts a directly attached device, and anything within reach of that connection (a shared LAN, a USB cable to an untrusted host, a paired phone) should be treated as part of the node itself.
+
+### Node identity (Trust On First Use)
+
+There is no central authority to sign node keys. The first public key a node hears for a given node number is the one it binds to that node number, a Trust On First Use (TOFU) model that is a hard requirement of a decentralized mesh. Clients and firmware reduce the impact of this by keeping favorited nodes from rolling out of the node database and by flagging public-key changes in the client UI.
+
+Firmware 2.8.X adds XEdDSA packet signing to further secure node identity claims and the authenticity of subsequent messages. It reuses each node's existing x25519 key pair to produce signatures, so a receiver can verify that a packet came from the holder of the bound key. Once a node has been seen signing, unsigned packets claiming that identity can be rejected.
+
+### Known limitations
+
+- No perfect forward secrecy. Traffic captured today can be decrypted later if a key is compromised, for example through a lost node or a mishandled channel key.
+- Channel messages are not authenticated, as noted above. Although as of 2.8, channel messages will be xedDSA signed as a means of verification that is non-breaking.
+- Setting WiFi credentials, or performing any other local administration, on an ESP32 over an untrusted network exposes that traffic, including the credentials, to the network. Provision and administer nodes over a trusted channel instead: Bluetooth, USB serial, or remote admin over the mesh. There is no current roadmap item to secure local administration over untrusted WiFi, though it may be addressed in a future release.

bin/eth-ota-upload.py

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Meshtastic Ethernet OTA Upload Tool
+
+Uploads firmware to RP2350-based Meshtastic devices via Ethernet (W5500).
+Compresses firmware with GZIP and sends it over TCP using the MOTA protocol.
+Authenticates using SHA256 challenge-response with a pre-shared key (PSK).
+
+Usage:
+    python bin/eth-ota-upload.py --host 192.168.1.100 firmware.bin
+    python bin/eth-ota-upload.py --host 192.168.1.100 --psk mySecretKey firmware.bin
+    python bin/eth-ota-upload.py --host 192.168.1.100 --psk-hex 6d65736874... firmware.bin
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import gzip
+import hashlib
+import socket
+import struct
+import sys
+import time
+
+# Default PSK matching the firmware default: "meshtastic_ota_default_psk_v1!!!"
+DEFAULT_PSK = b"meshtastic_ota_default_psk_v1!!!"
+
+
+def crc32(data: bytes) -> int:
+    """Compute CRC32 matching ErriezCRC32 (standard CRC32 with final XOR)."""
+    import binascii
+
+    return binascii.crc32(data) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+
+
+def load_firmware(path: str) -> bytes:
+    """Load firmware file, compressing with GZIP if not already compressed."""
+    # Reject UF2 files — OTA requires raw .bin firmware
+    if path.lower().endswith(".uf2"):
+        bin_path = path.rsplit(".", 1)[0] + ".bin"
+        print(f"ERROR: UF2 files cannot be used for OTA updates.")
+        print(f"       The Updater/picoOTA expects raw .bin firmware.")
+        print(f"       Try: {bin_path}")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    with open(path, "rb") as f:
+        data = f.read()
+
+    # Check if already GZIP compressed (magic bytes 1f 8b)
+    if data[:2] == b"\x1f\x8b":
+        print(f"Firmware already GZIP compressed: {len(data):,} bytes")
+        return data
+
+    print(f"Firmware raw size: {len(data):,} bytes")
+    compressed = gzip.compress(data, compresslevel=9)
+    ratio = len(compressed) / len(data) * 100
+    print(f"GZIP compressed: {len(compressed):,} bytes ({ratio:.1f}%)")
+    return compressed
+
+
+def authenticate(sock: socket.socket, psk: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Perform SHA256 challenge-response authentication with the device."""
+    # Receive 32-byte nonce from server
+    nonce = b""
+    while len(nonce) < 32:
+        chunk = sock.recv(32 - len(nonce))
+        if not chunk:
+            print("ERROR: Connection closed during authentication")
+            return False
+        nonce += chunk
+
+    # Compute SHA256(nonce || PSK)
+    h = hashlib.sha256()
+    h.update(nonce)
+    h.update(psk)
+    response = h.digest()
+
+    # Send 32-byte response
+    sock.sendall(response)
+
+    # Wait for auth result (1 byte)
+    result = sock.recv(1)
+    if not result:
+        print("ERROR: No authentication response")
+        return False
+
+    if result[0] == 0x06:  # ACK
+        print("Authentication successful.")
+        return True
+    elif result[0] == 0x07:  # OTA_ERR_AUTH
+        print("ERROR: Authentication failed — wrong PSK")
+        return False
+    else:
+        print(f"ERROR: Unexpected auth response 0x{result[0]:02X}")
+        return False
+
+
+def upload_firmware(host: str, port: int, firmware: bytes, psk: bytes, timeout: float) -> bool:
+    """Upload firmware over TCP using the MOTA protocol with PSK authentication."""
+    fw_crc = crc32(firmware)
+    fw_size = len(firmware)
+
+    print(f"Connecting to {host}:{port}...")
+    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    sock.settimeout(timeout)
+
+    try:
+        sock.connect((host, port))
+        print("Connected.")
+
+        # Step 1: Authenticate
+        print("Authenticating...")
+        if not authenticate(sock, psk):
+            return False
+
+        # Step 2: Send 12-byte MOTA header: magic(4) + size(4) + crc32(4)
+        header = struct.pack("<4sII", b"MOTA", fw_size, fw_crc)
+        sock.sendall(header)
+        print(f"Header sent: size={fw_size:,}, CRC32=0x{fw_crc:08X}")
+
+        # Wait for ACK (1 byte)
+        ack = sock.recv(1)
+        if not ack or ack[0] != 0x06:
+            error_codes = {
+                0x02: "Size error",
+                0x04: "Invalid magic",
+                0x05: "Update.begin() failed",
+            }
+            code = ack[0] if ack else 0xFF
+            msg = error_codes.get(code, f"Unknown error 0x{code:02X}")
+            print(f"ERROR: Server rejected header: {msg}")
+            return False
+
+        print("Header accepted. Uploading firmware...")
+
+        # Send firmware in 1KB chunks
+        chunk_size = 1024
+        sent = 0
+        start_time = time.time()
+
+        while sent < fw_size:
+            end = min(sent + chunk_size, fw_size)
+            chunk = firmware[sent:end]
+            sock.sendall(chunk)
+            sent = end
+
+            # Progress bar
+            pct = sent * 100 // fw_size
+            bar_len = 40
+            filled = bar_len * sent // fw_size
+            bar = "█" * filled + "░" * (bar_len - filled)
+            elapsed = time.time() - start_time
+            speed = sent / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0
+            sys.stdout.write(f"\r  [{bar}] {pct:3d}% {sent:,}/{fw_size:,} ({speed/1024:.1f} KB/s)")
+            sys.stdout.flush()
+
+        elapsed = time.time() - start_time
+        print(f"\n  Transfer complete in {elapsed:.1f}s")
+
+        # Wait for final result (1 byte)
+        print("Waiting for verification...")
+        result = sock.recv(1)
+        if not result:
+            print("ERROR: No response from device")
+            return False
+
+        result_codes = {
+            0x00: "OK — Update staged, device rebooting",
+            0x01: "CRC mismatch",
+            0x02: "Size error",
+            0x03: "Write error",
+            0x04: "Magic mismatch",
+            0x05: "Updater.begin() failed",
+            0x07: "Auth failed",
+            0x08: "Timeout",
+        }
+        code = result[0]
+        msg = result_codes.get(code, f"Unknown result 0x{code:02X}")
+
+        if code == 0x00:
+            print(f"SUCCESS: {msg}")
+            return True
+        else:
+            print(f"ERROR: {msg}")
+            return False
+
+    except socket.timeout:
+        print("ERROR: Connection timed out")
+        return False
+    except ConnectionRefusedError:
+        print(f"ERROR: Connection refused by {host}:{port}")
+        return False
+    except OSError as e:
+        print(f"ERROR: {e}")
+        return False
+    finally:
+        sock.close()
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Upload firmware to Meshtastic RP2350 devices via Ethernet OTA"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("firmware", help="Path to firmware .bin or .bin.gz file")
+    parser.add_argument("--host", required=True, help="Device IP address")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--port", type=int, default=4243, help="OTA port (default: 4243)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--timeout",
+        type=float,
+        default=60.0,
+        help="Socket timeout in seconds (default: 60)",
+    )
+    psk_group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
+    psk_group.add_argument(
+        "--psk",
+        type=str,
+        help="Pre-shared key as UTF-8 string (default: meshtastic_ota_default_psk_v1!!!)",
+    )
+    psk_group.add_argument(
+        "--psk-hex",
+        type=str,
+        help="Pre-shared key as hex string (e.g., 6d65736874...)",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    # Resolve PSK
+    if args.psk:
+        psk = args.psk.encode("utf-8")
+    elif args.psk_hex:
+        try:
+            psk = bytes.fromhex(args.psk_hex)
+        except ValueError:
+            print("ERROR: Invalid hex string for --psk-hex")
+            sys.exit(1)
+    else:
+        psk = DEFAULT_PSK
+
+    print("Meshtastic Ethernet OTA Upload")
+    print("=" * 40)
+
+    firmware = load_firmware(args.firmware)
+
+    if upload_firmware(args.host, args.port, firmware, psk, args.timeout):
+        print("\nDevice is rebooting with new firmware.")
+        sys.exit(0)
+    else:
+        print("\nUpload failed.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

bin/org.meshtastic.meshtasticd.metainfo.xml

@@ -87,12 +87,6 @@
   </screenshots>
 
   <releases>
-    <release version="2.7.26" date="2026-06-10">
-      <url type="details">https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/releases?q=tag%3Av2.7.26</url>
-    </release>
-    <release version="2.7.25" date="2026-05-23">
-      <url type="details">https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/releases?q=tag%3Av2.7.25</url>
-    </release>
     <release version="2.7.24" date="2026-05-08">
       <url type="details">https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/releases?q=tag%3Av2.7.24</url>
     </release>

bin/run-tests.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Run native PlatformIO unit tests and emit a single, unambiguous RED/AMBER/GREEN verdict.
+#
+# Why this exists: PlatformIO reports failures three different ways ([FAILED], :FAIL:,
+# [ERRORED]) and an all-pass run prints "N succeeded" with NO "0 failed" clause — so naive
+# greps produce false greens (see .notes/test-passfail-filter.md). This script encodes the
+# correct logic once, and cross-checks the number of suites that actually ran against the
+# canonical set in test/ so a suite silently going missing shows up as AMBER, not green.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./bin/run-tests.sh                      # run all suites, full RAG + count cross-check
+#   ./bin/run-tests.sh -f test_utf8         # run one suite (no count cross-check)
+#   ./bin/run-tests.sh -e native            # override env (default: coverage)
+#   ./bin/run-tests.sh --quiet              # only print the final RESULT line
+#
+# Exit codes: 0 = GREEN, 1 = RED, 2 = AMBER.
+#
+# The final line is machine-readable, e.g.:
+#   RESULT: GREEN 19/19 suites passed
+#   RESULT: AMBER 17/19 suites ran (missing: test_radio test_serial) — all that ran passed
+#   RESULT: RED test_traffic_management: 1 failed  (or: build/crash error)
+#   RESULT: RED sanitizer fault — SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 1272 byte(s) leaked  (tests may have
+#           all passed; the coverage build aborts at exit on an ASan/LSan fault — often shown only
+#           as [ERRORED]/SIGHUP. The script names it and points at running the binary bare.)
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$ROOT_DIR"
+
+ENV="coverage"
+FILTER=""
+QUIET=false
+PASSTHRU=()
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+	case "$1" in
+	-f)
+		FILTER="$2"
+		PASSTHRU+=("-f" "$2")
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	-e)
+		ENV="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	--quiet)
+		QUIET=true
+		shift
+		;;
+	*)
+		PASSTHRU+=("$1")
+		shift
+		;;
+	esac
+done
+
+# Locate pio (PATH, then the standard PlatformIO venv).
+PIO="$(command -v pio || command -v platformio || echo "$HOME/.platformio/penv/bin/pio")"
+if [[ ! -x $PIO ]] && ! command -v "$PIO" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo "RESULT: RED pio not found (looked in PATH and ~/.platformio/penv/bin)"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+LOG="$(mktemp -t meshtest.XXXXXX.log)"
+MARKER=""
+PROGRESS_PID=""
+trap 'rm -f "$LOG" "${MARKER:-}"; [[ -n ${PROGRESS_PID:-} ]] && kill "$PROGRESS_PID" 2>/dev/null' EXIT
+
+# Canonical suite set = the directories in test/. This is the source of truth for
+# "what should run"; a filtered run only expects its filtered suite.
+mapfile -t ALL_SUITES < <(find test -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'test_*' -printf '%f\n' | sort)
+EXPECTED_COUNT=${#ALL_SUITES[@]}
+
+# Cached object-count for this env, written after each completed build (in the gitignored build
+# dir). Used as the progress denominator: accurate for a full rebuild (every object recompiles),
+# only a rough upper bound for an incremental run.
+BASELINE_FILE=".pio/build/${ENV}/.runtests-objcount"
+
+# Progress trail file (gitignored build dir). ALWAYS written so a backgrounded/piped run can be
+# checked mid-build with `tail -f` — that's the whole point: don't fly blind on a 20-min rebuild.
+PROGRESS_FILE=".pio/build/${ENV}/.runtests-progress"
+
+# --- Progress heartbeat ------------------------------------------------------
+# Emit ONE status line every few seconds: build = objects (re)compiled this run / cached total +
+# best-effort ETA; test = suites finished / expected. Appends to $PROGRESS_FILE always (tail it to
+# check on a backgrounded run); also live-updates the tty when $5=1 (interactive --quiet). Never
+# touches $LOG, which is parsed for the verdict, so piped/CI captures stay clean.
+progress_monitor() {
+	local marker="$1" objtotal="$2" testtotal="$3" pfile="$4" totty="$5" start now el done ran eta line
+	start=$(date +%s)
+	while :; do
+		now=$(date +%s)
+		el=$((now - start))
+		if grep -q 'Testing\.\.\.' "$LOG" 2>/dev/null; then
+			ran=$(grep -cE "${ENV}:test_[a-z0-9_]+ \[(PASSED|FAILED|ERRORED)\]" "$LOG" 2>/dev/null)
+			line=$(printf '[test] %s/%s suites done — %dm%02ds' "$ran" "$testtotal" $((el / 60)) $((el % 60)))
+		else
+			done=$(find ".pio/build/${ENV}" -name '*.o' -newer "$marker" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
+			if ((objtotal > 0 && done > 0)); then
+				eta=$((objtotal > done ? (objtotal - done) * el / done : 0))
+				line=$(printf '[build] %d/%d objs — %dm%02ds — ETA ~%dm%02ds' \
+					"$done" "$objtotal" $((el / 60)) $((el % 60)) $((eta / 60)) $((eta % 60)))
+			else
+				# done==0 (incremental: nothing to rebuild yet) or no cached baseline — no ETA yet.
+				line=$(printf '[build] %d objs compiled — %dm%02ds' "$done" $((el / 60)) $((el % 60)))
+			fi
+		fi
+		printf '%s\n' "$line" >>"$pfile" 2>/dev/null                           # file trail (always)
+		[[ $totty == 1 ]] && printf '\r\033[K%s' "$line" >/dev/tty 2>/dev/null # live line (human)
+		sleep 4
+	done
+}
+
+# Launch the heartbeat for every run. It writes the progress file unconditionally; the live tty
+# line only when interactive AND --quiet (where pio's own output is hidden — otherwise pio's
+# streamed compile lines already show progress and a \r line would just fight them).
+mkdir -p ".pio/build/${ENV}" 2>/dev/null || true
+: >"$PROGRESS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true
+MARKER="$(mktemp -t meshtest-mark.XXXXXX)"
+TOTTY=0
+{ $QUIET && [[ -t 1 ]]; } && TOTTY=1
+progress_monitor "$MARKER" "$(cat "$BASELINE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" \
+	"$([[ -n $FILTER ]] && echo 1 || echo "$EXPECTED_COUNT")" "$PROGRESS_FILE" "$TOTTY" &
+PROGRESS_PID=$!
+
+if ! $QUIET; then
+	echo "Running: $PIO test -e $ENV ${PASSTHRU[*]-} (expecting $EXPECTED_COUNT suites)"
+fi
+echo "progress: tail -f $PROGRESS_FILE" >&2
+
+# Run pio, tee to log. PIPESTATUS[0] is pio's real exit (NOT tee's).
+if $QUIET; then
+	"$PIO" test -e "$ENV" "${PASSTHRU[@]}" >"$LOG" 2>&1
+else
+	"$PIO" test -e "$ENV" "${PASSTHRU[@]}" 2>&1 | tee "$LOG"
+fi
+PIO_RC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
+
+# Stop the heartbeat, clear its line, and cache this build's object total for next time.
+if [[ -n $PROGRESS_PID ]]; then
+	kill "$PROGRESS_PID" 2>/dev/null
+	wait "$PROGRESS_PID" 2>/dev/null
+	PROGRESS_PID=""
+	# Clear the live line only if we were writing one — opening /dev/tty when there is none is
+	# itself a redirect-open error the trailing 2>/dev/null cannot suppress.
+	[[ $TOTTY == 1 ]] && printf '\r\033[K' >/dev/tty 2>/dev/null
+fi
+[[ -d ".pio/build/${ENV}" ]] && find ".pio/build/${ENV}" -name '*.o' 2>/dev/null | wc -l >"$BASELINE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# --- Outcome detection -------------------------------------------------------
+# The SAME outcome is spelled differently depending on which layer emitted the line — this is
+# the trap that produces false greens (grepping ":PASS" misses pio's "[PASSED]", grepping
+# "[FAILED]" misses Unity's ":FAIL:"). So every regex below matches BOTH spellings:
+#   pass:  Unity per-assertion ":PASS"   | pio per-suite "[PASSED]"      | summary "N succeeded"
+#   fail:  Unity per-assertion ":FAIL:"  | pio per-suite "[FAILED]"      | summary "M failed"
+#   error: pio build/crash "[ERRORED]"   | Unity "M Failures"            | compiler "error:"
+# Match \b after :PASS/:FAIL so ":PASSED"/":FAILED" forms are also caught either way.
+FAIL_RE=':FAIL\b|\[FAILED\]|\[ERRORED\]|[1-9][0-9]* failed|[0-9]+ Tests [1-9][0-9]* Failures|error:|undefined reference|Segmentation fault|terminate called|SIGHUP|SIGSEGV|SIGABRT'
+# Positive proof tests actually ran & passed (absence != success). Accept any pass spelling:
+# the per-test/per-suite tokens OR a success summary line.
+PASS_RE=':PASS\b|\[PASSED\]|test cases: *[0-9]+ succeeded|[0-9]+ Tests 0 Failures'
+# Sanitizer (ASan/LSan/UBSan/TSan) fault signatures. The coverage build is sanitizer-instrumented
+# and aborts NON-ZERO at exit on a fault — most often a LeakSanitizer leak — AFTER every test has
+# already printed [PASSED]. pio then reports [ERRORED]/SIGHUP with no :FAIL: anywhere, so it
+# masquerades as a phantom "N-1 of N succeeded". See .notes/test-passfail-filter.md.
+# Match only real FAULT lines, never the benign "AddressSanitizer: failed to intercept '...'"
+# startup noise that prints on every sanitizer run (it'd mislabel a normal [FAILED] as a leak).
+# Formats per LLVM/Google sanitizer docs: ASan/LSan emit "==PID==ERROR: <San>: ...", UBSan emits
+# "file:line:col: runtime error: ...", TSan emits "WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: ..."; all close with
+# a "SUMMARY: <San>: ..." line (LSan-under-ASan reports its SUMMARY as "AddressSanitizer").
+SAN_RE='(ERROR|WARNING): (Address|Leak|Thread|UndefinedBehavior)Sanitizer:|SUMMARY: (Address|Leak|Thread|UndefinedBehavior)Sanitizer:|Direct leak of|Indirect leak of|detected memory leaks|heap-use-after-free|heap-buffer-overflow|stack-buffer-overflow|attempting double-free|LeakSanitizer has encountered a fatal error|runtime error:'
+
+# Suites that produced a per-suite verdict. pio emits "coverage:test_x [PASSED|FAILED|ERRORED]";
+# a SKIPPED suite (hardware-only on native) is "accounted for" too, so it doesn't read as missing.
+mapfile -t RAN_SUITES < <(grep -oE "${ENV}:test_[a-z0-9_]+ \[(PASSED|FAILED|ERRORED)\]" "$LOG" |
+	sed -E "s/^${ENV}:(test_[a-z0-9_]+) .*/\1/" | sort -u)
+RAN_COUNT=${#RAN_SUITES[@]}
+# Suites pio explicitly skipped (don't count these as "missing" in the canonical cross-check).
+mapfile -t SKIPPED_SUITES < <(grep -oE "${ENV}:test_[a-z0-9_]+.*\bSKIPPED\b" "$LOG" |
+	grep -oE "test_[a-z0-9_]+" | sort -u)
+
+verdict_red() {
+	local detail bin
+	detail="$(grep -nE '\[FAILED\]|:FAIL:|\[ERRORED\]' "$LOG" | head -3 | sed 's/^/    /')"
+	echo ""
+	echo "RED — failures detected:"
+	[[ -n $detail ]] && echo "$detail"
+	grep -E 'test cases:' "$LOG" | tail -1 | sed 's/^/    /'
+
+	# Path to the test binary for the "run it bare" hint. For native/coverage the test program is
+	# the env executable (e.g. .pio/build/coverage/meshtasticd), NOT a file named 'program'.
+	bin="$(find ".pio/build/${ENV}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -executable ! -name '*.so' 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
+	[[ -z $bin ]] && bin=".pio/build/${ENV}/<program>  (build it first: $PIO test -e ${ENV} ${FILTER:+-f $FILTER} --without-testing)"
+
+	# Sanitizer fault (ASan/LSan/UBSan/TSan): name the real cause instead of "build/crash error".
+	if grep -qE "$SAN_RE" "$LOG"; then
+		grep -nE "$SAN_RE" "$LOG" | head -4 | sed 's/^/    /'
+		echo "    -> sanitizer fault: if every test above is PASS, this is an exit-time abort, not a failed assertion."
+		echo "    -> read the full report by running the binary BARE (gdb hides it via ptrace): ./$bin 2>&1 | tail -40"
+		echo "RESULT: RED sanitizer fault — $(grep -ohE 'SUMMARY: [A-Za-z]+Sanitizer:.*' "$LOG" | tail -1 || echo 'see report above')"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	# All tests passed but the process still aborted at EXIT (ERRORED/SIGHUP/SIGABRT) and the
+	# sanitizer report was swallowed by the runner (often surfaced only as SIGHUP). Almost always a
+	# sanitizer fault — point at how to surface it rather than calling it a generic crash.
+	if grep -qE "$PASS_RE" "$LOG" && grep -qE '\[ERRORED\]|SIGHUP|SIGABRT' "$LOG" && ! grep -qE ':FAIL\b|\[FAILED\]' "$LOG"; then
+		echo "    -> all tests passed but the process aborted at EXIT — likely an ASan/LSan fault whose report"
+		echo "       the runner swallowed (commonly shown as SIGHUP). Run the binary BARE to see it: ./$bin 2>&1 | tail -40"
+		echo "RESULT: RED exit-time abort (tests passed; likely sanitizer — see hint above)"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	echo "RESULT: RED $(grep -oE '[0-9]+ failed' "$LOG" | tail -1 || echo 'build/crash error')"
+	exit 1
+}
+
+# RED: pio non-zero, any failure marker, or no positive summary at all (build died early).
+if [[ $PIO_RC -ne 0 ]] || grep -qE "$FAIL_RE" "$LOG"; then
+	verdict_red
+fi
+if ! grep -qE "$PASS_RE" "$LOG"; then
+	echo ""
+	echo "RESULT: RED no success summary found (build error / no tests ran?) — see log"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# AMBER: everything that ran passed, but (full run only) a canonical suite neither ran NOR was
+# explicitly skipped — i.e. it silently went missing. SKIPPED suites are accounted for.
+ACCOUNTED_COUNT=$((RAN_COUNT + ${#SKIPPED_SUITES[@]}))
+if [[ -z $FILTER && $ACCOUNTED_COUNT -lt $EXPECTED_COUNT ]]; then
+	missing=()
+	for s in "${ALL_SUITES[@]}"; do
+		printf '%s\n' "${RAN_SUITES[@]}" "${SKIPPED_SUITES[@]}" | grep -qx "$s" || missing+=("$s")
+	done
+	echo ""
+	echo "RESULT: AMBER ${RAN_COUNT}/${EXPECTED_COUNT} suites ran (missing: ${missing[*]}) — all that ran passed"
+	exit 2
+fi
+
+# GREEN.
+if [[ -n $FILTER ]]; then
+	echo "RESULT: GREEN ${RAN_COUNT} suite(s) passed (filtered: $FILTER)"
+else
+	echo "RESULT: GREEN ${RAN_COUNT}/${EXPECTED_COUNT} suites passed"
+fi
+exit 0

boards/heltec_mesh_tower_v2.json

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+{
+  "build": {
+    "arduino": {
+      "ldscript": "nrf52840_s140_v6.ld"
+    },
+    "core": "nRF5",
+    "cpu": "cortex-m4",
+    "extra_flags": "-DNRF52840_XXAA",
+    "f_cpu": "64000000L",
+    "hwids": [
+      ["0x239A", "0x4405"],
+      ["0x239A", "0x0029"],
+      ["0x239A", "0x002A"],
+      ["0x239A", "0x0071"]
+    ],
+    "usb_product": "HT-n5262",
+    "mcu": "nrf52840",
+    "variant": "heltec_mesh_tower_v2",
+    "variants_dir": "variants",
+    "bsp": {
+      "name": "adafruit"
+    },
+    "softdevice": {
+      "sd_flags": "-DS140",
+      "sd_name": "s140",
+      "sd_version": "6.1.1",
+      "sd_fwid": "0x00B6"
+    },
+    "bootloader": {
+      "settings_addr": "0xFF000"
+    }
+  },
+  "connectivity": ["bluetooth"],
+  "debug": {
+    "jlink_device": "nRF52840_xxAA",
+    "onboard_tools": ["jlink"],
+    "svd_path": "nrf52840.svd",
+    "openocd_target": "nrf52840-mdk-rs"
+  },
+  "frameworks": ["arduino"],
+  "name": "Heltec MeshTower V2 (Adafruit BSP)",
+  "upload": {
+    "maximum_ram_size": 248832,
+    "maximum_size": 815104,
+    "speed": 115200,
+    "protocol": "nrfutil",
+    "protocols": ["jlink", "nrfjprog", "nrfutil", "stlink"],
+    "use_1200bps_touch": true,
+    "require_upload_port": true,
+    "wait_for_upload_port": true
+  },
+  "url": "https://heltec.org",
+  "vendor": "Heltec"
+}

boards/wiscore_rak4600.json

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "build": {
-    "arduino": {
-      "ldscript": "nrf52832_s132_v6.ld"
-    },
-    "core": "nRF5",
-    "cpu": "cortex-m4",
-    "extra_flags": "-DNRF52832_XXAA -DNRF52",
-    "f_cpu": "64000000L",
-    "hwids": [
-      ["0x239A", "0x8029"],
-      ["0x239A", "0x0029"],
-      ["0x239A", "0x002A"],
-      ["0x239A", "0x802A"]
-    ],
-    "usb_product": "Feather nRF52832 Express",
-    "mcu": "nrf52832",
-    "variant": "WisCore_RAK4600_Board",
-    "bsp": {
-      "name": "adafruit"
-    },
-    "softdevice": {
-      "sd_flags": "-DS132",
-      "sd_name": "s132",
-      "sd_version": "6.1.1",
-      "sd_fwid": "0x00B7"
-    },
-    "zephyr": {
-      "variant": "nrf52_adafruit_feather"
-    }
-  },
-  "connectivity": ["bluetooth"],
-  "debug": {
-    "jlink_device": "nRF52832_xxAA",
-    "svd_path": "nrf52.svd",
-    "openocd_target": "nrf52840-mdk-rs"
-  },
-  "frameworks": ["arduino", "zephyr"],
-  "name": "Adafruit Bluefruit nRF52832 Feather",
-  "upload": {
-    "maximum_ram_size": 65536,
-    "maximum_size": 524288,
-    "require_upload_port": true,
-    "speed": 115200,
-    "protocol": "nrfutil",
-    "protocols": ["jlink", "nrfjprog", "nrfutil", "stlink"]
-  },
-  "url": "https://www.adafruit.com/product/3406",
-  "vendor": "Adafruit"
-}

debian/changelog

@@ -1,15 +1,3 @@
-meshtasticd (2.7.26.0) unstable; urgency=medium
-
-  * Version 2.7.26
-
- -- GitHub Actions <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>  Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:19:23 +0000
-
-meshtasticd (2.7.25.0) unstable; urgency=medium
-
-  * Version 2.7.25
-
- -- GitHub Actions <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>  Sat, 23 May 2026 01:16:20 +0000
-
 meshtasticd (2.7.24.0) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * Version 2.7.24

extra_scripts/nrf52_lto.py

@@ -80,14 +80,19 @@ env.AddBuildMiddleware(_no_lto)
 # the weak `b .` Default_Handler stub -- i.e. LTO (or a deps bump, or a new ISR-owning library
 # that nobody added to LIB_ISR) silently dropped it. A dropped handler hangs the chip the
 # instant that IRQ fires; this turns a field hang into a red build. CI builds every nrf52840
-# target, so this runs on every PR automatically. All five are used by every nrf52840
-# Meshtastic build; if a board deliberately stops using one, edit this tuple on purpose.
+# target, so this runs on every PR automatically. If a board deliberately stops using one of
+# these, edit the tuples on purpose.
 _REQUIRED_STRONG = (
     "SWI2_EGU2_IRQHandler",  # SoftDevice BLE event (SD_EVT) -- advertising & connections
     "GPIOTE_IRQHandler",  # GPIO interrupts: radio DIO + buttons
     "RTC1_IRQHandler",  # FreeRTOS scheduler tick
+)
+# Owned by the TinyUSB stack, so only required when the board builds with USB at all.
+# Boards without native USB wiring (e.g. wio-sdk-wm1110's CH340 UART) strip TinyUSB via
+# disable_adafruit_usb.py / unflagging USE_TINYUSB, leaving these legitimately weak.
+_REQUIRED_STRONG_USB = (
     "USBD_IRQHandler",  # USB CDC (serial console + 1200bps DFU trigger)
-    "POWER_CLOCK_IRQHandler",  # HF/LF clock + power (HFCLK start for radio & SoftDevice)
+    "POWER_CLOCK_IRQHandler",  # USB power events (VBUS detect/ready) via TinyUSB hal
 )
 
 _tc = env.PioPlatform().get_package_dir("toolchain-gccarmnoneeabi") or ""
@@ -113,7 +118,13 @@ def _assert_isr_handlers_survived(source, target, env):
         f = line.split()
         if len(f) >= 3 and f[-1].endswith("_IRQHandler"):
             kind[f[-1]] = f[-2]
-    dropped = [h for h in _REQUIRED_STRONG if kind.get(h, "W").upper() != "T"]
+    required = list(_REQUIRED_STRONG)
+    defines = [
+        str(d[0] if isinstance(d, tuple) else d) for d in env.get("CPPDEFINES", [])
+    ]
+    if "USE_TINYUSB" in defines:
+        required += _REQUIRED_STRONG_USB
+    dropped = [h for h in required if kind.get(h, "W").upper() != "T"]
     if dropped:
         sys.stderr.write(
             "\n*** nrf52 LTO guard: interrupt handler(s) DROPPED: %s ***\n"
@@ -127,8 +138,7 @@ def _assert_isr_handlers_survived(source, target, env):
 
         Exit(1)  # canonical SCons build-abort -> red build
     print(
-        "nrf52_lto: ISR-handler guard OK -- %d critical handlers strong"
-        % len(_REQUIRED_STRONG)
+        "nrf52_lto: ISR-handler guard OK -- %d critical handlers strong" % len(required)
     )
 
 

extra_scripts/nrf52_warm_region.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# trunk-ignore-all(ruff/F821)
+# trunk-ignore-all(flake8/F821): For SConstruct imports
+#
+# Post-link guard for the warm-node-store raw-flash region on nRF52840.
+#
+# The 3 app-region pages below LittleFS (0xEA000-0xED000, reclaimed by whole-image
+# LTO) are reserved for the WarmNodeStore record-ring (see WarmNodeStore.h). Our
+# linker scripts (nrf52840_s140_v6.ld and nrf52840_s140_v7.ld) cap the image at
+# 0xEA000, but boards on the framework-default script (FLASH ending at 0xED000) could
+# silently place code in those pages — the first warm-store save would then brick the
+# device. This turns that into a build failure.
+#
+# Image flash end = __etext + sizeof(.data) (loaded at LMA __etext); symbols from
+# the framework's nrf52_common.ld.
+import os
+
+Import("env")
+
+WARM_REGION_BASE = 0xEA000  # keep in sync with WARM_FLASH_REGION_BASE in WarmNodeStore.h (3 x 4 KB record-ring)
+
+_tc = env.PioPlatform().get_package_dir("toolchain-gccarmnoneeabi") or ""
+_NM = os.path.join(_tc, "bin", "arm-none-eabi-nm")
+if not os.path.isfile(_NM):
+    _NM = "arm-none-eabi-nm"  # fall back to PATH
+
+
+def _assert_warm_region_clear(source, target, env):
+    import subprocess
+    import sys
+
+    try:
+        elf = env.subst("$BUILD_DIR/${PROGNAME}.elf")
+        out = subprocess.check_output([_NM, elf], universal_newlines=True)
+    except Exception as exc:  # tooling hiccup: warn loudly, don't wedge the build
+        print("nrf52_warm_region: WARNING - guard skipped (nm failed: %s)" % exc)
+        return
+
+    syms = {}
+    for line in out.split("\n"):
+        f = line.split()
+        if len(f) >= 3 and f[-1] in ("__etext", "__data_start__", "__data_end__"):
+            syms[f[-1]] = int(f[0], 16)
+    if len(syms) != 3:
+        print("nrf52_warm_region: WARNING - guard skipped (linker symbols not found)")
+        return
+
+    flash_end = syms["__etext"] + (syms["__data_end__"] - syms["__data_start__"])
+    if flash_end > WARM_REGION_BASE:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            "\n*** nrf52 warm-region guard: image ends at 0x%X, past the reserved "
+            "warm-store region at 0x%X ***\n"
+            "The 12 KB region at 0xEA000 holds the WarmNodeStore record-ring; a warm-store\n"
+            "save would overwrite this firmware's tail. Shrink the image, or shrink/move\n"
+            "the region (WARM_FLASH_REGION_BASE in src/mesh/WarmNodeStore.h, the FLASH\n"
+            "LENGTH in src/platform/nrf52/nrf52840_s140_v6.ld and _v7.ld, and this guard).\n\n"
+            % (flash_end, WARM_REGION_BASE)
+        )
+        from SCons.Script import Exit
+
+        Exit(1)
+    print(
+        "nrf52_warm_region: guard OK -- image ends at 0x%X, %d KB clear of the warm region"
+        % (flash_end, (WARM_REGION_BASE - flash_end) // 1024)
+    )
+
+
+# Attach to the phony "buildprog" alias (not the .elf node) so the guard runs
+# on incremental relinks too -- same reasoning as nrf52_lto.py's guard.
+env.AddPostAction("buildprog", _assert_warm_region_clear)

mcp-server/tests/test_00_bake.py

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ _ESP32_ARCHES = {
     "esp32-c6",
     "esp32c6",
 }
-_NRF52_ARCHES = {"nrf52", "nrf52840", "nrf52832"}
+_NRF52_ARCHES = {"nrf52", "nrf52840"}
 
 
 def _wait_port_free(port: str, *, timeout_s: float = 15.0, role: str = "") -> None:

platformio.ini

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ build_unflags =
 	-std=gnu++11
 build_flags = ${env.build_flags} -Os
 	-std=gnu++17
-build_src_filter = ${env.build_src_filter} -<platform/portduino/> -<graphics/niche/>
+build_src_filter = ${env.build_src_filter} -<platform/> +<platform/extra_variants/> -<graphics/niche/>
 
 ; Common libs for communicating over TCP/IP networks such as MQTT
 [networking_base]

src/FSCommon.h

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 #define FILE_O_READ "r"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
-// STM32WL
+#if defined(ARCH_STM32)
+// STM32
 #include "LittleFS.h"
 #define FSCom InternalFS
 #define FSBegin() FSCom.begin()

src/MessageStore.cpp

@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ void MessageStore::clearAllMessages()
     resetMessagePool();
 
 #ifdef FSCom
+    concurrency::LockGuard guard(spiLock);
     SafeFile f(filename.c_str(), false);
     uint8_t count = 0;
     f.write(&count, 1); // write "0 messages"

src/Power.cpp

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
 #include "concurrency/LockGuard.h"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(ARCH_STM32WL) && defined(BATTERY_PIN)
+#if defined(ARCH_STM32) && defined(BATTERY_PIN)
 #include "stm32yyxx_ll_adc.h"
 
 /* Analog read resolution */
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ class AnalogBatteryLevel : public HasBatteryLevel
             float scaled = 0;
 
             battery_adcEnable();
-#ifdef ARCH_STM32WL
+#ifdef ARCH_STM32
             // STM32 ADC with VREFINT runtime calibration
             Vref = __LL_ADC_CALC_VREFANALOG_VOLTAGE(analogRead(AVREF), LL_ADC_RESOLUTION);
             raw = analogRead(BATTERY_PIN);
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ class AnalogBatteryLevel : public HasBatteryLevel
     bool initial_read_done = false;
     float last_read_value = (OCV[NUM_OCV_POINTS - 1] * NUM_CELLS);
     uint32_t last_read_time_ms = 0;
-#ifdef ARCH_STM32WL
+#ifdef ARCH_STM32
     // 3300mV placeholder for STM32 errata where VREFINT factory calibration may be missing
     // (e.g. STM32U0, see DS14756 Rev 3 §2.4.1 "VREFINT offset")
     uint32_t Vref = 3300;
@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ bool Power::analogInit()
 #define BATTERY_SENSE_RESOLUTION_BITS 10
 #endif
 
-#ifdef ARCH_STM32WL
+#ifdef ARCH_STM32
     analogReadResolution(BATTERY_SENSE_RESOLUTION_BITS);
 #elif defined(ARCH_ESP32) // ESP32 needs special analog stuff
     adc_oneshot_unit_init_cfg_t init_config = {
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ bool Power::analogInit()
 
     // NRF52 ADC init moved to powerHAL_init in nrf52 platform
 
-#if !defined(ARCH_ESP32) && !defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#if !defined(ARCH_ESP32) && !defined(ARCH_STM32)
     analogReadResolution(BATTERY_SENSE_RESOLUTION_BITS);
 #endif
 
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ void Power::reboot()
     }
     LOG_DEBUG("final reboot!");
     ::reboot();
-#elif defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#elif defined(ARCH_STM32)
     HAL_NVIC_SystemReset();
 #else
     rebootAtMsec = -1;

src/PowerFSM.cpp

@@ -219,7 +219,11 @@ static void darkEnter()
 static void serialEnter()
 {
     LOG_POWERFSM("State: serialEnter");
+#ifndef ARCH_NRF52
+    // nRF52 runs BLE on SoftDevice independently of USB serial — no need to disable it.
+    // (Same rationale as nbEnter() which already guards this with #ifdef ARCH_ESP32)
     setBluetoothEnable(false);
+#endif
     if (screen) {
         screen->setOn(true);
     }

src/configuration.h

@@ -179,6 +179,13 @@ along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#ifdef USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY
+#if defined(HELTEC_MESH_TOWER_V2)
+#define NUM_PA_POINTS 22
+#define TX_GAIN_LORA 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 8, 7
+#endif
+#endif
+
 #ifdef RAK13302
 #define NUM_PA_POINTS 22
 #define TX_GAIN_LORA 7, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8
@@ -573,5 +580,94 @@ along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 #define USE_ETHERNET_DEFAULT 0
 #endif
 
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN — runtime, client-toggleable hardening (nRF52 only)
+//
+// Lockdown/protect support is opt-in at build time. Builds that need it pass
+// -DMESHTASTIC_ENABLE_LOCKDOWN=1. When enabled on nRF52 (CC310 hardware
+// crypto), whether it is ACTIVE is decided entirely at runtime by
+// EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive()
+// (== a passphrase has been provisioned, i.e. /prefs/.dek exists). A device
+// that has never been provisioned — or that the operator disabled from the
+// client app — behaves exactly like stock firmware: plaintext storage, no
+// redaction, normal logging, normal display.
+//
+// The operator toggles lockdown from the client app:
+//   off -> on : provision a passphrase (AdminMessage.lockdown_auth). The
+//               firmware generates a DEK, encrypts the stored config, and
+//               authorizes the connection.
+//   on -> off : AdminMessage.lockdown_auth { disable=true } with the
+//               passphrase — decrypts storage back to plaintext and removes
+//               the DEK / token / monotonic-counter / backoff files, then
+//               reboots into normal mode. APPROTECT is the one thing that
+//               does NOT revert (see below).
+//
+// MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN here is an INTERNAL capability marker. It gates the UI
+// bits (lock screen, pairing-PIN handling). Flash-constrained nRF52 variants
+// that genuinely cannot afford the ~tens-of-KB of crypto + access-control code
+// may also opt out with -DMESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_LOCKDOWN=1.
+//
+//   MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL — per-connection auth + redaction,
+//                                        gated at runtime on isLockdownActive()
+//   MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE       — AES-128-CTR + HMAC-SHA256 at-rest
+//   MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT        — UICR APPROTECT capability. The actual
+//                                        one-way burn happens at runtime, only
+//                                        once provisioned, only on non-vulnerable
+//                                        silicon, and is STICKY: disabling
+//                                        lockdown does NOT (cannot) reverse it.
+//
+// DEBUG_MUTE is intentionally NOT coupled to lockdown — a capable-but-off
+// device must log normally. Define DEBUG_MUTE separately for a silent build.
+//
+// -DMESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_DEBUG=1 keeps the irreversible APPROTECT burn disabled
+// even when provisioned — for development so dev boards never lose SWD.
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#if defined(ARCH_NRF52)
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_LOCKDOWN
+#define MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_LOCKDOWN 0
+#endif
+
+#if !MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_LOCKDOWN
+#undef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+#undef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+#undef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#undef MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_LOCKDOWN
+#define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_LOCKDOWN 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_LOCKDOWN && !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_LOCKDOWN)
+#define MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN 1
+#define MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL 1
+#define MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE 1
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_DEBUG
+#define MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT 1
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+
+// Per-boot uptime cap on unlocked sessions. 0 = unlimited (token-only
+// enforcement, the existing behavior). When non-zero, every passphrase
+// unlock (and every token-auto-unlock that inherits the value) arms a
+// timer; on expiry the device lockNow()s and reboots into locked state.
+// Bounds the total exposure window to bootsRemaining * this value if an
+// attacker has physical possession but not the passphrase.
+//
+// Override at build time. Suggested:
+//   carry device:        3600  (1h sessions, periodic re-auth from phone)
+//   tower / infra node:  0     (default — relies on token TTLs only)
+//
+// A future LockdownAuth.max_session_seconds proto field will let the
+// client set this per-token; until that lands the build-time value is
+// the only source.
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS
+#define MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS 0
+#endif
+
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+
 #include "DebugConfiguration.h"
 #include "RF95Configuration.h"

src/detect/ScanI2C.cpp

@@ -37,15 +37,15 @@ ScanI2C::FoundDevice ScanI2C::firstKeyboard() const
 
 ScanI2C::FoundDevice ScanI2C::firstAccelerometer() const
 {
-    ScanI2C::DeviceType types[] = {MPU6050, LIS3DH, BMA423, LSM6DS3, BMX160, STK8BAXX,
-                                   ICM20948, QMA6100P, BMM150,  BMI270,  ICM42607P};
-    return firstOfOrNONE(11, types);
+    ScanI2C::DeviceType types[] = {MPU6050,  LIS3DH,   BMA423, LSM6DS3, BMX160,    STK8BAXX,
+                                   ICM20948, QMA6100P, BMM150, BMI270,  ICM42607P, ISM330DHCX};
+    return firstOfOrNONE(12, types);
 }
 
 ScanI2C::FoundDevice ScanI2C::firstMagnetometer() const
 {
-    ScanI2C::DeviceType types[] = {MMC5983MA};
-    return firstOfOrNONE(1, types);
+    ScanI2C::DeviceType types[] = {MMC5983MA, IIS2MDCTR};
+    return firstOfOrNONE(2, types);
 }
 
 ScanI2C::FoundDevice ScanI2C::firstAQI() const

src/detect/ScanI2C.h

@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ class ScanI2C
         CW2015,
         SCD30,
         ADS1115,
+        IIS2MDCTR,
+        ISM330DHCX,
     } DeviceType;
 
     // typedef uint8_t DeviceAddress;

src/detect/ScanI2CTwoWire.cpp

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #if defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO)
 #include "linux/LinuxHardwareI2C.h"
 #endif
-#if !defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) && !defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#if !defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) && !defined(ARCH_STM32)
 #include "meshUtils.h" // vformat
 
 #endif
@@ -584,6 +584,9 @@ void ScanI2CTwoWire::scanPort(I2CPort port, uint8_t *address, uint8_t asize)
                 if (registerValue == 0x6A) {
                     type = LSM6DS3;
                     logFoundDevice("LSM6DS3", (uint8_t)addr.address);
+                } else if (registerValue == 0x6B) {
+                    type = ISM330DHCX;
+                    logFoundDevice("ISM330DHCX", (uint8_t)addr.address);
                 } else {
                     type = QMI8658;
                     logFoundDevice("QMI8658", (uint8_t)addr.address);
@@ -591,7 +594,17 @@ void ScanI2CTwoWire::scanPort(I2CPort port, uint8_t *address, uint8_t asize)
                 break;
 
                 SCAN_SIMPLE_CASE(QMC5883L_ADDR, QMC5883L, "QMC5883L", (uint8_t)addr.address)
-                SCAN_SIMPLE_CASE(HMC5883L_ADDR, HMC5883L, "HMC5883L", (uint8_t)addr.address)
+            case HMC5883L_ADDR:
+                registerValue = getRegisterValue(ScanI2CTwoWire::RegisterLocation(addr, 0x4FU), 1); // get ID
+                if (registerValue == 0x40) {
+                    type = IIS2MDCTR;
+                    logFoundDevice("IIS2MDCTR", (uint8_t)addr.address);
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    type = HMC5883L;
+                    logFoundDevice("HMC5883L", (uint8_t)addr.address);
+                    break;
+                }
 #ifdef HAS_QMA6100P
                 SCAN_SIMPLE_CASE(QMA6100P_ADDR, QMA6100P, "QMA6100P", (uint8_t)addr.address)
 #else

src/gps/GPS.cpp

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ template <typename T, std::size_t N> std::size_t array_count(const T (&)[N])
 
 #if defined(ARCH_NRF52)
 Uart *GPS::_serial_gps = &GPS_SERIAL_PORT;
-#elif defined(ARCH_ESP32) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#elif defined(ARCH_ESP32) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32)
 HardwareSerial *GPS::_serial_gps = &GPS_SERIAL_PORT;
 #elif defined(ARCH_RP2040)
 SerialUART *GPS::_serial_gps = &GPS_SERIAL_PORT;
@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ namespace
 constexpr uint32_t GPS_PROBE_CACHE_MAGIC = 0x47504348UL; // "GPCH"
 constexpr uint16_t GPS_PROBE_CACHE_VERSION = 1;
 constexpr const char *GPS_PROBE_CACHE_FILE = "/prefs/gps_probe_cache.dat";
+constexpr int MIN_PLAUSIBLE_GPS_YEAR = 2020;
+constexpr int MAX_PLAUSIBLE_GPS_YEAR = 2100;
+#ifdef TRACKER_T1000_E
+constexpr uint32_t T1000_E_AIROHA_WAKE_MS = 1000;
+constexpr uint32_t T1000_E_AIROHA_WAKE_INTERVAL_MS = 40;
+#endif
 
 struct GPSProbeCacheRecord {
     uint32_t magic;
@@ -101,6 +107,45 @@ bool isValidProbeBaud(uint32_t baud)
     return baud >= 1200 && baud <= 921600;
 }
 
+template <typename T> void wakeAirohaForActiveProbe(T *serialGps)
+{
+#ifdef TRACKER_T1000_E
+    digitalWrite(PIN_GPS_EN, GPS_EN_ACTIVE);
+    digitalWrite(GPS_RTC_INT, HIGH);
+    delay(3);
+    digitalWrite(GPS_RTC_INT, LOW);
+    delay(50);
+
+    const uint32_t start = millis();
+    do {
+        serialGps->write("$PAIR382,1*2E\r\n");
+        delay(T1000_E_AIROHA_WAKE_INTERVAL_MS);
+    } while (Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(start, T1000_E_AIROHA_WAKE_MS));
+#elif defined(GNSS_AIROHA)
+    serialGps->write("$PAIR382,1*2E\r\n");
+    delay(20);
+#else
+    (void)serialGps;
+#endif
+}
+
+bool isPlausibleNmeaTime(const struct tm &t)
+{
+    const int year = t.tm_year + 1900;
+    if (year < MIN_PLAUSIBLE_GPS_YEAR || year > MAX_PLAUSIBLE_GPS_YEAR) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+#ifdef BUILD_EPOCH
+    const int64_t candidate = static_cast<int64_t>(gm_mktime(&t));
+    const int64_t minEpoch = static_cast<int64_t>(BUILD_EPOCH);
+    const int64_t maxEpoch = minEpoch + static_cast<int64_t>(FORTY_YEARS);
+    return candidate >= minEpoch && candidate <= maxEpoch;
+#else
+    return true;
+#endif
+}
+
 template <typename T> bool sawNmeaSentenceAtBaud(T *serialGps, uint32_t timeoutMs)
 {
     // Lightweight passive check: look for at least one complete
@@ -642,7 +687,7 @@ bool GPS::verifyCachedProbePresence()
         return false;
     }
 
-#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32)
     _serial_gps->end();
     _serial_gps->begin(cachedProbeBaud);
 #elif defined(ARCH_RP2040)
@@ -689,6 +734,7 @@ bool GPS::verifyCachedProbePresence()
     case GNSS_MODEL_AG3352:
         if (cachedProbeModel == GNSS_MODEL_AG3352)
             cachedProbeModelName = "AG3352";
+        wakeAirohaForActiveProbe(_serial_gps);
         _serial_gps->write("$PAIR021*39\r\n");
         present = (getACK("$PAIR021,", 900) == GNSS_RESPONSE_OK);
         break;
@@ -741,7 +787,6 @@ bool GPS::verifyCachedProbePresence()
     if (!present) {
         LOG_WARN("Cached GPS probe is stale (%s @ %d), clearing cache", cachedProbeModelName, cachedProbeBaud);
         clearProbeCache();
-        cachedProbeFailedThisBoot = true;
         return false;
     }
 
@@ -762,13 +807,6 @@ bool GPS::setup()
 {
     if (!didSerialInit) {
         int msglen = 0;
-        if (cachedProbeFailedThisBoot) {
-            // If cached verification failed, suppress further probing until
-            // reboot.
-            didSerialInit = true;
-            return true;
-        }
-
         if (tx_gpio && gnssModel == GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN) {
             if (!hasProbeCache && !triedProbeCache) {
                 (void)loadProbeCache();
@@ -777,12 +815,13 @@ bool GPS::setup()
             if (hasProbeCache && !triedProbeCache) {
                 triedProbeCache = true;
                 if (!verifyCachedProbePresence()) {
-                    // Cache was stale and got wiped; skip scanning this boot
-                    // and let next boot do a full probe.
-                    didSerialInit = true;
-                    return true;
+                    currentStep = 0;
+                    speedSelect = 0;
+                    probeTries = 0;
                 }
-            } else if (probeTries < GPS_PROBETRIES) {
+            }
+
+            if (gnssModel == GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN && probeTries < GPS_PROBETRIES) {
                 // No usable cache: walk common baud rates first.
                 gnssModel = probe(serialSpeeds[speedSelect]);
                 if (gnssModel != GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN) {
@@ -794,7 +833,7 @@ bool GPS::setup()
             }
             // Rare Serial Speeds
 #ifndef CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C6
-            else if (probeTries == GPS_PROBETRIES) {
+            else if (gnssModel == GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN && probeTries == GPS_PROBETRIES) {
                 // Then try less common baud rates before giving up.
                 gnssModel = probe(rareSerialSpeeds[speedSelect]);
                 if (gnssModel != GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN) {
@@ -1121,10 +1160,22 @@ void GPS::setPowerState(GPSPowerState newState, uint32_t sleepTime)
     switch (newState) {
     case GPS_ACTIVE:
     case GPS_IDLE:
-        if (oldState == GPS_ACTIVE || oldState == GPS_IDLE) // If hardware already awake, no changes needed
+        if (oldState == GPS_ACTIVE)
+            break;
+        gotTime = false;
+        if (oldState == GPS_IDLE) // If hardware already awake, no changes needed
             break;
         if (oldState != GPS_ACTIVE && oldState != GPS_IDLE) // If hardware just waking now, clear buffer
             clearBuffer();
+#ifdef TRACKER_T1000_E
+        pinMode(GPS_VRTC_EN, OUTPUT);
+        digitalWrite(GPS_VRTC_EN, HIGH);
+        pinMode(GPS_SLEEP_INT, OUTPUT);
+        digitalWrite(GPS_SLEEP_INT, HIGH);
+        pinMode(GPS_RTC_INT, OUTPUT);
+        digitalWrite(GPS_RTC_INT, LOW);
+        pinMode(GPS_RESETB_OUT, INPUT_PULLUP);
+#endif
         powerMon->setState(meshtastic_PowerMon_State_GPS_Active); // Report change for power monitoring (during testing)
         writePinEN(true);                                         // Power (EN pin): on
         setPowerPMU(true);                                        // Power (PMU): on
@@ -1383,9 +1434,8 @@ int32_t GPS::runOnce()
         if (!setup())
             return currentDelay; // Setup failed, re-run in two seconds
 
-        if (cachedProbeFailedThisBoot || gnssModel == GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN) {
-            LOG_WARN("GPS not detected at cached settings; marked not present "
-                     "for this boot");
+        if (gnssModel == GNSS_MODEL_UNKNOWN) {
+            LOG_WARN("GPS not detected; marked not present for this boot");
             return disable();
         }
 
@@ -1437,8 +1487,7 @@ int32_t GPS::runOnce()
         // if gps_update_interval is <=10s, GPS never goes off, so we treat that differently
         uint32_t updateInterval = Default::getConfiguredOrDefaultMs(config.position.gps_update_interval);
 
-        // 1. Got a time for the first time
-        bool gotTime = (getRTCQuality() >= RTCQualityGPS);
+        // 1. Got a time for the first time this cycle
         if (!gotTime && lookForTime()) { // Note: we count on this && short-circuiting and not resetting the RTC time
             gotTime = true;
         }
@@ -1564,7 +1613,7 @@ GnssModel_t GPS::probe(int serialSpeed)
 
     switch (currentStep) {
     case 0: {
-#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32)
         _serial_gps->end();
         _serial_gps->begin(serialSpeed);
 #elif defined(ARCH_RP2040)
@@ -1585,6 +1634,9 @@ GnssModel_t GPS::probe(int serialSpeed)
         digitalWrite(PIN_GPS_RESET, GPS_RESET_MODE); // assert for 10ms
         delay(10);
         digitalWrite(PIN_GPS_RESET, !GPS_RESET_MODE);
+#ifdef TRACKER_T1000_E
+        delay(100);
+#endif
 
         // attempt to detect the chip based on boot messages
         std::vector<ChipInfo> passive_detect = {
@@ -1637,6 +1689,7 @@ GnssModel_t GPS::probe(int serialSpeed)
     }
     case 3: {
         /* Airoha (Mediatek) AG3335A/M/S, A3352Q, Quectel L89 2.0, SimCom SIM65M */
+        wakeAirohaForActiveProbe(_serial_gps);
         _serial_gps->write("$PAIR062,2,0*3C\r\n"); // GSA OFF to reduce volume
         _serial_gps->write("$PAIR062,3,0*3D\r\n"); // GSV OFF to reduce volume
         _serial_gps->write("$PAIR513*3D\r\n");     // save configuration
@@ -1921,7 +1974,7 @@ std::unique_ptr<GPS> GPS::createGps()
 #elif defined(ARCH_NRF52)
         _serial_gps->setPins(new_gps->rx_gpio, new_gps->tx_gpio);
         _serial_gps->begin(GPS_BAUDRATE);
-#elif defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#elif defined(ARCH_STM32)
         _serial_gps->setTx(new_gps->tx_gpio);
         _serial_gps->setRx(new_gps->rx_gpio);
         _serial_gps->begin(GPS_BAUDRATE);
@@ -1968,6 +2021,9 @@ The Unix epoch (or Unix time or POSIX time or Unix timestamp) is the number of s
         t.tm_year = d.year() - 1900;
         t.tm_isdst = false;
         if (t.tm_mon > -1) {
+            if (!isPlausibleNmeaTime(t)) {
+                return false;
+            }
             if (perhapsSetRTC(RTCQualityGPS, t) == RTCSetResultSuccess) {
                 LOG_DEBUG("NMEA GPS time set %02d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d age %d", d.year(), d.month(), t.tm_mday, t.tm_hour,
                           t.tm_min, t.tm_sec, ti.age());

src/gps/GPS.h

@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ class GPS : private concurrency::OSThread
     uint32_t lastChecksumFailCount = 0;
     uint8_t currentStep = 0;
     int32_t currentDelay = 2000;
+    bool gotTime = false;
 
 #ifndef TINYGPS_OPTION_NO_CUSTOM_FIELDS
     // (20210908) TinyGps++ can only read the GPGSA "FIX TYPE" field
@@ -193,8 +194,6 @@ class GPS : private concurrency::OSThread
     bool hasProbeCache = false;
     // Ensures cached probe is attempted once per boot.
     bool triedProbeCache = false;
-    // Latched when cached presence check fails
-    bool cachedProbeFailedThisBoot = false;
 
     /**
      * hasValidLocation - indicates that the position variables contain a complete

src/gps/RTC.cpp

@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ RTCSetResult perhapsSetRTC(RTCQuality q, const struct timeval *tv, bool forceUpd
     } else if (q == RTCQualityGPS) {
         shouldSet = true;
         LOG_DEBUG("Reapply GPS time: %ld secs", printableEpoch);
-    } else if (q == RTCQualityNTP && !Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(lastSetMsec, (12 * 60 * 60 * 1000UL))) {
-        // Every 12 hrs we will slam in a new NTP or Phone GPS / NTP time, to correct for local RTC clock drift
+    } else if (q == RTCQualityNTP && !Throttle::isWithinTimespanMs(lastSetMsec, (30 * 60 * 1000UL))) {
+        // Every 30 minutes we will slam in a new NTP or Phone GPS / NTP time, to correct for local RTC clock drift
         shouldSet = true;
         LOG_DEBUG("Reapply external time to correct clock drift %ld secs", printableEpoch);
     } else {

src/graphics/Screen.cpp

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 #include "draw/UIRenderer.h"
 #include "graphics/TFTColorRegions.h"
 #include "modules/CannedMessageModule.h"
+#include "security/LockdownDisplay.h"
 
 #if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_GPS
 #include "GPS.h"
@@ -119,8 +120,76 @@ static inline void prepareFrameColorRegions()
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+// Static lock screen drawn in place of normal frames when
+// meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay() returns true. Renders centered
+// "LOCKED" plus battery so the operator can see the device is alive and
+// charged without leaking any node/channel/message/position content.
+// Draw the LOCKED frame into the host-side framebuffer. Does NOT commit
+// to the panel — the caller is responsible for calling display->display()
+// once it has composited any overlays on top. Committing here would cause
+// visible flicker between "just LOCKED" and "LOCKED + banner overlay" when
+// the pairing-PIN special-case in updateUiFrame paints the overlay after
+// this returns.
+static void drawLockdownLockScreenIntoBuffer(OLEDDisplay *display)
+{
+    display->clear();
+
+    const int w = display->getWidth();
+    const int h = display->getHeight();
+
+    display->setTextAlignment(TEXT_ALIGN_CENTER);
+    display->setFont(FONT_LARGE);
+    display->drawString(w / 2, h / 2 - FONT_HEIGHT_LARGE, "LOCKED");
+
+    display->setFont(FONT_SMALL);
+    char status[32] = "Connect to unlock";
+    if (powerStatus && powerStatus->getHasBattery()) {
+        int pct = powerStatus->getBatteryChargePercent();
+        snprintf(status, sizeof(status), "Battery %d%%", pct);
+    }
+    display->drawString(w / 2, h / 2 + 2, status);
+}
+
+// Convenience wrapper for callers that want the LOCKED frame committed
+// to the panel immediately and have no overlay to compose on top.
+static void drawLockdownLockScreen(OLEDDisplay *display)
+{
+    drawLockdownLockScreenIntoBuffer(display);
+    display->display();
+}
+#endif
+
 static inline void updateUiFrame(OLEDDisplayUi *ui)
 {
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+    if (meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay() && screen != nullptr) {
+        OLEDDisplay *display = screen->getDisplayDevice();
+        // Paint LOCKED into the framebuffer WITHOUT committing. We commit
+        // exactly once at the bottom — after any overlay has been composed
+        // on top — so the panel never visibly transitions from "just LOCKED"
+        // to "LOCKED + overlay" mid-frame. Committing twice per cycle was
+        // the source of the H13 flicker.
+        drawLockdownLockScreenIntoBuffer(display);
+        // Special-case the BLE pairing PIN banner. The PIN is needed to
+        // complete first-pair against a locked device, but the lockdown
+        // short-circuit would otherwise hide the PIN entirely. The PIN is
+        // a per-attempt ephemeral pair-handshake artifact, not operator
+        // content, so compositing it over the LOCKED frame is safe.
+        //
+        // Calling ui->update() here would be wrong: it redraws the current
+        // carousel frame (the dashboard) into the framebuffer before the
+        // overlay paints, leaving operator content visible underneath the
+        // banner. Instead we invoke the banner overlay callback directly,
+        // which paints only the banner box on top of the LOCKED pixels we
+        // already have in the framebuffer.
+        if (NotificationRenderer::current_notification_type == notificationTypeEnum::pairing_pin) {
+            NotificationRenderer::drawBannercallback(display, ui->getUiState());
+        }
+        display->display();
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
 #if GRAPHICS_TFT_COLORING_ENABLED
     prepareFrameColorRegions();
 #endif
@@ -164,6 +233,16 @@ static inline float wrapHeading360(float heading)
     return heading;
 }
 
+static inline float wrapDelta180(float delta)
+{
+    if (delta > 180.0f) {
+        delta -= 360.0f;
+    } else if (delta < -180.0f) {
+        delta += 360.0f;
+    }
+    return delta;
+}
+
 void Screen::setHeading(float heading)
 {
     const float wrappedHeading = wrapHeading360(heading);
@@ -175,37 +254,30 @@ void Screen::setHeading(float heading)
     }
 
     // Interpolate using shortest-path angular delta to avoid jumps around 0/360.
-    float delta = wrappedHeading - compassHeading;
-    if (delta > 180.0f) {
-        delta -= 360.0f;
-    } else if (delta < -180.0f) {
-        delta += 360.0f;
-    }
+    float delta = wrapDelta180(wrappedHeading - compassHeading);
 
     // Adaptive filtering:
     // - Strong damping for tiny deltas (jitter)
     // - Faster response for larger turns
     const float absDelta = (delta >= 0.0f) ? delta : -delta;
-    if (absDelta < 1.0f) {
-        return;
-    }
+    if (absDelta >= 1.0f) {
+        float alpha = 0.35f;
+        if (absDelta > 25.0f) {
+            alpha = 0.85f;
+        } else if (absDelta > 10.0f) {
+            alpha = 0.65f;
+        }
 
-    float alpha = 0.35f;
-    if (absDelta > 25.0f) {
-        alpha = 0.85f;
-    } else if (absDelta > 10.0f) {
-        alpha = 0.65f;
-    }
+        float step = delta * alpha;
+        const float maxStep = 12.0f;
+        if (step > maxStep) {
+            step = maxStep;
+        } else if (step < -maxStep) {
+            step = -maxStep;
+        }
 
-    float step = delta * alpha;
-    const float maxStep = 12.0f;
-    if (step > maxStep) {
-        step = maxStep;
-    } else if (step < -maxStep) {
-        step = -maxStep;
+        compassHeading = wrapHeading360(compassHeading + step);
     }
-
-    compassHeading = wrapHeading360(compassHeading + step);
 }
 
 // ==============================
@@ -583,6 +655,21 @@ void Screen::handleSetOn(bool on, FrameCallback einkScreensaver)
             setScreensaverFrames(einkScreensaver);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+            // M19: before turning the panel off, paint a safe frame into the
+            // OLED's GDDRAM. The panel retains whatever was last written even
+            // while powered down, so when displayOn() is called later the
+            // screen would otherwise flash the previous frame's content for
+            // 16-50 ms before the next ui->update() lands. Painting the
+            // LOCKED frame now ensures the only thing the operator (or
+            // someone over their shoulder) can see on wake is the redacted
+            // view. Gated on lockdown — non-lockdown builds keep the
+            // previous frame as a UX cue that the display is just dimmed.
+            // dispdev is dereferenced unguarded throughout this file (incl.
+            // displayOff() just below), so no null check here.
+            drawLockdownLockScreen(dispdev);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef PIN_EINK_EN
             digitalWrite(PIN_EINK_EN, LOW);
 #elif defined(PCA_PIN_EINK_EN)
@@ -702,6 +789,27 @@ void Screen::setup()
 #endif
     LOG_INFO("Applied screen brightness: %d", brightness);
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN) && defined(USE_EINK)
+    // M20: e-ink panels physically retain the last-rendered image without
+    // power, so a power-cycled lockdown handheld would keep showing
+    // operator-identifying content (position, messages, node info) until
+    // the firmware's first natural refresh — which on e-ink can be seconds
+    // into boot. Force a full refresh to the LOCKED frame here, immediately
+    // after the display is initialised and before any other rendering, so
+    // the persistent pixels are wiped to the redacted view before an
+    // observer can see them.
+    if (meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay()) {
+        drawLockdownLockScreen(dispdev);
+#if defined(USE_EINK_PARALLELDISPLAY)
+        // Parallel-display variants drive refresh through a different path;
+        // a bare drawLockdownLockScreen above lands the frame into the
+        // panel buffer and the next ui->update() commits it as normal.
+#else
+        static_cast<EInkDisplay *>(dispdev)->forceDisplay();
+#endif
+    }
+#endif
+
     // Set custom overlay callbacks
     static OverlayCallback overlays[] = {
         graphics::UIRenderer::drawNavigationBar // Custom indicator icons for each frame
@@ -809,10 +917,16 @@ void Screen::setOn(bool on, FrameCallback einkScreensaver)
     if (cardKbI2cImpl)
         cardKbI2cImpl->toggleBacklight(on);
 #endif
-    if (!on)
+    if (!on) {
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+        // Screen powering off (idle timeout, shutdown, deep sleep) latches
+        // the screen-lock. Next time the display wakes it shows the LOCKED
+        // frame until a client authenticates with the passphrase.
+        meshtastic_security::lockScreen();
+#endif
         // We handle off commands immediately, because they might be called because the CPU is shutting down
         handleSetOn(false, einkScreensaver);
-    else
+    } else
         enqueueCmd(ScreenCmd{.cmd = Cmd::SET_ON});
 }
 
@@ -919,7 +1033,17 @@ int32_t Screen::runOnce()
 #endif
 
 #ifndef DISABLE_WELCOME_UNSET
-    if (!NotificationRenderer::isOverlayBannerShowing() && config.lora.region == meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET) {
+    bool suppressRegionOnboard = false;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+    // While lockdown is active and storage is still locked, config.lora.region
+    // is a deliberate UNSET placeholder — the real region lives in encrypted
+    // storage and is restored on unlock (see NodeDB's locked-boot path). Don't
+    // pop the region picker over the lock screen: it would trap input, and the
+    // operator can't set a region until they unlock anyway.
+    suppressRegionOnboard = meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay();
+#endif
+    if (!suppressRegionOnboard && !NotificationRenderer::isOverlayBannerShowing() &&
+        config.lora.region == meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET) {
 #if defined(OLED_TINY)
         menuHandler::LoraRegionPicker();
 #else
@@ -1635,6 +1759,15 @@ void Screen::handleStartFirmwareUpdateScreen()
 
 void Screen::blink()
 {
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+    // L4: defensive guard. blink() paints arbitrary geometry, not node
+    // data, so it doesn't actually leak today. But it bypasses the normal
+    // ui->update() path that the lockdown short-circuit gates, so any
+    // future change that puts content into blink would silently leak past
+    // redaction. Refuse to draw when the redaction latch is set.
+    if (meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay())
+        return;
+#endif
     setFastFramerate();
     uint8_t count = 10;
     dispdev->setBrightness(254);

src/graphics/Screen.h

@@ -12,7 +12,21 @@
 #define getStringCenteredX(s) ((SCREEN_WIDTH - display->getStringWidth(s)) / 2)
 namespace graphics
 {
-enum notificationTypeEnum { none, text_banner, selection_picker, node_picker, number_picker, hex_picker, text_input };
+enum notificationTypeEnum {
+    none,
+    text_banner,
+    selection_picker,
+    node_picker,
+    number_picker,
+    hex_picker,
+    text_input,
+    // BLE pairing PIN banner. Treated specially by the lockdown short-circuit
+    // in Screen.cpp: the PIN is ephemeral (regenerated per pair attempt) and
+    // not a real secret, so we allow ui->update() to composite it over the
+    // LOCKED frame. Without this, a first-pair on a locked device cannot
+    // complete because the PIN never renders.
+    pairing_pin,
+};
 
 struct BannerOverlayOptions {
     const char *message;

src/graphics/TFTDisplay.cpp

@@ -1533,8 +1533,7 @@ bool TFTDisplay::hasTouch(void)
 {
 #ifdef RAK14014
     return true;
-#elif !defined(M5STACK) && !defined(HACKADAY_COMMUNICATOR) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T096) &&                                 \
-    !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T1)
+#elif !defined(M5STACK) && !defined(HACKADAY_COMMUNICATOR) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T096) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T1)
     return tft->touch() != nullptr;
 #else
     return false;
@@ -1553,8 +1552,7 @@ bool TFTDisplay::getTouch(int16_t *x, int16_t *y)
     } else {
         return false;
     }
-#elif !defined(M5STACK) && !defined(HACKADAY_COMMUNICATOR) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T096) &&                                 \
-    !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T1)
+#elif !defined(M5STACK) && !defined(HACKADAY_COMMUNICATOR) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T096) && !defined(HELTEC_MESH_NODE_T1)
     return tft->getTouch(x, y);
 #else
     return false;

src/graphics/draw/MenuHandler.cpp

@@ -180,6 +180,18 @@ static void applyLoraRegion(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode region, bool
     config.lora.region = region;
     config.lora.channel_num = 0; // Reset to default channel
 
+    // Reconcile the preset with the explicitly chosen region: a preset locked to another
+    // region would leave config.lora invalid until applyModemConfig() repairs it with
+    // error/critical-error side effects — or, for the swappable EU trio, the clamp would
+    // flip the region right back. The user picked the region, so the preset follows it.
+    const RegionInfo *newRegion = getRegion(region);
+    if (config.lora.use_preset && !newRegion->supportsPreset(config.lora.modem_preset)) {
+        LOG_INFO("Preset %s not available in %s, using default %s",
+                 DisplayFormatters::getModemPresetDisplayName(config.lora.modem_preset, false, true), newRegion->name,
+                 DisplayFormatters::getModemPresetDisplayName(newRegion->getDefaultPreset(), false, true));
+        config.lora.modem_preset = newRegion->getDefaultPreset();
+    }
+
     if (isHam && adminModule) {
         meshtastic_HamParameters hamParams = meshtastic_HamParameters_init_zero;
         strncpy(hamParams.call_sign, "N0CALL", sizeof(hamParams.call_sign) - 1);
@@ -199,7 +211,7 @@ static void applyLoraRegion(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode region, bool
         config.lora.ignore_mqtt = true;
     }
     if (strncmp(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, default_mqtt_root, strlen(default_mqtt_root)) == 0) {
-        sprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
+        snprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, sizeof(moduleConfig.mqtt.root), "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
         changes |= SEGMENT_MODULECONFIG;
     }
     service->reloadConfig(changes);
@@ -263,13 +275,17 @@ void menuHandler::LoraRegionPicker(uint32_t duration)
                 return;
             }
 
-            // Guard: without a reboot, reconfigure() applies the region directly.
-            // Reject LORA_24 on sub-GHz-only hardware — getRadio() used to catch this post-reboot.
-            // TODO: change this to either use the validateLoraConfig() logic or at least check the region for wideLora
-            // rather than a hardcoded check for LORA_24.
-            if (selectedRegion == meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_LORA_24 &&
-                !(RadioLibInterface::instance && RadioLibInterface::instance->wideLora())) {
-                LOG_WARN("Radio hardware does not support 2.4 GHz; ignoring region selection");
+            // Guard: without a reboot, reconfigure() applies the region directly, so reject
+            // regions this node can't use up front: unrecognized codes, licensed-only regions,
+            // and radio hardware mismatches (2.4 GHz vs sub-GHz) — the same checks the admin
+            // set-config path applies, but side-effect-free: ignoring a menu selection should
+            // not record a critical error or notify clients. getRadio() used to catch hardware
+            // mismatches post-reboot only.
+            auto candidateLora = config.lora;
+            candidateLora.region = selectedRegion;
+            char regionErr[160];
+            if (!RadioInterface::checkConfigRegion(candidateLora, regionErr, sizeof(regionErr))) {
+                LOG_WARN("Ignoring region selection: %s", regionErr);
                 return;
             }
 
@@ -1556,6 +1572,7 @@ void menuHandler::manageNodeMenu()
                 nodeDB->set_favorite(false, menuHandler::pickedNodeNum);
             } else {
                 LOG_INFO("Adding node %08X to favorites", menuHandler::pickedNodeNum);
+                // set_favorite() already logs PROTECTED_CAP_WARN_FMT on a cap refusal; don't double-log here.
                 nodeDB->set_favorite(true, menuHandler::pickedNodeNum);
             }
             screen->setFrames(graphics::Screen::FOCUS_PRESERVE);
@@ -1599,15 +1616,23 @@ void menuHandler::manageNodeMenu()
                 return;
             }
 
+            bool changed = false;
             if (nodeInfoLiteIsIgnored(n)) {
                 nodeInfoLiteSetBit(n, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, false);
                 LOG_INFO("Unignoring node %08X", menuHandler::pickedNodeNum);
-            } else {
-                nodeInfoLiteSetBit(n, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, true);
+                changed = true;
+            } else if (nodeDB->setProtectedFlag(n, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, true)) {
                 LOG_INFO("Ignoring node %08X", menuHandler::pickedNodeNum);
+                changed = true;
+            } else {
+                LOG_WARN(NodeDB::PROTECTED_CAP_WARN_FMT, "ignore", menuHandler::pickedNodeNum, MAX_NUM_NODES - 2);
+            }
+            // Only persist/notify when the ignore bit actually moved; a cap
+            // refusal changed nothing and shouldn't trigger a prefs save.
+            if (changed) {
+                nodeDB->notifyObservers(true);
+                nodeDB->saveToDisk();
             }
-            nodeDB->notifyObservers(true);
-            nodeDB->saveToDisk();
             screen->setFrames(graphics::Screen::FOCUS_PRESERVE);
             return;
         }

src/graphics/draw/NotificationRenderer.cpp

@@ -260,6 +260,12 @@ void NotificationRenderer::drawBannercallback(OLEDDisplay *display, OLEDDisplayU
         break;
     case notificationTypeEnum::text_banner:
     case notificationTypeEnum::selection_picker:
+    case notificationTypeEnum::pairing_pin:
+        // pairing_pin is rendered the same as text_banner — it's just a
+        // text banner. The split type exists only so the lockdown UI
+        // short-circuit in Screen.cpp can recognise the BLE pair-PIN
+        // banner as the one safe banner to composite over the LOCKED
+        // frame.
         drawAlertBannerOverlay(display, state);
         break;
     case notificationTypeEnum::node_picker:

src/graphics/niche/InkHUD/Applets/System/Menu/MenuAction.h

@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ enum MenuAction {
     // Administration
     RESET_NODEDB_ALL,
     RESET_NODEDB_KEEP_FAVORITES,
+    WIPE_MESSAGES_ALL,
 };
 
 } // namespace NicheGraphics::InkHUD

src/graphics/niche/InkHUD/Applets/System/Menu/MenuApplet.cpp

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "GPS.h"
 #include "MeshRadio.h"
 #include "MeshService.h"
+#include "MessageStore.h"
 #include "RTC.h"
 #include "Router.h"
 #include "airtime.h"
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static void applyLoRaRegion(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode region)
     }
 
     if (strncmp(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, default_mqtt_root, strlen(default_mqtt_root)) == 0) {
-        sprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
+        snprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, sizeof(moduleConfig.mqtt.root), "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
         changes |= SEGMENT_MODULECONFIG;
     }
     // Notify UI that changes are being applied
@@ -1013,6 +1014,13 @@ void InkHUD::MenuApplet::execute(MenuItem item)
         rebootAtMsec = millis() + DEFAULT_REBOOT_SECONDS * 1000;
         break;
 
+    case WIPE_MESSAGES_ALL:
+        LOG_INFO("Wiping all messages from menu");
+        messageStore.clearAllMessages();
+        inkhud->persistence->loadLatestMessage();
+        inkhud->forceUpdate(Drivers::EInk::UpdateTypes::FULL, true);
+        break;
+
     default:
         LOG_WARN("Action not implemented");
     }
@@ -1130,6 +1138,7 @@ void InkHUD::MenuApplet::showPage(MenuPage page)
         // Administration Section
         items.push_back(MenuItem::Header("Administration"));
         items.push_back(MenuItem("Reset NodeDB", MenuPage::NODE_CONFIG_ADMIN_RESET));
+        items.push_back(MenuItem("Wipe Messages", MenuPage::NODE_CONFIG_ADMIN_MESSAGES));
 
         // Exit
         items.push_back(MenuItem("Exit", MenuPage::EXIT));
@@ -1534,6 +1543,13 @@ void InkHUD::MenuApplet::showPage(MenuPage page)
         items.push_back(MenuItem("Exit", MenuPage::EXIT));
         break;
 
+    case NODE_CONFIG_ADMIN_MESSAGES:
+        previousPage = MenuPage::NODE_CONFIG;
+        items.push_back(MenuItem("Back", previousPage));
+        items.push_back(MenuItem("Wipe All Messages", MenuAction::WIPE_MESSAGES_ALL, MenuPage::EXIT));
+        items.push_back(MenuItem("Exit", MenuPage::EXIT));
+        break;
+
     // Exit
     case EXIT:
         sendToBackground(); // Menu applet dismissed, allow normal behavior to resume

src/graphics/niche/InkHUD/Applets/System/Menu/MenuPage.h

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ enum MenuPage : uint8_t {
     NODE_CONFIG_BLUETOOTH,
     NODE_CONFIG_POSITION,
     NODE_CONFIG_ADMIN_RESET,
+    NODE_CONFIG_ADMIN_MESSAGES,
     TIMEZONE,
     APPLETS,
     AUTOSHOW,

src/graphics/niche/InkHUD/Persistence.cpp

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ void InkHUD::Persistence::loadSettings()
 // are immediately available to applets (DMApplet, AllMessageApplet, NotificationApplet).
 void InkHUD::Persistence::loadLatestMessage()
 {
+    latestMessage = LatestMessage();
+
     int lastBroadcastPos = -1, lastDMPos = -1, pos = 0;
     for (const StoredMessage &m : messageStore.getLiveMessages()) {
         if (m.type == MessageType::BROADCAST) {
@@ -75,4 +77,4 @@ void InkHUD::Persistence::printSettings(Settings *settings)
 }
 */
 
-#endif
+#endif

src/input/InputBroker.cpp

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
 #include "configuration.h"
 #include "graphics/Screen.h"
 #include "modules/ExternalNotificationModule.h"
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+#include "security/LockdownDisplay.h"
+#endif
 
 #if ARCH_PORTDUINO
 #include "input/LinuxInputImpl.h"
@@ -122,6 +125,22 @@ int InputBroker::handleInputEvent(const InputEvent *event)
     }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+    // Lockdown: when the display is redacted (storage locked, or screen-lock
+    // latch set after idle) the screen content is hidden, but local input
+    // would otherwise still flow into UI handlers — letting an operator
+    // drive menus, fire canned messages, change settings etc. blind. Eat
+    // the event here so input is no-op until the redaction clears.
+    // The latch is cleared only by unlockScreen() on a successful
+    // passphrase auth (see PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline) — local
+    // input does not clear it, even if storage happens to be unlocked.
+    // PowerFSM was already triggered above, so the backlight still wakes
+    // to show the LOCKED frame — the input just doesn't act on anything.
+    if (meshtastic_security::shouldRedactDisplay()) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
     this->notifyObservers(event);
     return 0;
 }

src/main.cpp

@@ -68,6 +68,19 @@ void nrf54l15Loop();
 NRF54L15Bluetooth *nrf54l15Bluetooth = nullptr;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT
+#include "security/APProtect.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#include "security/EncryptedStorage.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+#include "mesh/PhoneAPI.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+#include "security/LockdownDisplay.h"
+#endif
+
 #if HAS_WIFI || defined(USE_WS5500) || defined(USE_CH390D)
 #include "mesh/api/WiFiServerAPI.h"
 #include "mesh/wifi/WiFiAPClient.h"
@@ -379,6 +392,14 @@ void setup()
     consoleInit(); // Set serial baud rate and init our mesh console
 #endif
 
+    // M23 (audit): APPROTECT engagement moved below fsInit() so we can gate
+    // on EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned(). Engaging on an unprovisioned dev
+    // board permanently locks SWD before the operator has even set a
+    // passphrase — a misconfigured CI build flashed to a developer device
+    // would brick its debug port on first boot. Now we only engage when the
+    // device has a DEK file on flash, i.e. the operator has explicitly
+    // committed to lockdown via passphrase provisioning.
+
 #ifdef UNPHONE
     unphone.printStore();
 #endif
@@ -409,7 +430,12 @@ void setup()
 #endif
 #endif
 
-#if defined(DEBUG_MUTE) && defined(DEBUG_PORT)
+    // The DEBUG_MUTE "we are muted, FYI" banner spills APP_VERSION / APP_ENV /
+    // APP_REPO out the USB CDC even with logging otherwise suppressed — a free
+    // firmware-fingerprinting primitive for an attacker holding the cable.
+    // Under MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN we want the device to look uniformly silent
+    // until the operator authenticates, so skip the banner entirely there.
+#if defined(DEBUG_MUTE) && defined(DEBUG_PORT) && !defined(MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN)
     DEBUG_PORT.printf("\r\n\r\n//\\ E S H T /\\ S T / C\r\n");
     DEBUG_PORT.printf("Version %s for %s from %s\r\n", optstr(APP_VERSION), optstr(APP_ENV), optstr(APP_REPO));
     DEBUG_PORT.printf("Debug mute is enabled, there will be no serial output.\r\n");
@@ -481,6 +507,38 @@ void setup()
 
     fsInit();
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    EncryptedStorage::initLocked();
+    if (!EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked()) {
+        if (!EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned()) {
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: Device not provisioned — connect and set a passphrase to unlock storage");
+        } else {
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: Device locked — connect and provide passphrase to unlock storage");
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT) && defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE)
+    // M23 (audit): only engage the irreversible UICR APPROTECT lockout once
+    // the device has been provisioned with a passphrase. A misconfigured
+    // CI build of a lockdown variant flashed to a developer board would
+    // otherwise burn SWD on first boot before the operator has even set a
+    // passphrase, taking the board out of the dev/recovery workflow with
+    // no real security benefit (there's no DEK to protect yet). Once a
+    // DEK file exists, the operator has committed to lockdown — engaging
+    // APPROTECT then is the protection they asked for.
+    if (EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned()) {
+        enableAPProtect();
+    } else {
+        LOG_INFO("APPROTECT deferred: device not yet provisioned");
+    }
+#elif defined(MESHTASTIC_ENABLE_APPROTECT)
+    // Lockdown without encrypted storage shouldn't be reachable per
+    // configuration.h, but if it ever is, fall back to the unconditional
+    // engagement.
+    enableAPProtect();
+#endif
+
 #if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_I2C
 #if defined(I2C_SDA1) && defined(ARCH_RP2040)
     Wire1.setSDA(I2C_SDA1);
@@ -1077,6 +1135,11 @@ uint32_t rebootAtMsec;     // If not zero we will reboot at this time (used to r
 uint32_t shutdownAtMsec;   // If not zero we will shutdown at this time (used to shutdown from python or mobile client)
 bool suppressRebootBanner; // If true, suppress "Rebooting..." overlay (used for OTA handoff)
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+volatile bool lockdownReloadPending;  // see main.h — deferred NodeDB reload after lockdown unlock
+volatile bool lockdownDisablePending; // see main.h — deferred decrypt-revert after lockdown disable
+#endif
+
 // If a thread does something that might need for it to be rescheduled ASAP it can set this flag
 // This will suppress the current delay and instead try to run ASAP.
 bool runASAP;
@@ -1128,7 +1191,7 @@ extern meshtastic_DeviceMetadata getDeviceMetadata()
 // No bluetooth on these targets (yet):
 // Pico W / 2W may get it at some point
 // Portduino and ESP32-C6 are excluded because we don't have a working bluetooth stacks integrated yet.
-#if defined(ARCH_RP2040) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32WL) || defined(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C6)
+#if defined(ARCH_RP2040) || defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || defined(ARCH_STM32) || defined(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32C6)
     deviceMetadata.excluded_modules |= meshtastic_ExcludedModules_BLUETOOTH_CONFIG;
 #endif
 
@@ -1161,6 +1224,85 @@ void loop()
 {
     runASAP = false;
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+    if (lockdownDisablePending) {
+        lockdownDisablePending = false;
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: disabling — reverting encrypted storage to plaintext");
+        if (nodeDB->disableLockdownToPlaintext()) {
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: disabled, rebooting into normal mode");
+            PhoneAPI::broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_DISABLED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+            rebootAtMsec = millis() + DEFAULT_REBOOT_SECONDS * 1000;
+        } else {
+            // Revert failed mid-way (a file couldn't be decrypted/rewritten).
+            // The DEK file is still present (it's deleted last), so the device
+            // stays in lockdown and the operator can retry disable. Surface
+            // the failure rather than leaving the client hanging.
+            LOG_ERROR("Lockdown: disable revert failed — device remains in lockdown");
+            PhoneAPI::broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "disable_failed", 0, 0, 0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (lockdownReloadPending) {
+        lockdownReloadPending = false;
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: reloading config from disk after unlock");
+        bool reloadOk = nodeDB->reloadFromDisk();
+        if (!reloadOk) {
+            // Storage decrypt/decode failed during reload. Treat as
+            // unrecoverable for this boot: lock storage, revoke any
+            // auth that managed to slip through (defense in depth — the
+            // cold-unlock path doesn't authorize until completion, but
+            // a concurrent re-verify-path call from another connection
+            // might have), and notify clients. Storage will be locked
+            // on next boot anyway; deferring to the user-visible
+            // notification path is sufficient for now.
+            LOG_ERROR("Lockdown: reload failed — locking and notifying clients");
+            EncryptedStorage::lockNow();
+            PhoneAPI::revokeAllAuth();
+        }
+        PhoneAPI::completePendingUnlocks(reloadOk);
+    }
+
+    // Periodic session-expiry check. Cheap — millis() comparison. Don't
+    // hammer it every loop tick; once a second is plenty.
+    static uint32_t lastSessionCheckMs = 0;
+    if (millis() - lastSessionCheckMs > 1000) {
+        lastSessionCheckMs = millis();
+        if (rebootAtMsec == 0 && EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked() && EncryptedStorage::isSessionExpired()) {
+            // The session expired. Two paths:
+            //   1. Budget remains (bootsRemaining > 0): decrement the
+            //      on-flash boot count in place, revoke per-connection
+            //      auth, re-engage screen redaction, re-arm the uptime
+            //      timer — all WITHOUT rebooting. Storage stays unlocked
+            //      so the mesh keeps routing. Clients must re-authenticate
+            //      to see content again. The decrement is what enforces
+            //      the rollback ceiling — bootsRemaining ticks down
+            //      monotonically whether the device reboots or not.
+            //   2. Budget exhausted (bootsRemaining == 0): no more
+            //      sessions to grant. Hard lock (token deleted, DEK
+            //      zeroed) and reboot. Operator must re-enter passphrase.
+            if (EncryptedStorage::getBootsRemaining() == 0) {
+                LOG_WARN("Lockdown: session limit reached and boot budget exhausted, locking and rebooting");
+                EncryptedStorage::lockNow();
+                PhoneAPI::revokeAllAuth();
+                PhoneAPI::broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "session_budget_exhausted", 0, 0, 0);
+                rebootAtMsec = millis() + DEFAULT_REBOOT_SECONDS * 1000;
+            } else {
+                uint8_t newBoots = EncryptedStorage::consumeSessionBoot();
+                LOG_WARN("Lockdown: session expired, rolled to next budget slot (boots=%u remaining)", newBoots);
+                PhoneAPI::revokeAllAuth();
+                meshtastic_security::lockScreen();
+                // Signal clients that they need to re-auth on this
+                // connection. Storage is still unlocked (DEK in RAM,
+                // mesh keeps routing) but per-connection auth is gone.
+                // Reusing the LOCKED(needs_auth) post-config emission
+                // pattern so existing clients don't need a new state.
+                PhoneAPI::broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "needs_auth", newBoots,
+                                                  EncryptedStorage::getValidUntilEpoch(), 0);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
 #ifdef ARCH_ESP32
     esp32Loop();
 #endif

src/main.h

@@ -92,6 +92,19 @@ extern uint32_t rebootAtMsec;
 extern uint32_t shutdownAtMsec;
 extern bool suppressRebootBanner;
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+// Set by PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline after a successful unlock.
+// Serviced on the main loop thread because NodeDB::reloadFromDisk() is
+// too heavy for the BLE/serial transport callback stack.
+extern volatile bool lockdownReloadPending;
+
+// Set by PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline on a disable request (after the
+// passphrase is verified). Serviced on the main loop thread: decrypt every
+// pref back to plaintext, remove the lockdown artifacts, reboot. Heavy file
+// IO, same reason as lockdownReloadPending.
+extern volatile bool lockdownDisablePending;
+#endif
+
 extern uint32_t serialSinceMsec;
 
 // If a thread does something that might need for it to be rescheduled ASAP it can set this flag

src/memGet.cpp

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 #include <malloc.h>
 #include <unistd.h> // sbrk
 
-#ifdef ARCH_STM32WL
+#if defined(ARCH_STM32)
 // Returns the uncommitted sbrk headroom: addressable space between the current heap
 // break and the stack pointer that has not yet been committed to the arena.
 static uint32_t sbrkHeadroom()

src/mesh/Channels.cpp

@@ -404,6 +404,42 @@ bool Channels::isDefaultChannel(ChannelIndex chIndex)
     return false;
 }
 
+bool cryptoKeyIsPublic(const CryptoKey &key)
+{
+    if (key.length == 0)
+        return true; // encryption disabled
+    // Match the defaultpsk family ignoring its last byte (getKey() bumps only that byte per 1-byte index).
+    if (key.length == (int)sizeof(defaultpsk) && memcmp(key.bytes, defaultpsk, sizeof(defaultpsk) - 1) == 0)
+        return true;
+    return false;
+}
+
+bool Channels::usesPublicKey(ChannelIndex chIndex)
+{
+    const meshtastic_Channel &ch = getByIndex(chIndex);
+    if (!ch.has_settings || ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED)
+        return false;
+
+    const auto &psk = ch.settings.psk;
+    if (psk.size == 0) {
+        // Secondary channels inherit the primary key when unset; primary size==0 means encryption disabled.
+        if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_SECONDARY) {
+            // Guard against malformed configs with no PRIMARY channel (primaryIndex could point back to us).
+            if (primaryIndex == chIndex)
+                return true; // fail closed: treat as public
+            return usesPublicKey(primaryIndex);
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    if (psk.size == 1) {
+        // Short PSK aliases: 0 disables encryption; 1..255 are the public defaultpsk family.
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    return (psk.size == sizeof(defaultpsk) && memcmp(psk.bytes, defaultpsk, sizeof(defaultpsk) - 1) == 0);
+}
+
 bool Channels::hasDefaultChannel()
 {
     // If we don't use a preset or the default frequency slot, or we override the frequency, we don't have a default channel

src/mesh/Channels.h

@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ class Channels
     // Returns true if the channel has the default name and PSK
     bool isDefaultChannel(ChannelIndex chIndex);
 
+    // Returns true if this channel's effective key is publicly decryptable (open or well-known/default PSK).
+    bool usesPublicKey(ChannelIndex chIndex);
+
     // Returns true if we can be reached via a channel with the default settings given a region and modem preset
     bool hasDefaultChannel();
 
@@ -144,6 +147,9 @@ extern Channels channels;
 static const uint8_t defaultpsk[] = {0xd4, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x20, 0x29, 0x07, 0x59,
                                      0xf0, 0xbc, 0xff, 0xab, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0x69, 0x01};
 
+/// True if a getKey()-resolved key offers no privacy: length 0 (off) or the public defaultpsk family. Pure; for tests.
+bool cryptoKeyIsPublic(const CryptoKey &key);
+
 static const uint8_t eventpsk[] = {0x38, 0x4b, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0x1d, 0xc0, 0x22, 0xd1, 0x81, 0xbf, 0x36,
                                    0xb8, 0x61, 0x21, 0xe1, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xb7, 0x2e, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x74,
                                    0x22, 0x7e, 0x9d, 0x6a, 0xfb, 0x48, 0xd6, 0x4c, 0xb1, 0xa1};

src/mesh/CryptoEngine.cpp

@@ -12,10 +12,18 @@
 #include <Curve25519.h>
 #include <RNG.h>
 #include <SHA256.h>
-#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
-#if !defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
-#define CryptRNG RNG
+
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+#include "XEdDSA.h"
+#include <Ed25519.h>
+
+#ifndef NUM_LIMBS_256BIT
+#define NUM_LIMBS_BITS(n) (((n) + sizeof(limb_t) * 8 - 1) / (8 * sizeof(limb_t)))
+#define NUM_LIMBS_256BIT NUM_LIMBS_BITS(256)
 #endif
+#endif
+
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
 
 /**
  * Create a public/private key pair with Curve25519.
@@ -46,6 +54,9 @@ void CryptoEngine::generateKeyPair(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey)
     Curve25519::dh1(public_key, private_key);
     memcpy(pubKey, public_key, sizeof(public_key));
     memcpy(privKey, private_key, sizeof(private_key));
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+    XEdDSA::priv_curve_to_ed_keys(private_key, xeddsa_private_key, xeddsa_public_key);
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -65,6 +76,9 @@ bool CryptoEngine::regeneratePublicKey(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey)
         }
         memcpy(private_key, privKey, sizeof(private_key));
         memcpy(public_key, pubKey, sizeof(public_key));
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+        XEdDSA::priv_curve_to_ed_keys(private_key, xeddsa_private_key, xeddsa_public_key);
+#endif
     } else {
         LOG_WARN("X25519 key generation failed due to blank private key");
         return false;
@@ -72,6 +86,97 @@ bool CryptoEngine::regeneratePublicKey(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey)
     return true;
 }
 
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+/**
+ * Build a signing buffer that covers packet metadata and payload:
+ *   [fromNode(4) | packetId(4) | portnum(4) | payload(N)]
+ * This prevents replay, reattribution, and portnum redirection attacks.
+ */
+static size_t buildSigningBuffer(uint8_t *buf, size_t bufSize, uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum,
+                                 const uint8_t *payload, size_t payloadLen)
+{
+    const size_t headerLen = sizeof(uint32_t) * 3;
+    size_t totalLen = headerLen + payloadLen;
+    if (totalLen > bufSize)
+        return 0;
+    // May need endian conversion for oddball platforms.
+    memcpy(buf, &fromNode, sizeof(uint32_t));
+    memcpy(buf + sizeof(uint32_t), &packetId, sizeof(uint32_t));
+    memcpy(buf + sizeof(uint32_t) * 2, &portnum, sizeof(uint32_t));
+    memcpy(buf + headerLen, payload, payloadLen);
+    return totalLen;
+}
+
+bool CryptoEngine::xeddsa_sign(uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payloadLen,
+                               uint8_t *signature)
+{
+    if (memfll(xeddsa_private_key, 0, sizeof(xeddsa_private_key)))
+        return false;
+    uint8_t sigBuf[MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+    size_t sigLen = buildSigningBuffer(sigBuf, sizeof(sigBuf), fromNode, packetId, portnum, payload, payloadLen);
+    if (sigLen == 0)
+        return false;
+    // the XEdDSA::sign function requires at least the first 32 bytes of signature to be pre-filled with randomness
+    HardwareRNG::fill(signature, 32);
+    XEdDSA::sign(signature, xeddsa_private_key, xeddsa_public_key, sigBuf, sigLen);
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool CryptoEngine::xeddsa_verify(const uint8_t *pubKey, uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum,
+                                 const uint8_t *payload, size_t payloadLen, const uint8_t *signature)
+{
+    // Use cached Ed25519 key if the Curve25519 key matches, avoiding expensive field inversion
+    if (memcmp(pubKey, cached_curve_pubkey, 32) != 0) {
+        curve_to_ed_pub(pubKey, cached_ed_pubkey);
+        memcpy(cached_curve_pubkey, pubKey, 32);
+    }
+    uint8_t sigBuf[MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+    size_t sigLen = buildSigningBuffer(sigBuf, sizeof(sigBuf), fromNode, packetId, portnum, payload, payloadLen);
+    if (sigLen == 0)
+        return false;
+    return XEdDSA::verify(signature, cached_ed_pubkey, sigBuf, sigLen);
+}
+
+void CryptoEngine::curve_to_ed_pub(const uint8_t *curve_pubkey, uint8_t *ed_pubkey)
+{
+
+    // Apply the birational map defined in RFC 7748, section 4.1 "Curve25519" to calculate an Ed25519 public
+    // key from a Curve25519 public key. Because the serialization format of Curve25519 public keys only
+    // contains the u coordinate, the x coordinate of the corresponding Ed25519 public key can't be uniquely
+    // calculated as defined by the birational map. The x coordinate is represented in the serialization
+    // format of Ed25519 public keys only in a single sign bit. XEdDSA always normalizes the Ed25519 public
+    // key to a sign bit of zero (the signer negates its key pair when needed), so this function clears the
+    // sign bit unconditionally below instead of taking it as an input.
+    fe u, y;
+    fe one;
+    fe u_minus_one, u_plus_one, u_plus_one_inv;
+
+    // Parse the Curve25519 public key input as a field element containing the u coordinate. RFC 7748,
+    // section 5 "The X25519 and X448 Functions", mandates that the most significant bit of the Curve25519
+    // public key has to be zeroized. This is handled by fe_frombytes internally.
+    fe_frombytes(u, curve_pubkey);
+
+    // Calculate the parameters (u - 1) and (u + 1)
+    fe_1(one);
+    fe_sub(u_minus_one, u, one);
+    fe_add(u_plus_one, u, one);
+
+    // Invert u + 1
+    fe_invert(u_plus_one_inv, u_plus_one);
+
+    // Calculate y = (u - 1) * inv(u + 1) (mod p)
+    fe_mul(y, u_minus_one, u_plus_one_inv);
+
+    // Serialize the field element containing the y coordinate to the Ed25519 public key output
+    fe_tobytes(ed_pubkey, y);
+
+    // Set the sign bit to zero
+    ed_pubkey[31] &= 0x7f;
+
+    // need to convert the pubkey y = ( u - 1) * inv( u + 1) (mod p).
+}
+#endif
+
 bool CryptoEngine::ensurePkiKeys(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig &security, meshtastic_User &user)
 {
     if (user.is_licensed) {

src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct CryptoKey {
 
 #define MAX_BLOCKSIZE 256
 #define TEST_CURVE25519_FIELD_OPS // Exposes Curve25519::isWeakPoint() for testing keys
+#define XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE 64
 
 class CryptoEngine
 {
@@ -37,7 +38,12 @@ class CryptoEngine
     virtual void generateKeyPair(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey);
     virtual bool regeneratePublicKey(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey);
     virtual bool ensurePkiKeys(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig &security, meshtastic_User &user);
-
+#endif
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+    bool xeddsa_sign(uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payloadLen,
+                     uint8_t *signature);
+    bool xeddsa_verify(const uint8_t *pubKey, uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum, const uint8_t *payload,
+                       size_t payloadLen, const uint8_t *signature);
 #endif
     void setDHPrivateKey(uint8_t *_private_key);
     // The remotePublic key parameter takes the public_key bytes container from
@@ -85,6 +91,14 @@ class CryptoEngine
 #if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
     uint8_t shared_key[32] = {0};
     uint8_t private_key[32] = {0};
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+    uint8_t xeddsa_public_key[32] = {0};
+    uint8_t xeddsa_private_key[32] = {0};
+    void curve_to_ed_pub(const uint8_t *curve_pubkey, uint8_t *ed_pubkey);
+    // Single-entry cache for curve_to_ed_pub conversion (avoids expensive field inversion per packet)
+    uint8_t cached_curve_pubkey[32] = {0};
+    uint8_t cached_ed_pubkey[32] = {0};
+#endif
 #endif
     /**
      * Init our 128 bit nonce for a new packet

src/mesh/LoRaFEMInterface.cpp

@@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ static void releaseSleepHolds()
 void LoRaFEMInterface::init(void)
 {
     setLnaCanControl(false); // Default is uncontrollable
+#if defined(RF_PA_DETECT_PIN)
+    pinMode(RF_PA_DETECT_PIN, INPUT);
+    high_power_pa = (digitalRead(RF_PA_DETECT_PIN) == RF_PA_HIGH_POWER_VALUE);
+    LOG_INFO("Detected %s LoRa PA profile", high_power_pa ? "high-power" : "low-power");
+#endif
 #ifdef HELTEC_V4
     pinMode(LORA_PA_POWER, OUTPUT);
     digitalWrite(LORA_PA_POWER, HIGH);
@@ -119,6 +124,13 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::init(void)
     pinMode(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CTX, OUTPUT);
     digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CTX, LOW); // LNA enabled by default
     setLnaCanControl(true);
+#elif defined(USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY)
+    fem_type = KCT8103L_PA;
+    pinMode(LORA_KCT8103L_EN, OUTPUT);
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_EN, HIGH);
+    delay(1);
+    pinMode(LORA_KCT8103L_TX_RX, OUTPUT);
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_TX_RX, LOW);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -148,6 +160,9 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::setSleepModeEnable(void)
     // shutdown the PA
     digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CSD, LOW);
     digitalWrite(LORA_PA_POWER, LOW);
+#elif defined(USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY)
+    // shutdown the PA
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_EN, LOW);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -173,6 +188,9 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::setTxModeEnable(void)
     enableFEMPower();
     digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CSD, HIGH);
     digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CTX, HIGH);
+#elif defined(USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY)
+    enableFEMPower();
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_TX_RX, HIGH);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -206,6 +224,9 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::setRxModeEnable(void)
     } else {
         digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CTX, HIGH);
     }
+#elif defined(USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY)
+    enableFEMPower();
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_TX_RX, LOW);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -247,6 +268,9 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::setRxModeEnableWhenMCUSleep(void)
     rtc_gpio_hold_en((gpio_num_t)LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CSD);
     rtc_gpio_hold_en((gpio_num_t)LORA_KCT8103L_PA_CTX);
 #endif
+#elif defined(USE_KCT8103L_PA_ONLY)
+    enableFEMPower();
+    digitalWrite(LORA_KCT8103L_TX_RX, LOW);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -257,6 +281,11 @@ void LoRaFEMInterface::setLNAEnable(bool enabled)
 
 int8_t LoRaFEMInterface::powerConversion(int8_t loraOutputPower)
 {
+#if defined(RF_PA_DETECT_PIN)
+    if (!high_power_pa) {
+        return loraOutputPower;
+    }
+#endif
 #ifdef HELTEC_V4
     const uint16_t gc1109_tx_gain[] = {11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 9, 9, 8, 7};
     const uint16_t kct8103l_tx_gain[] = {13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 12, 12, 11, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7};

src/mesh/LoRaFEMInterface.h

@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ class LoRaFEMInterface
     LoRaFEMType fem_type;
     bool lna_enabled = true;
     bool lna_can_control = false;
+    bool high_power_pa = true;
 };
 extern LoRaFEMInterface loraFEMInterface;
 
-#endif
+#endif

src/mesh/MeshRadio.h

@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@ struct RegionInfo {
     // Preset accessors (delegate through profile)
     meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_ModemPreset getDefaultPreset() const { return defaultPreset; }
     const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_ModemPreset *getAvailablePresets() const { return profile->presets; }
+    bool supportsPreset(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_ModemPreset preset) const
+    {
+        for (size_t i = 0; profile->presets[i] != MODEM_PRESET_END; i++) {
+            if (profile->presets[i] == preset)
+                return true;
+        }
+        return false;
+    }
     size_t getNumPresets() const
     {
         size_t n = 0;

src/mesh/MeshService.h

@@ -141,6 +141,12 @@ class MeshService
     /// Release the next ClientNotification packet to pool.
     void releaseClientNotificationToPool(meshtastic_ClientNotification *p) { clientNotificationPool.release(p); }
 
+    /// Bump fromNum to signal connected clients to poll for new FromRadio data.
+    /// Used by code paths (e.g. lockdown status queueing) that surface a new
+    /// FromRadio variant without going through one of the existing pool-backed
+    /// senders.
+    void nudgeFromNum() { fromNum++; }
+
     /**
      *  Given a ToRadio buffer parse it and properly handle it (setup radio, owner or send packet into the mesh)
      * Called by PhoneAPI.handleToRadio.  Note: p is a scratch buffer, this function is allowed to write to it but it can not keep

src/mesh/NodeDB.h

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include "MeshTypes.h"
 #include "NodeStatus.h"
+#include "WarmNodeStore.h"
 #include "concurrency/Lock.h"
 #include "configuration.h"
 #include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
@@ -226,9 +227,25 @@ class NodeDB
     bool updateUser(uint32_t nodeId, meshtastic_User &p, uint8_t channelIndex = 0);
 
     /*
-     * Sets a node either favorite or unfavorite
+     * Sets a node either favorite or unfavorite. Returns true if the node ends
+     * up in the requested state; false if the node is unknown or favouriting
+     * was refused by the protected-node cap (MAX_NUM_NODES - 2).
      */
-    void set_favorite(bool is_favorite, uint32_t nodeId);
+    bool set_favorite(bool is_favorite, uint32_t nodeId);
+
+    /// Count of eviction-protected (favourite/ignored/manually-verified) nodes.
+    int numProtectedNodes() const;
+
+    /// printf-style warning emitted when setProtectedFlag() refuses a node at
+    /// the cap. %s = verb (favorite/ignore), 0x%08x = node, %d = cap. Shared by
+    /// LOG_WARN here and AdminModule::sendWarning so the wording stays in sync.
+    static constexpr const char *PROTECTED_CAP_WARN_FMT = "Can't %s 0x%08x: protected-node limit (%d) reached";
+
+    /// Turn an eviction-protection flag (favourite/ignored/verified) on/off. Off
+    /// always succeeds; on returns false (no change) once the protected set hits
+    /// the cap (MAX_NUM_NODES-2), keeping >=2 always-evictable slots. Callers
+    /// surface the refusal to the user.
+    bool setProtectedFlag(meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node, uint32_t mask, bool on);
 
     /*
      * Returns true if the node is in the NodeDB and marked as favorite
@@ -295,6 +312,24 @@ class NodeDB
 
     virtual meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *getMeshNode(NodeNum n);
     size_t getNumMeshNodes() { return numMeshNodes; }
+    /// Find a node in our DB, create an empty NodeInfoLite if missing (evicting
+    /// the oldest non-protected node when full). Public so admin handlers can
+    /// register a node we have not heard from yet (e.g. to block it by ID).
+    meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *getOrCreateMeshNode(NodeNum n);
+
+#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
+    // Warm ("long-tail") tier: minimal {num, last_heard, public_key} records
+    // for nodes evicted from the hot store. See WarmNodeStore.h.
+    WarmNodeStore warmStore;
+#endif
+
+    /// Copy the 32-byte public key for node n — hot store first, then the warm
+    /// tier. Returns false if we don't know a key for n.
+    bool copyPublicKey(NodeNum n, meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t &out);
+
+    /// last_heard of a hot-store node, or 0 if absent. Plain scan of meshNodes
+    /// with no allocation side effects (unlike getOrCreateMeshNode).
+    uint32_t hotNodeLastHeard(NodeNum n) const;
 
     // Thread-safe satellite-map accessors. Return false if absent or the
     // corresponding DB is compiled out.
@@ -341,11 +376,15 @@ class NodeDB
         emptyNodeDatabase.version = DEVICESTATE_CUR_VER;
         size_t nodeDatabaseSize;
         pb_get_encoded_size(&nodeDatabaseSize, meshtastic_NodeDatabase_fields, &emptyNodeDatabase);
-        // Always include satellite slots so backups from higher-cap peers
-        // decode without truncation, even when our build excludes the DBs.
-        return nodeDatabaseSize + (MAX_NUM_NODES * meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_size) +
-               (MAX_NUM_NODES * meshtastic_NodePositionEntry_size) + (MAX_NUM_NODES * meshtastic_NodeTelemetryEntry_size) +
-               (MAX_NUM_NODES * meshtastic_NodeEnvironmentEntry_size) + (MAX_NUM_NODES * meshtastic_NodeStatusEntry_size);
+        // Decode-stream size ceiling only — no buffer this big is allocated (load
+        // streams from the file). Sized for the largest file any prior firmware
+        // could write (250-node ESP32-S3, satellites uncapped) so capacity
+        // downgrades / peer backups still decode; excess is trimmed after load.
+        // (not constexpr: portduino resolves MAX_NUM_NODES from runtime config)
+        const size_t loadCeiling = ((size_t)MAX_NUM_NODES > 250) ? (size_t)MAX_NUM_NODES : 250;
+        return nodeDatabaseSize + (loadCeiling * meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_size) +
+               (loadCeiling * meshtastic_NodePositionEntry_size) + (loadCeiling * meshtastic_NodeTelemetryEntry_size) +
+               (loadCeiling * meshtastic_NodeEnvironmentEntry_size) + (loadCeiling * meshtastic_NodeStatusEntry_size);
     }
 
     // returns true if the maximum number of nodes is reached or we are running low on memory
@@ -376,6 +415,12 @@ class NodeDB
     bool checkLowEntropyPublicKey(const meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig_public_key_t &keyToTest);
 #endif
 
+    /// Consolidate crypto key generation logic used across multiple modules
+    /// @param privateKey Optional 32-byte private key to use. If nullptr, generates new random keys.
+    bool generateCryptoKeyPair(const uint8_t *privateKey = nullptr);
+
+    bool createNewIdentity();
+
     bool backupPreferences(meshtastic_AdminMessage_BackupLocation location);
     bool restorePreferences(meshtastic_AdminMessage_BackupLocation location,
                             int restoreWhat = SEGMENT_CONFIG | SEGMENT_MODULECONFIG | SEGMENT_DEVICESTATE | SEGMENT_CHANNELS);
@@ -388,15 +433,46 @@ class NodeDB
         newStatus.notifyObservers(&status);
     }
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    /// Re-run loadFromDisk() after the encrypted storage is unlocked at runtime.
+    /// Trigger: PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline sets lockdownReloadPending
+    /// on a successful provisionPassphrase / unlockWithPassphrase; the main
+    /// loop in main.cpp services the flag and calls this method on the main
+    /// thread. The transport callback stack (BLE/USB) is too small for the
+    /// file IO + MAX_NUM_NODES vector reserve + proto decode this triggers.
+    ///
+    /// Returns true iff every encrypted file decrypted and decoded cleanly.
+    /// On false the caller MUST treat the storage as corrupt: leave the
+    /// connection unauthenticated, emit a LOCKED(storage_corrupt) status,
+    /// and refuse to call setAdminAuthorized — otherwise a subsequent
+    /// set_config would re-encrypt a wrong baseline (the locked-default
+    /// values still resident in `config` / `channelFile` / `nodeDatabase`)
+    /// and overwrite the operator's persisted state.
+    bool reloadFromDisk();
+
+    /// Disable lockdown: decrypt every encrypted pref file back to plaintext,
+    /// then remove the DEK / token / counter / backoff artifacts. Requires
+    /// EncryptedStorage to be unlocked (DEK in RAM). Returns false if any
+    /// file failed to revert — in which case the DEK is still present and the
+    /// device remains in lockdown so the operator can retry. APPROTECT is not
+    /// reversed. Called from the main loop via lockdownDisablePending.
+    bool disableLockdownToPlaintext();
+
+    /// Set by loadProto when any encrypted file fails to decrypt or decode.
+    /// Tracked across an entire loadFromDisk pass so reloadFromDisk can
+    /// surface the condition without callers re-walking each loadProto
+    /// result. Cleared at the top of every loadFromDisk run.
+    bool storageCorruptThisLoad = false;
+#endif
+
   private:
     mutable concurrency::Lock satelliteMutex;
     bool duplicateWarned = false;
     bool localPositionUpdatedSinceBoot = false;
+    bool migrationSavePending = false;
     uint32_t lastNodeDbSave = 0;    // when we last saved our db to flash
     uint32_t lastBackupAttempt = 0; // when we last tried a backup automatically or manually
     uint32_t lastSort = 0;          // When last sorted the nodeDB
-    /// Find a node in our DB, create an empty NodeInfoLite if missing
-    meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *getOrCreateMeshNode(NodeNum n);
 
     /*
      * Internal boolean to track sorting paused
@@ -409,9 +485,33 @@ class NodeDB
     /// read our db from flash
     void loadFromDisk();
 
+#ifdef PIO_UNIT_TESTING
+    // Grant the unit-test shim access to the private maintenance paths below
+    // (migration / cleanup / eviction) without relaxing production access.
+    friend class NodeDBTestShim;
+#endif
+
     /// purge db entries without user info
     void cleanupMeshDB();
 
+    /// Trim each satellite map down to MAX_SATELLITE_NODES, dropping the
+    /// stalest entries (used after loading files written before the cap, or by
+    /// a build with a larger cap). Returns true iff anything was trimmed.
+    bool enforceSatelliteCaps();
+
+    /// Node-DB self-care; call only once identity is established (getNodeNum()
+    /// valid). Confirms self is present, trims/demotes only NON-self overflow, and
+    /// rewrites the store once when something changed (never while storage locked).
+    void nodeDBSelfCare();
+
+#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
+    /// A database from a larger-cap build (e.g. the pre-fork 150-node nRF52 store)
+    /// can exceed MAX_NUM_NODES on load. Rank the hot store, demote the oldest
+    /// overflow into the warm tier preserving {num, last_heard, public_key} so PKI
+    /// DMs survive instead of dropping on truncation.
+    void demoteOldestHotNodesToWarm();
+#endif
+
     /// Reinit device state from scratch (not loading from disk)
     void installDefaultDeviceState(), installDefaultNodeDatabase(), installDefaultChannels(),
         installDefaultConfig(bool preserveKey), installDefaultModuleConfig();
@@ -487,7 +587,9 @@ extern uint32_t error_address;
 #define NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_UNMESSAGABLE_MASK (1u << NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_UNMESSAGABLE_SHIFT)
 #define NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_IS_UNMESSAGABLE_SHIFT 8
 #define NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_IS_UNMESSAGABLE_MASK (1u << NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_IS_UNMESSAGABLE_SHIFT)
-// Bits 9..31 reserved for future single-bit flags.
+#define NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_SHIFT 9
+#define NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK (1u << NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_SHIFT)
+// Bits 10..31 reserved for future single-bit flags.
 
 // Convenience accessors so call sites read like the old struct fields.
 inline bool nodeInfoLiteHasUser(const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n)
@@ -526,6 +628,16 @@ inline bool nodeInfoLiteIsKeyManuallyVerified(const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n)
 {
     return n && (n->bitfield & NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_KEY_MANUALLY_VERIFIED_MASK);
 }
+inline bool nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n)
+{
+    return n && (n->bitfield & NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK);
+}
+/// A node that the eviction/migration paths must not drop: a favourite, an
+/// ignored (blocked) node, or a manually-verified key.
+inline bool nodeInfoLiteIsProtected(const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n)
+{
+    return nodeInfoLiteIsFavorite(n) || nodeInfoLiteIsIgnored(n) || nodeInfoLiteIsKeyManuallyVerified(n);
+}
 
 inline void nodeInfoLiteSetBit(meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *n, uint32_t mask, bool value)
 {

src/mesh/NodeDBLegacyMigration.cpp

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include "configuration.h"
 #include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
 #include "mesh/generated/meshtastic/deviceonly_legacy.pb.h"
+#include "meshUtils.h"
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <cstring>
@@ -88,8 +89,10 @@ bool NodeDB::migrateLegacyNodeDatabase()
                 slim.bitfield |= NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_USER_MASK;
                 strncpy(slim.long_name, legacy.user.long_name, sizeof(slim.long_name));
                 slim.long_name[sizeof(slim.long_name) - 1] = '\0';
+                sanitizeUtf8(slim.long_name, sizeof(slim.long_name)); // replace bad bytes so nanopb encode never fails
                 strncpy(slim.short_name, legacy.user.short_name, sizeof(slim.short_name));
                 slim.short_name[sizeof(slim.short_name) - 1] = '\0';
+                sanitizeUtf8(slim.short_name, sizeof(slim.short_name)); // same — v24 names may contain non-UTF-8 bytes
                 slim.hw_model = legacy.user.hw_model;
                 slim.role = legacy.user.role;
                 if (legacy.user.is_licensed)

src/mesh/PhoneAPI.cpp

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
 #include "GPS.h"
 #endif
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#include "security/EncryptedStorage.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN
+#include "security/LockdownDisplay.h"
+#endif
 #include "Channels.h"
 #include "Default.h"
 #include "FSCommon.h"
@@ -36,6 +42,194 @@
 // Flag to indicate a heartbeat was received and we should send queue status
 bool heartbeatReceived = false;
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+// Auth-slot table and status-slot table are both sized to the typical
+// SerialConsole + BluetoothPhoneAPI footprint plus room for WiFi/TCP
+// transports. Sized together so both tables are keyed identically.
+static constexpr size_t MAX_AUTH_SLOTS = 6;
+
+// Per-PhoneAPI pending LockdownStatus. One slot per connection so a
+// status produced for connection A (e.g. UNLOCKED with the active TTL,
+// or UNLOCK_FAILED with a backoff) cannot be drained by connection B,
+// which would otherwise learn that A just authenticated or just failed
+// — a real information leak across local clients.
+//
+// File-scope rather than a per-PhoneAPI member because adding any
+// non-trivial state directly to PhoneAPI broke USB-CDC enumeration on
+// the current nRF52 framework; the auth-slot table next door uses the
+// same workaround. Lifecycle is tied to the auth slot table — both are
+// keyed by PhoneAPI*, both are cleared together in clearAuthSlot_LH,
+// and both share g_authSlotsMutex.
+struct PendingStatusSlot {
+    PhoneAPI *who = nullptr;
+    meshtastic_LockdownStatus status = {};
+    bool hasPending = false;
+    // True between a successful passphrase verify and the main-loop
+    // reloadFromDisk that follows. While set, the connection is NOT
+    // yet authorized and no UNLOCKED status has been emitted — the
+    // client still sees LOCKED, and any admin op it tries is dropped
+    // by the existing unauth gates. Cleared either way by
+    // completePendingUnlocks once reload finishes.
+    bool pendingUnlockAfterReload = false;
+};
+static PendingStatusSlot g_statusSlots[MAX_AUTH_SLOTS];
+
+// Lock-held helpers ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+static PendingStatusSlot *findOrAllocStatusSlot_LH(PhoneAPI *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return nullptr;
+    for (auto &s : g_statusSlots)
+        if (s.who == p)
+            return &s;
+    for (auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+        if (s.who == nullptr) {
+            s.who = p;
+            s.hasPending = false;
+            s.pendingUnlockAfterReload = false;
+            memset(&s.status, 0, sizeof(s.status));
+            return &s;
+        }
+    }
+    // Mirror the auth-slot eviction policy: stale slots can be reused.
+    // A connection that lost its auth slot has nothing meaningful to be
+    // told via a pending status anyway. Never evict a slot mid-unlock
+    // (pendingUnlockAfterReload set) — completing that flow on the
+    // wrong PhoneAPI would authorize the wrong connection.
+    for (auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+        if (!s.hasPending && !s.pendingUnlockAfterReload) {
+            s.who = p;
+            memset(&s.status, 0, sizeof(s.status));
+            return &s;
+        }
+    }
+    return nullptr;
+}
+
+static void clearStatusSlot_LH(const PhoneAPI *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    for (auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+        if (s.who == p) {
+            s.who = nullptr;
+            s.hasPending = false;
+            s.pendingUnlockAfterReload = false;
+            memset(&s.status, 0, sizeof(s.status));
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// Build a LockdownStatus message under lock from the supplied fields,
+// applying the audit's M13 redaction so token_* tamper-detection
+// strings are not leaked to unauth clients over the wire.
+static void buildStatus_LH(meshtastic_LockdownStatus &out, meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State state, const char *lock_reason,
+                           uint8_t boots_remaining, uint32_t valid_until_epoch, uint32_t backoff_seconds)
+{
+    memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
+    out.state = state;
+    // Collapse the specific token_* reasons to a generic "locked" over
+    // the wire — full detail still goes to local logs. An unauth client
+    // does not need to know whether HMAC failed vs the boot count
+    // hit zero vs the file was the wrong size; all of those mean the
+    // same thing to the client ("locked, ask for passphrase") but
+    // telling them apart over the network lets an attacker confirm
+    // that their tampering or rollback attempt was noticed.
+    const char *wireReason = lock_reason;
+    if (state == meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED && wireReason && wireReason[0] != '\0') {
+        if (strncmp(wireReason, "token_", 6) == 0)
+            wireReason = "locked";
+    }
+    if (wireReason && wireReason[0] != '\0')
+        strncpy(out.lock_reason, wireReason, sizeof(out.lock_reason) - 1);
+    out.boots_remaining = boots_remaining;
+    out.valid_until_epoch = valid_until_epoch;
+    out.backoff_seconds = backoff_seconds;
+}
+
+// Per-connection auth state table keyed by PhoneAPI*. Searched linearly;
+// cost is negligible compared to the redaction gates that call it.
+struct PhoneAuthSlot {
+    PhoneAPI *who = nullptr;
+    bool authorized = false;
+    uint32_t epoch = 0;
+};
+static PhoneAuthSlot g_authSlots[MAX_AUTH_SLOTS];
+
+// Global auth epoch. Lock Now bumps it; per-slot `epoch` compared against
+// this. Wraps at 2^32 revocations — practically unreachable; on wrap the
+// only behavioral effect is that any slot whose epoch happens to match the
+// new low value would be treated as authorized again, which requires a
+// pre-existing authorized slot to survive 2^32 lockNow events on the same
+// boot.
+static uint32_t g_authEpoch = 1;
+
+// Single mutex guarding g_authSlots and g_authEpoch. All readers and
+// writers — including const getters like getAdminAuthorized — must take
+// it. Granularity is fine because the critical sections are short (a
+// fixed-size linear scan over 6 entries) and contention is dominated by
+// getFromRadio's per-call redaction checks, which tolerate brief
+// blocking.
+static concurrency::Lock g_authSlotsMutex;
+
+// Find or allocate the auth slot for `p`. Caller must hold g_authSlotsMutex.
+// When the table is full of *unauthorized* slots from prior dead PhoneAPIs,
+// evicts the first unauthorized slot found. Refuses to evict an authorized
+// slot (those represent a live operator session and must outlive the table
+// pressure of reconnect churn). Returns nullptr only if every slot is
+// occupied by a different live, authorized PhoneAPI — practically only
+// reachable as a DoS via 7+ simultaneous authed connections, in which
+// case fail-closed and log.
+static PhoneAuthSlot *findOrAllocSlot_LH(PhoneAPI *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return nullptr;
+    for (auto &s : g_authSlots)
+        if (s.who == p)
+            return &s;
+    // First pass: free (who==nullptr) slot.
+    for (auto &s : g_authSlots) {
+        if (s.who == nullptr) {
+            s.who = p;
+            s.authorized = false;
+            s.epoch = 0;
+            return &s;
+        }
+    }
+    // Second pass: evict an unauthorized stale slot. Don't touch authorized
+    // ones — those still represent an operator-authenticated session.
+    for (auto &s : g_authSlots) {
+        if (!s.authorized) {
+            s.who = p;
+            s.epoch = 0;
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: auth slot table full, evicted stale unauthorized slot for new PhoneAPI %p", p);
+            return &s;
+        }
+    }
+    LOG_WARN("Lockdown: auth slot table full of authorized sessions, refusing new PhoneAPI %p (fail-closed)", p);
+    return nullptr;
+}
+
+// Drop p's slot from both the auth table and the status-queue table.
+// Lock-held variant.
+static void clearAuthSlot_LH(const PhoneAPI *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    for (auto &s : g_authSlots) {
+        if (s.who == p) {
+            s.authorized = false;
+            s.epoch = 0;
+            s.who = nullptr;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    clearStatusSlot_LH(p);
+}
+#endif
+
 PhoneAPI::PhoneAPI()
 {
     lastContactMsec = millis();
@@ -45,6 +239,17 @@ PhoneAPI::PhoneAPI()
 PhoneAPI::~PhoneAPI()
 {
     close();
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+    // Free the auth slot unconditionally, regardless of whether close()'s
+    // slot-clear branch ran (it skips when state == STATE_SEND_NOTHING).
+    // Leaving a stale slot.who pointing at freed memory lets a future
+    // PhoneAPI heap-allocated at the same address inherit the prior
+    // session's authorization through findOrAllocSlot.
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+        clearAuthSlot_LH(this);
+    }
+#endif
 }
 
 void PhoneAPI::handleStartConfig()
@@ -55,6 +260,28 @@ void PhoneAPI::handleStartConfig()
         observe(&service->fromNumChanged);
 #ifdef FSCom
         observe(&xModem.packetReady);
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        // New physical connection: clear this PhoneAPI's auth slot so the new
+        // client must present a passphrase or PKC admin signature before
+        // seeing full config. Do NOT reset on a subsequent want_config_id
+        // within the same connection: after a successful unlock the client
+        // re-requests config to pull the now-unredacted values, and re-locking
+        // that same-link re-fetch would strip the auth it just earned (config
+        // comes back redacted and set_config writes get dropped).
+        //
+        // The security boundary is therefore the physical connection, not the
+        // want_config handshake. For BLE that boundary is enforced in
+        // onConnect() (which fires once per link and also resets the slot), so
+        // a reconnect re-locks even if this !isConnected() transition was
+        // missed because the prior link's close() raced the new config burst.
+        {
+            concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+            if (auto *slot = findOrAllocSlot_LH(this)) {
+                slot->authorized = false;
+                slot->epoch = 0;
+            }
+        }
 #endif
     }
 
@@ -157,6 +384,12 @@ void PhoneAPI::close()
         config_state = 0;
         pauseBluetoothLogging = false;
         heartbeatReceived = false;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        {
+            concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+            clearAuthSlot_LH(this);
+        }
+#endif
     }
 }
 
@@ -185,6 +418,26 @@ bool PhoneAPI::handleToRadio(const uint8_t *buf, size_t bufLength)
     if (pb_decode_from_bytes(buf, bufLength, &meshtastic_ToRadio_msg, &toRadioScratch)) {
         switch (toRadioScratch.which_payload_variant) {
         case meshtastic_ToRadio_packet_tag:
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Allow admin messages addressed to this device — passphrase delivery must get through.
+                // AdminModule handles its own is_managed gate for those.
+                // Block everything else — unauthorized clients cannot inject mesh traffic.
+                // Require the packet to carry a decoded (not encrypted) payload so portnum is valid.
+                // Refuse to match when our own node number is still 0 (NodeDB
+                // not yet loaded — happens during the locked-default boot path
+                // before reloadFromDisk). Otherwise a packet with to==0 would
+                // satisfy the equality and bypass the gate.
+                NodeNum ourNum = nodeDB->getNodeNum();
+                bool isLocalAdmin =
+                    ourNum != 0 && toRadioScratch.packet.which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
+                    toRadioScratch.packet.decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_ADMIN_APP && toRadioScratch.packet.to == ourNum;
+                if (!isLocalAdmin) {
+                    LOG_INFO("Lockdown: Dropping non-admin ToRadio packet from unauthorized client");
+                    return false;
+                }
+            }
+#endif
             return handleToRadioPacket(toRadioScratch.packet);
         case meshtastic_ToRadio_want_config_id_tag:
             config_nonce = toRadioScratch.want_config_id;
@@ -196,6 +449,12 @@ bool PhoneAPI::handleToRadio(const uint8_t *buf, size_t bufLength)
             close();
             break;
         case meshtastic_ToRadio_xmodemPacket_tag:
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                LOG_INFO("Lockdown: Dropping xmodem packet from unauthorized client");
+                break;
+            }
+#endif
             LOG_INFO("Got xmodem packet");
 #ifdef FSCom
             xModem.handlePacket(toRadioScratch.xmodemPacket);
@@ -298,6 +557,21 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         strncpy(myNodeInfo.pio_env, optstr(APP_ENV), sizeof(myNodeInfo.pio_env));
         myNodeInfo.nodedb_count = static_cast<uint16_t>(nodeDB->getNumMeshNodes());
         fromRadioScratch.my_info = myNodeInfo;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+            // device_id is a stable hardware identifier — useful for an attacker
+            // to fingerprint / correlate the device across observations. Strip it
+            // for unauthenticated clients. my_node_num is kept (it's broadcast
+            // on the mesh anyway). pio_env / min_app_version reveal the exact
+            // build flavour, useful only for picking which known-CVE to try.
+            // nodedb_count stays — clients need it to decide whether to pull
+            // the node DB after unlocking.
+            fromRadioScratch.my_info.device_id.size = 0;
+            memset(fromRadioScratch.my_info.device_id.bytes, 0, sizeof(fromRadioScratch.my_info.device_id.bytes));
+            memset(fromRadioScratch.my_info.pio_env, 0, sizeof(fromRadioScratch.my_info.pio_env));
+            fromRadioScratch.my_info.min_app_version = 0;
+        }
+#endif
         state = STATE_SEND_UIDATA;
 
         service->refreshLocalMeshNode(); // Update my NodeInfo because the client will be asking for it soon.
@@ -331,8 +605,15 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         }
         if (config_nonce == SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_NODES) {
             // If client only wants node info, jump directly to sending nodes
-            state = STATE_SEND_OTHER_NODEINFOS;
-            onNowHasData(0);
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                state = STATE_SEND_COMPLETE_ID; // Unauthorized: skip node DB
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                state = STATE_SEND_OTHER_NODEINFOS;
+                onNowHasData(0);
+            }
         } else {
             state = STATE_SEND_METADATA;
         }
@@ -343,12 +624,35 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         LOG_DEBUG("Send device metadata");
         fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_metadata_tag;
         fromRadioScratch.metadata = getDeviceMetadata();
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+            // DeviceMetadata is one large fingerprint vector for an unauth
+            // client: firmware_version, device_state_version, hw_model,
+            // hw_model_string, has_bluetooth/has_wifi/has_ethernet, role,
+            // position_flags, excluded_modules, optionsCount. None of it
+            // is needed to drive lockdown_auth, and most of it tells an
+            // attacker which CVE / behavior quirks to probe. Wipe the
+            // whole struct — clients re-fetch once authenticated.
+            memset(&fromRadioScratch.metadata, 0, sizeof(fromRadioScratch.metadata));
+        }
+#endif
         state = STATE_SEND_CHANNELS;
         break;
 
     case STATE_SEND_CHANNELS:
         fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_channel_tag;
-        fromRadioScratch.channel = channels.getByIndex(config_state);
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+            // Unauthenticated: emit a zero-initialized Channel. fromRadioScratch
+            // was memset(0) at the top of getFromRadio(), so leaving .channel
+            // untouched gives the client an empty entry — no name, no PSK, no
+            // role. Advances the state machine normally so config_complete_id
+            // still fires.
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            fromRadioScratch.channel = channels.getByIndex(config_state);
+        }
         config_state++;
         // Advance when we have sent all of our Channels
         if (config_state >= MAX_NUM_CHANNELS) {
@@ -380,7 +684,15 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         case meshtastic_Config_network_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: network");
             fromRadioScratch.config.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_Config_network_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.network = config.network;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Unauthenticated: emit an empty NetworkConfig (zero-init from the
+                // top-of-loop memset). No wifi_psk, no SSID, no static IP info.
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.network = config.network;
+            }
             break;
         case meshtastic_Config_display_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: display");
@@ -390,7 +702,28 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         case meshtastic_Config_lora_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: lora");
             fromRadioScratch.config.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_Config_lora_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.lora = config.lora;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Whitelist only the spec-mandated radio identity fields that
+                // are intrinsically observable on the air anyway: region,
+                // modem_preset, use_preset, channel_num, hop_limit. Operator-
+                // private knobs (ignore_incoming list, override_duty_cycle,
+                // override_frequency, sx126x_rx_boosted_gain, tx_power,
+                // ignore_mqtt, fem_lna_mode, config_ok_to_mqtt, ...) stay
+                // hidden — they tell an attacker how the operator has tuned
+                // the device but are not needed by an unauth client.
+                meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig whitelist = {};
+                whitelist.use_preset = config.lora.use_preset;
+                whitelist.modem_preset = config.lora.modem_preset;
+                whitelist.region = config.lora.region;
+                whitelist.channel_num = config.lora.channel_num;
+                whitelist.hop_limit = config.lora.hop_limit;
+                fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.lora = whitelist;
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.lora = config.lora;
+            }
             break;
         case meshtastic_Config_bluetooth_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: bluetooth");
@@ -400,7 +733,21 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         case meshtastic_Config_security_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: security");
             fromRadioScratch.config.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_Config_security_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.security = config.security;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Unauthenticated: emit an empty SecurityConfig (zero-init from
+                // the top-of-loop memset). No private_key, no admin_keys, no
+                // public_key — nothing for an attacker to inspect.
+                //
+                // Provisioning state (NEEDS_PROVISION vs LOCKED) is conveyed via
+                // the FromRadio.lockdown_status proto sent post-config; clients
+                // should consume that rather than inferring from this empty
+                // security config.
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.config.payload_variant.security = config.security;
+            }
             break;
         case meshtastic_Config_sessionkey_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send config: sessionkey");
@@ -430,7 +777,17 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         case meshtastic_ModuleConfig_mqtt_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send module config: mqtt");
             fromRadioScratch.moduleConfig.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_ModuleConfig_mqtt_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.moduleConfig.payload_variant.mqtt = moduleConfig.mqtt;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Unauthenticated: emit an empty MQTTConfig (zero-init from
+                // the top-of-loop memset). MQTT broker username/password, the
+                // server address, and root_topic are credentials/config that
+                // shouldn't be visible to an unauth client.
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.moduleConfig.payload_variant.mqtt = moduleConfig.mqtt;
+            }
             break;
         case meshtastic_ModuleConfig_serial_tag:
             LOG_DEBUG("Send module config: serial");
@@ -509,15 +866,21 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
         config_state++;
         // Advance when we have sent all of our ModuleConfig objects
         if (config_state > (_meshtastic_AdminMessage_ModuleConfigType_MAX + 1)) {
-            // Handle special nonce behaviors:
-            // - SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_CONFIG: Skip node info, go directly to file manifest
-            // - SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_NODES: After sending nodes, skip to complete
-            if (config_nonce == SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_CONFIG) {
-                state = STATE_SEND_FILEMANIFEST;
-            } else {
-                state = STATE_SEND_OTHER_NODEINFOS;
-                onNowHasData(0);
-            }
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                // Unauthorized client: skip node DB and file manifest — only send config complete
+                state = STATE_SEND_COMPLETE_ID;
+            } else
+#endif
+                // Handle special nonce behaviors:
+                // - SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_CONFIG: Skip node info, go directly to file manifest
+                // - SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_NODES: After sending nodes, skip to complete
+                if (config_nonce == SPECIAL_NONCE_ONLY_CONFIG) {
+                    state = STATE_SEND_FILEMANIFEST;
+                } else {
+                    state = STATE_SEND_OTHER_NODEINFOS;
+                    onNowHasData(0);
+                }
             config_state = 0;
         }
         break;
@@ -590,24 +953,58 @@ size_t PhoneAPI::getFromRadio(uint8_t *buf)
             fromRadioScratch.queueStatus = *queueStatusPacketForPhone;
             releaseQueueStatusPhonePacket();
         } else if (mqttClientProxyMessageForPhone) {
-            fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_mqttClientProxyMessage_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.mqttClientProxyMessage = *mqttClientProxyMessageForPhone;
-            releaseMqttClientProxyPhonePacket();
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                releaseMqttClientProxyPhonePacket(); // Discard — unauthorized client
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_mqttClientProxyMessage_tag;
+                fromRadioScratch.mqttClientProxyMessage = *mqttClientProxyMessageForPhone;
+                releaseMqttClientProxyPhonePacket();
+            }
         } else if (xmodemPacketForPhone.control != meshtastic_XModem_Control_NUL) {
-            fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_xmodemPacket_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.xmodemPacket = xmodemPacketForPhone;
-            xmodemPacketForPhone = meshtastic_XModem_init_zero;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                xmodemPacketForPhone = meshtastic_XModem_init_zero; // Discard — unauthorized client
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_xmodemPacket_tag;
+                fromRadioScratch.xmodemPacket = xmodemPacketForPhone;
+                xmodemPacketForPhone = meshtastic_XModem_init_zero;
+            }
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        } else if (hasPendingLockdownStatus()) {
+            concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+            // Look up our own slot only — never another connection's. Re-check
+            // hasPending under the lock since a concurrent drain on the same
+            // connection (unlikely but possible if multiple transport
+            // callbacks race against one PhoneAPI) may have grabbed it.
+            if (auto *slot = findOrAllocStatusSlot_LH(this); slot && slot->hasPending) {
+                fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_lockdown_status_tag;
+                fromRadioScratch.lockdown_status = slot->status;
+                memset(&slot->status, 0, sizeof(slot->status));
+                slot->hasPending = false;
+            }
+#endif
         } else if (clientNotification) {
             fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_clientNotification_tag;
             fromRadioScratch.clientNotification = *clientNotification;
             releaseClientNotification();
         } else if (packetForPhone) {
-            printPacket("phone downloaded packet", packetForPhone);
-
-            // Encapsulate as a FromRadio packet
-            fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_packet_tag;
-            fromRadioScratch.packet = *packetForPhone;
-            releasePhonePacket();
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                releasePhonePacket(); // Discard mesh traffic — unauthorized client
+            } else
+#endif
+            {
+                printPacket("phone downloaded packet", packetForPhone);
+                // Encapsulate as a FromRadio packet
+                fromRadioScratch.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_FromRadio_packet_tag;
+                fromRadioScratch.packet = *packetForPhone;
+                releasePhonePacket();
+            }
         } else if (replayPending()) {
             // No live packet pending — feed the phone one cached satellite-DB packet.
             // popReplayPacket advances through positions->telemetry->environment->status,
@@ -669,6 +1066,29 @@ void PhoneAPI::sendConfigComplete()
         service->api_state = service->STATE_ETH;
     }
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+    if (!EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive()) {
+        // Lockdown-capable firmware, but lockdown is not active on this
+        // device (never provisioned, or disabled). Tell the client so its
+        // "lockdown mode" toggle renders OFF. Note getAdminAuthorized()
+        // returns true in this state, so the redaction gates are no-ops and
+        // the client just received the full, unredacted config above.
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_DISABLED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+        LOG_INFO("PhoneAPI: DISABLED (lockdown not active) sent to client");
+    } else if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+        if (!EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned()) {
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_NEEDS_PROVISION, "", 0, 0, 0);
+            LOG_INFO("PhoneAPI: NEEDS_PROVISION sent to client");
+        } else if (!EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked()) {
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, EncryptedStorage::getLockReason(), 0, 0, 0);
+            LOG_INFO("PhoneAPI: LOCKED (%s) sent to client", EncryptedStorage::getLockReason());
+        } else {
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "needs_auth", 0, 0, 0);
+            LOG_INFO("PhoneAPI: LOCKED (needs_auth) sent to client");
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
     // Allow subclasses to know we've entered steady-state so they can lower power consumption
     onConfigComplete();
 
@@ -1121,6 +1541,10 @@ bool PhoneAPI::available()
         if (!clientNotification)
             clientNotification = service->getClientNotificationForPhone();
         bool hasPacket = !!queueStatusPacketForPhone || !!mqttClientProxyMessageForPhone || !!clientNotification;
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+        if (hasPendingLockdownStatus())
+            hasPacket = true;
+#endif
         if (hasPacket)
             return true;
 
@@ -1192,6 +1616,46 @@ bool PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket(meshtastic_MeshPacket &p)
 {
     printPacket("PACKET FROM PHONE", &p);
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+    // Local admin gating happens here, synchronously on the dispatching
+    // task. Two distinct cases:
+    //
+    //   (a) lockdown_auth: handled inline. Passphrase never enters the
+    //       routed MeshPacket queue, and authorize-this-connection
+    //       runs while `this` is still on the call stack.
+    //
+    //   (b) Any other admin payload from an unauthorized connection:
+    //       dropped here. The previous design relied on AdminModule
+    //       to apply isLocalAdminAuthorized() during dispatch, but
+    //       AdminModule runs on the Router task — by then the
+    //       PhoneAPI dispatching task has already exited and the
+    //       per-connection auth context is unrecoverable. Putting
+    //       the gate here closes that race and covers H6/H7 from the
+    //       audit: get_config_request and set_config from unauthed
+    //       clients no longer reach AdminModule at all.
+    if (p.from == 0 && p.which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
+        p.decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_ADMIN_APP) {
+        meshtastic_AdminMessage admin = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_zero;
+        if (pb_decode_from_bytes(p.decoded.payload.bytes, p.decoded.payload.size, &meshtastic_AdminMessage_msg, &admin)) {
+            if (admin.which_payload_variant == meshtastic_AdminMessage_lockdown_auth_tag) {
+                handleLockdownAuthInline(admin.lockdown_auth);
+                // Wipe the decoded passphrase scratch — the byte array in
+                // p.decoded.payload.bytes is wiped by handleLockdownAuthInline.
+                volatile uint8_t *adminVol = const_cast<volatile uint8_t *>(admin.lockdown_auth.passphrase.bytes);
+                for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(admin.lockdown_auth.passphrase.bytes); i++)
+                    adminVol[i] = 0;
+                return true;
+            }
+            if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+                LOG_WARN("Lockdown: dropping admin payload variant=%d from unauthorized connection", admin.which_payload_variant);
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        // pb_decode failure: fall through to normal handling so the
+        // regular Router/AdminModule reject path can respond.
+    }
+#endif
+
 #if defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO)
     // For use with the simulator, we should not ignore duplicate packets from the phone
     if (SimRadio::instance == nullptr)
@@ -1260,3 +1724,314 @@ int PhoneAPI::onNotify(uint32_t newValue)
 
     return timeout ? -1 : 0; // If we timed out, MeshService should stop iterating through observers as we just removed one
 }
+
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+bool PhoneAPI::getAdminAuthorized() const
+{
+    // Runtime-toggle model: when lockdown is NOT active (a lockdown-capable
+    // build that hasn't been provisioned, or that was disabled), there is
+    // nothing to protect — every connection is implicitly authorized, so
+    // all the `if (!getAdminAuthorized())` redaction gates throughout
+    // getFromRadio() / handleToRadio() become no-ops and the device serves
+    // config exactly like stock firmware. Only once provisioned (lockdown
+    // active) do we consult the per-connection auth slot table.
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    if (!EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive())
+        return true;
+#endif
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+    // const_cast is safe — findOrAllocSlot_LH only mutates the slot table,
+    // not the PhoneAPI itself, and the table key is just the pointer.
+    const auto *slot = findOrAllocSlot_LH(const_cast<PhoneAPI *>(this));
+    return slot && slot->authorized && slot->epoch == g_authEpoch;
+}
+
+void PhoneAPI::setAdminAuthorized(bool authorized)
+{
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+    auto *slot = findOrAllocSlot_LH(this);
+    if (!slot)
+        return; // slot table full — fail-closed
+    if (authorized) {
+        slot->epoch = g_authEpoch;
+        slot->authorized = true;
+    } else {
+        slot->authorized = false;
+        slot->epoch = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+void PhoneAPI::revokeAllAuth()
+{
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard g(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+        g_authEpoch++;
+    }
+    LOG_INFO("Lockdown: All connection auth revoked (Lock Now)");
+}
+
+void PhoneAPI::completePendingUnlocks(bool reloadOk)
+{
+    // Snapshot fields that we'll need outside the lock (we cannot call
+    // EncryptedStorage / setAdminAuthorized / unlockScreen while holding
+    // g_authSlotsMutex without risking re-entry — setAdminAuthorized
+    // itself takes the same lock).
+    constexpr size_t kMaxSnapshots = MAX_AUTH_SLOTS;
+    PhoneAPI *targets[kMaxSnapshots] = {};
+    size_t targetCount = 0;
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+        for (auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+            if (!s.pendingUnlockAfterReload || !s.who)
+                continue;
+            if (targetCount < kMaxSnapshots)
+                targets[targetCount++] = s.who;
+            // Clear the pending flag either way — failure path must not
+            // leave it set so a subsequent successful reload retries
+            // against the wrong PhoneAPI.
+            s.pendingUnlockAfterReload = false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (reloadOk) {
+        uint8_t boots = EncryptedStorage::getBootsRemaining();
+        uint32_t until = EncryptedStorage::getValidUntilEpoch();
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < targetCount; i++) {
+            PhoneAPI *p = targets[i];
+            p->setAdminAuthorized(true);
+            p->queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCKED, "", boots, until, 0);
+        }
+        // Screen-lock latch is cleared once any client successfully
+        // unlocks — the operator has proven the passphrase. Matches the
+        // re-verify path's behavior.
+        if (targetCount > 0)
+            meshtastic_security::unlockScreen();
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: post-reload completion: authorized %u connection(s)", (unsigned)targetCount);
+    } else {
+        // Storage corrupt — emit LOCKED(storage_corrupt) to every slot
+        // that was awaiting the unlock. setAdminAuthorized is NOT called
+        // so the connection stays redacted and any set_config it sends
+        // is dropped at the existing unauth gates. Caller (main.cpp) has
+        // already lockNow'd storage and broadcast-revoked.
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < targetCount; i++) {
+            targets[i]->queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "storage_corrupt", 0, 0, 0);
+        }
+        LOG_ERROR("Lockdown: post-reload completion: storage corrupt, notified %u connection(s)", (unsigned)targetCount);
+    }
+}
+
+void PhoneAPI::queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State state, const char *lock_reason, uint8_t boots_remaining,
+                                   uint32_t valid_until_epoch, uint32_t backoff_seconds)
+{
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+        auto *slot = findOrAllocStatusSlot_LH(this);
+        if (!slot)
+            return; // slot table exhausted — fail-closed, no status delivered
+        buildStatus_LH(slot->status, state, lock_reason, boots_remaining, valid_until_epoch, backoff_seconds);
+        slot->hasPending = true;
+    }
+    if (service)
+        service->nudgeFromNum();
+}
+
+void PhoneAPI::broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State state, const char *lock_reason, uint8_t boots_remaining,
+                                       uint32_t valid_until_epoch, uint32_t backoff_seconds)
+{
+    bool anyOverwritten = false;
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+        for (auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+            if (s.who) {
+                buildStatus_LH(s.status, state, lock_reason, boots_remaining, valid_until_epoch, backoff_seconds);
+                s.hasPending = true;
+                anyOverwritten = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // Service nudge is shared across connections; one nudge wakes every
+    // drainer. Skip if no connection currently has a slot.
+    if (anyOverwritten && service)
+        service->nudgeFromNum();
+}
+
+bool PhoneAPI::hasPendingLockdownStatus() const
+{
+    concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+    for (const auto &s : g_statusSlots) {
+        if (s.who == this && s.hasPending)
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+bool PhoneAPI::handleLockdownAuthInline(const meshtastic_LockdownAuth &la)
+{
+    // Wipe passphrase bytes in the caller's decoded scratch on every exit.
+    auto zeroPassphrase = [&]() {
+        volatile uint8_t *ppVol = const_cast<volatile uint8_t *>(la.passphrase.bytes);
+        for (pb_size_t zi = 0; zi < la.passphrase.size; zi++)
+            ppVol[zi] = 0;
+    };
+
+    // Lock Now — only honored from a connection that has already proven
+    // the passphrase. Unauthenticated clients used to be able to trigger
+    // a reboot, which was a trivial local-presence DoS (any BLE/USB
+    // attacker could brick-loop the device). Now lock_now requires
+    // prior auth on this connection.
+    if (la.lock_now) {
+        if (!getAdminAuthorized()) {
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: LOCK NOW from unauthorized connection — denied");
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+            zeroPassphrase();
+            return true;
+        }
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: LOCK NOW command received from authorized connection");
+        EncryptedStorage::lockNow();
+        revokeAllAuth();
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_LOCKED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+        zeroPassphrase();
+        rebootAtMsec = millis() + DEFAULT_REBOOT_SECONDS * 1000;
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Disable lockdown entirely. Requires the passphrase (must prove
+    // ownership before reverting at-rest encryption). We verify it here to
+    // load the DEK, then hand the heavy decrypt-revert work to the main
+    // loop via lockdownDisablePending — exactly like the unlock reload
+    // path, because decrypting + rewriting nodes.proto is too heavy for
+    // this transport-callback stack. APPROTECT is NOT reversed.
+    if (la.disable) {
+        if (la.passphrase.size < 1) {
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: disable with empty passphrase — rejecting");
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+            zeroPassphrase();
+            return true;
+        }
+        if (!EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive()) {
+            // Already off — nothing to do; report DISABLED so the client UI settles.
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: disable requested but lockdown is not active");
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_DISABLED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+            zeroPassphrase();
+            return true;
+        }
+        // Re-verify the passphrase (loads the DEK needed to decrypt files).
+        bool ok = EncryptedStorage::unlockWithPassphrase(la.passphrase.bytes, la.passphrase.size,
+                                                         EncryptedStorage::TOKEN_DEFAULT_BOOTS, 0, 0);
+        if (!ok) {
+            uint32_t backoff = EncryptedStorage::getBackoffSecondsRemaining();
+            queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, backoff);
+            LOG_WARN("Lockdown: disable passphrase verification failed");
+            zeroPassphrase();
+            return true;
+        }
+        setAdminAuthorized(true);
+        lockdownDisablePending = true; // main loop runs nodeDB->disableLockdownToPlaintext() then reboots
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: disable authorized, deferring decrypt-revert to main loop");
+        zeroPassphrase();
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Empty-passphrase auth was previously a silent success — clients
+    // got no feedback and the device looked the same as it would after
+    // an actual no-op. Emit UNLOCK_FAILED with no backoff so honest
+    // clients can detect their own bug and an attacker still learns
+    // nothing they wouldn't from any other failed attempt.
+    if (la.passphrase.size < 1) {
+        LOG_WARN("Lockdown: lockdown_auth with empty passphrase and lock_now=false — rejecting");
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+        zeroPassphrase();
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // boots_remaining is uint32 on the wire but the token field is uint8.
+    // Silently truncating (256 -> 0 -> default 50) hides a real client
+    // bug. Reject explicitly so the client can correct its request.
+    if (la.boots_remaining > 255) {
+        LOG_WARN("Lockdown: boots_remaining=%u exceeds uint8 cap, rejecting", la.boots_remaining);
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, 0);
+        zeroPassphrase();
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t boots = la.boots_remaining != 0 ? (uint8_t)la.boots_remaining : EncryptedStorage::TOKEN_DEFAULT_BOOTS;
+    uint32_t validUntilEpoch = la.valid_until_epoch;
+    // Client-supplied session cap when present; otherwise the
+    // firmware-side default. 0 from the client means "use firmware
+    // default", consistent with the boots_remaining sentinel.
+    uint32_t sessionMaxSeconds =
+        la.max_session_seconds != 0 ? la.max_session_seconds : MESHTASTIC_LOCKDOWN_SESSION_DEFAULT_SECONDS;
+
+    bool ok = false;
+    bool needsReload = false;
+    if (!EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked()) {
+        if (!EncryptedStorage::isProvisioned()) {
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: first-time provisioning with passphrase");
+            ok = EncryptedStorage::provisionPassphrase(la.passphrase.bytes, la.passphrase.size, boots, validUntilEpoch,
+                                                       sessionMaxSeconds);
+        } else {
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: unlock with passphrase");
+            ok = EncryptedStorage::unlockWithPassphrase(la.passphrase.bytes, la.passphrase.size, boots, validUntilEpoch,
+                                                        sessionMaxSeconds);
+        }
+        if (ok) {
+            needsReload = true;
+            // Mark this slot for the main-loop completion handler. Don't
+            // authorize or emit UNLOCKED yet — `config` / `channelFile`
+            // / `nodeDatabase` still hold the locked-default placeholders
+            // installed by loadFromDisk()'s !isUnlocked() branch. If we
+            // flipped the connection to authorized here, the client could
+            // read those placeholders as if they were the operator's real
+            // settings, or set_config write a corrupted baseline that
+            // overwrites the real config when reloadFromDisk swaps them
+            // in. completePendingUnlocks() runs on the main thread after
+            // reloadFromDisk has populated the real values and the radio
+            // has been reconfigured.
+            {
+                concurrency::LockGuard guard(&g_authSlotsMutex);
+                if (auto *slot = findOrAllocStatusSlot_LH(this))
+                    slot->pendingUnlockAfterReload = true;
+            }
+            lockdownReloadPending = true;
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: storage unlocked, awaiting reload before client visibility");
+        }
+    } else {
+        LOG_INFO("Lockdown: passphrase re-verify for admin authorization");
+        ok = EncryptedStorage::unlockWithPassphrase(la.passphrase.bytes, la.passphrase.size, boots, validUntilEpoch,
+                                                    sessionMaxSeconds);
+        if (ok) {
+            // Storage was already unlocked — no reload needed. Authorize
+            // and surface UNLOCKED to the client immediately.
+            setAdminAuthorized(true);
+            LOG_INFO("Lockdown: passphrase verified, this connection authorized");
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ok && !needsReload) {
+        // Re-verify path: storage was already unlocked. Clear the screen
+        // latch and emit UNLOCKED now. The cold-unlock path defers both
+        // of these to completePendingUnlocks() once reloadFromDisk finishes.
+        meshtastic_security::unlockScreen();
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCKED, "", EncryptedStorage::getBootsRemaining(),
+                            EncryptedStorage::getValidUntilEpoch(), 0);
+    } else if (ok && needsReload) {
+        // Cold-unlock path: deliberately no status emission yet — the
+        // client keeps seeing LOCKED until completePendingUnlocks()
+        // runs after a successful reload.
+    } else {
+        uint32_t backoff = EncryptedStorage::getBackoffSecondsRemaining();
+        queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State_UNLOCK_FAILED, "", 0, 0, backoff);
+        // Don't log backoff seconds — the client receives it in the
+        // UNLOCK_FAILED status anyway, and in non-DEBUG_MUTE builds the
+        // numeric value would otherwise spill onto a USB-attached
+        // attacker's serial terminal alongside other diagnostic noise.
+        LOG_WARN("Lockdown: passphrase verification failed");
+        (void)backoff;
+    }
+
+    zeroPassphrase();
+    return true;
+}
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL

src/mesh/PhoneAPI.h

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "concurrency/Lock.h"
 #include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
 #include "meshtastic/portnums.pb.h"
+#include <atomic>
 #include <cstdint>
 #include <deque>
 #include <iterator>
@@ -170,6 +171,49 @@ class PhoneAPI
     bool isConnected() { return state != STATE_SEND_NOTHING; }
     bool isSendingPackets() { return state == STATE_SEND_PACKETS; }
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+    /// Per-connection auth: tracked in a small file-scope slot table keyed
+    /// by PhoneAPI*. Adding state members directly to PhoneAPI broke
+    /// USB-CDC enumeration on current nRF52 framework — even one extra
+    /// per-instance uint32_t was enough. Keeping all state out-of-line
+    /// avoids the issue.
+    void setAdminAuthorized(bool authorized);
+    bool getAdminAuthorized() const;
+
+    /// Lock Now: O(1) invalidation of every connection's auth by advancing
+    /// the global epoch. Subsequent gate checks see slot.myEpoch != epoch
+    /// and treat the connection as unauthenticated.
+    static void revokeAllAuth();
+
+    /// Called from the main loop after NodeDB::reloadFromDisk() finishes.
+    /// On reloadOk=true: any connection marked pending-unlock-after-reload
+    /// is promoted to authorized and receives an UNLOCKED status; the
+    /// screen-lock latch clears. On reloadOk=false: those connections
+    /// receive a LOCKED(storage_corrupt) status and remain unauthorized
+    /// so they cannot drive set_config against the corrupt baseline.
+    static void completePendingUnlocks(bool reloadOk);
+
+    /// Queue a LockdownStatus FromRadio for THIS connection only. Each
+    /// PhoneAPI owns its own pending-status slot in a file-scope table
+    /// (file-scope because adding fields directly to PhoneAPI broke
+    /// USB-CDC enumeration on nRF52); a status produced here will not
+    /// be delivered to any other connection. `lock_reason` may be
+    /// nullptr / empty for non-LOCKED states.
+    void queueLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State state, const char *lock_reason, uint8_t boots_remaining,
+                             uint32_t valid_until_epoch, uint32_t backoff_seconds);
+
+    /// Queue the same LockdownStatus on every active connection's slot.
+    /// Use for events with no specific originating connection (session
+    /// expiry tick in main.cpp, broadcast revocations, etc.). Per-
+    /// connection callers should prefer the instance method above to
+    /// avoid leaking one client's auth state to another.
+    static void broadcastLockdownStatus(meshtastic_LockdownStatus_State state, const char *lock_reason, uint8_t boots_remaining,
+                                        uint32_t valid_until_epoch, uint32_t backoff_seconds);
+
+    /// True iff this connection has a pending lockdown_status drain.
+    bool hasPendingLockdownStatus() const;
+#endif
+
   protected:
     /// Our fromradio packet while it is being assembled
     meshtastic_FromRadio fromRadioScratch = {};
@@ -211,6 +255,20 @@ class PhoneAPI
 
     APIType api_type = TYPE_NONE;
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+    // No per-instance auth members — see method-level note. All state lives
+    // in a file-scope slot table in PhoneAPI.cpp keyed by `this` pointer.
+
+    // Pending LockdownStatus storage is NOT a class member — having a
+    // meshtastic_LockdownStatus (~50 bytes with the char[33] lock_reason)
+    // as a PhoneAPI member broke USB-CDC enumeration on the nRF52 Adafruit
+    // framework. The exact mechanism wasn't pinned down, but moving the
+    // storage to a file-scope static in PhoneAPI.cpp side-steps it cleanly.
+    // Trade-off: all PhoneAPI instances share one pending slot. Acceptable
+    // because only one transport delivers a lockdown command at a time in
+    // any realistic scenario.
+#endif
+
   private:
     void releasePhonePacket();
 
@@ -248,6 +306,16 @@ class PhoneAPI
      */
     bool handleToRadioPacket(meshtastic_MeshPacket &p);
 
+#if defined(MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE) && defined(MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL)
+    /// Synchronously handle a lockdown_auth AdminMessage from the local
+    /// client. Runs inside handleToRadioPacket so the originating
+    /// connection is reachable via `this` — avoids the async context
+    /// loss that broke the previous AdminModule path. Always consumes the
+    /// packet (returns true): lockdown_auth is local-only and must not be
+    /// forwarded to the mesh router.
+    bool handleLockdownAuthInline(const meshtastic_LockdownAuth &la);
+#endif
+
     /// If the mesh service tells us fromNum has changed, tell the phone
     virtual int onNotify(uint32_t newValue) override;
 };

src/mesh/PositionPrecision.cpp

@@ -16,7 +16,16 @@ uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &channel)
 
 uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(uint8_t channelIndex)
 {
-    return getPositionPrecisionForChannel(channels.getByIndex(channelIndex));
+    const meshtastic_Channel &ch = channels.getByIndex(channelIndex);
+    if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED)
+        return 0;
+    uint32_t precision = getPositionPrecisionForChannel(ch);
+
+    // Never send a precise position on a publicly-decryptable channel (key check is gated on > ceiling).
+    if (precision > MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY && channels.usesPublicKey(channelIndex)) {
+        precision = MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    }
+    return precision;
 }
 
 static int32_t truncateCoordinate(int32_t coordinate, uint32_t precision)

src/mesh/PositionPrecision.h

@@ -4,7 +4,16 @@
 #include "meshtastic/mesh.pb.h"
 #include <stdint.h>
 
+// Max precision on a publicly-decryptable channel. CCPA "precise geolocation" = within a ~564m (1,850ft) radius.
+// Precision is bit-truncation of latitude_i/longitude_i: the latitude cell stays ~constant in meters worldwide
+// (~700m at 15 bits), while only the longitude cell varies — widest at the equator, narrowing toward the poles.
+// 15 also matches the MQTT map-report public precision ceiling.
+#define MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY 15
+
+// Configured precision as-is; does NOT apply the public-key clamp -- use the channelIndex overload for the on-wire value.
 uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &channel);
+
+// Configured precision, clamped to MAX_POSITION_PRECISION_PUBLIC_KEY when the channel's effective key is publicly decryptable.
 uint32_t getPositionPrecisionForChannel(uint8_t channelIndex);
 void applyPositionPrecision(meshtastic_Position &position, uint32_t precision);
 bool applyPositionPrecision(meshtastic_MeshPacket &packet, uint32_t precision);

src/mesh/RadioInterface.cpp

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ const RegionProfile PROFILE_HAM_20KHZ = {PRESETS_TINY, 0, 0.0022f, false, true,
 // Ham '100kHz' profile. 62.5kHz bandwidth coerced to 100kHz via padding.
 const RegionProfile PROFILE_HAM_100KHZ = {PRESETS_NARROW, 0, 0.01875f, false, true, 0, 1, 1};
 
+Observable<uint32_t> RadioInterface::loraRxPacketObservable;
+
 #define RDEF(name, freq_start, freq_end, duty_cycle, power_limit, frequency_switching, wide_lora, profile_ptr, default_preset,   \
              override_slot)                                                                                                      \
     {                                                                                                                            \
@@ -85,20 +87,30 @@ const RegionInfo regions[] = {
      */
     RDEF(EU_433, 433.0f, 434.0f, 10, 10, false, false, PROFILE_STD, PRESET(LONG_FAST), 0),
     /*
-       https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/duty-cycle/
-       https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/regional-parameters/
-       https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/930/schedule/6/part/III/made/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true
+        https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/duty-cycle/
+        https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/regional-parameters/
+        https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/930/schedule/6/part/III/made/data.xht?view=snippet&wrap=true
 
-       audio_permitted = false per regulation
+        audio_permitted = false per regulation
 
-       Special Note:
-       The link above describes LoRaWAN's band plan, stating a power limit of 16 dBm. This is their own suggested specification,
-       we do not need to follow it. The European Union regulations clearly state that the power limit for this frequency range is
-       500 mW, or 27 dBm. It also states that we can use interference avoidance and spectrum access techniques (such as LBT +
-       AFA) to avoid a duty cycle. (Please refer to line P page 22 of this document.)
-       https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/300200_300299/30022002/03.01.01_60/en_30022002v030101p.pdf
-     */
+        Special Note:
+        The link above describes LoRaWAN's band plan, stating a power limit of 16 dBm. This is their own suggested specification,
+        we do not need to follow it. The European Union regulations clearly state that the power limit for this frequency range is
+        500 mW, or 27 dBm. It also states that we can use interference avoidance and spectrum access techniques (such as LBT +
+        AFA) to avoid a duty cycle. (Please refer to line P page 22 of this document.)
+        https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/300200_300299/30022002/03.01.01_60/en_30022002v030101p.pdf
+
+        EU 866MHz band (Band no. 46b of 2006/771/EC and subsequent amendments) for Non-specific short-range devices (SRD)
+        Gives 4 channels at 865.7/866.3/866.9/867.5 MHz, 400 kHz gap plus 37.5 kHz padding between channels, 27 dBm,
+        duty cycle 2.5% (mobile) or 10% (fixed) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02006D0771(01)-20250123
+
+        EU 868MHz band: 3 channels at 869.410/869.4625/869.577 MHz
+        Channel centres at 869.442/869.525/869.608 MHz,
+        10.4 kHz padding on channels, 27 dBm, duty cycle 10%
+    */
     RDEF(EU_868, 869.4f, 869.65f, 10, 27, false, false, PROFILE_EU868, PRESET(LONG_FAST), 0),
+    RDEF(EU_866, 865.6f, 867.6f, 2.5, 27, false, false, PROFILE_LITE, PRESET(LITE_FAST), 0),
+    RDEF(EU_N_868, 869.4f, 869.65f, 10, 27, false, false, PROFILE_NARROW, PRESET(NARROW_SLOW), 1),
 
     /*
         https://lora-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/lorawan_regional_parameters_v1.0.3reva_0.pdf
@@ -276,20 +288,6 @@ const RegionInfo regions[] = {
     */
     RDEF(LORA_24, 2400.0f, 2483.5f, 100, 10, false, true, PROFILE_STD, PRESET(LONG_FAST), 0),
 
-    /*
-        EU 866MHz band (Band no. 46b of 2006/771/EC and subsequent amendments) for Non-specific short-range devices (SRD)
-        Gives 4 channels at 865.7/866.3/866.9/867.5 MHz, 400 kHz gap plus 37.5 kHz padding between channels, 27 dBm,
-        duty cycle 2.5% (mobile) or 10% (fixed) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02006D0771(01)-20250123
-    */
-    RDEF(EU_866, 865.6f, 867.6f, 2.5, 27, false, false, PROFILE_LITE, PRESET(LITE_FAST), 0),
-
-    /*
-        EU 868MHz band: 3 channels at 869.410/869.4625/869.577 MHz
-        Channel centres at 869.442/869.525/869.608 MHz,
-        10.4 kHz padding on channels, 27 dBm, duty cycle 10%
-    */
-    RDEF(EU_N_868, 869.4f, 869.65f, 10, 27, false, false, PROFILE_NARROW, PRESET(NARROW_SLOW), 1),
-
     /*
         This needs to be last. Same as US.
     */
@@ -857,53 +855,116 @@ uint32_t RadioInterface::getChannelNum()
 }
 
 /**
- * Send an error-level client notification. Safe to call when service is null (e.g. in tests).
+ * Send a client notification (error level unless specified). Safe to call when service is null (e.g. in tests).
  */
-static void sendErrorNotification(const char *msg)
+static void sendErrorNotification(const char *msg, meshtastic_LogRecord_Level level = meshtastic_LogRecord_Level_ERROR)
 {
     if (!service)
         return;
     meshtastic_ClientNotification *cn = clientNotificationPool.allocZeroed();
     if (!cn)
         return;
-    cn->level = meshtastic_LogRecord_Level_ERROR;
+    cn->level = level;
     snprintf(cn->message, sizeof(cn->message), "%s", msg);
     service->sendClientNotification(cn);
 }
 
+// The EU_868/EU_866/EU_N_868 trio own mutually exclusive preset lists. Selecting a preset
+// locked to a sibling means the user wants that sibling region, not the default preset.
+static const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode SWAPPABLE_EU_REGIONS[] = {
+    meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_EU_868,
+    meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_EU_866,
+    meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_EU_N_868,
+};
+
 /**
- * Checks if a region is valid for the current settings.
+ * If currentRegion is one of the swappable EU regions and preset belongs to a sibling in
+ * that trio, return the sibling region that owns the preset. Returns nullptr otherwise.
+ */
+const RegionInfo *RadioInterface::regionSwapForPreset(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode currentRegion,
+                                                      meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_ModemPreset preset)
+{
+    bool currentIsSwappable = false;
+    for (auto code : SWAPPABLE_EU_REGIONS) {
+        if (code == currentRegion)
+            currentIsSwappable = true;
+    }
+    if (!currentIsSwappable)
+        return nullptr;
+
+    for (auto code : SWAPPABLE_EU_REGIONS) {
+        if (code == currentRegion)
+            continue;
+        const RegionInfo *sibling = getRegion(code);
+        if (sibling->supportsPreset(preset))
+            return sibling;
+    }
+    return nullptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a region is valid for the current settings, with no side effects.
+ * Safe to call speculatively (e.g. from UI pickers). When errBuf is given, it
+ * receives the human-readable failure reason.
  * Returns false if not compatible.
  */
-bool RadioInterface::validateConfigRegion(const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig)
+bool RadioInterface::checkConfigRegion(const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig, char *errBuf, size_t errLen)
 {
     const RegionInfo *newRegion = getRegion(loraConfig.region);
 
     // Reject unrecognized region codes (getRegion returns UNSET sentinel for unknown codes)
     if (newRegion->code != loraConfig.region) {
-        char err_string[160];
-        snprintf(err_string, sizeof(err_string), "Region code %d is not recognized", loraConfig.region);
-        LOG_ERROR("%s", err_string);
-        RECORD_CRITICALERROR(meshtastic_CriticalErrorCode_INVALID_RADIO_SETTING);
-        sendErrorNotification(err_string);
+        if (errBuf)
+            snprintf(errBuf, errLen, "Region code %d is not recognized", loraConfig.region);
         return false;
     }
 
     // If you are not licensed, you can't use ham regions.
     if (newRegion->profile->licensedOnly && !devicestate.owner.is_licensed) {
-        char err_string[160];
-        snprintf(err_string, sizeof(err_string), "Region %s requires licensed mode", newRegion->name);
-        LOG_ERROR("%s", err_string);
-        RECORD_CRITICALERROR(meshtastic_CriticalErrorCode_INVALID_RADIO_SETTING);
-        sendErrorNotification(err_string);
+        if (errBuf)
+            snprintf(errBuf, errLen, "Region %s requires licensed mode", newRegion->name);
         return false;
     }
 
+    // Hardware compatibility: wide-LoRa (2.4 GHz) regions need a wide-capable radio, and
+    // sub-GHz regions need a radio that can tune below 2.4 GHz (SX128x cannot). UNSET is
+    // always allowed since it is the "no region" state.
+    if (newRegion->code != meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET && RadioLibInterface::instance) {
+        const char *unsupported = nullptr;
+        if (newRegion->wideLora && !RadioLibInterface::instance->wideLora()) {
+            unsupported = "2.4 GHz";
+        } else if (!newRegion->wideLora && !RadioLibInterface::instance->supportsSubGhz()) {
+            unsupported = "sub-GHz";
+        }
+        if (unsupported) {
+            if (errBuf)
+                snprintf(errBuf, errLen, "Region %s needs %s, which this radio does not support", newRegion->name, unsupported);
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     return true;
 }
 
 /**
- * Internal helper: validate or clamp a LoRa config against its region.
+ * Checks if a region is valid for the current settings. On failure, logs at ERROR,
+ * records a critical error, and sends a client notification.
+ * Returns false if not compatible.
+ */
+bool RadioInterface::validateConfigRegion(const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig)
+{
+    char err_string[160];
+    if (checkConfigRegion(loraConfig, err_string, sizeof(err_string)))
+        return true;
+
+    LOG_ERROR("%s", err_string);
+    RECORD_CRITICALERROR(meshtastic_CriticalErrorCode_INVALID_RADIO_SETTING);
+    sendErrorNotification(err_string);
+    return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Internal helper: check or clamp a LoRa config against its region.
  * When clamp==false, returns false on first error (pure validation).
  * When clamp==true, fixes invalid settings in-place and returns true.
  */
@@ -920,11 +981,29 @@ bool RadioInterface::checkOrClampConfigLora(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraCo
     if (loraConfig.use_preset) {
         check_bw = modemPresetToBwKHz(loraConfig.modem_preset, newRegion->wideLora);
 
-        bool preset_valid = false;
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < newRegion->getNumPresets(); i++) {
-            if (loraConfig.modem_preset == newRegion->getAvailablePresets()[i]) {
+        bool preset_valid = newRegion->supportsPreset(loraConfig.modem_preset);
+        if (!preset_valid) {
+            // A preset locked to a sibling of the swappable EU regions swaps the region instead
+            // of clamping the preset, as long as the previous region was itself one of the trio.
+            const RegionInfo *swapRegion = regionSwapForPreset(loraConfig.region, loraConfig.modem_preset);
+            if (swapRegion) {
+                if (!clamp) {
+                    // Validation must still fail so callers route into the clamp, but quietly:
+                    // the clamp will accept this config by swapping regions, so don't record a
+                    // critical error or alarm the user over a change that is about to succeed.
+                    LOG_INFO("Preset %s implies region swap %s to %s, deferring to clamp", presetName, newRegion->name,
+                             swapRegion->name);
+                    return false;
+                }
+                snprintf(err_string, sizeof(err_string), "Preset %s swaps region %s to %s", presetName, newRegion->name,
+                         swapRegion->name);
+                LOG_INFO("%s", err_string);
+                sendErrorNotification(err_string, meshtastic_LogRecord_Level_INFO);
+
+                loraConfig.region = swapRegion->code;
+                newRegion = swapRegion;
+                check_bw = modemPresetToBwKHz(loraConfig.modem_preset, newRegion->wideLora);
                 preset_valid = true;
-                break;
             }
         }
         if (!preset_valid) {
@@ -1288,4 +1367,4 @@ size_t RadioInterface::beginSending(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
 
     sendingPacket = p;
     return p->encrypted.size + sizeof(PacketHeader);
-}
+}

src/mesh/RadioInterface.h

@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ class RadioInterface
 
     virtual ~RadioInterface() {}
 
+    /// Fires once per valid received LoRa packet (arg = sender NodeNum). Used e.g. to flash LED_LORA.
+    static Observable<uint32_t> loraRxPacketObservable;
+
     /**
      * Coerce LoRa config fields (bandwidth/spread_factor) derived from presets.
      * This is used during early bootstrapping so UIs that display these fields directly remain consistent.
@@ -143,6 +146,10 @@ class RadioInterface
 
     virtual bool wideLora() { return false; }
 
+    /// Whether the radio can tune sub-GHz bands. False for 2.4 GHz-only chips (SX128x);
+    /// multiband chips like the LR1121 keep the default.
+    virtual bool supportsSubGhz() { return true; }
+
     /// Prepare hardware for sleep.  Call this _only_ for deep sleep, not needed for light sleep.
     virtual bool sleep() { return true; }
 
@@ -244,7 +251,12 @@ class RadioInterface
 
     static bool checkOrClampConfigLora(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig, bool clamp);
 
-    // Check if a candidate region is compatible and valid.
+    // Check if a candidate region is compatible and valid, with no side effects (safe for
+    // speculative UI checks). errBuf, if given, receives the failure reason.
+    static bool checkConfigRegion(const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig, char *errBuf = nullptr, size_t errLen = 0);
+
+    // Check if a candidate region is compatible and valid. On failure, logs at ERROR,
+    // records a critical error, and sends a client notification.
     static bool validateConfigRegion(const meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig);
 
     // Check if a candidate radio configuration is valid.
@@ -253,6 +265,11 @@ class RadioInterface
     // Make a candidate radio configuration valid, even if it isn't.
     static void clampConfigLora(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig &loraConfig);
 
+    // If preset is locked to a sibling of currentRegion among the swappable EU regions
+    // (EU_868/EU_866/EU_N_868), return the sibling region owning the preset, else nullptr.
+    static const RegionInfo *regionSwapForPreset(meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode currentRegion,
+                                                 meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_ModemPreset preset);
+
   protected:
     int8_t power = 17; // Set by applyModemConfig()
 

src/mesh/RadioLibInterface.cpp

@@ -614,6 +614,10 @@ void RadioLibInterface::handleReceiveInterrupt()
 
             printPacket("Lora RX", mp);
 
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+            loraRxPacketObservable.notifyObservers(mp->from);
+#endif
+
             airTime->logAirtime(RX_LOG, rxMsec);
 
             deliverToReceiver(mp);

src/mesh/Router.cpp

@@ -485,14 +485,16 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
     bool decrypted = false;
     ChannelIndex chIndex = 0;
 #if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
-    // Attempt PKI decryption first
-    if (p->channel == 0 && isToUs(p) && p->to > 0 && !isBroadcast(p->to) && nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from) != nullptr &&
-        nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from)->public_key.size > 0 && nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to) != nullptr &&
-        nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to)->public_key.size > 0 && rawSize > MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD) {
+    // Attempt PKI decryption first. The sender's key may come from the hot
+    // store or the warm tier (nodes evicted from the hot store keep their key
+    // there), so DMs from long-tail nodes still decrypt.
+    meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t fromKey = {0, {0}};
+    if (p->channel == 0 && isToUs(p) && p->to > 0 && !isBroadcast(p->to) && nodeDB->copyPublicKey(p->from, fromKey) &&
+        nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to) != nullptr && nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to)->public_key.size > 0 &&
+        rawSize > MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD) {
         LOG_DEBUG("Attempt PKI decryption");
 
-        if (crypto->decryptCurve25519(p->from, nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from)->public_key, p->id, rawSize, p->encrypted.bytes,
-                                      bytes)) {
+        if (crypto->decryptCurve25519(p->from, fromKey, p->id, rawSize, p->encrypted.bytes, bytes)) {
             LOG_INFO("PKI Decryption worked!");
 
             meshtastic_Data decodedtmp;
@@ -503,7 +505,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
                 decrypted = true;
                 LOG_INFO("Packet decrypted using PKI!");
                 p->pki_encrypted = true;
-                memcpy(&p->public_key.bytes, nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from)->public_key.bytes, 32);
+                memcpy(p->public_key.bytes, fromKey.bytes, 32);
                 p->public_key.size = 32;
                 p->decoded = decodedtmp;
                 p->which_payload_variant = meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag; // change type to decoded
@@ -559,6 +561,38 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
         if (p->decoded.has_bitfield)
             p->decoded.want_response |= p->decoded.bitfield & BITFIELD_WANT_RESPONSE_MASK;
 
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+        if (p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size == XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
+            meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
+            if (node && node->public_key.size == 32) {
+                p->xeddsa_signed =
+                    crypto->xeddsa_verify(node->public_key.bytes, p->from, p->id, p->decoded.portnum, p->decoded.payload.bytes,
+                                          p->decoded.payload.size, p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes);
+                if (p->xeddsa_signed) {
+                    // Mark this node as a signer so future unsigned packets from it are rejected
+                    nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK, true);
+                    LOG_DEBUG("Verified XEdDSA signature from 0x%08x", p->from);
+                } else {
+                    LOG_WARN("XEdDSA signature verification failed from 0x%08x, dropping", p->from);
+                    return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
+                }
+            } else {
+                LOG_DEBUG("No public key for 0x%08x, cannot verify XEdDSA signature", p->from);
+            }
+        } else {
+            // Unsigned packet — only reject the class of packet a signing node always signs:
+            // an unencrypted broadcast small enough to also carry a signature (see perhapsEncode()).
+            // Unicast packets and oversized broadcasts are never signed, so they must not be
+            // hard-failed here even if this node has signed before.
+            const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from);
+            if (node && nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node) && isBroadcast(p->to) &&
+                p->decoded.payload.size + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE < meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
+                LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned broadcast from 0x%08x that previously signed", p->from);
+                return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+
         /* Not actually ever used.
         // Decompress if needed. jm
         if (p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_TEXT_MESSAGE_COMPRESSED_APP) {
@@ -629,6 +663,18 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
             p->decoded.has_bitfield = true;
             p->decoded.bitfield |= (config.lora.config_ok_to_mqtt << BITFIELD_OK_TO_MQTT_SHIFT);
             p->decoded.bitfield |= (p->decoded.want_response << BITFIELD_WANT_RESPONSE_SHIFT);
+#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
+            // Sign broadcast packets if payload + signature fits within the max Data payload.
+            // The actual encoded size is checked after pb_encode (TOO_LARGE).
+            if (!p->pki_encrypted && isBroadcast(p->to) &&
+                p->decoded.payload.size + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE < meshtastic_Constants_DATA_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
+                if (crypto->xeddsa_sign(p->from, p->id, p->decoded.portnum, p->decoded.payload.bytes, p->decoded.payload.size,
+                                        p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.bytes)) {
+                    p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size = XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+                    LOG_DEBUG("XEdDSA signed packet 0x%08x", p->id);
+                }
+            }
+#endif
         }
 
         size_t numbytes = pb_encode_to_bytes(bytes, sizeof(bytes), &meshtastic_Data_msg, &p->decoded);
@@ -676,7 +722,10 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
         ChannelIndex chIndex = p->channel; // keep as a local because we are about to change it
 
 #if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
-        meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->to);
+        // Destination key from the hot store or the warm tier (evicted
+        // long-tail nodes keep their key there)
+        meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t destKey = {0, {0}};
+        bool haveDestKey = nodeDB->copyPublicKey(p->to, destKey);
         // We may want to retool things so we can send a PKC packet when the client specifies a key and nodenum, even if the node
         // is not in the local nodedb
         // First, only PKC encrypt packets we are originating
@@ -699,18 +748,17 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
             if (numbytes + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD > MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN)
                 return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;
             // Check for a known public key for the destination
-            if (node == nullptr || node->public_key.size != 32) {
+            if (!haveDestKey) {
                 LOG_WARN("Unknown public key for destination node 0x%08x (portnum %d), refusing to send legacy DM", p->to,
                          p->decoded.portnum);
                 return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_SEND_FAIL_PUBLIC_KEY;
             }
-            if (p->pki_encrypted && !memfll(p->public_key.bytes, 0, 32) &&
-                memcmp(p->public_key.bytes, node->public_key.bytes, 32) != 0) {
+            if (p->pki_encrypted && !memfll(p->public_key.bytes, 0, 32) && memcmp(p->public_key.bytes, destKey.bytes, 32) != 0) {
                 LOG_WARN("Client public key differs from requested: 0x%02x, stored key begins 0x%02x", *p->public_key.bytes,
-                         *node->public_key.bytes);
+                         *destKey.bytes);
                 return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_FAILED;
             }
-            crypto->encryptCurve25519(p->to, getFrom(p), node->public_key, p->id, numbytes, bytes, p->encrypted.bytes);
+            crypto->encryptCurve25519(p->to, getFrom(p), destKey, p->id, numbytes, bytes, p->encrypted.bytes);
             numbytes += MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
             p->channel = 0;
             p->pki_encrypted = true;

src/mesh/Router.h

@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@ class Router : protected concurrency::OSThread, protected PacketHistory
      */
     void addInterface(std::unique_ptr<RadioInterface> _iface) { iface = std::move(_iface); }
 
+    /**
+     * Borrowed (non-owning) access to the radio interface — used by NodeDB
+     * after a lockdown unlock so it can push the freshly-loaded config to
+     * the SX12xx via reconfigure(). Returns nullptr when no radio has been
+     * attached (e.g. ARCH_PORTDUINO simulator before SimRadio bind).
+     */
+    RadioInterface *getRadioIface() { return iface.get(); }
+
     /**
      * do idle processing
      * Mostly looking in our incoming rxPacket queue and calling handleReceived.

src/mesh/SX128xInterface.h

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ template <class T> class SX128xInterface : public RadioLibInterface
 
     virtual bool wideLora() override;
 
+    /// SX128x is a 2.4 GHz-only chip; it cannot tune sub-GHz regions
+    virtual bool supportsSubGhz() override { return false; }
+
     /// Apply any radio provisioning changes
     /// Make sure the Driver is properly configured before calling init().
     /// \return true if initialisation succeeded.

src/mesh/TypeConversions.cpp

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ meshtastic_NodeInfo TypeConversions::ConvertToNodeInfo(const meshtastic_NodeInfo
     info.is_ignored = nodeInfoLiteIsIgnored(lite);
     info.is_key_manually_verified = nodeInfoLiteIsKeyManuallyVerified(lite);
     info.is_muted = nodeInfoLiteIsMuted(lite);
+    info.has_xeddsa_signed = nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(lite);
 
     if (lite->has_hops_away) {
         info.has_hops_away = true;

src/mesh/WarmNodeStore.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,548 @@
+#include "WarmNodeStore.h"
+
+#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
+
+#include "FSCommon.h"
+#include "SPILock.h"
+#include "SafeFile.h"
+#include "configuration.h"
+#include "power/PowerHAL.h"
+#include <ErriezCRC32.h>
+#include <vector>
+
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+#include "flash/flash_nrf5x.h"
+#define WARM_RING_MAGIC 0x474E5257u // "WRNG"
+// A tombstone is an entry record whose last_heard is all-ones — getTime()
+// (unix seconds) cannot reach 0xFFFFFFFF until 2106, and erased flash is
+// detected via num == 0xFFFFFFFF before last_heard is ever inspected.
+#define WARM_RING_TOMBSTONE 0xFFFFFFFFu
+#else
+// warm.dat layout: this header followed by count packed WarmNodeEntry records.
+struct WarmStoreHeader {
+    uint32_t magic;     // WARM_STORE_MAGIC
+    uint32_t reserved;  // 0; kept so the header stays 16 B
+    uint16_t count;     // entries persisted
+    uint16_t entrySize; // sizeof(WarmNodeEntry), format guard
+    uint32_t crc;       // crc32 over count * entrySize bytes
+};
+static_assert(sizeof(WarmStoreHeader) == 16, "header layout is part of the persistence format");
+
+#define WARM_STORE_MAGIC 0x314D5257u // "WRM1"
+
+#ifdef FSCom
+static const char *warmFileName = "/prefs/warm.dat";
+#endif
+#endif // NRF52840_XXAA
+
+static inline bool keyIsSet(const uint8_t key[32])
+{
+    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+        if (key[i])
+            return true;
+    return false;
+}
+
+WarmNodeStore::WarmNodeStore()
+{
+#if defined(ARCH_ESP32) && defined(BOARD_HAS_PSRAM)
+    entries = static_cast<WarmNodeEntry *>(ps_calloc(WARM_NODE_COUNT, sizeof(WarmNodeEntry)));
+    if (!entries) {
+        LOG_WARN("WarmStore: PSRAM alloc failed, using heap");
+        entries = static_cast<WarmNodeEntry *>(calloc(WARM_NODE_COUNT, sizeof(WarmNodeEntry)));
+    }
+#else
+    entries = static_cast<WarmNodeEntry *>(calloc(WARM_NODE_COUNT, sizeof(WarmNodeEntry)));
+#endif
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+    memset(pageOf, kNoPage, sizeof(pageOf));
+#endif
+}
+
+WarmNodeStore::~WarmNodeStore()
+{
+    free(entries); // always malloc-family (calloc / ps_calloc)
+    entries = nullptr;
+}
+
+WarmNodeEntry *WarmNodeStore::find(NodeNum num) const
+{
+    if (!entries || !num)
+        return nullptr;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++)
+        if (entries[i].num == num)
+            return &entries[i];
+    return nullptr;
+}
+
+// Slot placement with the keyed-first admission policy. Shared by absorb()
+// and the ring replay, so the policy is applied identically in both paths.
+WarmNodeEntry *WarmNodeStore::place(NodeNum num, uint32_t lastHeard, const uint8_t *key32)
+{
+    if (!entries || !num)
+        return nullptr;
+
+    const bool candidateKeyed = key32 && keyIsSet(key32);
+
+    WarmNodeEntry *slot = find(num);
+    const bool sameNode = slot != nullptr;
+    if (!slot) {
+        // Pick a victim: any empty slot, else the oldest keyless entry, else
+        // (only for keyed candidates) the oldest keyed entry.
+        WarmNodeEntry *oldestKeyless = nullptr, *oldestKeyed = nullptr;
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++) {
+            WarmNodeEntry &e = entries[i];
+            if (!e.num) {
+                slot = &e;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (keyIsSet(e.public_key)) {
+                if (!oldestKeyed || e.last_heard < oldestKeyed->last_heard)
+                    oldestKeyed = &e;
+            } else {
+                if (!oldestKeyless || e.last_heard < oldestKeyless->last_heard)
+                    oldestKeyless = &e;
+            }
+        }
+        if (!slot)
+            slot = oldestKeyless ? oldestKeyless : (candidateKeyed ? oldestKeyed : nullptr);
+        if (!slot)
+            return nullptr; // store full of keyed entries and the candidate has no key
+    }
+
+    slot->num = num;
+    slot->last_heard = lastHeard;
+    if (candidateKeyed)
+        memcpy(slot->public_key, key32, 32);
+    else if (!sameNode)
+        // Repurposing a victim slot for a different node: clear its stale key.
+        // A keyless refresh of a node already here keeps the key we learned.
+        memset(slot->public_key, 0, 32);
+    return slot;
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::absorb(NodeNum num, uint32_t lastHeard, const uint8_t *key32)
+{
+    const WarmNodeEntry *slot = place(num, lastHeard, key32);
+    if (!slot)
+        return false;
+    persistEntry(*slot);
+    LOG_MIGRATION("WarmStore absorb 0x%08x key=%d last_heard=%u (now %u/%u)", (unsigned)num, keyIsSet(slot->public_key) ? 1 : 0,
+                  (unsigned)lastHeard, (unsigned)count(), (unsigned)capacity());
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::take(NodeNum num, WarmNodeEntry &out)
+{
+    WarmNodeEntry *e = find(num);
+    if (!e)
+        return false;
+    out = *e;
+    const int idx = static_cast<int>(e - entries);
+    memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+    persistRemove(num, idx);
+    LOG_MIGRATION("WarmStore take(rehydrate) 0x%08x key=%d (now %u/%u)", (unsigned)num, keyIsSet(out.public_key) ? 1 : 0,
+                  (unsigned)count(), (unsigned)capacity());
+    return true;
+}
+
+#if MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+void WarmNodeStore::dumpToLog(const char *reason) const
+{
+    if (!entries) {
+        LOG_MIGRATION("WarmStore dump (%s): backend not allocated", reason);
+        return;
+    }
+    LOG_MIGRATION("WarmStore dump (%s): %u live / %u cap ==>", reason, (unsigned)count(), (unsigned)capacity());
+    unsigned shown = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++) {
+        const WarmNodeEntry &e = entries[i];
+        if (e.num == 0)
+            continue;
+        LOG_MIGRATION("  warm[%3u] 0x%08x last_heard=%u key=%d", (unsigned)i, (unsigned)e.num, (unsigned)e.last_heard,
+                      keyIsSet(e.public_key) ? 1 : 0);
+        shown++;
+    }
+    LOG_MIGRATION("WarmStore dump (%s): <== end (%u entries)", reason, shown);
+}
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::copyKey(NodeNum num, uint8_t out[32]) const
+{
+    const WarmNodeEntry *e = find(num);
+    if (!e || !keyIsSet(e->public_key))
+        return false;
+    memcpy(out, e->public_key, 32);
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::contains(NodeNum num) const
+{
+    return find(num) != nullptr;
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::remove(NodeNum num)
+{
+    WarmNodeEntry *e = find(num);
+    if (e) {
+        const int idx = static_cast<int>(e - entries);
+        memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+        persistRemove(num, idx);
+    }
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::clear()
+{
+    if (!entries)
+        return;
+    memset(entries, 0, WARM_NODE_COUNT * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry));
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+    memset(pageOf, kNoPage, sizeof(pageOf));
+#endif
+    persistClear();
+}
+
+size_t WarmNodeStore::count() const
+{
+    size_t n = 0;
+    if (entries)
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++)
+            if (entries[i].num)
+                n++;
+    return n;
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::saveIfDirty()
+{
+    if (!dirty)
+        return true;
+    bool ok = save();
+    if (ok)
+        dirty = false;
+    return ok;
+}
+
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+
+// Raw-flash record-ring backend (nRF52840).
+// 3 × 4 KB pages below LittleFS. Mutations append 40 B records (entry snapshot,
+// or tombstone with last_heard == 0xFFFFFFFF) via the shared flash_nrf5x page
+// cache; saveIfDirty() is the durability point. A full page reclaims the oldest
+// (stranded live entries re-appended, then erased). Flash access holds spiLock —
+// the page cache is shared with InternalFS/LittleFS.
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::ringReadHeader(uint8_t page, WarmPageHeader &h) const
+{
+    flash_nrf5x_read(&h, WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(page), sizeof(h));
+    return h.magic == WARM_RING_MAGIC && h.seq != 0xFFFFFFFFu;
+}
+
+// Caller holds spiLock.
+void WarmNodeStore::ringOpenPage(uint8_t page)
+{
+    // Drop any cached state for the page before the real erase, so a later
+    // cache flush can't resurrect stale bytes.
+    flash_nrf5x_flush();
+    flash_nrf5x_erase(WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(page));
+    WarmPageHeader h;
+    h.magic = WARM_RING_MAGIC;
+    h.seq = nextSeq++;
+    flash_nrf5x_write(WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(page), &h, sizeof(h));
+    activePage = page;
+    writeSlot = 0;
+}
+
+// Caller holds spiLock. May recurse once via ringAppend if the stranded set
+// fills the fresh page exactly — bounded by WARM_NODE_COUNT <= 2*kRecordsPerPage.
+void WarmNodeStore::ringRotate()
+{
+    uint8_t target = 0;
+    if (activePage != kNoPage) {
+        // Lowest-seq valid page, preferring erased pages; never the active one
+        uint32_t bestSeq = 0;
+        bool found = false;
+        for (uint8_t p = 0; p < WARM_FLASH_PAGES; p++) {
+            if (p == activePage)
+                continue;
+            WarmPageHeader h;
+            if (!ringReadHeader(p, h)) {
+                target = p; // erased/invalid page: free real estate, take it
+                found = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            if (!found || static_cast<int32_t>(h.seq - bestSeq) < 0) {
+                target = p;
+                bestSeq = h.seq;
+                found = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Capture live entries stranded in the page we're about to erase
+    int stranded[WARM_NODE_COUNT] = {};
+    int nStranded = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++) {
+        if (entries[i].num && pageOf[i] == target)
+            stranded[nStranded++] = static_cast<int>(i);
+        if (pageOf[i] == target)
+            pageOf[i] = kNoPage;
+    }
+
+    ringOpenPage(target);
+
+    for (int k = 0; k < nStranded; k++)
+        ringAppend(entries[stranded[k]], stranded[k]);
+}
+
+// Caller holds spiLock.
+void WarmNodeStore::ringAppend(const WarmNodeEntry &rec, int storeSlot)
+{
+    if (activePage == kNoPage || writeSlot >= kRecordsPerPage)
+        ringRotate();
+    const uint32_t addr =
+        WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(activePage) + sizeof(WarmPageHeader) + static_cast<uint32_t>(writeSlot) * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry);
+    flash_nrf5x_write(addr, &rec, sizeof(rec));
+    writeSlot++;
+    if (storeSlot >= 0)
+        pageOf[storeSlot] = activePage;
+    dirty = true;
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistEntry(const WarmNodeEntry &e)
+{
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    ringAppend(e, static_cast<int>(&e - entries));
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistRemove(NodeNum num, int storeSlot)
+{
+    if (storeSlot >= 0 && storeSlot < static_cast<int>(WARM_NODE_COUNT))
+        pageOf[storeSlot] = 0xFF;
+    WarmNodeEntry tomb;
+    memset(&tomb, 0, sizeof(tomb));
+    tomb.num = num;
+    tomb.last_heard = WARM_RING_TOMBSTONE;
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    ringAppend(tomb, -1);
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistClear()
+{
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    flash_nrf5x_flush();
+    for (uint8_t p = 0; p < WARM_FLASH_PAGES; p++)
+        flash_nrf5x_erase(WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(p));
+    activePage = 0xFF;
+    writeSlot = 0;
+    nextSeq = 1;
+    dirty = false; // the erased ring already reflects the empty store
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::load()
+{
+    if (!entries)
+        return;
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+
+    // Order valid pages by ascending seq so replay applies oldest first
+    uint8_t order[WARM_FLASH_PAGES] = {};
+    uint32_t seqs[WARM_FLASH_PAGES] = {};
+    uint8_t nValid = 0;
+    uint8_t nCorrupt = 0;
+    for (uint8_t p = 0; p < WARM_FLASH_PAGES; p++) {
+        WarmPageHeader h;
+        if (!ringReadHeader(p, h)) {
+            // An erased page reads back all-ones; any other magic is a
+            // partially-written or bit-rotted header we're dropping, so flag it
+            // rather than silently treating the loss as a clean empty ring.
+            if (h.magic != 0xFFFFFFFFu)
+                nCorrupt++;
+            continue;
+        }
+        uint8_t pos = nValid;
+        while (pos > 0 && static_cast<int32_t>(h.seq - seqs[pos - 1]) < 0) {
+            order[pos] = order[pos - 1];
+            seqs[pos] = seqs[pos - 1];
+            pos--;
+        }
+        order[pos] = p;
+        seqs[pos] = h.seq;
+        nValid++;
+    }
+
+    if (nValid == 0) {
+        activePage = 0xFF;
+        writeSlot = 0;
+        nextSeq = 1;
+        if (nCorrupt)
+            LOG_WARN("WarmStore: ring unreadable (%u bad page(s)), empty", nCorrupt);
+        else
+            LOG_INFO("WarmStore: ring empty, starting fresh");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    uint32_t replayed = 0;
+    for (uint8_t k = 0; k < nValid; k++) {
+        const uint8_t p = order[k];
+        uint16_t slot = 0;
+        for (; slot < kRecordsPerPage; slot++) {
+            WarmNodeEntry rec;
+            flash_nrf5x_read(&rec, WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(p) + sizeof(WarmPageHeader) + (uint32_t)slot * sizeof(rec), sizeof(rec));
+            if (rec.num == 0xFFFFFFFFu)
+                break; // erased space: end of this page's records (append-only)
+            if (rec.num == 0)
+                continue; // unexpected; skip defensively
+            replayed++;
+            if (rec.last_heard == WARM_RING_TOMBSTONE) {
+                WarmNodeEntry *e = find(rec.num);
+                if (e) {
+                    pageOf[e - entries] = 0xFF;
+                    memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+                }
+            } else {
+                const WarmNodeEntry *e = place(rec.num, rec.last_heard, rec.public_key);
+                if (e)
+                    pageOf[e - entries] = p;
+            }
+        }
+        if (k == nValid - 1) { // newest page becomes the active head
+            activePage = p;
+            writeSlot = slot;
+            nextSeq = seqs[k] + 1;
+        }
+    }
+    if (nCorrupt)
+        LOG_WARN("WarmStore: dropped %u corrupt ring page(s), some nodes lost", nCorrupt);
+    LOG_INFO("WarmStore: replayed %u ring records -> %u live nodes (page %u, slot %u)", (unsigned)replayed, (unsigned)count(),
+             activePage, writeSlot);
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::save()
+{
+    if (!powerHAL_isPowerLevelSafe()) {
+        LOG_ERROR("Error: trying to save WarmStore on unsafe device power level.");
+        return false;
+    }
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    flash_nrf5x_flush();
+    return true;
+}
+
+#else // !NRF52840_XXAA --------------------
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistEntry(const WarmNodeEntry &e)
+{
+    (void)e;
+    dirty = true;
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistRemove(NodeNum num, int storeSlot)
+{
+    (void)num;
+    (void)storeSlot;
+    dirty = true;
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::persistClear()
+{
+    dirty = true;
+}
+
+#ifdef FSCom
+
+// ---- File persistence: /prefs/warm.dat snapshots ----------------------------
+
+// Compact occupied slots to the front of `dst`; returns the count.
+static uint16_t packEntries(const WarmNodeEntry *src, WarmNodeEntry *dst)
+{
+    uint16_t n = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < WARM_NODE_COUNT; i++)
+        if (src[i].num)
+            dst[n++] = src[i];
+    return n;
+}
+
+void WarmNodeStore::load()
+{
+    if (!entries)
+        return;
+    // Clear first — all failure paths below then correctly represent "empty",
+    // even if load() is called on an already-used instance.
+    memset(entries, 0, WARM_NODE_COUNT * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry));
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    auto f = FSCom.open(warmFileName, FILE_O_READ);
+    if (!f)
+        return;
+    WarmStoreHeader h;
+    if ((size_t)f.read((uint8_t *)&h, sizeof(h)) != sizeof(h)) {
+        f.close();
+        LOG_WARN("WarmStore: %s header read failed, starting empty", warmFileName);
+        return;
+    }
+    if (h.magic != WARM_STORE_MAGIC || h.entrySize != sizeof(WarmNodeEntry) || h.count > WARM_NODE_COUNT) {
+        f.close();
+        LOG_WARN("WarmStore: %s header invalid (magic=0x%08x entrySize=%u count=%u), starting empty", warmFileName, h.magic,
+                 h.entrySize, h.count);
+        return;
+    }
+    if (h.count) {
+        const size_t len = (size_t)h.count * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry);
+        const bool readOk = (size_t)f.read((uint8_t *)entries, len) == len;
+        f.close();
+        if (!readOk) {
+            LOG_WARN("WarmStore: %s entries read failed, starting empty", warmFileName);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (crc32Buffer(entries, len) != h.crc) {
+            LOG_WARN("WarmStore: %s CRC mismatch, starting empty", warmFileName);
+            return;
+        }
+    } else {
+        f.close();
+    }
+    LOG_INFO("WarmStore: loaded %u warm nodes from %s", h.count, warmFileName);
+}
+
+bool WarmNodeStore::save()
+{
+    if (!entries)
+        return false;
+    if (!powerHAL_isPowerLevelSafe()) {
+        LOG_ERROR("Error: trying to save WarmStore on unsafe device power level.");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    std::vector<WarmNodeEntry> packed(WARM_NODE_COUNT);
+    WarmStoreHeader h;
+    h.magic = WARM_STORE_MAGIC;
+    h.reserved = 0;
+    h.count = packEntries(entries, packed.data());
+    h.entrySize = sizeof(WarmNodeEntry);
+    h.crc = crc32Buffer(packed.data(), h.count * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry));
+
+    concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
+    FSCom.mkdir("/prefs");
+
+    auto f = SafeFile(warmFileName, false);
+    f.write((const uint8_t *)&h, sizeof(h));
+    f.write((const uint8_t *)packed.data(), h.count * sizeof(WarmNodeEntry));
+    bool ok = f.close();
+    if (!ok)
+        LOG_ERROR("WarmStore: can't write %s", warmFileName);
+    else
+        LOG_DEBUG("WarmStore: saved %u warm nodes to %s", h.count, warmFileName);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+#else
+
+void WarmNodeStore::load() {}
+bool WarmNodeStore::save()
+{
+    return true;
+}
+
+#endif // FSCom
+#endif // NRF52840_XXAA
+
+#endif // WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0

src/mesh/WarmNodeStore.h

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#pragma once
+
+#include "MeshTypes.h"
+#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+// Verbose tracing for the warm-store migration + NodeDB self-care. Per-event /
+// per-boot chatter routes through this so it can be silenced in one place (set
+// to 0) once they're proven; genuine LOG_WARN anomalies stay unconditional.
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+#define MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE 0
+#endif
+#if MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+#define LOG_MIGRATION(...) LOG_INFO(__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define LOG_MIGRATION(...) ((void)0)
+#endif
+
+#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0
+
+/**
+ * Warm ("long-tail") node tier.
+ *
+ * Minimal identity record (NodeNum, last_heard, Curve25519 public key) for nodes
+ * evicted from the hot NodeInfoLite store, so DMs to/from them keep encrypting —
+ * the key is expensive to re-learn, the rest rebuilds from traffic in seconds.
+ * Flat fixed array, linear scan (only on hot-store misses), LRU by last_heard
+ * with keyed entries outranking keyless.
+ *
+ * Persistence: nRF52840 uses a 12 KB raw-flash record-ring below LittleFS
+ * (append + replay + compact-on-rotate — see the backend in WarmNodeStore.cpp,
+ * link-guarded by nrf52840_s140_v7.ld). Everywhere else: /prefs/warm.dat.
+ */
+struct WarmNodeEntry {
+    NodeNum num;            // 0 = empty slot
+    uint32_t last_heard;    // recency for LRU ordering
+    uint8_t public_key[32]; // all-zero = no key (a real key is never all-zero)
+};
+static_assert(sizeof(WarmNodeEntry) == 40, "WarmNodeEntry must stay 40 B — persistence format depends on it");
+
+// Gated on NRF52840_XXAA: the ring sits at 0xEA000
+// valid only on the 1 MB-flash nRF52840.
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+#define WARM_FLASH_PAGE_SIZE 4096u
+#define WARM_FLASH_PAGES 3u
+#define WARM_FLASH_REGION_BASE (0xED000u - WARM_FLASH_PAGES * WARM_FLASH_PAGE_SIZE) // 0xEA000
+#define WARM_FLASH_PAGE_ADDR(i) (WARM_FLASH_REGION_BASE + (i)*WARM_FLASH_PAGE_SIZE)
+#endif
+
+class WarmNodeStore
+{
+  public:
+    WarmNodeStore();
+    ~WarmNodeStore();
+    WarmNodeStore(const WarmNodeStore &) = delete;
+    WarmNodeStore &operator=(const WarmNodeStore &) = delete;
+
+    /// Remember an evicted hot node. Keyless candidates never displace keyed
+    /// entries; otherwise the oldest (keyless-first) entry is replaced.
+    /// @return true if the node was stored or updated
+    bool absorb(NodeNum num, uint32_t lastHeard, const uint8_t *key32 /* may be NULL */);
+
+    /// Find and remove an entry (used when the node is re-admitted to the hot store).
+    bool take(NodeNum num, WarmNodeEntry &out);
+
+    /// Copy the 32-byte public key for a node, if we have one.
+    bool copyKey(NodeNum num, uint8_t out[32]) const;
+
+    bool contains(NodeNum num) const;
+    void remove(NodeNum num);
+    void clear();
+    size_t count() const;
+    size_t capacity() const { return entries ? WARM_NODE_COUNT : 0; }
+
+#if MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+    /// Debug: dump every live warm entry (num / last_heard / has-key) to the
+    /// console. Compiled out unless MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE.
+    void dumpToLog(const char *reason = "dump") const;
+#endif
+
+    /// Load persisted entries (called once at boot, after the node DB loads).
+    void load();
+    /// Durability point, piggybacked on the node-database save cadence. On the
+    /// ring backend this flushes the shared flash page cache; on the file
+    /// backend it writes the warm.dat snapshot.
+    bool saveIfDirty();
+
+  private:
+    WarmNodeEntry *entries = nullptr; // WARM_NODE_COUNT slots; PSRAM on ESP32 when available
+    bool dirty = false;
+
+    WarmNodeEntry *find(NodeNum num) const;
+    // Internal slot-placement shared by absorb() and ring replay: applies the
+    // keyed-first admission policy without touching persistence.
+    WarmNodeEntry *place(NodeNum num, uint32_t lastHeard, const uint8_t *key32);
+
+    // Persistence hooks called from the mutation paths. File backend: mark
+    // dirty. Ring backend: append an upsert/tombstone record (+ mark dirty).
+    void persistEntry(const WarmNodeEntry &e); // e must point into entries[]
+    void persistRemove(NodeNum num, int storeSlot);
+    void persistClear();
+
+#if defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+    // nRF52840 raw-flash record-ring state.
+    struct WarmPageHeader {
+        uint32_t magic; // WARM_RING_MAGIC
+        uint32_t seq;   // page generation; 0xFFFFFFFF = erased/unused
+    };
+    static_assert(sizeof(WarmPageHeader) == 8, "page header is part of the flash format");
+    static constexpr uint16_t kRecordsPerPage = (WARM_FLASH_PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(WarmPageHeader)) / sizeof(WarmNodeEntry); // 102
+    static_assert(WARM_NODE_COUNT <= 2 * ((WARM_FLASH_PAGE_SIZE - 8) / 40), "live set must fit the ring with one page reclaimed");
+
+    static constexpr uint8_t kNoPage = 0xFF; // "no page" sentinel for activePage / pageOf[]
+
+    uint8_t activePage = kNoPage;    // no page opened yet (fresh/erased ring)
+    uint16_t writeSlot = 0;          // next free record slot in the active page
+    uint32_t nextSeq = 1;            // seq for the next page opened
+    uint8_t pageOf[WARM_NODE_COUNT]; // flash page holding each RAM slot's newest record; kNoPage = none
+
+    void ringAppend(const WarmNodeEntry &rec, int storeSlot /* -1 for tombstones */);
+    void ringRotate();               // reclaim oldest page, compacting stranded live entries
+    void ringOpenPage(uint8_t page); // erase + write header (seq = nextSeq++)
+    bool ringReadHeader(uint8_t page, WarmPageHeader &h) const;
+#endif
+
+    bool save();
+};
+
+#endif // WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0

src/mesh/eth/ethClient.cpp

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #include "main.h"
 #include "mesh/api/ethServerAPI.h"
 #include "target_specific.h"
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(HAS_ETHERNET_OTA)
+#include "mesh/eth/ethOTA.h"
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_ARDUINO_ETHERNET
 #include <Ethernet.h> // arduino-libraries/Ethernet — supports W5100/W5200/W5500
 // Shorter DHCP timeout so LoRa startup isn't blocked when no DHCP server is present.
@@ -154,6 +157,10 @@ static int32_t reconnectETH()
             }
 #endif
 
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(HAS_ETHERNET_OTA)
+            initEthOTA();
+#endif
+
             ethStartupComplete = true;
         }
     }
@@ -180,6 +187,10 @@ static int32_t reconnectETH()
     }
 #endif
 
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(HAS_ETHERNET_OTA)
+    ethOTALoop();
+#endif
+
     return 5000; // every 5 seconds
 }
 

src/mesh/eth/ethOTA.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+#include "configuration.h"
+
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(HAS_ETHERNET_OTA)
+
+#include "ethOTA.h"
+#include <ErriezCRC32.h>
+#include <SHA256.h>
+#include <Updater.h>
+#ifdef ARCH_RP2040
+#include <hardware/watchdog.h>
+#define FEED_WATCHDOG() watchdog_update()
+#else
+#define FEED_WATCHDOG() ((void)0)
+#endif
+
+/// Protocol header sent by the upload tool
+struct __attribute__((packed)) OTAHeader {
+    uint8_t magic[4];      // "MOTA" (Meshtastic OTA)
+    uint32_t firmwareSize; // Size of the firmware payload in bytes (little-endian)
+    uint32_t crc32;        // CRC32 of the entire firmware payload
+};
+
+/// Response codes sent back to the client
+enum OTAResponse : uint8_t {
+    OTA_OK = 0x00,
+    OTA_ERR_CRC = 0x01,
+    OTA_ERR_SIZE = 0x02,
+    OTA_ERR_WRITE = 0x03,
+    OTA_ERR_MAGIC = 0x04,
+    OTA_ERR_BEGIN = 0x05,
+    OTA_ACK = 0x06, // ACK uses ASCII ACK character
+    OTA_ERR_AUTH = 0x07,
+    OTA_ERR_TIMEOUT = 0x08,
+};
+
+static const uint32_t OTA_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;      // 30s inactivity timeout
+static const size_t OTA_CHUNK_SIZE = 1024;         // 1KB receive buffer
+static const uint32_t OTA_AUTH_COOLDOWN_MS = 5000; // 5s cooldown after failed auth
+static const size_t OTA_NONCE_SIZE = 32;
+static const size_t OTA_HASH_SIZE = 32;
+
+// OTA PSK — override via USERPREFS_OTA_PSK in userPrefs.jsonc
+// USERPREFS_OTA_PSK is stringified by PlatformIO (wrapped in quotes), so we
+// use a char[] and sizeof-1 to exclude the trailing NUL byte from the hash.
+#ifdef USERPREFS_OTA_PSK
+static const char otaPSKString[] = USERPREFS_OTA_PSK;
+static const uint8_t *const otaPSK = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(otaPSKString);
+static const size_t otaPSKSize = sizeof(otaPSKString) - 1;
+#else
+// Default PSK (CHANGE THIS for production deployments)
+static const uint8_t otaPSK[] = {0x6d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x68, 0x74, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x69, 0x63, 0x5f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x61, 0x5f, 0x64,
+                                 0x65, 0x66, 0x61, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x70, 0x73, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x31, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21};
+// = "meshtastic_ota_default_psk_v1!!!"
+static const size_t otaPSKSize = sizeof(otaPSK);
+#endif
+
+static EthernetServer *otaServer = nullptr;
+static uint32_t lastAuthFailure = 0;
+
+static bool readExact(EthernetClient &client, uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t received = 0;
+    uint32_t lastActivity = millis();
+
+    while (received < len) {
+        if (!client.connected()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        int avail = client.available();
+        if (avail > 0) {
+            size_t toRead = min((size_t)avail, len - received);
+            size_t got = client.read(buf + received, toRead);
+            received += got;
+            lastActivity = millis();
+        } else {
+            if (millis() - lastActivity > OTA_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            delay(1);
+        }
+        FEED_WATCHDOG();
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+/// Compute SHA256(nonce || psk) for challenge-response authentication
+static void computeAuthHash(const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonceLen, const uint8_t *psk, size_t pskLen, uint8_t *hashOut)
+{
+    SHA256 sha;
+    sha.reset();
+    sha.update(nonce, nonceLen);
+    sha.update(psk, pskLen);
+    sha.finalize(hashOut, OTA_HASH_SIZE);
+}
+
+/// Challenge-response authentication. Returns true if client is authenticated.
+static bool authenticateClient(EthernetClient &client)
+{
+    // Rate-limit after failed auth — close silently so the error byte is not
+    // misinterpreted as part of the nonce by a re-trying client.
+    if (lastAuthFailure != 0 && (millis() - lastAuthFailure) < OTA_AUTH_COOLDOWN_MS) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Auth cooldown active, rejecting connection");
+        client.stop();
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Generate random nonce
+    uint8_t nonce[OTA_NONCE_SIZE];
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < OTA_NONCE_SIZE; i += 4) {
+        uint32_t r = random();
+        size_t remaining = OTA_NONCE_SIZE - i;
+        memcpy(nonce + i, &r, min((size_t)4, remaining));
+    }
+
+    // Send nonce to client
+    client.write(nonce, OTA_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+    // Read client's response: SHA256(nonce || PSK)
+    uint8_t clientHash[OTA_HASH_SIZE];
+    if (!readExact(client, clientHash, OTA_HASH_SIZE)) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Timeout reading auth response");
+        lastAuthFailure = millis();
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Compute expected hash
+    uint8_t expectedHash[OTA_HASH_SIZE];
+    computeAuthHash(nonce, OTA_NONCE_SIZE, otaPSK, otaPSKSize, expectedHash);
+
+    // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
+    uint8_t diff = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < OTA_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
+        diff |= clientHash[i] ^ expectedHash[i];
+    }
+
+    if (diff != 0) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Authentication failed");
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_AUTH);
+        lastAuthFailure = millis();
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Auth success — send ACK
+    client.write(OTA_ACK);
+    LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: Authentication successful");
+    return true;
+}
+
+static void handleOTAClient(EthernetClient &client)
+{
+    LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: Client connected from %u.%u.%u.%u", client.remoteIP()[0], client.remoteIP()[1], client.remoteIP()[2],
+             client.remoteIP()[3]);
+
+    // Step 1: Challenge-response authentication
+    if (!authenticateClient(client)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Step 2: Read 12-byte header
+    OTAHeader hdr;
+    if (!readExact(client, (uint8_t *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr))) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Timeout reading header");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Validate magic
+    if (memcmp(hdr.magic, "MOTA", 4) != 0) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Invalid magic");
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_MAGIC);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: Firmware size=%u, CRC32=0x%08X", hdr.firmwareSize, hdr.crc32);
+
+    // Sanity check on size (must be > 0 and fit in LittleFS)
+    if (hdr.firmwareSize == 0 || hdr.firmwareSize > 1024 * 1024) {
+        LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Invalid firmware size");
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_SIZE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Begin the update — this opens firmware.bin on LittleFS
+    if (!Update.begin(hdr.firmwareSize)) {
+        LOG_ERROR("ETH OTA: Update.begin() failed, error=%u", Update.getError());
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_BEGIN);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // ACK the header — client can start sending firmware data
+    client.write(OTA_ACK);
+
+    // Receive firmware in chunks
+    uint8_t buf[OTA_CHUNK_SIZE];
+    size_t remaining = hdr.firmwareSize;
+    uint32_t crc = CRC32_INITIAL;
+    uint32_t lastActivity = millis();
+    size_t totalReceived = 0;
+
+    while (remaining > 0) {
+        if (!client.connected()) {
+            LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Client disconnected during transfer");
+            Update.end(false);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        int avail = client.available();
+        if (avail <= 0) {
+            if (millis() - lastActivity > OTA_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+                LOG_WARN("ETH OTA: Timeout during transfer (%u/%u bytes)", totalReceived, hdr.firmwareSize);
+                client.write(OTA_ERR_TIMEOUT);
+                Update.end(false);
+                return;
+            }
+            delay(1);
+            FEED_WATCHDOG();
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        size_t toRead = min((size_t)avail, min(remaining, sizeof(buf)));
+        size_t got = client.read(buf, toRead);
+        if (got == 0)
+            continue;
+
+        // Write to Updater (LittleFS firmware.bin)
+        size_t written = Update.write(buf, got);
+        if (written != got) {
+            LOG_ERROR("ETH OTA: Write failed (wrote %u of %u), error=%u", written, got, Update.getError());
+            client.write(OTA_ERR_WRITE);
+            Update.end(false);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        crc = crc32Update(buf, got, crc);
+        remaining -= got;
+        totalReceived += got;
+        lastActivity = millis();
+        FEED_WATCHDOG();
+
+        // Progress log every ~10%
+        if (totalReceived % (hdr.firmwareSize / 10 + 1) < got) {
+            LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: %u%% (%u/%u bytes)", (uint32_t)(100ULL * totalReceived / hdr.firmwareSize), totalReceived,
+                     hdr.firmwareSize);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Verify CRC32
+    uint32_t computedCRC = crc32Final(crc);
+    if (computedCRC != hdr.crc32) {
+        LOG_ERROR("ETH OTA: CRC mismatch (expected=0x%08X, computed=0x%08X)", hdr.crc32, computedCRC);
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_CRC);
+        Update.end(false);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Finalize — this calls picoOTA.commit() which stages the update for the
+    // bootloader
+    if (!Update.end(true)) {
+        LOG_ERROR("ETH OTA: Update.end() failed, error=%u", Update.getError());
+        client.write(OTA_ERR_WRITE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: Update staged successfully (%u bytes). Rebooting...", hdr.firmwareSize);
+    client.write(OTA_OK);
+    client.flush();
+    delay(500);
+
+    // Reboot — the built-in bootloader will apply the update from LittleFS
+    rp2040.reboot();
+}
+
+void initEthOTA()
+{
+    if (!otaServer) {
+        otaServer = new EthernetServer(ETH_OTA_PORT);
+        otaServer->begin();
+        LOG_INFO("ETH OTA: Server listening on TCP port %d", ETH_OTA_PORT);
+    }
+}
+
+void ethOTALoop()
+{
+    if (!otaServer)
+        return;
+
+    EthernetClient client = otaServer->accept();
+    if (client) {
+        handleOTAClient(client);
+        client.stop();
+    }
+}
+
+#endif // HAS_ETHERNET && HAS_ETHERNET_OTA

src/mesh/eth/ethOTA.h

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#pragma once
+
+#include "configuration.h"
+
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(HAS_ETHERNET_OTA)
+
+#ifdef USE_ARDUINO_ETHERNET
+#include <Ethernet.h>
+#else
+#include <RAK13800_W5100S.h>
+#endif
+
+#define ETH_OTA_PORT 4243
+
+/// Initialize the Ethernet OTA server (call after Ethernet is connected)
+void initEthOTA();
+
+/// Poll for incoming OTA connections (call periodically from ethClient
+/// reconnect loop)
+void ethOTALoop();
+
+#endif // HAS_ETHERNET && HAS_ETHERNET_OTA

src/mesh/generated/meshtastic/admin.pb.h

@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ typedef struct _meshtastic_HamParameters {
     float frequency;
     /* Optional short name of user */
     char short_name[5];
+    /* Optional long name of user
+ Appended to callsign */
+    char long_name[15];
 } meshtastic_HamParameters;
 
 /* Response envelope for node_remote_hardware_pins */
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_InputEvent_init_default {0, 0, 0, 0}
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_OTAEvent_init_default {_meshtastic_OTAMode_MIN, {0, {0}}}
 #define meshtastic_LockdownAuth_init_default     {{0, {0}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
-#define meshtastic_HamParameters_init_default    {"", 0, 0, ""}
+#define meshtastic_HamParameters_init_default    {"", 0, 0, "", ""}
 #define meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePinsResponse_init_default {0, {meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default}}
 #define meshtastic_SharedContact_init_default    {0, false, meshtastic_User_init_default, 0, 0}
 #define meshtastic_KeyVerificationAdmin_init_default {_meshtastic_KeyVerificationAdmin_MessageType_MIN, 0, 0, false, 0}
@@ -557,7 +560,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_InputEvent_init_zero {0, 0, 0, 0}
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_OTAEvent_init_zero {_meshtastic_OTAMode_MIN, {0, {0}}}
 #define meshtastic_LockdownAuth_init_zero        {{0, {0}}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
-#define meshtastic_HamParameters_init_zero       {"", 0, 0, ""}
+#define meshtastic_HamParameters_init_zero       {"", 0, 0, "", ""}
 #define meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePinsResponse_init_zero {0, {meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero}}
 #define meshtastic_SharedContact_init_zero       {0, false, meshtastic_User_init_zero, 0, 0}
 #define meshtastic_KeyVerificationAdmin_init_zero {_meshtastic_KeyVerificationAdmin_MessageType_MIN, 0, 0, false, 0}
@@ -584,6 +587,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define meshtastic_HamParameters_tx_power_tag    2
 #define meshtastic_HamParameters_frequency_tag   3
 #define meshtastic_HamParameters_short_name_tag  4
+#define meshtastic_HamParameters_long_name_tag   5
 #define meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePinsResponse_node_remote_hardware_pins_tag 1
 #define meshtastic_SharedContact_node_num_tag    1
 #define meshtastic_SharedContact_user_tag        2
@@ -786,7 +790,8 @@ X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, BOOL,     disable,           6)
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   call_sign,         1) \
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, INT32,    tx_power,          2) \
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, FLOAT,    frequency,         3) \
-X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   short_name,        4)
+X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   short_name,        4) \
+X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   long_name,         5)
 #define meshtastic_HamParameters_CALLBACK NULL
 #define meshtastic_HamParameters_DEFAULT NULL
 
@@ -891,7 +896,7 @@ extern const pb_msgdesc_t meshtastic_SHTXX_config_msg;
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_InputEvent_size  14
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_OTAEvent_size    36
 #define meshtastic_AdminMessage_size             511
-#define meshtastic_HamParameters_size            31
+#define meshtastic_HamParameters_size            47
 #define meshtastic_KeyVerificationAdmin_size     25
 #define meshtastic_LockdownAuth_size             56
 #define meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePinsResponse_size 496

src/mesh/generated/meshtastic/clientonly.pb.h

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 typedef struct _meshtastic_DeviceProfile {
     /* Long name for the node */
     bool has_long_name;
-    char long_name[40];
+    char long_name[25];
     /* Short name of the node */
     bool has_short_name;
     char short_name[5];

src/mesh/generated/meshtastic/deviceonly.pb.h

@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ typedef PB_BYTES_ARRAY_T(32) meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t;
 typedef struct _meshtastic_NodeInfoLite {
     /* The node number */
     uint32_t num;
-    /* Returns the Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the last received message,
- as measured by the receiver. Return SNR of the last received message in dB */
+    /* In-memory SNR of the last received message in dB. Not serialised directly:
+ always zeroed before encode; persisted as snr_q4 = 19 below. */
     float snr;
     /* Set to indicate the last time we received a packet from this node */
     uint32_t last_heard;
@@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ typedef struct _meshtastic_NodeInfoLite {
     meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role role;
     /* The public key of the user's device, for PKI-based encrypted DMs. */
     meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t public_key;
+    /* Q4-encoded SNR: dB × 4, sint32 zigzag. Matches RouteDiscovery convention.
+ Encode: snr_q4 = (int32_t)(snr * 4.0f). Decode: snr = snr_q4 / 4.0f.
+ float snr is always zeroed on disk; this field carries all persisted SNR. */
+    int32_t snr_q4;
 } meshtastic_NodeInfoLite;
 
 /* This message is never sent over the wire, but it is used for serializing DB
@@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* Initializer values for message structs */
 #define meshtastic_PositionLite_init_default     {0, 0, 0, 0, _meshtastic_Position_LocSource_MIN, 0}
 #define meshtastic_UserLite_init_default         {{0}, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, 0, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}, false, 0}
-#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_default     {0, 0, 0, 0, false, 0, 0, 0, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}}
+#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_default     {0, 0, 0, 0, false, 0, 0, 0, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}, 0}
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_init_default      {false, meshtastic_MyNodeInfo_init_default, false, meshtastic_User_init_default, 0, {meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_default}, false, meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_default, 0, 0, 0, false, meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_default, 0, {meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_default}}
 #define meshtastic_NodePositionEntry_init_default {0, false, meshtastic_PositionLite_init_default}
 #define meshtastic_NodeTelemetryEntry_init_default {0, false, meshtastic_DeviceMetrics_init_default}
@@ -226,7 +230,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define meshtastic_BackupPreferences_init_default {0, 0, false, meshtastic_LocalConfig_init_default, false, meshtastic_LocalModuleConfig_init_default, false, meshtastic_ChannelFile_init_default, false, meshtastic_User_init_default}
 #define meshtastic_PositionLite_init_zero        {0, 0, 0, 0, _meshtastic_Position_LocSource_MIN, 0}
 #define meshtastic_UserLite_init_zero            {{0}, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, 0, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}, false, 0}
-#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_zero        {0, 0, 0, 0, false, 0, 0, 0, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}}
+#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_init_zero        {0, 0, 0, 0, false, 0, 0, 0, "", "", _meshtastic_HardwareModel_MIN, _meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_MIN, {0, {0}}, 0}
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_init_zero         {false, meshtastic_MyNodeInfo_init_zero, false, meshtastic_User_init_zero, 0, {meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero}, false, meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero, 0, 0, 0, false, meshtastic_MeshPacket_init_zero, 0, {meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero, meshtastic_NodeRemoteHardwarePin_init_zero}}
 #define meshtastic_NodePositionEntry_init_zero   {0, false, meshtastic_PositionLite_init_zero}
 #define meshtastic_NodeTelemetryEntry_init_zero  {0, false, meshtastic_DeviceMetrics_init_zero}
@@ -263,6 +267,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_hw_model_tag     16
 #define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_role_tag         17
 #define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_tag   18
+#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_snr_q4_tag       19
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_my_node_tag       2
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_owner_tag         3
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_receive_queue_tag 5
@@ -330,7 +335,8 @@ X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   long_name,        14) \
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, STRING,   short_name,       15) \
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, UENUM,    hw_model,         16) \
 X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, UENUM,    role,             17) \
-X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, BYTES,    public_key,       18)
+X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, BYTES,    public_key,       18) \
+X(a, STATIC,   SINGULAR, SINT32,   snr_q4,           19)
 #define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_CALLBACK NULL
 #define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_DEFAULT NULL
 
@@ -450,7 +456,7 @@ extern const pb_msgdesc_t meshtastic_BackupPreferences_msg;
 #define meshtastic_ChannelFile_size              718
 #define meshtastic_DeviceState_size              1944
 #define meshtastic_NodeEnvironmentEntry_size     170
-#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_size             105
+#define meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_size             112
 #define meshtastic_NodePositionEntry_size        42
 #define meshtastic_NodeStatusEntry_size          89
 #define meshtastic_NodeTelemetryEntry_size       35

src/mesh/generated/meshtastic/mesh.pb.h

@@ -325,6 +325,14 @@ typedef enum _meshtastic_HardwareModel {
     meshtastic_HardwareModel_T_IMPULSE_PLUS = 135,
     /* Lilygo T-Echo Card */
     meshtastic_HardwareModel_T_ECHO_CARD = 136,
+    /* Seeed Tracker L2 */
+    meshtastic_HardwareModel_SEEED_WIO_TRACKER_L2 = 137,
+    /* Elecrow CrowPanel Advance P4 models, ESP32-P4 and TFT with SX1262 radio plugin */
+    meshtastic_HardwareModel_CROWPANEL_P4 = 138,
+    /* Heltec Mesh Tower V2 */
+    meshtastic_HardwareModel_HELTEC_MESH_TOWER_V2 = 139,
+    /* Meshnology W10 */
+    meshtastic_HardwareModel_MESHNOLOGY_W10 = 140,
     /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Reserved ID For developing private Ports. These will show up in live traffic sparsely, so we can use a high number. Keep it within 8 bits.
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -774,7 +782,10 @@ typedef struct _meshtastic_User {
  Note: app developers are encouraged to also use the following standard
  node IDs "^all" (for broadcast), "^local" (for the locally connected node) */
     char id[16];
-    /* A full name for this user, i.e. "Kevin Hester" */
+    /* A full name for this user, i.e. "Kevin Hester"
+ Limited to 24 bytes of UTF-8: longer names are accepted from senders
+ built against the older 39-byte limit, but devices truncate them before
+ storing or rebroadcasting. Clients should enforce 24 bytes in their UI. */
     char long_name[40];
     /* A VERY short name, ideally two characters.
  Suitable for a tiny OLED screen */

src/mesh/generated/meshtastic/mqtt.pb.h

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ typedef struct _meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope {
 /* Information about a node intended to be reported unencrypted to a map using MQTT. */
 typedef struct _meshtastic_MapReport {
     /* A full name for this user, i.e. "Kevin Hester" */
-    char long_name[40];
+    char long_name[25];
     /* A VERY short name, ideally two characters.
  Suitable for a tiny OLED screen */
     char short_name[5];
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ extern const pb_msgdesc_t meshtastic_MapReport_msg;
 /* Maximum encoded size of messages (where known) */
 /* meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope_size depends on runtime parameters */
 #define MESHTASTIC_MESHTASTIC_MQTT_PB_H_MAX_SIZE meshtastic_MapReport_size
-#define meshtastic_MapReport_size                110
+#define meshtastic_MapReport_size                95
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 } /* extern "C" */

src/mesh/mesh-pb-constants.h

@@ -48,39 +48,40 @@ static_assert(sizeof(meshtastic_NodeInfoLite) <= 130, "NodeInfoLite size increas
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_POSITIONDB 1
 #else
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_POSITIONDB 0
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif // STM32WL
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_POSITIONDB
 
 #ifndef MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_TELEMETRYDB
 #if defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_TELEMETRYDB 1
 #else
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_TELEMETRYDB 0
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif // STM32WL
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_TELEMETRYDB
 
 #ifndef MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_ENVIRONMENTDB
 #if defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_ENVIRONMENTDB 1
 #else
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_ENVIRONMENTDB 0
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif // STM32WL
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_ENVIRONMENTDB
 
 #ifndef MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_STATUSDB
 #if defined(ARCH_STM32WL) || defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_STATUS)
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_STATUSDB 1
 #else
 #define MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_STATUSDB 0
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif // STM32WL
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_STATUSDB
 
-/// max number of nodes allowed in the nodeDB
+/// Max nodes in the hot store (full NodeInfoLite). Evicted nodes' identities
+/// live in the warm tier (WARM_NODE_COUNT). nRF52840 caps at 120 to keep
+/// nodes.proto inside the stock 28 KB LittleFS; flash-rich platforms (ESP32-S3,
+/// portduino) keep their larger hot store and lean on warm only for the tail.
 #ifndef MAX_NUM_NODES
 #if defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
 #define MAX_NUM_NODES 10
-#elif defined(ARCH_NRF52)
-#define MAX_NUM_NODES 150
 #elif defined(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3)
 #include "Esp.h"
 static inline int get_max_num_nodes()
@@ -95,10 +96,48 @@ static inline int get_max_num_nodes()
     }
 }
 #define MAX_NUM_NODES get_max_num_nodes()
+#elif defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO)
+#define MAX_NUM_NODES 250 // native host: no flash/RAM constraint; match the ESP32-S3 top tier
 #else
-#define MAX_NUM_NODES 100
-#endif
-#endif
+#define MAX_NUM_NODES 120 // nRF52840 (28 KB LittleFS) and generic ESP32
+#endif                    // platform
+#endif                    // MAX_NUM_NODES
+
+/// Per-map cap (position/telemetry/environment/status): only the freshest
+/// MAX_SATELLITE_NODES nodes keep satellite payloads, the rest just the
+/// NodeInfoLite header. RAM-bound: the four maps live in internal SRAM (not
+/// PSRAM). PSRAM-equipped ESP32-S3 (and native) keep the full 250; other ESP32
+/// (no-PSRAM, incl. S3) get 80 -- ~32 KB worst case, affordable now the warm
+/// tier is trimmed; nRF52840 and other tight parts stay at 40.
+#ifndef MAX_SATELLITE_NODES
+#if defined(ARCH_PORTDUINO) || (defined(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3) && defined(BOARD_HAS_PSRAM))
+#define MAX_SATELLITE_NODES 250 // native / PSRAM-equipped ESP32-S3
+#elif defined(ARCH_ESP32)
+#define MAX_SATELLITE_NODES 80 // no-PSRAM ESP32 (incl. ESP32-S3)
+#else
+#define MAX_SATELLITE_NODES 40 // nRF52840 (28 KB LittleFS) and other constrained parts
+#endif                         // platform
+#endif                         // MAX_SATELLITE_NODES
+
+/// Warm tier: 40 B {num, last_heard, public_key} records kept for evicted nodes
+/// so DMs to/from them keep decrypting. 0 disables it; size is per-platform
+/// below, persisted to /prefs/warm.dat (or the nRF52840 raw-flash ring).
+#ifndef WARM_NODE_COUNT
+#if defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#define WARM_NODE_COUNT 0
+#elif defined(NRF52840_XXAA)
+// Keyed on the NRF52840_XXAA build flag, not ARCH_NRF52: the latter (from
+// architecture.h via configuration.h) isn't defined this early in every include
+// chain. Backed by the raw-flash ring below LittleFS — see WarmNodeStore.h.
+#define WARM_NODE_COUNT 200
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IDF_TARGET_ESP32S3) && defined(BOARD_HAS_PSRAM)
+#define WARM_NODE_COUNT 2000 // ESP32-S3 with PSRAM (external); warm.dat ~80 KB
+#else
+// generic ESP32 and no-PSRAM ESP32-S3: ~12.5 KB in internal heap (calloc fallback in
+// WarmNodeStore), leaving room for the BLE controller. PSRAM-equipped S3 takes the 2000 case above.
+#define WARM_NODE_COUNT 320
+#endif // platform
+#endif // WARM_NODE_COUNT
 
 /// Max number of channels allowed
 #define MAX_NUM_CHANNELS (member_size(meshtastic_ChannelFile, channels) / member_size(meshtastic_ChannelFile, channels[0]))
@@ -125,8 +164,8 @@ static inline int get_max_num_nodes()
 #define TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE 1000
 #else
 #define TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE 0
-#endif
-#endif
+#endif // HAS_TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT
+#endif // TRAFFIC_MANAGEMENT_CACHE_SIZE
 
 /// helper function for encoding a record as a protobuf, any failures to encode are fatal and we will panic
 /// returns the encoded packet size

src/mesh/udp/UdpMulticastHandler.h

@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ class UdpMulticastHandler final
                 return;
             }
             mp.transport_mechanism = meshtastic_MeshPacket_TransportMechanism_TRANSPORT_MULTICAST_UDP;
+            // Preserve the whole MeshPacket as received: while payload_variant is encrypted, `channel` is a hash (and is 0 for
+            // PKI DMs), so it must be copied verbatim for the router to attempt PKI/channel decryption. Keep
+            // pki_encrypted/public_key too so downstream auth/metadata can reflect PKI usage correctly.
             UniquePacketPoolPacket p = packetPool.allocUniqueCopy(mp);
             // Unset received SNR/RSSI
             p->rx_snr = 0;

src/mesh/wifi/WiFiAPClient.cpp

@@ -573,11 +573,14 @@ static void WiFiEvent(WiFiEvent_t event)
 #endif
         break;
     case ARDUINO_EVENT_ETH_GOT_IP6:
-#if defined(USE_WS5500) || defined(USE_CH390D)
+#if defined(USE_CH390D)
+        // The CH390 driver's ETH class doesn't expose the IPv6 address getters
+        LOG_INFO("Obtained IP6 address");
+#elif defined(USE_WS5500)
 #if ESP_ARDUINO_VERSION >= ESP_ARDUINO_VERSION_VAL(3, 0, 0)
         LOG_INFO("Obtained Local IP6 address: %s", ETH.linkLocalIPv6().toString().c_str());
         LOG_INFO("Obtained GlobalIP6 address: %s", ETH.globalIPv6().toString().c_str());
-#elif defined(USE_WS5500)
+#else
         LOG_INFO("Obtained IP6 address: %s", ETH.localIPv6().toString().c_str());
 #endif
 #endif

src/meshUtils.cpp

@@ -206,4 +206,10 @@ bool sanitizeUtf8(char *buf, size_t bufSize)
     }
 
     return replaced;
-}
+}
+
+void clampLongName(char *longName)
+{
+    longName[MAX_LONG_NAME_BYTES] = '\0';
+    sanitizeUtf8(longName, MAX_LONG_NAME_BYTES + 1);
+}

src/meshUtils.h

@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ size_t pb_string_length(const char *str, size_t max_len);
 // Ensures the result is null-terminated within bufSize. Returns true if any bytes were replaced.
 bool sanitizeUtf8(char *buf, size_t bufSize);
 
+// Longest User.long_name content (bytes, excluding NUL) we store or transmit.
+// The wire decode buffer stays at 40 so names from senders built against the
+// older 39-byte limit still parse; everything we keep or send is clamped to
+// this, matching the slim NodeInfoLite storage width in deviceonly.proto.
+#define MAX_LONG_NAME_BYTES 24
+
+// Clamp a long_name buffer (at least MAX_LONG_NAME_BYTES + 1 bytes) in-place
+// to MAX_LONG_NAME_BYTES bytes of content, fixing any partial UTF-8 sequence
+// left at the cut.
+void clampLongName(char *longName);
+
 /// Calculate 2^n without calling pow() - used for spreading factor and other calculations
 inline uint32_t pow_of_2(uint32_t n)
 {

src/modules/AdminModule.cpp

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include "Channels.h"
 #include "MeshService.h"
 #include "NodeDB.h"
+#include "PositionPrecision.h"
 #include "PowerFSM.h"
 #include "RTC.h"
 #include "SPILock.h"
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
 #include "main.h"
 #endif
 #ifdef ARCH_PORTDUINO
+#include "PortduinoGlue.h"
 #include "unistd.h"
 #endif
 
@@ -27,6 +29,12 @@
 #include "RadioInterface.h"
 #include "TypeConversions.h"
 #include "mesh/RadioLibInterface.h"
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+#include "mesh/PhoneAPI.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#include "security/EncryptedStorage.h"
+#endif
 
 #if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_MQTT
 #include "mqtt/MQTT.h"
@@ -76,20 +84,69 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
     // if handled == false, then let others look at this message also if they want
     bool handled = false;
     assert(r);
+
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    // While storage is locked, drop every admin payload — both local and
+    // remote (PKC, mesh-relayed). Lockdown unlock is the prerequisite for
+    // any admin operation: operators must authenticate via lockdown_auth
+    // first. The lockdown_auth path itself is handled synchronously in
+    // PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket before reaching here, so the real
+    // unlock flow is not affected by this gate. Without this, a remote
+    // PKC-authorized peer (or a USERPREFS-baked admin_key) could drive
+    // factory_reset / set_config against a locked device before the
+    // operator has even unlocked it.
+    // Only gate when lockdown is ACTIVE. A lockdown-capable build that hasn't
+    // been provisioned (or was disabled) is not unlocked either, but must
+    // still serve admin normally — so check isLockdownActive() first.
+    if (EncryptedStorage::isLockdownActive() && !EncryptedStorage::isUnlocked()) {
+        LOG_WARN("AdminModule: dropping admin payload — storage locked");
+        return handled;
+    }
+#endif
+
     bool fromOthers = !isFromUs(&mp);
     if (mp.which_payload_variant != meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag) {
         return handled;
     }
+#ifdef ARCH_PORTDUINO
+    // Simulator only: honor exit_simulator unconditionally for the local client (from==0).
+    // The from==0 branch below now covers pki_encrypted local packets too, but is_managed
+    // can still block it. Rather than threading simulator awareness through the auth gates,
+    // intercept here before any auth logic runs. Local-origin + force_simradio only.
+    // TODO: should a local client bypass admin auth at all? Fenced to the simulator for now.
+    if (portduino_config.force_simradio && mp.from == 0 &&
+        r->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_AdminMessage_exit_simulator_tag) {
+        LOG_INFO("Exiting simulator");
+        exit(0);
+    }
+#endif
     meshtastic_Channel *ch = &channels.getByIndex(mp.channel);
     // Could tighten this up further by tracking the last public_key we went an AdminMessage request to
     // and only allowing responses from that remote.
     if (messageIsResponse(r)) {
         LOG_DEBUG("Allow admin response message");
     } else if (mp.from == 0) {
+        // Local admin from a BLE/USB/TCP client. from == 0 cannot arrive from the
+        // mesh: RF drops packets without a sender (RadioLibInterface) and MQTT treats
+        // from == 0 as our own downlink and ignores it. Clients may set pki_encrypted
+        // on self-addressed admin (the python CLI does), so don't use it to reroute
+        // local packets into the remote-PKC key check.
+        //
+        // Under MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL, the per-connection auth
+        // gate lives in PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket — any local admin
+        // payload other than lockdown_auth is dropped there if the
+        // originating connection is unauthorized. By the time we reach
+        // this branch the connection has already proven the passphrase,
+        // so is_managed needs no additional gate here.
+        //
+        // Without that build flag the legacy is_managed semantics still
+        // apply: refuse all plain local admin and require PKC instead.
+#ifndef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
         if (config.security.is_managed) {
             LOG_INFO("Ignore local admin payload because is_managed");
             return handled;
         }
+#endif
     } else if (strcasecmp(ch->settings.name, Channels::adminChannel) == 0) {
         if (!config.security.admin_channel_enabled) {
             LOG_INFO("Ignore admin channel, legacy admin is disabled");
@@ -105,6 +162,17 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
              memcmp(mp.public_key.bytes, config.security.admin_key[2].bytes, 32) == 0)) {
             LOG_INFO("PKC admin payload with authorized sender key");
 
+            // Note: PKC admin does NOT automatically authorize the
+            // originating local PhoneAPI connection for content
+            // redaction purposes. PKC and the per-connection lockdown
+            // auth slot are independent gates — operators using PKC
+            // admin from a local app should still send lockdown_auth
+            // separately to unlock the redacted FromRadio stream.
+            // (The previous auto-authorize path read a shared
+            // g_currentContext set during synchronous PhoneAPI
+            // dispatch; by the time this Router-thread handler runs
+            // that pointer is unrelated, so the path was unsafe.)
+
             // Automatically favorite the node that is using the admin key
             auto remoteNode = nodeDB->getMeshNode(mp.from);
             if (remoteNode && !nodeInfoLiteIsFavorite(remoteNode)) {
@@ -113,8 +181,11 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
                     // without the user doing so deliberately.
                     LOG_INFO("PKC admin valid, but not auto-favoriting node %x because role==CLIENT_BASE", mp.from);
                 } else {
-                    LOG_INFO("PKC admin valid. Auto-favoriting node %x", mp.from);
-                    nodeInfoLiteSetBit(remoteNode, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_FAVORITE_MASK, true);
+                    if (nodeDB->setProtectedFlag(remoteNode, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_FAVORITE_MASK, true)) {
+                        LOG_INFO("PKC admin valid. Auto-favoriting node %x", mp.from);
+                    } else {
+                        LOG_WARN("PKC admin valid, but auto-favorite refused for node %x (protected-node cap)", mp.from);
+                    }
                 }
             }
         } else {
@@ -141,6 +212,17 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
     }
     switch (r->which_payload_variant) {
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    // lockdown_auth is handled synchronously in
+    // PhoneAPI::handleToRadioPacket — see handleLockdownAuthInline. A
+    // packet should not normally reach AdminModule under that flag set,
+    // but if it ever does (e.g. injected via a non-PhoneAPI path), drop
+    // it silently rather than leaking a partial response.
+    case meshtastic_AdminMessage_lockdown_auth_tag:
+        LOG_WARN("AdminModule: lockdown_auth reached Router/AdminModule path; ignoring (should be handled in PhoneAPI)");
+        return handled;
+#endif // MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+
     /**
      * Getters
      */
@@ -393,10 +475,13 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
         LOG_INFO("Client received set_favorite_node command");
         meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(r->set_favorite_node);
         if (node != NULL) {
-            nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_FAVORITE_MASK, true);
-            saveChanges(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE, false);
-            if (screen)
-                screen->setFrames(graphics::Screen::FOCUS_PRESERVE); // <-- Rebuild screens
+            if (nodeDB->setProtectedFlag(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_FAVORITE_MASK, true)) {
+                saveChanges(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE, false);
+                if (screen)
+                    screen->setFrames(graphics::Screen::FOCUS_PRESERVE); // <-- Rebuild screens
+            } else if (mp.from == 0) { // local request from the phone — tell the user why it didn't take
+                sendWarning(NodeDB::PROTECTED_CAP_WARN_FMT, "favorite", r->set_favorite_node, MAX_NUM_NODES - 2);
+            }
         }
         break;
     }
@@ -413,13 +498,17 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
     }
     case meshtastic_AdminMessage_set_ignored_node_tag: {
         LOG_INFO("Client received set_ignored_node command");
-        meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(r->set_ignored_node);
+        // Unlike the sibling node-targeted admin commands, create the entry if
+        // it's absent so the block sticks for a node we've not heard from yet
+        // (e.g. one a remote admin asks us to block) with no NodeInfo or key.
+        meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getOrCreateMeshNode(r->set_ignored_node);
         if (node != NULL) {
-            nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, true);
-            nodeDB->eraseNodeSatellites(node->num);
-            node->public_key.size = 0;
-            memset(node->public_key.bytes, 0, sizeof(node->public_key.bytes));
-            saveChanges(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE, false);
+            if (nodeDB->setProtectedFlag(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_IS_IGNORED_MASK, true)) {
+                nodeDB->eraseNodeSatellites(node->num);
+                saveChanges(SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE, false);
+            } else if (mp.from == 0) { // local request from the phone — tell the user why it didn't take
+                sendWarning(NodeDB::PROTECTED_CAP_WARN_FMT, "ignore", r->set_ignored_node, MAX_NUM_NODES - 2);
+            }
         }
         break;
     }
@@ -481,7 +570,7 @@ bool AdminModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, meshta
 #if HAS_SCREEN
         IF_SCREEN(screen->showSimpleBanner("Device is rebooting\ninto DFU mode.", 0));
 #endif
-#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_RP2040) || defined(ARCH_STM32WL)
+#if defined(ARCH_NRF52) || defined(ARCH_RP2040) || defined(ARCH_STM32)
         enterDfuMode();
 #endif
         break;
@@ -625,10 +714,15 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetOwner(const meshtastic_User &o)
     int changed = 0;
 
     if (*o.long_name) {
-        changed |= strcmp(owner.long_name, o.long_name);
-        strncpy(owner.long_name, o.long_name, sizeof(owner.long_name));
+        // Apps built against the older 39-byte limit may send longer names; clamp
+        // before the changed-compare so re-sending the same long name is a no-op.
+        char longName[sizeof(o.long_name)];
+        strncpy(longName, o.long_name, sizeof(longName));
+        longName[sizeof(longName) - 1] = '\0';
+        clampLongName(longName);
+        changed |= strcmp(owner.long_name, longName);
+        strncpy(owner.long_name, longName, sizeof(owner.long_name));
         owner.long_name[sizeof(owner.long_name) - 1] = '\0';
-        sanitizeUtf8(owner.long_name, sizeof(owner.long_name));
     }
     if (*o.short_name) {
         changed |= strcmp(owner.short_name, o.short_name);
@@ -829,7 +923,7 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetConfig(const meshtastic_Config &c, bool fromOthers)
                 }
                 if (strncmp(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, default_mqtt_root, strlen(default_mqtt_root)) == 0) {
                     //  Default root is in use, so subscribe to the appropriate MQTT topic for this region
-                    sprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
+                    snprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, sizeof(moduleConfig.mqtt.root), "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
                 }
                 changes = SEGMENT_CONFIG | SEGMENT_MODULECONFIG;
             } else {
@@ -840,13 +934,39 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetConfig(const meshtastic_Config &c, bool fromOthers)
 
         if (!RadioInterface::validateConfigLora(validatedLora)) {
             if (fromOthers) {
-                LOG_WARN("Invalid LoRa config received from another node, rejecting changes");
-                //  modem_preset set to use the old setting if the check fails
-                validatedLora.modem_preset = oldLoraConfig.modem_preset;
+                // A preset locked to a sibling EU region still swaps the region for remote admin;
+                // any other invalid config is rejected outright.
+                const RegionInfo *swapRegion =
+                    validatedLora.use_preset
+                        ? RadioInterface::regionSwapForPreset(validatedLora.region, validatedLora.modem_preset)
+                        : NULL;
+                if (swapRegion) {
+                    validatedLora.region = swapRegion->code;
+                }
+                if (!swapRegion || !RadioInterface::validateConfigLora(validatedLora)) {
+                    LOG_WARN("Invalid LoRa config received from another node, rejecting changes");
+                    // Rejecting means rejecting everything: a partial restore of region/preset
+                    // could still apply other fields the validation already deemed invalid.
+                    validatedLora = oldLoraConfig;
+                }
             } else {
                 LOG_WARN("Invalid LoRa config received from client, using corrected values");
                 RadioInterface::clampConfigLora(validatedLora);
             }
+            // A preset locked to a sibling EU region swaps the region during the clamp;
+            // apply the same housekeeping as an explicit region change.
+            if (validatedLora.region != oldLoraConfig.region) {
+                config.lora.region = validatedLora.region;
+                initRegion();
+                if (getEffectiveDutyCycle() < 100) {
+                    validatedLora.ignore_mqtt = true; // Ignore MQTT by default if region has a duty cycle limit
+                }
+                if (strncmp(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, default_mqtt_root, strlen(default_mqtt_root)) == 0) {
+                    //  Default root is in use, so subscribe to the appropriate MQTT topic for this region
+                    snprintf(moduleConfig.mqtt.root, sizeof(moduleConfig.mqtt.root), "%s/%s", default_mqtt_root, myRegion->name);
+                }
+                changes = SEGMENT_CONFIG | SEGMENT_MODULECONFIG;
+            }
             //  use_preset and bandwidth are coerced into valid values by the check.
         }
 
@@ -895,22 +1015,14 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetConfig(const meshtastic_Config &c, bool fromOthers)
         LOG_INFO("Set config: Security");
         config.security = c.payload_variant.security;
 #if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN) && !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
-        // If the client set the key to blank, go ahead and regenerate so long as we're not in ham mode
-        if (!owner.is_licensed && config.lora.region != meshtastic_Config_LoRaConfig_RegionCode_UNSET) {
-            if (config.security.private_key.size != 32) {
-                crypto->generateKeyPair(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes);
-
-            } else {
-                if (crypto->regeneratePublicKey(config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.private_key.bytes)) {
-                    config.security.public_key.size = 32;
-                }
-            }
+        // Only regenerate keys if the private key is not 32 bytes
+        if (config.security.private_key.size != 32) {
+            nodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair();
+        }
+        // If user provided a private key of correct size but no public key, generate the public key from private key
+        else if (config.security.private_key.size == 32 && config.security.public_key.size == 0) {
+            nodeDB->generateCryptoKeyPair(config.security.private_key.bytes);
         }
-#endif
-        owner.public_key.size = config.security.public_key.size;
-        memcpy(owner.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.bytes, config.security.public_key.size);
-#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI
-        crypto->setDHPrivateKey(config.security.private_key.bytes);
 #endif
         if (config.security.is_managed && !(config.security.admin_key[0].size == 32 || config.security.admin_key[1].size == 32 ||
                                             config.security.admin_key[2].size == 32)) {
@@ -920,9 +1032,9 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetConfig(const meshtastic_Config &c, bool fromOthers)
             sendWarning(warning);
         }
 
-        if (config.security.debug_log_api_enabled == c.payload_variant.security.debug_log_api_enabled &&
-            config.security.serial_enabled == c.payload_variant.security.serial_enabled)
-            requiresReboot = false;
+        changes = SEGMENT_CONFIG | SEGMENT_DEVICESTATE | SEGMENT_NODEDATABASE;
+
+        requiresReboot = true;
 
         break;
     case meshtastic_Config_device_ui_tag:
@@ -1056,7 +1168,26 @@ void AdminModule::handleSetChannel(const meshtastic_Channel &cc)
     if (channels.ensureLicensedOperation()) {
         sendWarning(licensedModeMessage);
     }
+    // Refresh derived state (primaryIndex in particular) BEFORE the precision clamp below. usesPublicKey()
+    // resolves a secondary channel's key against the primary, so it must see the post-update primaryIndex;
+    // running the clamp first could evaluate secondaries against the previous primary and skip the clamp/warning.
     channels.onConfigChanged(); // tell the radios about this change
+
+    // Persist the public-key precision clamp for all channels that may be affected (e.g. secondaries
+    // that inherit a now-public primary key) and warn the client once if anything was coarsened.
+    bool clamped = false;
+    for (uint8_t i = 0; i < channels.getNumChannels(); i++) {
+        meshtastic_Channel &ch = channels.getByIndex(i);
+        if (ch.role == meshtastic_Channel_Role_DISABLED || !ch.settings.has_module_settings)
+            continue;
+        uint32_t allowed = getPositionPrecisionForChannel(i);
+        if (allowed != ch.settings.module_settings.position_precision) {
+            ch.settings.module_settings.position_precision = allowed;
+            clamped = true;
+        }
+    }
+    if (clamped)
+        sendWarning(publicChannelPrecisionMessage);
     saveChanges(SEGMENT_CHANNELS, false);
 }
 
@@ -1284,6 +1415,13 @@ void AdminModule::handleGetNodeRemoteHardwarePins(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &r
 
 void AdminModule::handleGetDeviceMetadata(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &req)
 {
+#if WARM_NODE_COUNT > 0 && MESHTASTIC_NODEDB_MIGRATION_VERBOSE
+    // Debug aid: dump the warm tier to the console on a local metadata request
+    // (e.g. `meshtastic --info` over USB/BLE). Gated to req.from == 0 so remote
+    // or admin polling can't spam the console.
+    if (nodeDB && req.from == 0)
+        nodeDB->warmStore.dumpToLog("admin get_metadata");
+#endif
     meshtastic_AdminMessage r = meshtastic_AdminMessage_init_default;
     r.get_device_metadata_response = getDeviceMetadata();
     r.which_payload_variant = meshtastic_AdminMessage_get_device_metadata_response_tag;

src/modules/AdminModule.h

@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ class AdminModule : public ProtobufModule<meshtastic_AdminMessage>, public Obser
 static constexpr const char *licensedModeMessage =
     "Licensed mode activated, removing admin channel and encryption from all channels";
 
+static constexpr const char *publicChannelPrecisionMessage =
+    "Precise position is not allowed on a public (open / known-key) channel; reduced to coarse precision";
+
 extern AdminModule *adminModule;
 
 void disableBluetooth();

src/modules/CannedMessageModule.cpp

@@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ void CannedMessageModule::LaunchWithDestination(NodeNum newDest, uint8_t newChan
     // Do NOT override explicit broadcast replies
     // Only reuse lastDest in LaunchRepeatDestination()
 
-    dest = newDest;
+    if (newDest == 0) {
+        dest = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
+    } else {
+        dest = newDest;
+    }
     channel = newChannel;
 
     lastDest = dest;
@@ -124,7 +128,11 @@ void CannedMessageModule::LaunchFreetextWithDestination(NodeNum newDest, uint8_t
     // Do NOT override explicit broadcast replies
     // Only reuse lastDest in LaunchRepeatDestination()
 
-    dest = newDest;
+    if (newDest == 0) {
+        dest = NODENUM_BROADCAST;
+    } else {
+        dest = newDest;
+    }
     channel = newChannel;
 
     lastDest = dest;

src/modules/NodeInfoModule.cpp

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ bool NodeInfoModule::handleReceivedProtobuf(const meshtastic_MeshPacket &mp, mes
         LOG_WARN("Invalid nodeInfo detected, is_licensed mismatch!");
         return true;
     }
+    NodeNum sourceNum = getFrom(&mp);
+    const meshtastic_NodeInfoLite *node = nodeDB->getMeshNode(sourceNum);
+    if (node && nodeInfoLiteHasXeddsaSigned(node) && !mp.xeddsa_signed) {
+        LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned NodeInfo from node 0x%08x that previously signed", sourceNum);
+        return true;
+    }
 
     // Coerce user.id to be derived from the node number
     snprintf(p.id, sizeof(p.id), "!%08x", getFrom(&mp));
@@ -158,8 +164,8 @@ meshtastic_MeshPacket *NodeInfoModule::allocReply()
         ignoreRequest = true;
         return NULL;
     } else {
-        ignoreRequest = false; // Don't ignore requests anymore
-        meshtastic_User &u = owner;
+        ignoreRequest = false;     // Don't ignore requests anymore
+        meshtastic_User u = owner; // deliberate copy: the licensed strip below must not clobber the global owner state
 
         // Strip the public key if the user is licensed
         if (u.is_licensed && u.public_key.size > 0) {

src/modules/StatusLEDModule.cpp

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include "StatusLEDModule.h"
 #include "MeshService.h"
 #include "configuration.h"
+#include "mesh/RadioInterface.h"
 #include <Arduino.h>
 
 /*
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ StatusLEDModule::StatusLEDModule() : concurrency::OSThread("StatusLEDModule")
     if (inputBroker)
         inputObserver.observe(inputBroker);
 #endif
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+    loraRxObserver.observe(&RadioInterface::loraRxPacketObservable);
+#endif
 #ifdef NEOPIXEL_STATUS_POWER_PIN
     powerPixel.begin();
     powerPixel.clear();
@@ -90,6 +94,18 @@ int StatusLEDModule::handleInputEvent(const InputEvent *event)
     return 0;
 }
 #endif
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+int StatusLEDModule::handleLoRaRx(uint32_t)
+{
+    // Briefly flash LED_LORA on each received packet. Turn it on now (we share the main thread with
+    // the radio's receive handler, so this is safe) and wake runOnce() at flash end to turn it off.
+    digitalWrite(LED_LORA, LED_STATE_ON);
+    LORA_LED_state = LED_STATE_ON;
+    LORA_LED_starttime = millis();
+    setIntervalFromNow(LORA_RX_LED_FLASH_MS);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
 
 int32_t StatusLEDModule::runOnce()
 {
@@ -115,6 +131,12 @@ int32_t StatusLEDModule::runOnce()
                 CHARGE_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
             }
         }
+    } else {
+#if defined(LED_HEARTBEAT)
+        // If we are using the heartbeat, as in the Thinknode M4, we need to explicitly turn off the charge LED
+        // This probably implies that in the future we need to stop re-using this bool for multiple purposes.
+        CHARGE_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
+#endif
     }
 // If we want a LED to be dedicated to the simple hearbeat, we can use that instead of the charge LED
 #if defined(LED_HEARTBEAT)
@@ -142,6 +164,7 @@ int32_t StatusLEDModule::runOnce()
         }
     }
 #endif
+#ifdef LED_PAIRING
     if (!config.bluetooth.enabled || PAIRING_LED_starttime + 30 * 1000 < millis() || doing_fast_blink) {
         PAIRING_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
     } else if (ble_state == unpaired) {
@@ -156,6 +179,7 @@ int32_t StatusLEDModule::runOnce()
     } else {
         PAIRING_LED_state = LED_STATE_ON;
     }
+#endif
 
     // Override if disabled in config
     if (config.device.led_heartbeat_disabled) {
@@ -227,6 +251,20 @@ int32_t StatusLEDModule::runOnce()
     digitalWrite(Battery_LED_4, chargeIndicatorLED4);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+    // End the LoRa-RX flash once its duration has elapsed; otherwise make sure we come back
+    // exactly at flash end (only ever clamp my_interval down, so other LED timing is preserved).
+    if (LORA_LED_state == LED_STATE_ON) {
+        uint32_t elapsed = millis() - LORA_LED_starttime;
+        if (elapsed >= LORA_RX_LED_FLASH_MS) {
+            digitalWrite(LED_LORA, LED_STATE_OFF);
+            LORA_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
+        } else if ((uint32_t)my_interval > LORA_RX_LED_FLASH_MS - elapsed) {
+            my_interval = LORA_RX_LED_FLASH_MS - elapsed;
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
     return (my_interval);
 }
 

src/modules/StatusLEDModule.h

@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ class StatusLEDModule : private concurrency::OSThread
 #if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_INPUTBROKER
     int handleInputEvent(const InputEvent *arg);
 #endif
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+    int handleLoRaRx(uint32_t sender);
+#endif
 
     void setPowerLED(bool);
 
@@ -65,6 +68,10 @@ class StatusLEDModule : private concurrency::OSThread
     CallbackObserver<StatusLEDModule, const InputEvent *> inputObserver =
         CallbackObserver<StatusLEDModule, const InputEvent *>(this, &StatusLEDModule::handleInputEvent);
 #endif
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+    CallbackObserver<StatusLEDModule, uint32_t> loraRxObserver =
+        CallbackObserver<StatusLEDModule, uint32_t>(this, &StatusLEDModule::handleLoRaRx);
+#endif
 
   private:
     bool CHARGE_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
@@ -77,6 +84,11 @@ class StatusLEDModule : private concurrency::OSThread
     uint32_t lastUserbuttonTime = 0;
     uint32_t POWER_LED_starttime = 0;
     bool doing_fast_blink = false;
+#ifdef LED_LORA
+    static constexpr uint32_t LORA_RX_LED_FLASH_MS = 100;
+    bool LORA_LED_state = LED_STATE_OFF;
+    uint32_t LORA_LED_starttime = 0;
+#endif
 
     enum PowerState { discharging, charging, charged, critical };
 

src/modules/Telemetry/AirQualityTelemetry.cpp

@@ -428,20 +428,6 @@ bool AirQualityTelemetryModule::sendTelemetry(NodeNum dest, bool phoneOnly)
                 LOG_DEBUG("Start next execution in 5s, then sleep");
                 setIntervalFromNow(FIVE_SECONDS_MS);
             }
-
-            if (config.device.role == meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_SENSOR && config.power.is_power_saving) {
-                meshtastic_ClientNotification *notification = clientNotificationPool.allocZeroed();
-                notification->level = meshtastic_LogRecord_Level_INFO;
-                notification->time = getValidTime(RTCQualityFromNet);
-                sprintf(notification->message, "Sending telemetry and sleeping for %us interval in a moment",
-                        Default::getConfiguredOrDefaultMs(moduleConfig.telemetry.air_quality_interval,
-                                                          default_telemetry_broadcast_interval_secs) /
-                            1000U);
-                service->sendClientNotification(notification);
-                sleepOnNextExecution = true;
-                LOG_DEBUG("Start next execution in 5s, then sleep");
-                setIntervalFromNow(FIVE_SECONDS_MS);
-            }
         }
         return true;
     }

src/motion/AccelerometerThread.h

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
 #endif
 #include "BMM150Sensor.h"
 #include "BMX160Sensor.h"
-#include "ICM42607PSensor.h"
 #include "ICM20948Sensor.h"
+#include "ICM42607PSensor.h"
 #include "LIS3DHSensor.h"
 #include "LSM6DS3Sensor.h"
 #include "MPU6050Sensor.h"
@@ -92,32 +92,44 @@ class AccelerometerThread : public concurrency::OSThread
             sensor = new BMA423Sensor(device);
             break;
 #endif
+#if __has_include(<Adafruit_MPU6050.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::MPU6050:
             sensor = new MPU6050Sensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::BMX160:
             sensor = new BMX160Sensor(device);
             break;
+#if __has_include(<Adafruit_LIS3DH.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::LIS3DH:
             sensor = new LIS3DHSensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
+#if __has_include(<Adafruit_LSM6DS3TRC.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::LSM6DS3:
             sensor = new LSM6DS3Sensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
 #ifdef HAS_STK8XXX
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::STK8BAXX:
             sensor = new STK8XXXSensor(device);
             break;
 #endif
+#if __has_include(<ICM_20948.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::ICM20948:
             sensor = new ICM20948Sensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
+#if __has_include(<ICM42670P.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::ICM42607P:
             sensor = new ICM42607PSensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
+#if __has_include(<DFRobot_BMM150.h>)
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::BMM150:
             sensor = new BMM150Sensor(device);
             break;
+#endif
 #ifdef HAS_BMI270
         case ScanI2C::DeviceType::BMI270:
             sensor = new BMI270Sensor(device);

src/motion/ICM42607PSensor.cpp

@@ -4,10 +4,16 @@
 
 #include "detect/ScanI2CTwoWire.h"
 #include <ICM42670P.h>
+#include <math.h>
 
 static constexpr uint16_t ICM42607P_ACCEL_ODR_HZ = 50;
 static constexpr uint16_t ICM42607P_ACCEL_FSR_G = 2;
-static constexpr float ICM42607P_COUNTS_PER_G = 32768.0f / ICM42607P_ACCEL_FSR_G;
+static constexpr float ICM42607P_ACCEL_TO_COMPASS_ROTATION_DEG_VALUE =
+#ifdef ICM42607P_ACCEL_TO_COMPASS_ROTATION_DEG
+    ICM42607P_ACCEL_TO_COMPASS_ROTATION_DEG;
+#else
+    0.0f;
+#endif
 
 #ifdef ICM_42607P_INT_PIN
 volatile static bool ICM42607P_IRQ = false;
@@ -18,10 +24,7 @@ void ICM42607PSetInterrupt()
 }
 #endif
 
-ICM42607PSensor::ICM42607PSensor(ScanI2C::FoundDevice foundDevice) : MotionSensor::MotionSensor(foundDevice)
-{
-    wire = ScanI2CTwoWire::fetchI2CBus(foundDevice.address);
-}
+ICM42607PSensor::ICM42607PSensor(ScanI2C::FoundDevice foundDevice) : MotionSensor::MotionSensor(foundDevice) {}
 
 ICM42607PSensor::~ICM42607PSensor() = default;
 
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ bool ICM42607PSensor::init()
     bool addressLsb = deviceAddress() == ICM42607P_ADDR_ALT;
 
     LOG_DEBUG("ICM-42607-P begin on addr 0x%02X (port=%d)", deviceAddress(), devicePort());
+    TwoWire *wire = ScanI2CTwoWire::fetchI2CBus(device.address);
     sensor.reset();
     auto newSensor = std::make_unique<ICM42670>(*wire, addressLsb);
 
@@ -82,8 +86,22 @@ int32_t ICM42607PSensor::runOnce()
         return MOTION_SENSOR_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS;
     }
 
-    // LOG_DEBUG("ICM-42607-P accel read x=%.3fg y=%.3fg z=%.3fg", (float)event.accel[0] / ICM42607P_COUNTS_PER_G,
-    //           (float)event.accel[1] / ICM42607P_COUNTS_PER_G, (float)event.accel[2] / ICM42607P_COUNTS_PER_G);
+    float ax = static_cast<float>(event.accel[0]);
+    float ay = static_cast<float>(event.accel[1]);
+    const float az = static_cast<float>(event.accel[2]);
+
+    if (ICM42607P_ACCEL_TO_COMPASS_ROTATION_DEG_VALUE != 0.0f) {
+        static const float rotRad = ICM42607P_ACCEL_TO_COMPASS_ROTATION_DEG_VALUE * DEG_TO_RAD;
+        static const float cosTheta = cosf(rotRad);
+        static const float sinTheta = sinf(rotRad);
+        const float rotatedX = (ax * cosTheta) - (ay * sinTheta);
+        const float rotatedY = (ax * sinTheta) + (ay * cosTheta);
+        ax = rotatedX;
+        ay = rotatedY;
+    }
+
+    // Match the accel sign convention used by other FusionCompass sensor paths.
+    publishCompassAccelSample(ax, -ay, -az);
 
     return MOTION_SENSOR_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS;
 #endif

src/motion/ICM42607PSensor.h

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ class ICM42607PSensor : public MotionSensor
 {
   private:
     std::unique_ptr<ICM42670> sensor;
-    TwoWire *wire = nullptr;
 
   public:
     explicit ICM42607PSensor(ScanI2C::FoundDevice foundDevice);

src/motion/MMC5983MASensor.cpp

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 #if !defined(ARCH_STM32WL) && !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_I2C && __has_include(<SparkFun_MMC5983MA_Arduino_Library.h>)
 
+#include "Fusion/Fusion.h"
 #include "detect/ScanI2CTwoWire.h"
 
 #if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN)
@@ -10,8 +11,11 @@ extern graphics::Screen *screen;
 
 static constexpr float MMC5983MA_ZERO_FIELD = 131072.0f;
 static constexpr float MMC5983MA_COUNTS_PER_GAUSS = 16384.0f;
-static constexpr uint16_t MMC5983MA_CONTINUOUS_FREQUENCY_HZ = 10;
+static constexpr uint16_t MMC5983MA_CONTINUOUS_FREQUENCY_HZ = 50;
+static constexpr int32_t MMC5983MA_UPDATE_INTERVAL_MS = 20;
 static constexpr float MMC5983MA_HEADING_OFFSET_DEG = 180.0f;
+static constexpr uint32_t MMC5983MA_ACCEL_STALE_MS = 300;
+static constexpr float MMC5983MA_MIN_AXIS_RADIUS = 1e-4f;
 
 MMC5983MASensor::MMC5983MASensor(ScanI2C::FoundDevice foundDevice) : MotionSensor::MotionSensor(foundDevice) {}
 
@@ -59,40 +63,68 @@ bool MMC5983MASensor::readMagnetometer(float &xGauss, float &yGauss, float &zGau
 }
 
 int32_t MMC5983MASensor::runOnce()
-    {
-        float magX = 0, magY = 0, magZ = 0;
-        if (!readMagnetometer(magX, magY, magZ)) {
-            return MOTION_SENSOR_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS;
+{
+    float magX = 0, magY = 0, magZ = 0;
+    if (!readMagnetometer(magX, magY, magZ)) {
+        return MMC5983MA_UPDATE_INTERVAL_MS;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN)
+    if (doCalibration) {
+        beginCalibrationDisplay(showingScreen);
+        updateCalibrationExtrema(magX, magY, magZ, highestX, lowestX, highestY, lowestY, highestZ, lowestZ);
+        finishCalibrationIfExpired(showingScreen, compassCalibrationFileName, highestX, lowestX, highestY, lowestY, highestZ,
+                                   lowestZ);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    // Hard-iron bias removal.
+    magX -= (highestX + lowestX) * 0.5f;
+    magY -= (highestY + lowestY) * 0.5f;
+    magZ -= (highestZ + lowestZ) * 0.5f;
+
+    // Soft-iron diagonal scaling from calibration extrema.
+    const float radiusX = (highestX - lowestX) * 0.5f;
+    const float radiusY = (highestY - lowestY) * 0.5f;
+    const float radiusZ = (highestZ - lowestZ) * 0.5f;
+    const float avgRadius = (radiusX + radiusY + radiusZ) / 3.0f;
+    magX *= (radiusX > MMC5983MA_MIN_AXIS_RADIUS) ? (avgRadius / radiusX) : 1.0f;
+    magY *= (radiusY > MMC5983MA_MIN_AXIS_RADIUS) ? (avgRadius / radiusY) : 1.0f;
+    magZ *= (radiusZ > MMC5983MA_MIN_AXIS_RADIUS) ? (avgRadius / radiusZ) : 1.0f;
+
+#if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN) && HAS_SCREEN
+    float heading;
+    float accelX = 0.0f;
+    float accelY = 0.0f;
+    float accelZ = 0.0f;
+    uint32_t accelAgeMs = 0;
+
+    if (getLatestCompassAccelSample(accelX, accelY, accelZ, accelAgeMs) && accelAgeMs <= MMC5983MA_ACCEL_STALE_MS) {
+        FusionVector ga = {.axis = {accelX, accelY, accelZ}};
+        FusionVector ma = {.axis = {magX, magY, magZ}};
+        if (config.display.compass_orientation > meshtastic_Config_DisplayConfig_CompassOrientation_DEGREES_270) {
+            ma = FusionAxesSwap(ma, FusionAxesAlignmentNXNYPZ);
+            ga = FusionAxesSwap(ga, FusionAxesAlignmentNXNYPZ);
         }
+        heading = FusionCompassCalculateHeading(FusionConventionNed, ga, ma) + MMC5983MA_HEADING_OFFSET_DEG;
+    } else {
+        heading = atan2f(magY, magX) * RAD_TO_DEG + MMC5983MA_HEADING_OFFSET_DEG;
+    }
 
-    #if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN)
-        if (doCalibration) {
-            beginCalibrationDisplay(showingScreen);
-            updateCalibrationExtrema(magX, magY, magZ, highestX, lowestX, highestY, lowestY, highestZ, lowestZ);
-            finishCalibrationIfExpired(showingScreen, compassCalibrationFileName, highestX, lowestX, highestY, lowestY, highestZ,
-                                    lowestZ);
-        }
-    #endif
+    if (heading >= 360.0f)
+        heading -= 360.0f;
+    else if (heading < 0.0f)
+        heading += 360.0f;
+    heading = 360.0f - heading;
+    if (heading >= 360.0f)
+        heading -= 360.0f;
 
-        magX -= (highestX + lowestX) / 2;
-        magY -= (highestY + lowestY) / 2;
-        magZ -= (highestZ + lowestZ) / 2;
+    heading = applyCompassOrientation(heading);
+    if (screen)
+        screen->setHeading(heading);
+#endif
 
-    #if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN) && HAS_SCREEN
-        float heading = atan2f(magY, magX) * RAD_TO_DEG + MMC5983MA_HEADING_OFFSET_DEG;
-        if (heading < 0.0f) {
-            heading += 360.0f;
-        } else if (heading >= 360.0f) {
-            heading -= 360.0f;
-        }
-
-        heading = applyCompassOrientation(heading);
-        if (screen) {
-            screen->setHeading(heading);
-        }
-    #endif
-
-        return MOTION_SENSOR_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS;
+    return MMC5983MA_UPDATE_INTERVAL_MS;
 }
 
 void MMC5983MASensor::calibrate(uint16_t forSeconds)

src/motion/MagnetometerThread.h

@@ -47,9 +47,8 @@ class MagnetometerThread : public concurrency::OSThread
     {
         canSleep = true;
 
-        if (isInitialised) {
+        if (isInitialised)
             return sensor->runOnce();
-        }
 
         return MOTION_SENSOR_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS;
     }

src/motion/MotionSensor.cpp

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include "FSCommon.h"
 #include "SPILock.h"
 #include "SafeFile.h"
+#include "concurrency/LockGuard.h"
 #include "graphics/draw/CompassRenderer.h"
 
 #if !defined(ARCH_STM32WL) && !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_I2C
@@ -30,6 +31,17 @@ bool isRangeValid(float highest, float lowest)
     // NaN/Inf guard without pulling in extra math helpers.
     return (highest == highest) && (lowest == lowest) && (highest > lowest);
 }
+
+struct CompassAccelSample {
+    float x = 0.0f;
+    float y = 0.0f;
+    float z = 0.0f;
+    uint32_t sampledAtMs = 0;
+    bool valid = false;
+};
+
+concurrency::Lock latestCompassAccelLock;
+CompassAccelSample latestCompassAccelSample;
 } // namespace
 
 // screen is defined in main.cpp
@@ -204,6 +216,35 @@ float MotionSensor::applyCompassOrientation(float heading)
     }
 }
 
+void MotionSensor::publishCompassAccelSample(float x, float y, float z)
+{
+    concurrency::LockGuard guard(&latestCompassAccelLock);
+    latestCompassAccelSample.x = x;
+    latestCompassAccelSample.y = y;
+    latestCompassAccelSample.z = z;
+    latestCompassAccelSample.sampledAtMs = millis();
+    latestCompassAccelSample.valid = true;
+}
+
+bool MotionSensor::getLatestCompassAccelSample(float &x, float &y, float &z, uint32_t &ageMs)
+{
+    uint32_t sampledAtMs = 0;
+    {
+        concurrency::LockGuard guard(&latestCompassAccelLock);
+        if (!latestCompassAccelSample.valid) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        x = latestCompassAccelSample.x;
+        y = latestCompassAccelSample.y;
+        z = latestCompassAccelSample.z;
+        sampledAtMs = latestCompassAccelSample.sampledAtMs;
+    }
+
+    ageMs = millis() - sampledAtMs;
+    return true;
+}
+
 #if !defined(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_SCREEN) && HAS_SCREEN
 void MotionSensor::drawFrameCalibration(OLEDDisplay *display, OLEDDisplayUiState *state, int16_t x, int16_t y)
 {

src/motion/MotionSensor.h

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ class MotionSensor
     static void updateCalibrationExtrema(float x, float y, float z, float &highestX, float &lowestX, float &highestY,
                                          float &lowestY, float &highestZ, float &lowestZ);
     static float applyCompassOrientation(float heading);
+    static void publishCompassAccelSample(float x, float y, float z);
+    static bool getLatestCompassAccelSample(float &x, float &y, float &z, uint32_t &ageMs);
 
     ScanI2C::FoundDevice device;
 

src/mqtt/MQTT.cpp

@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 #if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(ARCH_ESP32)
 #include <ETH.h>
 #endif // HAS_ETHERNET
+#if HAS_ETHERNET && defined(USE_CH390D)
+#include "ESP32_CH390.h"
+#endif // USE_CH390D
 #include "Default.h"
 #include <Throttle.h>
 #include <assert.h>
@@ -250,7 +253,7 @@ inline bool isConnectedToNetwork()
     if (ETH.connected())
         return true;
 #elif defined(USE_CH390D)
-    if (ETH.isConnected())
+    if (CH390.isConnected())
         return true;
 #endif
 
@@ -726,7 +729,9 @@ void MQTT::perhapsReportToMap()
 
     // Fill MapReport message
     meshtastic_MapReport mapReport = meshtastic_MapReport_init_default;
-    memcpy(mapReport.long_name, owner.long_name, sizeof(owner.long_name));
+    // owner.long_name (40) is wider than mapReport.long_name (25); bound by the destination
+    strncpy(mapReport.long_name, owner.long_name, sizeof(mapReport.long_name));
+    mapReport.long_name[sizeof(mapReport.long_name) - 1] = '\0';
     memcpy(mapReport.short_name, owner.short_name, sizeof(owner.short_name));
     mapReport.role = config.device.role;
     mapReport.hw_model = owner.hw_model;

src/mqtt/ServiceEnvelope.h

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
 // meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope that automatically releases dynamically allocated memory when it goes out of scope.
 struct DecodedServiceEnvelope : public meshtastic_ServiceEnvelope {
     DecodedServiceEnvelope(const uint8_t *payload, size_t length);
-    DecodedServiceEnvelope(DecodedServiceEnvelope &) = delete;
+    // const-qualified so std::variant instantiation works on Apple libc++ (copying stays ill-formed either way)
+    DecodedServiceEnvelope(const DecodedServiceEnvelope &) = delete;
     DecodedServiceEnvelope(DecodedServiceEnvelope &&);
     ~DecodedServiceEnvelope();
     // Clients must check that this is true before using.

src/nimble/NimbleBluetooth.cpp

@@ -21,7 +21,12 @@
 #include "PowerStatus.h"
 
 #include "host/ble_gap.h"
+#include "host/ble_hs.h"
 #include "host/ble_store.h"
+#ifdef ARCH_ESP32
+#include <nvs.h>
+#include <nvs_flash.h>
+#endif
 
 namespace
 {
@@ -30,6 +35,56 @@ constexpr uint16_t kPreferredBleTxOctets = 251;
 constexpr uint16_t kPreferredBleTxTimeUs = (kPreferredBleTxOctets + 14) * 8;
 } // namespace
 
+#ifdef ARCH_ESP32
+// Discard NimBLE bonds left in an incompatible on-disk format. The ESP-IDF/NimBLE upgrade changed
+// the length of the fixed-size bond records (ble_store_value_sec), so the new host rejects every
+// old record on each boot ("NVS data size mismatch for obj_type 1 ...") with no auto-recovery --
+// pairing stays broken until a factory reset. Wipe the bond namespace once when a stored record's
+// size differs from this build's struct; a same-size store is left untouched, so this never loops.
+// Adapted from https://github.com/h2zero/NimBLE-Arduino/issues/740
+static void purgeIncompatibleBleBonds()
+{
+    esp_err_t initErr = nvs_flash_init();
+    if (initErr != ESP_OK) {
+        LOG_WARN("purgeIncompatibleBleBonds: nvs_flash_init failed, err=%d", (int)initErr);
+        return; // NVS should already be up; if not, nothing safe to do here
+    }
+
+    nvs_handle_t handle = 0;
+    esp_err_t err = nvs_open("nimble_bond", NVS_READWRITE, &handle);
+    if (err == ESP_ERR_NVS_NOT_FOUND) {
+        return; // no bonds stored yet
+    }
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        LOG_ERROR("nimble_bond open failed, err=%d", err);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Probe the first record of each fixed-size object type (bonds are written from index 1); a
+    // stored size differing from this build's struct means the store predates a format change.
+    size_t sz = 0;
+    bool mismatch = (nvs_get_blob(handle, "our_sec_1", nullptr, &sz) == ESP_OK && sz != sizeof(struct ble_store_value_sec)) ||
+                    (nvs_get_blob(handle, "peer_sec_1", nullptr, &sz) == ESP_OK && sz != sizeof(struct ble_store_value_sec)) ||
+                    (nvs_get_blob(handle, "cccd_sec_1", nullptr, &sz) == ESP_OK && sz != sizeof(struct ble_store_value_cccd));
+
+    bool wiped = false;
+    if (mismatch) {
+        LOG_WARN("Wiping incompatible NimBLE bonds (on-disk format changed)");
+        wiped = nvs_erase_all(handle) == ESP_OK && nvs_commit(handle) == ESP_OK;
+        if (!wiped) {
+            LOG_ERROR("Failed to erase nimble_bond namespace");
+        }
+    }
+
+    nvs_close(handle);
+
+    if (wiped) {
+        LOG_INFO("Restarting after NimBLE bond cleanup");
+        ESP.restart();
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
 // Debugging options: careful, they slow things down quite a bit!
 // #define DEBUG_NIMBLE_ON_READ_TIMING  // uncomment to time onRead duration
 // #define DEBUG_NIMBLE_ON_WRITE_TIMING // uncomment to time onWrite duration
@@ -47,6 +102,11 @@ BLEServer *bleServer;
 static bool passkeyShowing;
 static std::atomic<uint16_t> nimbleBluetoothConnHandle{BLE_HS_CONN_HANDLE_NONE}; // BLE_HS_CONN_HANDLE_NONE means "no connection"
 
+// Set by onDisconnect to defer (re)starting advertising to the main task. A stale-bond reconnect
+// triggers a MIC failure + NimBLE host reset; re-entering ble_gap_adv_* from the disconnect
+// callback while the host is mid-reset crashes (LoadProhibited), so the main task does it instead.
+static std::atomic<bool> pendingStartAdvertising{false};
+
 static void clearPairingDisplay()
 {
     if (!passkeyShowing) {
@@ -155,6 +215,21 @@ class BluetoothPhoneAPI : public PhoneAPI, public concurrency::OSThread
   protected:
     virtual int32_t runOnce() override
     {
+        // Service a deferred advertising restart from onDisconnect, gated on ble_hs_synced() so we
+        // never re-enter the GAP API while the host is still mid-reset.
+        if (pendingStartAdvertising) {
+            if (checkIsConnected()) {
+                pendingStartAdvertising = false; // a new physical connection beat us to it; nothing to do
+            } else if (ble_hs_synced()) {
+                pendingStartAdvertising = false;
+                if (nimbleBluetooth) {
+                    nimbleBluetooth->startAdvertising();
+                }
+            } else {
+                return 200; // host still re-syncing after a reset; retry shortly
+            }
+        }
+
         while (runOnceHasWorkToDo()) {
             /*
               PROCESS fromPhoneQueue BEFORE toPhoneQueue:
@@ -592,6 +667,14 @@ class NimbleBluetoothSecurityCallback : public BLESecurityCallbacks
     }
     void onAuthenticationComplete(ble_gap_conn_desc *desc) override
     {
+        // Called on every BLE_GAP_EVENT_ENC_CHANGE, success or failure. A stale-bond reconnect
+        // yields a *failed* encryption change here -- don't latch a connected/authenticated state
+        // on a link that is actually being torn down.
+        if (desc == nullptr || !desc->sec_state.encrypted) {
+            LOG_WARN("BLE encryption change without an encrypted link; ignoring");
+            return;
+        }
+
         LOG_INFO("BLE authentication complete");
 
         meshtastic::BluetoothStatus newStatus(meshtastic::BluetoothStatus::ConnectionState::CONNECTED);
@@ -667,7 +750,13 @@ class NimbleBluetoothServerCallback : public BLEServerCallbacks
 
         nimbleBluetoothConnHandle = BLE_HS_CONN_HANDLE_NONE;
 
-        ble->startAdvertising();
+        // Defer the advertising restart to runOnce (see pendingStartAdvertising): calling
+        // startAdvertising() here would crash if this disconnect was a host reset.
+        pendingStartAdvertising = true;
+        if (bluetoothPhoneAPI) {
+            bluetoothPhoneAPI->setIntervalFromNow(0);
+        }
+        concurrency::mainDelay.interrupt(); // wake the main loop to service the restart
     }
 };
 
@@ -761,6 +850,12 @@ void NimbleBluetooth::setup()
 
     LOG_INFO("Init the NimBLE bluetooth module");
 
+#ifdef ARCH_ESP32
+    // Runs before BLEDevice::init() reads the bond store, but logs after the "Init" line above so
+    // any bond-cleanup output doesn't appear to precede the module init.
+    purgeIncompatibleBleBonds(); // wipe bonds left in an incompatible on-disk format (post-upgrade)
+#endif
+
     BLEDevice::init(getDeviceName());
     BLEDevice::setPower(ESP_PWR_LVL_P9);
 
@@ -889,6 +984,7 @@ void updateBatteryLevel(uint8_t level)
 void NimbleBluetooth::clearBonds()
 {
     LOG_INFO("Clearing bluetooth bonds!");
+    ble_store_util_delete_all(BLE_STORE_OBJ_TYPE_OUR_SEC, nullptr);
     ble_store_util_delete_all(BLE_STORE_OBJ_TYPE_PEER_SEC, nullptr);
     ble_store_util_delete_all(BLE_STORE_OBJ_TYPE_CCCD, nullptr);
 }
@@ -901,13 +997,4 @@ void NimbleBluetooth::sendLog(const uint8_t *logMessage, size_t length)
     logRadioCharacteristic->setValue(logMessage, length);
     logRadioCharacteristic->notify();
 }
-
-void clearNVS()
-{
-    ble_store_util_delete_all(BLE_STORE_OBJ_TYPE_PEER_SEC, nullptr);
-    ble_store_util_delete_all(BLE_STORE_OBJ_TYPE_CCCD, nullptr);
-#ifdef ARCH_ESP32
-    ESP.restart();
-#endif
-}
 #endif

src/platform/nrf52/NRF52Bluetooth.cpp

@@ -67,6 +67,16 @@ void onConnect(uint16_t conn_handle)
     connection->getPeerName(central_name, sizeof(central_name));
     LOG_INFO("BLE Connected to %s", central_name);
 
+    // A new physical link must start unauthenticated. The auth slot is keyed by
+    // the (single, reused) bluetoothPhoneAPI instance, so a prior session's
+    // authorization can otherwise survive a quick reconnect. handleStartConfig()
+    // re-locks on every want_config too; this closes the window before that.
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_PHONEAPI_ACCESS_CONTROL
+    if (bluetoothPhoneAPI) {
+        bluetoothPhoneAPI->setAdminAuthorized(false);
+    }
+#endif
+
     // Notify UI (or any other interested firmware components)
     meshtastic::BluetoothStatus newStatus(meshtastic::BluetoothStatus::ConnectionState::CONNECTED);
     bluetoothStatus->updateStatus(&newStatus);
@@ -401,7 +411,15 @@ bool NRF52Bluetooth::onPairingPasskey(uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t const passke
         std::string configuredPasskeyText = std::to_string(configuredPasskey);
         std::string ble_message =
             "Bluetooth\nPIN\n[M]" + configuredPasskeyText.substr(0, 3) + " " + configuredPasskeyText.substr(3, 6);
-        screen->showSimpleBanner(ble_message.c_str(), 30000);
+        // Use the pairing_pin notification type so the lockdown UI short-
+        // circuit (Screen.cpp updateUiFrame) allows the overlay through
+        // even on a locked device — see H13 audit fix. The banner content
+        // is the per-attempt ephemeral pair PIN, not operator content.
+        graphics::BannerOverlayOptions opts;
+        opts.message = ble_message.c_str();
+        opts.durationMs = 30000;
+        opts.notificationType = graphics::notificationTypeEnum::pairing_pin;
+        screen->showOverlayBanner(opts);
     }
 #endif
     passkeyShowing = true;

src/platform/nrf52/architecture.h

@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@
 #define HW_VENDOR meshtastic_HardwareModel_HELTEC_MESH_SOLAR
 #elif defined(MUZI_BASE)
 #define HW_VENDOR meshtastic_HardwareModel_MUZI_BASE
+#elif defined(HELTEC_MESH_TOWER_V2)
+#define HW_VENDOR meshtastic_HardwareModel_HELTEC_MESH_TOWER_V2
 #else
 #define HW_VENDOR meshtastic_HardwareModel_NRF52_UNKNOWN
 #endif

src/platform/nrf52/hardfault.cpp

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 #include "configuration.h"
 #include <core_cm4.h>
 
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+#include "security/EncryptedStorage.h"
+#endif
+
 // Based on reading/modifying https://blog.feabhas.com/2013/02/developing-a-generic-hard-fault-handler-for-arm-cortex-m3cortex-m4/
 
 enum { r0, r1, r2, r3, r12, lr, pc, psr };
@@ -50,6 +54,16 @@ static void printMemErrorMsg(uint32_t cfsr)
 
 extern "C" void HardFault_Impl(uint32_t stack[])
 {
+    // M11 (audit): before any diagnostic / coredump path that could capture
+    // RAM contents, zero the DEK / KEK / ephemeralKEK so they aren't sitting
+    // in BSS for a fault dump to pick up. This is called from the asm naked
+    // HardFault_Handler entry above, so we're effectively in the chip's
+    // exception context — keep this strictly to in-RAM scrubbing, no flash
+    // I/O, no logging.
+#ifdef MESHTASTIC_ENCRYPTED_STORAGE
+    EncryptedStorage::secureWipeKeys();
+#endif
+
     FAULT_MSG("Hard Fault occurred! SCB->HFSR = 0x%08lx\n", SCB->HFSR);
 
     if ((SCB->HFSR & SCB_HFSR_FORCED_Msk) != 0) {